Judgment :- 1. In this revision petition Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Kozhikode, passed in E. A. No. 554/62 in E. P. No. 123/62, which again was in O. S. No. 51960. 2. The application itself was to enlarge the time, or to excuse the delay, in making a certain deposit in accordance with the directions contained in the decree passed by the court. 3. It will be seen that O. S. No. 560 was a suit instituted by the petitioner for specific performance of a contract for sale of the immovable property mentioned in the plaint, against the defendants who were on the party array. The decree was passed on 5th September 1961, granting specific performance in favour of the plaintiff, on compliance with the directions contained therein. 4. At this stage it may be mentioned that defendants 1 and 2 had been set exparte, and defendants 3 to 5 contested the claim of the plaintiff. It may also be mentioned that the decree passed on 5th September 1961 as against the 1st defendant was, attempted to be reopened by her, by filing an application to set aside the exparte decree. But that did not result in any benefit, because that application had been dismissed. Therefore the decree has become final, so far as all the defendants are concerned including the 1st defendant, who is the only contesting respondent in this revision petition. 5. The decree of the trial court was as follows: 1. That on plaintiff depositing into court the sum of Rs. 5500/-being the balance consideration within two months from this date, the 1st defendant do execute the sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule properties within one month from the date of the deposit of Rs. 5500/- in court. 2. On that on execution of the sale deed the defendants do deliver and put the plaintiff in possession of the plaint schedule properties except the house therein. 3. That the plaintiff be at liberty to take appropriate proceedings for getting possession of the house in the plaint schedule properties. 4. That the defendants do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 1599-50 being his costs in this suit. 3. That the plaintiff be at liberty to take appropriate proceedings for getting possession of the house in the plaint schedule properties. 4. That the defendants do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 1599-50 being his costs in this suit. From the material parts of the decree incorporated above, it will be seen that the plaintiff had to deposit into court a sum of Rs. 5500/-being the balance consideration, within two months from 5th September, 1961, and the 1st defendant was to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit properties within one month from the date of the deposit of Rs. 5500/-in court by the plaintiff. There is also provision to the effect that on the execution of the sale deed, the defendants were to deliver possession of the plaint schedule properties to the plaintiff excepting the house therein; and so far as the house is concerned, the plaintiff was given liberty to take other appropriate proceedings for getting possession of the same. The decree also provides for payment of the costs of the plaintiff in the sum of Rs. 1599.50. It must also be noted that the liability for costs was imposed by the decree as against all the defendants jointly and severally, and therefore there was no individual decree in respect of any of the matters as against any of the defendants therein. 6. The decree, as I already mentioned, was passed on 5th September 1961. In accordance with the decree, the petitioner-plaintiff should have deposited the amount mentioned therein, for getting the sale deed executed, on or before 5th November 1961. It is seen that the petitioner did actually deposit, on 30th January 1962, a sum of Rs. 3900.50. This amount was arrived at by the petitioner after adjusting, out of the amounts to be deposited by him under Clause.l of the decree, the costs that are payable to him by the defendants under Clause.4 of the decree. The plaintiff also seems to have filed an application, E. P. No. 129/62 on 5-6-1962, for executing the decree to obtain the execution of the sale deed from the defendants in the suit. The plaintiff also seems to have filed an application, E. P. No. 129/62 on 5-6-1962, for executing the decree to obtain the execution of the sale deed from the defendants in the suit. But objection appears to have been raised by the office that inasmuch as the decree had provided that the amount was to be deposited by the plaintiff within two months from 5-9-1961, and as the two months' period had already expired on 30-1-1962 when the deposit was made, the plaintiff petitioner should file an application to have the time extended for deposit of the amount in court. On that objection, the plaintiff filed the present application, viz., E. A. No. 554/62 on 22-6-1962, the order in which is under attack in this revision petition. That application itself is for excusing the delay in depositing the amount as per the decree dated 5-9-1961. 