ORDER : This revision petition is directed against the order of the learned District Judge, Manipur, dated 4-8-62, by which he rejected the plea of the defendant-respondent that the appeal filed by Shri G.S. Sharma, plaintiff-appellant was barred by limitation. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision petition are that on July 20, 1951, G.S. Sharma, the plaintiff-apposite-party brought his first suit for declaration of his title to the paddy lands under patta Nos. 31/373 and 31/404 of the Khabampana and for recovery of possession over the same. That suit was numbered as T.S. No. 59 of 1951 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Manipur. The suit was dismissed on November 8, 1951. The order passed that day was as follows : "Case put up to day in presence of the parties. The plaintiff has filed some documents and list of witnesses. It appears that 30-10-51 was fixed for peremptory hearing of the suit. The case has been put up today for necessary orders for want of prosecution. The Court has no jurisdiction to grant the application filed today. Necessary steps should have been taken in time for the hearing fixed for 30-10-51. The Court has not fixed another date and is unable to fix another date without any prayer. There is no sufficient material on record to pronounce judgment. Ordered that the suit be dismissed. Announced. M.R. Singh, 8-11-1951" 3. The opposite-party filed an application on November 26, 1951 requesting that the order of dismissal be set aside. The Subordinate Judge, who heard the application, held that the suit was dismissed neither under Or. 17, R. 3 nor under Or. 9, R. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the Court had "no jurisdiction to proceed further". The Subordinate Judge, however, observed as follows : "In such cases remedy lies only under Section 151 of C.P.C. or plaintiff may file fresh suit. The application under Or. 9, R. 9 of C.P.C. is not entertainable". 4. The opposite party then filed his second suit. It is not necessary to mention the averments of the opposite party or those of the petitioner. The petitioner questioned the maintainability of the suit. The Subordinate Judge, however, held that the suit was maintainable, because the opposite party had been directed by the Court to file a fresh suit. He also accepted the opposite-partys case. It is not necessary to mention the averments of the opposite party or those of the petitioner. The petitioner questioned the maintainability of the suit. The Subordinate Judge, however, held that the suit was maintainable, because the opposite party had been directed by the Court to file a fresh suit. He also accepted the opposite-partys case. The petitioner then appealed to this Court. This Court on 13-5-55, accepted the appeal and reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and ordered the dismissal of the suit. The opposite party then preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court of India and that was dismissed on 9-2-1961. 5. After a period of 10 years the opposite-party filed an appeal against the judgment and decree in T.S. No. 59 of 1951 in the Court of District Judge, Manipur. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was time barred, but the learned District Judge overruled it and admitted the appeal. The petitioner has come in revision against this order of the District Judge. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the learned District Judge erred in law in holding by his order dated the 4th of August, 1962, that the appeal preferred by the opposite-party was within time. The period of limitation for filing an appeal in the Court of District Judge is, according to Article 1512 of the Indian Limitation Act, 30 days from the date of the decree appealed from. Under Order XX, Rule 7 of the Code of C. P. the decree shall bear the same date as the date on which the judgment was pronounced. In this case the judgment was pronounced on 8th November, 1951 and the appeal was filed on 18-8-1961 after a period of 10 years. Hence, it was hopelessly beyond time. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon Parbati v. Bhola, ILR 12 All 79. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite party contended that in this case the judgment was pronounced on 8-11-1951, and the decree was signed on 4th August, 1961. On 21st July the opposite party applied for a copy of the decree, and a copy was supplied to him on 4th August, 1961. Therefore the time between 8th November, 1951, the date on which the judgment was delivered and 4th August, 1961, the date on which the decree was signed should be excluded under Section 12(2). On 21st July the opposite party applied for a copy of the decree, and a copy was supplied to him on 4th August, 1961. Therefore the time between 8th November, 1951, the date on which the judgment was delivered and 4th August, 1961, the date on which the decree was signed should be excluded under Section 12(2). Limitation Act, as "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree". So by excluding this time the appeal was within time. The learned counsel for the opposite party relied upon Bani Madhub Hitter v. Matungini Dassi, ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB) and Ram Asray Singh v. Sheonandan Singh, 35 Ind Cas 868 : (AIR 1916 Pat 267 FB) of the Patna High Court in support of his contention. 