JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - This appeal is directed against an order of the workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Meerut, rejecting the appellants application for compensation to be given to him for injuries sustained during the course of his employment in the Ordnance Factor, Muradnagar, District Meerut. The accident took place on 5.6.1954. The appellant applied for compensation on 11.10.1954. He was informed on 12.2.1957 that since he had violated the provisions of Section 3(1)(b)(ii) of the workmens' Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the act) he was not entitled to receive any compensation. He thereafter filed the present claim on 29.11.1957. It was contended inter alia on behalf of the respondent that the application was barred by limitation and the accident was due to the carelessness and negligence of the appellant himself and that he had violated the provisions of Section 3(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. 2. The Commissioner held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not having preferred his claim within the prescribed period of 12 months and thus the application was not barred by limitation. He however held that the appellant did not comply with the instructions issued by the factory and there was nothing on the record to show that the disobedience of the appellant of the orders expressly given by the factory or of the rule expressly framed by the factory for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen was not wilful. It held that the appellant was careless and negligent and had wilfully disobeyed the rules and the orders on the subject. On the aforesaid findings the Commissioner did not think it necessary to consider the question about the amount of compensation which could be given to the appellant. Aggrieved from the aforesaid order of the Commissioner the appellant has come in appeal to this court. 3. The first question for consideration is whether the application was barred by limitation. It may be mentioned that the appellant continued to work in the factory after the accident and was only away from duty during the period he was undergoing treatment in hospital for his eye trouble. It could not be denied that he applied to the department for compensation and it was only on 12.2.1957 that he was informed that he could not get any compensation. The present application was moved nearly ten months after the aforesaid order had been received by him. It could not be denied that he applied to the department for compensation and it was only on 12.2.1957 that he was informed that he could not get any compensation. The present application was moved nearly ten months after the aforesaid order had been received by him. Under the circumstances it would be said that he had reasonable cause for not making the claim within 12 months of the accident. The appellant continued to work in the factory and it was not unreasonable on his part to hope that the representation made by him to the factory for the award of compensation would receive a favourable consideration. The fact that he waited for the reply of the factory could not lead to the inference that he had no valid ground for not lodging his claim for compensation earlier. There is no satisfactory explanation on behalf of the respondents as to why the reply to the petitioners representation was not given earlier. It took more than two and a half years for the respondents to give a reply to the appellant with regard to the claim lodged by him. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the Commissioner that the claim was not barred by limitation. 4. The next question for consideration is whether the appellant had disobeyed the orders issued by the factory and he was himself to be blamed for the injury received by him. The relevant provisions of Section 3 of the Act are as follows:- "Section 3, (1) If personnel injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Provided that the employer shall not be so liable. (a)............. (b) in respect of any injury not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to ........... (i) ......... (ii) the wilful disobedience of the workmen to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or......... (iii) ........... The appellant received injury in his right eye while he was sharpening his radius at the grinding machine on 5.6.1954. The injury was caused by a spark rushing into his right eye. He eventually lost his right eye. (iii) ........... The appellant received injury in his right eye while he was sharpening his radius at the grinding machine on 5.6.1954. The injury was caused by a spark rushing into his right eye. He eventually lost his right eye. It was contended by the respondent that specific instructions had been issued to the workman to use goggles while performing their duties. Such a notice had been put on the notice board and it was contended that the appellant himself was negligent in not asking for a goggle and working without putting a goggle. The supervisor of the factory came in the witness box and deposed that there were sufficient goggles in the store room and if the appellant had asked for such a goggle he would have got it. It was further stated that the workman understood what was said in the aforesaid notice which had been put on the notice board. The appellant can only sign his name in English and there is no evidence to indicate that he had sufficient knowledge of English which could enable him to understand the contents of the notice which had been put on the notice board or its contents had been actually explained to him. All that was stated on behalf of the defendant was that such a notice had been put up and every worker knew about it. The appellant stated in his evidence that he had asked for a goggle, but the same was no given him. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that since the appellant had stated that he knew about the instruction that had been issued and thus knew about the contents of the aforesaid notice. 