7. The reasons given by the plaintiff for excusing the delay in complying with the directions contained in the decree in the matter of deposit, are that he was ill and was laid up in the months of November and December 1961 and January, 1962, and that he was under the treatment of the Medical Officer, pw. 2; that he had made a request to Sri. Madhava Menon, clerk of his counsel, to make necessary application for filing an application to extend the time for deposit of the amount in court and he was under the bona fide belief that Sri. Madhava Menon would have made arrangements for filing the necessary application. According to the plaintiff, Madhava Menon himself died of smallpox on 16th March 1962, and it was only when objection was raised by the office to the execution petition filed by him on 5-6-1962, that he came to know that the application to excuse the delay had not been filed; and therefore he filed the present application E. A. 554 62 for excusing the delay in making the deposit. In support of this plea, the plaintiff, apart from examining himself as pw. 1, and also examining the Medical officer under whose treatment he was, as pw. 2, has also produced the medical certificate issued by the Doctor, namely Ext. Aldated 5-8-1962. On the side of the respondent, a Vakil's clerk was examined as rw.1. 8. In support of this plea, the plaintiff, apart from examining himself as pw. 1, and also examining the Medical officer under whose treatment he was, as pw. 2, has also produced the medical certificate issued by the Doctor, namely Ext. Aldated 5-8-1962. On the side of the respondent, a Vakil's clerk was examined as rw.1. 8. E. A. 554/62 filed by the plaintiff was opposed by the 1st defendant, who, as I mentioned already, is the sole respondent in this revision petition, on several grounds. The objection was that the application filed by the plaintiff petitioner is not maintainable, and there is absolutely no sufficient cause made out by the petitioner for excusing the delay in making the necessary deposit in court, and the reasons given by the petitioner in support of the application are not proved and therefore the delay in filing the application should not be condoned and as such the application should be dismissed. 9. The learned Subordinate Judge, in the order under attack, has in Para.2 referred to the nature of the suit which was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The learned judge then adverts to the petitioner having deposited the amount in court on 30-1-1962 and filing E. P. No. 129/62 on 5-6-1962. He then adverts to the objections raised by the office that inasmuch as the amount had been deposited long after the time provided by the decree, the time for the deposit should be got extended. The learned judge then refers to the circumstances under which E. A. 554/62 was filed on 22-6-1962 for excusing the delay in depositing the amount. There is a passing reference in Para.2 of the order to the effect that the application ought not to have been an application in the E. P., but it ought to have been an application on the original side to excuse the delay in making the deposit. Then the learned judge is of the view that there is a big mistake, and that he has got his own doubts as to whether the decree-holder is entitled to set off the amount of costs in the sum of Rs. 1599.50, towards the deposit he has to make under the decree. Then the learned judge is of the view that there is a big mistake, and that he has got his own doubts as to whether the decree-holder is entitled to set off the amount of costs in the sum of Rs. 1599.50, towards the deposit he has to make under the decree. But the learned judge does not express any opinion on any of these matters, either as to the maintainability of the application in the execution proceedings, or whether the application should be transferred to the original side for disposal. In this case, the same court, which passed the decree, was also seized of the execution proceedings in which E P. 129/62 was filed by the plaintiff. Nor does the learned judge express any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to adjust the sum of Rs. 1599.50 decreed in his favour as costs, in depositing the amount as per Clause.1 of the decree; because the learned judge says that whatever it is, the decree-holder having caused a set off, even then the amount the decree-holder should have deposited was actually Rs. 3900.50, and not Rs. 3900/- which, according to the learned judge, the decree-holder has deposited. Reference is made in this connection by the learned judge to the execution petition put in by the plaintiff namely E. P. No. 129/62. 10. Ultimately, after setting out all these circumstances, the learned Subordinate Judge, in the concluding part of Para.2 of the order, is of the view that as according to him the deposit made by the plaintiff petitioner should be considered to be short of 50 nP. on that basis alone he should come to the conclusion that the deposit made is not correct, and therefore the question of condoning the delay in making the deposit need not be considered. That gives an impression, so to say, that the learned judge had more or less made up his mind that inasmuch as the deposit should be considered to be less by 50 nP. and that the deposit is not in accordance with the terms of the decree, the application for excusing the delay should be dismissed. 