8. The sole question for determination is whether the period between the 8th November, 1951, the date of the delivery of judgment, and the 4th of August, 1961 the date of the signing of the decree, can be excluded within the meaning of Section 12(2), Limitation Act. Section 12(2) runs as follows : "Section 12(2) : in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the date on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded." 9. It is conceded on nil hands that unless the decree has been prepared and signed, its copy cannot be made, and so the time taken in the preparation of the decree will necessarily have to elapse before its copy is obtained. But the contention is that this period of time cannot be considered to be requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree unless an application for the copy had been made before the commencement of the time. Thus, the controversy is confined within a very narrow compass and it is this : whether the time taken in the preparation of the decree can be considered to be requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree when an application for obtaining it is made after the decree has been prepared. 10. Thus, the controversy is confined within a very narrow compass and it is this : whether the time taken in the preparation of the decree can be considered to be requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree when an application for obtaining it is made after the decree has been prepared. 10. There has been a sharp difference of opinion in the various High Courts as to the precise meaning of the phrase "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree." 11. I now proceed to examine the case law on the point. In ILR 13 Cal 104 a Full Bench consisting of five Judges held on a consideration of the meaning of S. 12, Limitation Act, and S. 541 (now Or. 41, R. 1(1)) of the old Code of Civil Procedure that in case where the decree was not signed on the date the judgment was delivered the decree was not in existence till the date on which it was signed and in such case it would be unfair to compute the period of limitation from the date on which the judgment was delivered. The facts of this Full Bench case were that the judgment was pronounced on 17th July, 1883. The decree was in fact signed on 23rd July, 1883. The appellant applied for a copy on 3rd August and obtained it on 11th August. He filed his appeal on 30th August, 1883, which was held to be in time. 12. This case was followed in I Pat LJ 573 : (AIR 1916 Pat 267 FB). In this case the judgment of the First Appellate Court was pronounced on 4th January 1916. The decree was not signed till the 8th January. An application for a copy of the judgment and decree was made on 12th February 1916, and on the same date notice was given to the applicant for the number of folios required for copies. The folios were filed on 22nd February, 1916, and copies were ready for delivery on 24th February. The applicant received the copies on the last mentioned date and filed his appeal in the High Court on 14th April, 1916. The folios were filed on 22nd February, 1916, and copies were ready for delivery on 24th February. The applicant received the copies on the last mentioned date and filed his appeal in the High Court on 14th April, 1916. The appeal was within time if limitation was calculated from 8th January, the date on which the decree was signed, and the appellant was allowed to deduct all the time that elapsed between the date of the filing of the application for copies and the delivery of the same. Sir Edward Chamier, C.J., followed the above Full Bench case of the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the practice in the Patna High Court was to follow Full Bench cases of the Calcutta High Court and held that the period of limitation should be calculated from the date on which the decree was actually signed. 13. I may here refer to a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Roy v. William Arthur Lee, 49 Ind App 307 : (AIR 1922 PC 352), wherein it appears that the Full Bench case of the Calcutta High Court reported in ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB) was referred to with approval, although on merits the appellant was not allowed the benefit of the exclusion of the whole period on the ground that it was his duty to apply for the drawing up of the order and he had been guilty of laches in not so applying. According to the practice prevailing on the original side of the High Court, a decree or order is not drawn up unless one or other of the parties applies for the drawing up of the same, and the appellant is entitled as of right to the exclusion of the time from the date of the judgment to the date when the decree is drawn up provided that nor part of the delay is due to his default or laches. In the above Privy Council case the plaintiff did not apply for the drawing up of the order. After, four days the defendant was entitled to apply himself. He allowed several days to elapse before he actually made such an application and their Lordships of the Privy Council held that he was, guilty of laches. In the above Privy Council case the plaintiff did not apply for the drawing up of the order. After, four days the defendant was entitled to apply himself. He allowed several days to elapse before he actually made such an application and their Lordships of the Privy Council held that he was, guilty of laches. From this decision of their Lordships again it is inferable that where the decree or order is to be drawn up without reference to the parties, the party appealing is entitled to the exclusion of time between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree is signed. 