5. In Bhut Nath Dal Mills v. Tirath Mistry A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 295 "It is said that the notice, if there was one, was printed in English and Hindi. But what use an English notice would be to an ignorant and illiterate workman, I cannot imagine. Further, if he did not read Hindi, it would also be of no use. Possibly, if the notice had been in Bengali literate workmen would have been able to read it. But it is very doubtful whether an average literate workman could read a notice in English or Hindi for that matter. In any event the learned Commissioner finds that the workman was illiterate. Possibly, if the notice had been in Bengali literate workmen would have been able to read it. But it is very doubtful whether an average literate workman could read a notice in English or Hindi for that matter. In any event the learned Commissioner finds that the workman was illiterate. So a notice in any language was perfectly useless as far as he was concerned unless its contents were expressly brought to his notice." As mentioned above, there is nothing to indicate that either the appellant had sufficient knowledge of English which could enable him to understand the contents of the aforesaid notice or that such contents had been duly explained to him. The mere fact that he was aware in a general way of such notice which required the use of goggles by him, did not mean that he had understood the precise contents of the aforesaid notice and he knew that the factory authorities had made a rule that the workmen should use goggles while engaged in the discharge of their duties. Under these circumstances it could not be said that the appellant had disobeyed any rule made by the factory authorities for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen. Further more, the provisions of Section 3(1)(b)(ii) require that there should be wilful disobedience on the part of a workman to an order expressly given or to a rule expressly framed for the purpose of securing his safety. There is no evidence on the record to indicate that the appellant had wilfully disobeyed any such rule or directions given by the authorities of the factory. All that was said on behalf of the respondent was that the appellant knew that he had to use a goggle and he did not ask for it and if he had asked for it, he would have got it. The Supervisor came in the witness box and he did not say that he had asked the appellant to use a goggle and that in spite of his warning the appellant had continued to work without using a goggle. It would be reasonable to infer that the Supervisor sees the workmen while they are discharging the duties. The Supervisor came in the witness box and he did not say that he had asked the appellant to use a goggle and that in spite of his warning the appellant had continued to work without using a goggle. It would be reasonable to infer that the Supervisor sees the workmen while they are discharging the duties. If the appellant was working without putting on a goggle, it was the duty of the Supervisor or any other officer to warn the workman not to work without a google and it was only if such an order was flouted by the workman that the respondent could claim protection under Section 3(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the finding of the Commissioner on the question of disobedience by the appellant of the rule framed by the factory is a finding of fact which could not be assailed under Section 30 of the Act in this Court. If it was only a pure finding of fact on the question of negligence then in that case this court could not interfere with that finding. But in the present case, the Commissioner has misconstrued the provisions of Section 3(1)(b)(ii) and has erred in holding that the respondent was entitled to the protection given by the aforesaid provision. 6. In the case of Bhut Nath Dal Mills A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 295 it was that "To bring a case within Section 3(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the workman must be in wilful disobedience of an order; mere disobedience is not sufficient. Disobedience may be the result of forgetfulness or the result of the impulse of the moment. Such would not be sufficient, as the Statute only exempts the employer from liability when the disobedience is wilful, that is, deliberate and intended." It was held in Bhurangya Coal Co. v. Sahebjan A.I.R. 1956 Pat. Disobedience may be the result of forgetfulness or the result of the impulse of the moment. Such would not be sufficient, as the Statute only exempts the employer from liability when the disobedience is wilful, that is, deliberate and intended." It was held in Bhurangya Coal Co. v. Sahebjan A.I.R. 1956 Pat. 299 that "A careful reading of it shows that in order to bring a case under proviso (b)(ii) of Sections 3(1) of the Act, the company has to establish firstly that an order or rule was in fact already in force at the time when the accident happened; secondly that the substantial purpose of that rule or order was that of securing the safety of workman as such; thirdly, that the order or rule was couched in words which in their fact fairly and clearly indicate that purpose; fourthly that its terms were brought to the notice of the particular workman who was the individual injured in this case; fifthly that the order or rule was disobeyed by that individual was wilful and deliberate and not only the result of mere negligence or due to a mistaken mode of doing a particular task or due to a wrong decision in an emergency; seventhly, that the accident was directly attributable to the aforesaid disobedience. In the present case not only that the evidence on the very existence of the rule or order is not at all sufficient as already stated but also that there is no evidence whatsoever, on elements other than that." As has been observed above, there is no finding in the present case that the appellant had deliberately and wilfully disobeyed any order or direction given by the appellant. Further there more, the precise contents of the aforesaid notice were also not proved. The Commissioner has thus arrived at its finding on a misconstruction of the aforesaid provisions of the act and it could not be said that his findings are pure findings of fact which could not be assailed in appeal in this court. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the appellant himself was responsible for the loss of his eye because he was reluctant to undergo an operation. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the appellant himself was responsible for the loss of his eye because he was reluctant to undergo an operation. It may be that if an operation had been performed, he might not have lost the eye, but the mere reluctance on the part of the appellant to subject himself to an operation could not deprive him from the reliefs which the law gives him on account of the injuries sustained by him in the course of the performance of his duties. I am thus of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to compensation. The Commissioner did not consider the question of the amount to which the appellant was entitled. It is necessary that the Commissioner should determine the amount of compensation to which the appellant is entitled under the law. 8. I therefore, set aside the order of the learned Commissioner and allow the appeal. I further direct that the application shall be restored to its original number before the Commissioner and he shall determine the exact amount of compensation to which the appellant is entitled under the Act. The appeal is allowed with costs.