11. Then the learned judge considers the merits of the application E. A. 554/62 and the averments made by the plaintiff petitioner for getting an extension of time. and that the deposit is not in accordance with the terms of the decree, the application for excusing the delay should be dismissed. 11. Then the learned judge considers the merits of the application E. A. 554/62 and the averments made by the plaintiff petitioner for getting an extension of time. He again adverts to the counter affidavit filed by the 1st defendant opposing the application. After all this, the learned judge in Para.5 of the order states that the one and only point that arises for consideration is as to whether the delay in making the deposit is to be condoned. That aspect has been considered by the learned judge in Para.6 and 7 of the order. The learned judge adverts to the evidence of the plaintiff as pw. 1, and also adverts to the fact that the Medical Practitioner has been examined as pw. 2. He also refers to the fact that rw.1, the Vakil's clerk, has given evidence before court. But so far as I could see, there is absolutely no further discussion either regarding the evidence of the Medical Practitioner who has figured as pw. 2, nor is there any reference to the certificate given by him, viz., Ext. A-1. Equally there is absolutely no further discussion by the learned judge regarding the nature of the evidence given by rw.1. Ultimately the learned judge, on the evidence of the plaintiff, pw. 1, is of the view that inasmuch as he himself claims that he had money with him at all the material times, instead of relying on Sri Madhava Menon to put in an application for further time to make a deposit, he could very well have contacted the lawyer to file an application for excusing the deity, if necessary. The learned judge is of the view at one stage, as will be seen from the discussion in Para.7 of the order, that even the question of the plaintiff being well or unwell does not really assume importance because even though be claims to have had money ready with him, he was not ready to make a deposit but wanted Madhava Menon to put in an application for further time to make the deposit, and that in itself shows lack of bona fides on his part. 12. 12. Then the learned Subordinate Judge considers the question as to the plea of the plaintiff petitioner that he was not well during the material period. So far as that is concerned, the learned judge no doubt says that regarding the alleged disease the plaintiff was stated to be suffering from, he does not believe his evidence. This statement is made without any reference or consideration of the evidence given by the Doctor pw. 2 nor the evidence given by pw.1 himself regarding the various periods he was ill and the treatment he was having and the nature of the illness, because the learned judge summarily proceeds to dispose of all these aspects on the ground that the mere fact that a Doctor has come to give evidence will not convince the court that the plaintiff was suffering from any disease. But nevertheless this aspect also does not seem to assume much importance before the lower court for dismissing the application filed by the plaintiff, because in the concluding part of Para.7 of the order the lower court is of the view that even the illness of the petitioner may not be of much importance because the court has observed in the earlier part of the order that the deposit by the petitioner of the sum of Rs. 3900/- falls short of 50 nP., and he was bound to deposit the full amount of Rs. 3900.50 even on the basis that he is allowed to set off the costs decreed in his favour under Clause.4 of the decree. No doubt finally the learned judge says that under any account he cannot allow the petitioner's application to excuse the delay. Ultimately he dismissed the application, no doubt, without any order as to costs. 13. I have fairly fully dealt with the various matters referred to by the lower court for dismissing the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner. It is that order that is under attack at the hands of Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the revision petitioner. The learned counsel - quite rightly in my view-urged that the lower court itself is ultimately prepared to rest its decision for dismissing the petitioner's application on the sole and only ground, namely that the deposit made by the petitioner is only the sum of Rs. 3900'-and not Rs. 3900.50, and inasmuch as the deposit falls short of 50 np. The learned counsel - quite rightly in my view-urged that the lower court itself is ultimately prepared to rest its decision for dismissing the petitioner's application on the sole and only ground, namely that the deposit made by the petitioner is only the sum of Rs. 3900'-and not Rs. 3900.50, and inasmuch as the deposit falls short of 50 np. the application has been dismissed. No doubt Mr. Balakrishna Eradi pointed out that there has been also to say reference in the earlier part of the order of the lower court to the effect that the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner should have been filed on the original side and that it is also doubtful as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to set off the amount of costs awarded in bis favour under