14. In this connection, I may refer to another Privy Council case, Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm, 55 Ind App 161 : (AIR 1928 PC 103). In this case their Lordships of the Privy Council in interpreting the word "requisite" have observed as follows : "The word "requisite" is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word required. It means "properly required", and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default. But for that time which is taken up by his opponent in drawing up the decree, or by the officials of the Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is not responsible." 15. This interpretation by their Lordships of the Privy Council, in my opinion, shows that the time requisite is not restricted to the time taken by the appellant personally but also refers to the time taken by the Office in proper cases. 16. I may further refer to some of the recent cases of the Calcutta High Court wherein the view taken in ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB) has been followed. 17. In Secy, of State v. Parijat Debi, ILR 59 Cal 1215 : AIR 1932 Cal 331 (FB) the matter was considered by a Full Bench of the Calcutta. High Court and the earlier decision reported in Nibaran Chandra v. Martin and Co., AIR 1920 Cal. 304 : 58 Ind Cas 408 was over-ruled and the decision in Bani Madthub Mitters case, ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB) was followed. 18. High Court and the earlier decision reported in Nibaran Chandra v. Martin and Co., AIR 1920 Cal. 304 : 58 Ind Cas 408 was over-ruled and the decision in Bani Madthub Mitters case, ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB) was followed. 18. The same view was taken in a subsequent case by Biswas, J., Sudhansu Bhusan v. Majho Bibi, AIR 1937 Cal 732 : 176 Ind Cas 361. 19. In Sarat Chandra v. Rati Kanta, AIR 1939 Cal 711 : 186 Ind Cas 58, Sen, J. expressed a similar opinion. 20. The same view was taken in a very recent case by Lahiri J., in Tincowri Haldar v. Kanigopal Mondal, AIR 1960 Cal 258 . 21. Coming to the Allahabad High Court, in ILR 12 All 79, Sir John Edge C.J. who delivered the judgment, observed as follows with regard to the Full Bench case of the Calcutta High Court. "In my opinion, applying S. 12, Limitation Act, to such a case, allowance should be made for the time between the date when a judgment was pronounced and the date when the decree was signed, if the delay in signing the decree delayed the applicant in obtaining a copy of the decree, and not otherwise. In such a case as that it would clearly be, within the meaning of S. 12, time which was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, because a copy of the decree could not be obtained until the decree was signed by the Judge." 22. In that case the judgment of the Court below had been delivered on 29th March, 1887, but the decree had not been signed until 1st April, 1887. The plaintiff-appellant applied for a copy of the judgment and decree on 15th April, 1887. As no application for copies had been made until April, 1887, it was held that : "In no sense was the applicant delayed in obtaining a copy of the decree by the fact that the decree was not signed by the Judge on the date the judgment was pronounced, but was signed on the 1st April." 23. Consequently the period between 29th March and 1st April, 1887 was not allowed. Consequently the period between 29th March and 1st April, 1887 was not allowed. In Bechi v. Ahsan-ul-Lah, ILR 12 All 461 (FB) emphasis was laid upon the word "obtaining" and it was held that in computing the period to be excluded under S. 12, Limitation Act, from a period of limitation, the "time requisite for obtaining a copy" does not begin until an application for copies has been made. If, therefore, after judgment, the decree remained unsigned, such interval was not to be excluded from the period of limitation unless an application for copies had been made. 24. In the Patna High Court I have already referred to 35 Ind Cas 868 : (AIR 1916 Pat 267), in which the view of the Calcutta High Court was followed. I may further refer to a recent Full Bench case reported in Gabriel Christian v. Chandra Mohan, ILR 15 Pat 284 : (AIR 1936 Pat 45) : In this case the Full Bench consisted of seven Judges and it was held as follows : "The result is that no period which may be under the control of the appellant between the date upon which judgment is pronounced (which is the date of the decree under the Civil Procedure Code) and the date on which the appeal was filed can be considered as the time requisite within the meaning of S. 12. In most cases the decree of the trial Court follows upon the judgment without the parties being required to do anything in the interval; and in such cases the appellant will be entitled to the exclusion of the time between the judgment and the decree. In exceptional cases, such (for instance) as cases of partition and mesne profits, the drawing up of the final decree may depend upon the filing of the necessary stamp paper or court-fees; in such cases the exclusion of time in favour of the party who is to file the court-fees will depend upon the circumstances, but other parties to whom no responsibility attaches for the, delay will be entitled to exclude the time." 25. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court also considered the matter in Muriidhar v. Moti Lal, ILR (1937) Bom 443 : AIR 1937 Bom 162 (FB). This Full Bench consisted of Sir John Beaumont C.J., Rangnekar, J. and Kania, J., Ex- Chief Justice of India. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court also considered the matter in Muriidhar v. Moti Lal, ILR (1937) Bom 443 : AIR 1937 Bom 162 (FB). This Full Bench consisted of Sir John Beaumont C.J., Rangnekar, J. and Kania, J., Ex- Chief Justice of India. The decisions in Yamaji v. Antaji, ILR 23 Bom 442, and in New Pieca Goods isazaar Co. v. Jivabnai, 15 Bom ILR 681 : 20 Ind Cas 537, were over-ruled and the Allahabad case in ILR 12 All 461 : 1890 All WN 149 (FB), was disapproved. Kania, J. expressed the opinion : "In ILR 49 Cal 999 : AIR 1922 PC 352, although the question was not directly considered by the Privy Council, it appears from the judgment that their Lordships agreed with the view of the Calcutta High Court that it was open to the Court; to treat the time properly spent in preparing the original decree as requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. That argument was considered not only in respect of the facts of that case in which the application for a copy was made after the prescribed period of limitation had expired, but also in respect of the time of six days excluded in Bani Madhubs case, ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB). It was held that the time spent in having the original prepared in Pramatha Nath Roys case, 49 Ind App 307 : AIR 1922 PC 352 was due to the appellants laches and therefore was not requisite within the meaning of the section. The six days spent for the decree in ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB), event before the application for a copy was made, was considered to be properly excluded under that section. Having regard to that view it is now difficult to accept the correctness of the view taken in subsequent decisions". Since then the Bombay High Court has consistently followed the Full Bench decision : vide Balappa Tammanna v. Dyamappa Bhusappa, AIR 1940 Bom 415 : 192 Ind Cas 275 and in Bhausaheb Jamburao v. Sonabai, AIR 1946 Bom 437 : ILR (1946) Bom 431. 26. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of three Judges consisting of Chagla C.J., Coyajee and Gajendragadkar, now Chief Justice at India, in Jayashankar Mulshankar v. Mayabhai Lalbhai, AIR 1952 Bom 122 (FB). 26. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of three Judges consisting of Chagla C.J., Coyajee and Gajendragadkar, now Chief Justice at India, in Jayashankar Mulshankar v. Mayabhai Lalbhai, AIR 1952 Bom 122 (FB). In this case Chagla, C.J. following the view taken in AIR 1937 Bom 162 (FB), observed that the time that elapses between the pronouncement of the judgment and signing of the decree should be excluded u/S. 12(2) Limitation Act. 27. In Narayanaswamy v. Krishnasami, AIR 1915 Mad 308 (1) : 25 Ind Cas 67, the Allahabad view does not seem to have been followed. In that case the judgment was pronounced on 18-4-1911. By the judgment the appellants were allowed time to pay extra court-fee up to 20-6-1911. They applied for copies of judgment and decree on 21-6-1911. But their application was rejected on the ground that the decree had not been drawn up. They seem to have again applied for copies after they had paid the extra court-fee. The Court held that the period between 18-4-1911 and 20-6-1911 must be excluded under S. 12(2), Limitation Act. They observed, "Until they did pay, it was impossible for any action to be taken towards preparing the decrees". 28. A single Judge of the Oudh Chief Court in Faquir Bux v. Bileshar, ILR 6 Luck. 187 : AIR 1930 Oudh 369, did not have his attention drawn to the implications of the Privy Council decision, but in later decisions the implications were fully appreciated and the view taken in the Calcutta, Patna and Bombay High Courts was adopted; vide Yusuf Ali v. Mohammad Kazim Ali Khan, AIR 1940 Oudh 173 : ILR 15 Luck 376, Kallu Mal v. Municipal Board Nawabganj, AIR 1942 Oudh 392 : 200 Ind Cas 608 and Jadubir Sing v. Sheo Naresh Singh, AIR 1944 Oudh 154 : ILR 19 Luck. 456. 29. In Kahn Chand v. Gurdit Singh, AIR 1936 Lah 976 : 168 Ind Cas 897, Agha Haidar, J. was of the same opinion. 30. There is nothing in Abdul Salam v. Abdul Khaliq, AIR 1945 Lah 233 : 47 Pun LR 193 which can be said to be against the above view. 31. The matter has not come up before the Nagpur High Court. 30. There is nothing in Abdul Salam v. Abdul Khaliq, AIR 1945 Lah 233 : 47 Pun LR 193 which can be said to be against the above view. 31. The matter has not come up before the Nagpur High Court. A Division Bench of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioners Court, however, in the year 1933 refused to follow the implications of the Privy Council decision : vide Mukunda Ram-krishna v. Bisansa, AIR 1933 Nag 125 : 29 Nag LR 220. 