the decree, but the lower court was not prepared to dismiss the application on any of these grounds. Even in respect of the illness pleaded by the plaintiff, the learned counsel, while attacking the reasoning of the lower court on that aspect, urges that even that aspect has not stood in the way of the court granting the application, if otherwise the plaintiff had deposited the entire amount of Rs. 3900.50. But the learned counsel urged that apart from the infirmities in the order, there is absolutely no consideration of the evidence of the plaintiff himself regarding the nature of the illness and the treatment that he had. Apart from there being no discussion at all of the evidence of the Medical Officer, pw. 2, against whom nothing has been elicted to discredit his testimony, and there being also no reference to the evidence of rw.1, who has categorically admitted the death of three or four members in the family of Madhava Menon in quick succession during the material period, due to small pox, and Madhava Menon himself dying due to small pox, the learned counsel points out that there is a very serious infirmity, namely in the assumption, of the only reason given by the lower court, for rejecting the application that the petitioner his not deposited the full amount of Rs. 3900.50. The learned counsel in this connection has referred me to the challan produced by his client and the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application to excuse the delay, and urged that the correct amount of Rs. 3900.50. The learned counsel in this connection has referred me to the challan produced by his client and the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application to excuse the delay, and urged that the correct amount of Rs. 3900.50 has been deposited by his client, after setting off the costs that are payable to him under the decree. In fact, the learned counsel urged no such plea that the amount deposited by the plaintiff falls short of 50 np. has been taken even by the contesting respondent, namely the 1st defendant. Therefore the learned counsel urged that the dismissal of the application by the lower court, on a wrong assumption that the correct amount has not been deposited, is absolutely erroneous and illegal. No doubt the learned counsel has also challenged the views expressed by the lower court regarding lack of bona fides on the part of the plaintiff-petitioner. 14. Mr. K. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent 1st defendant, has supported in full the views expressed by the lower court for rejecting the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner. That is on merits. The learned counsel has also raised certain legal contentions. According to him, the proper court where an application to excuse the delay or for extending the time should have been filed by the plaintiff, is not in the execution proceedings, as he has now done, but really before the original court which passed the decree. The learned counsel urged that inasmuch as the executing court has no jurisdiction to entertain such an application the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner should be considered to be absolutely void and of no legal effect. So far as this aspect is concerned, Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner has pointed out that no such specific objection like this has been raised by the respondent in the objection petition filed by him, excepting a bald statement to the effect that the application filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and therefore no relief should be granted to the plaintiff. Even regarding this aspect, I have already adverted to the fact that the learned Subordinate judge in the earlier part of his order merely refers to the circumstance that according to him the application, viz., E. A. 554/ 62 should have been filed not in the execution side, but really on the original side. Even regarding this aspect, I have already adverted to the fact that the learned Subordinate judge in the earlier part of his order merely refers to the circumstance that according to him the application, viz., E. A. 554/ 62 should have been filed not in the execution side, but really on the original side. But the learned judge does not express any opinion on this aspect, nor does he set that point for consideration in Para.5 of the order, as to whether the application filed by the plaintiff petitioner in the execution side is maintainable or not. In this case both the courts were the same. Therefore, I do not think this technical objection now sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the respondent should be entertained in these proceedings. And, in any event, the learned judge has not given that as a reason for dismissing the application filed by the plaintiff. No doubt, the ordinary rule, Mr. Velayudhan Nair urged, is that such application for extension of time which has been fixed under the decree, should be made not in the execution side, but only to the court which passed the decree itself. I quite agree with the proposition of law enunciated by Mr. Velayudhan Nair, though I do not find any scope for applying it to the present case, in the circumstances as pointed out by me. Therefore this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be entertained by this court and as such it is over-ruled. 15. Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, then urged that even on the assumption that the application for excusing the delay can be ordered in making the deposit, the amount of costs awarded in favour of the plaintiff under the decree should not be set off as against his client. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, so far as I could see, is that the plaintiff should deposit the full amount as mentioned in Clause.1 of the decree, and so far as his right to realise the costs decreed in his favour in Clause.4 of the decree is concerned, he must take other appropriate proceedings, and that he is not entitled to adjust the amount of costs in making the deposit as directed in clause 1 of the decree. Here again, the lower court no doubt has adverted to this aspect and expressed a doubt as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to set off the costs decreed in his favour. But it is not an expression of - opinion whatsoever. At any rate, that is not again a reason given by the learned judge for dismissing the plaintiff's application. But inasmuch as this contention has been raised by Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, I called upon Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, to meet that objection. 16. Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner, has drawn my attention to the principles laid in two decisions of the Allahabad High Court, namely those reported in Ishri v. Gopal Saran (I. L. R.6 Allahabad 351), and Ali Husain v. Amin Ullah (I. L. R.34 Allahabad 596) which principles have been adopted and approved by the Madras High Court in the decision of a Division Bench consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Cornish, JJ., reported in Chinnammal v. Chidambara Kothanar (A. I. R.1936 Mad. 626). In fact, in the said Madras decision, the question directly arose as to whether in a decree granting specific performance and in which the plaintiff is directed to deposit certain amounts and is also given a decree for costs as against the defendants, in depositing the amount, the plaintiff is entitled to adjust or set off his claim for costs and deposit only the balance amount. Venkatasubba Rao., J, if I may say so with respect, has considered the question very elaborately, and has ultimately held that the claims in such cases are in the nature of cross-demands arising out of the same transaction, and the doctrine of equitable set off allowed by courts of equity holds good. The learned judge has also stated that the plaintiff in that case could have very well deposited in court the full amount of Rs. 500 - and simultaneously attached a portion of that sum for realising the costs decreed in her favour under the decree in the suit, which will be a needless and idle formality to observe. 17. The learned judge has also stated that the plaintiff in that case could have very well deposited in court the full amount of Rs. 500 - and simultaneously attached a portion of that sum for realising the costs decreed in her favour under the decree in the suit, which will be a needless and idle formality to observe. 17. The principle that emerges from the above decisions is that in cases where the plaintiff has been directed to deposit amounts and is also given a decree for costs as against the defendant, the plaintiff is certainly entitled to deposit in court only such amount after adjusting the claim that has been granted in his favour by way of costs or otherwise as against the defendant. Therefore, the contention raised by Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent that in this case the plaintiff is not entitled to set off the costs decreed in favour of the plaintiff when he deposited only the balance amount of Rs. 3900.50, cannot certainly be accepted. This contention is also over-ruled. 18. At this stage I may mention that there is absolutely no controversy between the parties that the petitioner has deposited, not the sum of Rs. 3900-, as wrongly or erroneously assumed by the lower court, but he has actually deposited a sum of Rs. 3900.50, and that will be the correct amount that he has to deposit under the decree, after adjusting the costs awarded in his favour. Therefore the plaintiff-petitioner in this case must be considered to have deposited the correct amount for the purpose of seeking specific performance in accordance with the decree passed in his favour. 19. Mr. K. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, next urged that in this case the decree gave two months' time to the plaintiff to make the necessary deposit, and the two months period expired as early as 5-11-1961; and in this case the deposit itself was made only long afterwards, namely on 30-1-1962, and the application to enlarge the time or to excuse the delay in depositing the amount was filed only much later, namely on 22-6-1962. Therefore the learned counsel urged that inasmuch as the plaintiff-petitioner has not filed the application for enlarging or extending the time, within the period of two months allowed by the decree, i. e. on or before 5-11-1961, the application filed by the plaintiff under Ss.148,149 and 151, CPC. was not maintainable. In this connection, the learned counsel referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mahanth Bam Das v. Ganga Das (AIR, 1961 SC. 882), as well as the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, reported in Doraiswami v. Govindaswami (AIR. 1963 Madras 207). In fact according to Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mahanth Bam Das v. Ganga Das (AIR. 1961 SC. 882) completely support the stand taken by him, namely that the courts have jurisdiction to extend or enlarge the time in applications filed under S.148,149 & 151 CPC, even though the applications are filed after the time fixed by decree. Mr. Balakrishna Eradi also brought to my notice an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Kathayee Cotton Mills v. E. P. Pillai 1957 KLT.1175 to which I was also a party. In fact, in that decision it had been held, even before the Supreme Court rendered the decision in Mahanth Ram Das. v. Ganga Das (AIR. 1961 SC. 882) that under S.148 and S.149, CPC., the court has got the power to enlarge or extend the period originally fixed or granted, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. 20. Now the exact scope of the decisions relied on by Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, will have to be considered, because, according to him, in the Supreme Court case the application for extension of time was even before the expiry of the time fixed by the decree, and the Supreme Court allowed that application. Therefore the learned counsel argues that an application filed after the expiry of the period fixed or granted by the decree cannot be entertained, and the court has no jurisdiction to enlarge the time either under S.148 or 151 CPC. Therefore the learned counsel argues that an application filed after the expiry of the period fixed or granted by the decree cannot be entertained, and the court has no jurisdiction to enlarge the time either under S.148 or 151 CPC. After a careful consideration of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, in my view, the contention of the Learned counsel for the respondent does not find any support from the principles laid down by the learned Judges. It will be seen that in that case the Patna High Court had allowed the party therein to pay the court fees within a particular time. It is also seen that the said time was to expire on July, 8,1954. On July 8,1954 itself the party therein filed an application requesting that he be permitted to pay part of the court fees, and also requesting for a month's time to pay up the balance court fees. That application, which came up before the learned judges of the Patna High Court, was dismissed on the ground that inasmuch as the amount was not paid within time, there was no reason to extend or enlarge the time, and the appeal itself also stood dismissed. The party then moved an application under S.151, which was again rejected by the High Court, on the ground that the proper remedy for the party was. to file an application for review. The party thereupon appears to have filed another application under S.151, read with 0.47, R.1 CPC., for enlarging the time for payment of court fees. It must be noted that the two applications filed by the party, i. e., one under S.151 alone, and the other under S.151 read with 0.47, R.1. CPC., were admittedly filed after the expiry of the last day of the period fixed for payment of court fee, namely, July 8, 1954. I have already referred to the fact that the application filed by the party before the Patna High Court even on the last day was dismissed, and these two applications were also dismissed by the High Court on the ground that time cannot be extended under S.148 or 149 CPC., unless the application is filed before the expiry of the period fixed. It was that decision of the Patna High Court that was challenged before the Supreme Court. 21. It was that decision of the Patna High Court that was challenged before the Supreme Court. 21. The Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that the learned judges of the High Court could have exercised their jurisdiction under S.148 even in respect of the first application that was filed within time, on July, 13,1954. The learned judges of the Supreme Court have also emphasised the fact that the High Court could have exercised their inherent powers and extended the time when the two applications under S.151 were filed before them on the last day fixed for payment, namely July 8,1954. So far as this aspect is concerned, the Supreme Court is of the view that if the Patna High Court had felt disposed to take action on any of those occasions, S.148 & 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable sympathy, but to whose aid it erroneously felt unable to come. The Supreme Court also expresses the opinion that the view of the High Court that they have no powers under S.148 and 149 is erroneous; and the same principle is again repeated by the learned judges in the latter part of the Judgment. Therefore, it will be seen that the Supreme Court has categorically laid down that notwithstanding the fact that time may have been fixed in the original order of a court, the court, when its jurisdiction is invoked under S.148 & 149, either before or after the expiry of the time, has got ample jurisdiction, if a proper case is made out, to extend or enlarge the period granted. 