32. I may also refer to a recent case of the Gujarat High Court in Devkishin Fatechand v. Bai Marjambai, AIR 1963 Guj 255 in which V.B. Raju, J. observed as follows : "That the period for obtaining a copy of the decree is made up of two periods : (1) the period requisite for bringing the original decree into existence and (2) the period requisite for preparing a copy after the decree has come into existence. Both these periods have to be excluded. In counting, therefore, the period of limitation for an appeal, the period from the date of the judgment or the date of the decree and the date on which the decree is signed must be excluded even in cases where an application for a copy of the decree is given after the decree is signed. However, the period which is required for obtaining a copy or any part of that period cannot be considered twice over for the purpose of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act." From this, it appears that the learned Judge followed the Full Bench decision of Bombay High court, AIR 1952 Bom 122 . 33. The matter also came up before the Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish v. Jawahar Lal, AIR 1961 SC 832 . Gajendragadkar, now C.J. of India, observed as follows : "There is, however, a sharp difference of opinion in regard to cases where an application for a certified copy of the decree is made after the said decree is drawn up. In dealing with such cases Courts have differed as to what would be the period requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the decree. The Bombay, Calcutta and Patna High Courts appear to have held that the period taken in drawing up of the decree would be part of the requisite period, while other High Courts have taken a contrary view. The Bombay, Calcutta and Patna High Courts appear to have held that the period taken in drawing up of the decree would be part of the requisite period, while other High Courts have taken a contrary view. It is significant that though the High Courts have thus differed on this point, in every case an attempt is judicially made to do justice between the parties. With that aspect of the problem, however, we are not concerned in the present appeal". Their Lordships, however, have not decided this point. 34. From a survey of the cases referred to above it would appear that the difference of opinion has arisen over the construction of the words "time requisite for obtaining a copy" occurring in S. 12, Limitation Act. The Allahabad High Court has laid emphasis upon the word "obtaining" with the result that it has interpreted the said word as confined to the time actually employed by the appellant, i.e., in other words no time precedent to the application for copies by the appellant, can be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy. On the other hand, the Calcutta High Court had held that the "time requisite for obtaining a copy" would consist of not only the time between the application for copy and the date of its delivery but also the time spent in drawing up the decree after the judgment where the drawing up of the decree did not depend upon anything being done by the parties. 35. The Privy Council cases referred to above, i.e., 49 Ind App 307 : (AIR 1922 PC 352) and 55 Ind App 161 : (AIR 1928 PC 103) considered the appeals against decrees and formal orders on the original side of the High Court, but on the principle of exclusion contained in Section 12(2), Limitation Act, they lend considerable support to the view of the Calcutta High Court. The Allahabad High Court has had no occasion to consider and decide upon the view taken in Full Bench case of that Court in the light of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 49 Ind App 307 : (AIR 1922 PC 352). In my opinion the preponderance of view is in favour of the Full Bench case of the Calcutta High Court reported in ILR 13 Cal 104, which I respectfully follow. 36. In my opinion the preponderance of view is in favour of the Full Bench case of the Calcutta High Court reported in ILR 13 Cal 104, which I respectfully follow. 36. In the face of such overwhelming judicial opinion, it is enough to say that the period between the date of the judgment and the data of signing of the decree is not under the control of the party who wishes to file the appeal and hence it is necessary that the said period should be allowed to be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act. 37. The practice in this Union Territory has been to give notice to the parties of the date of signing of the decree and for the parties to apply for copy of the judgment on the date of pronouncement of judgment and for copy of the decree after the decree has been signed. 38. In the present case if the time between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree was signed is excluded from the computation of the period, there is no doubt that the appeal was filed in the Court below within limitation. It is true that nearly 10 years have elapsed after the pronouncement of the judgment but for this long delay and lapse of time the opposite party is not much to be blamed. The failure of the trial Court to draw up the decree has contributed substantially to this unprecedental delay. In such a case there can be no doubt that the litigant deserves to be protected against the default committed or negligence shown by the Court or its Officers in the discharge of their duties. As observed by Cairns, L.C., in Rodger v. Comptoir Escompte de Paris, (1871) 3 PC 465 at p. 475 as early as 1871. "one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors". 39. In the light of the foregoing discussions the result is that the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.