22. The same principles have been laid down by this court in the Full Bench decision already referred to, viz., Kathayee Cotton Mills v. Padmanabha Pillai (1957 K. L. T. 1175). 22. The same principles have been laid down by this court in the Full Bench decision already referred to, viz., Kathayee Cotton Mills v. Padmanabha Pillai (1957 K. L. T. 1175). The decision of Veeraswami, J., of the Madras High Court reported in Doraiswami v. Govindaswami (A. I. R.1963 Madras 207) does not in any manner, in my view, assist the learned counsel for the respondent for the contention that if an application for extension of time is filed after the period fixed in the decree or order, the court has no jurisdiction to enlarge the same under S.148 and 151, C. P. C. In fact, in that decision the learned judge refers to certain conditions that were prescribed in an order granting interim stay, and one of the conditions was that the payment was to be made on 1st July 1962 and every succeeding year. But though the party therein complied with all other conditions, the deposit which was to have been made on 1st July 1962 was not made; and promptly the decree-holder took out execution and obtained possession of the trees on 4th July 1962. The judgment-debtor in that case filed an application on 7th July 1962 requesting the court to extend the time for deposit of the amount due to be deposited on 1st July 1962, by reviewing the previous order. The learned judge is of the view that that prayer cannot be granted because in as much as the petitioner therein did not comply with the conditions under which the stay was granted, the decree-holder was perfectly justified in taking out execution of the decree and getting possession. The learned judge in fact observes in the latter part of the judgment that if delivery had not been taken by the decree-holder, the question as to whether the delay in complying with the condition relating to the payment of the sum of Rs. 350 could have been excused might have arisen for consideration. But in view of the particular circumstances existing in that case that inasmuch as the decree-holder had taken possession of the property, the learned judge is of the view that excusing the delay in favour of the judgment-debtor will serve no purpose whatsoever. 350 could have been excused might have arisen for consideration. But in view of the particular circumstances existing in that case that inasmuch as the decree-holder had taken possession of the property, the learned judge is of the view that excusing the delay in favour of the judgment-debtor will serve no purpose whatsoever. Therefore, it is on that ground that the learned judge ultimately declined to enlarge the time, not on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to enlarge the time under S.148 and 149, but on the sole ground that any extension of the time granted will serve no purpose whatsoever, inasmuch as the decree-holder had taken delivery of property. 23. Therefore, neither the decision of the Supreme Court nor the decision of the Madras High Court, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, in my view, support his contention that the court has no jurisdiction to grant enlargement of time under S.148,149 and 151 C. P. C., when an application is filed after the expiry of the period fixed in the original order. Therefore the objection to the jurisdiction of the court to enlarge time under these circumstances, cannot certainly be accepted. 24. No doubt, ultimately Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, urged that rightly or wrongly the trial court had declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner when its jurisdiction was invoked under S.148 C. P. C. and therefore this court should not interfere in revision with that discretion. In support of this proposition the learned counsel referred me to the decision of Rajagopalan, J., reported in Ramachandra Chettiar v. Kandasami Pillai (AIR. 1950 Mad. 1), as well as the decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Kashiram v. Ganpat (AIR. 1957 Nag. 86). If there had been a proper consideration by the lower court of the materials placed before it and all the necessary circumstances had been taken into account for coming to a conclusion one way or the other, certainly this court will be very reluctant to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower court, when its jurisdiction is invoked under S.115, CPC. But the question is whether in this case that test can be considered to be satisfied from the manner in which the lower court has considered the question. 25. But the question is whether in this case that test can be considered to be satisfied from the manner in which the lower court has considered the question. 25. " I have already referred to the infirmities contained in the order of the lower court, namely that it does not care to advert to the actual evidence given by rw.1. That evidence has been read out before me. That witness was prepared to go to the extent of saying that notwithstanding the fact that there were three or four consecutive deaths in the family of Madhava Menon due to smallpox and Madhava Menon himself died of small pox on 16th March, nevertheless that witness was prepared to speak to the fact that Madhava Menon was coming to the court till three or four days before his death. These are aspects which the court must have taken into account for the purpose of finding out the truth or falsity of the evidence of rw.1.On the other hand, if the 1st defendant respondent was earnest in contesting the claim of the plaintiff-petitioner, the proper thing for her to do was to examine the clerk of her own lawyer. The evidence of rw.1 who claims to be a vakil's clerk, clearly shows that he is a person who is not at all familiar with the movements of Madhava Menon nor with the litigation in which he has been asked to give evidence. It is seen that he has given evidence at the request made by the 1st defendant. 26. I have already pointed out that the evidence of the Doctor pw. 2 has not been adverted to at all by lower court, except making a reference to the fact that the plaintiff has examined the Medical Officer, pw. 2 and the fact that the mere fact that the Medical Officer has been examined certainly does not establish that the plaintiff was ill. The Medical Officer has given evidence, and he has also issued a certificate, Ext. A-1. No doubt he may have stated that he does not keep a record of all the patients that he attends to, and other matters. But nevertheless I do not find there is any effective cross-examination to discredit the evidence given by pw. 2. The Medical Officer has given evidence, and he has also issued a certificate, Ext. A-1. No doubt he may have stated that he does not keep a record of all the patients that he attends to, and other matters. But nevertheless I do not find there is any effective cross-examination to discredit the evidence given by pw. 2. Even regarding the illness spoken to by the plaintiff, that again does not seem to have been discussed by the lower court, because, as I mentioned earlier, all those matters according to the lower court do not at all assume any importance, and the only ground given by the lower court for dismissing the application is the erroneous assumption that instead of the sum of Rs, 3900.50 np., only a sum of Rs. 3900 - has been deposited by the plaintiff. That assumption is absolutely fallacious and contrary to records. The challan produced before the lower court would clearly show that the correct amount of Rs. 3900.50 np. has been deposited by the plaintiff. Therefore, in as much as there is absolutely no proper consideration of the materials that were before the court, this court will have to exercise its jurisdiction, however limited it may be, under S.115, C. P. C. There are gross irregularities and there has been failure to exercise the proper jurisdiction by the trial court vested in it by law. But notwithstanding the fact that the order of the lower court will have to be set aside, in my view, it certainly be stated that the plaintiff petitioner himself also is not to be blamed. In my view, the plaintiff will have to be put on terms before he should be allowed to proceed further in the matter of claiming specific performance. 27. Therefore, while setting aside the order of the lower court and allowing the revision petition-which means that the application filed by the plaintiff on 22-6-1962 for enlarging the period granted under the decree is allowed-the plaintiff will be allowed to proceed further, subject to two conditions viz., (1) that the plaintiff petitioner will have to deposit a sum of Rs. 300 -representing approximately the interest on the amount of Rs. 3900.50 for the period from 5-11-1961, viz., the last day of expiry of the period of two months granted under the decree, to the date on which the amount has been actually deposited viz., 30-1-1962. 300 -representing approximately the interest on the amount of Rs. 3900.50 for the period from 5-11-1961, viz., the last day of expiry of the period of two months granted under the decree, to the date on which the amount has been actually deposited viz., 30-1-1962. The deposit of Rs. 300 mentioned above will have to be made in the trial court within a period of one month from today; and the judgment debtor will be entitled to withdraw that amount also along with the other amount that has already been deposited by the plaintiff-petitioner. (2) The plaintiff will also have to pay an additional sum of Rs. 300/-to counsel appearing for the respondent in this Court, representing the costs in the lower court as well as in this Court, for the lax manner in which he appears to have been prosecuting the claim for specific performance in the lower court. This payment of Rs. 300/-as costs will also have to be made within a period of one month from today. If both the conditions mentioned above regarding deposit and payment are complied with and within time, the application filed by the petitioner to enlarge the time will stand allowed and further proceedings will follow according to law. If, however, the plaintiff-petitioner commits default in compliance with either one or both the conditions, and within time, the revision petition will stand dismissed with costs of the respondent.