JUDGMENT D.D. Seth, J. - This is a decree holder's application in revision. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the applicant obtained a decree suit No. 3410 of 1947 from the Bombay High Court and got it transferred to the Court of District Judge, Agra, for execution. The decree, so transferred, was registered in the court of the District Judge, Agra in May, 1953. One Musaddi Lal had also obtained a decree against the judgment-debtor in suit no. 61 of 1955 from the court of the Civil Judge and put it in execution and prayed from rateable distribution on 9th July, 1955. The applicant filed an application on 23rd December, 1953 before the learned District Judge praying that the property of the judgment-debtor be attached and sold in execution of the decree. The learned District Judge ordered the execution proceedings to be transferred to the court of Civil Judge, Agra, on the same day. The attachment of the property took place in the court of the Civil Judge some time before 10th March, 1954. The opposite party had also a decree against the same judgment-debtor as a result of suit No. 64 of 1951 which had been decided by the learned Munsif, Agra. The opposite party put the decree in execution in the Munsif's court. On 18th November, 1955 the applicant filed an application before the learned Civil Judge to the effect that he had come to know that there are other execution proceedings pending against the same property of the judgment debtor in other courts and, therefore, rateable distribution should be allowed to him and the necessary amendment be made in the applicant's application dated 22nd December, 1953. This application was allowed the same day by the learned Civil Judge who ordered notice to be issued. The notice was served on the opposite party on 7th April, 1956. Subsequently on 7th July, 1956 the learned Civil Judge passed the following order: "Rateable distribution be made from the decree of S.N. 64/51 pending in the court of Munsif Agra." Before this order was passed sale of the judgment-debtor's property took place on 25/28th May, 1956 in execution proceedings pending before the learned Munsif Agra, and the sale amount was deposited in that court on 4th July, 1956. On 9th July, 1956 the learned Civil Judge issued a Robkar to the learned Munsif that the applicant's decree which he had obtained from Bombay High Court was for about Rs. 44,000/- and that the applicant be allowed rateable distribution out of the sale proceeds as a result of suit No. 64 of 1951. On 18th July, 1956 the opposite party filed objections in the court of the Munsif Agra, objecting to the applications of the two decree-holders for rateable distribution. The objections were that the applications for rateable distribution made by the two decree-holders were not legally maintainable as they were made after the auction sale and after the assets had been deposited in Munsif's Court on 4th July, 1956. The opposite party, therefore, urged that the assets held by the learned Munsif's court were not liable to be rateably distributed to the two decree-holders. The applicant filed a reply on 24th July, 1956 to the objections of the opposite party to the effect that his application for rateable distribution had been made on 18th November, 1955 in the court of the Civil Judge and had been allowed and, therefore, the applicant was entitled to rateable distribution. 2. The opposite party conceded that Musaddi Lal decree-holder was entitled to rateable distribution but in respect of the applicant's application he urged before the learned Munsif that the Robkar from the Civil Judge's court was received in the court of the learned Munsif on 9th July, 1956 while the sale assets had been deposited in Munsif's court on 4th July, 1956 and the sale had taken place on 25th/28th May, 1956. The learned Munsif partly allowed the objection and held that under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure the applicant should have applied for rateable distribution before the receipt of the assets and since the Robkar from the Civil Judges' court was received after the sale proceeds were deposited, the applicant had not observed the mandatory procedure prescribed by law. He further held that had the decree in favour of the applicant been under execution in is court then no application for rateable distribution was necessary but as the applicant was executing his decree in a different court an application to the court which was holding the assets was necessary and as such the applicant was not entitled to rateable distribution. 3. 3. It is against this order that the present application in revision has been filed in this court. 4. I have heard Sri S.B.L. Gaur, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri H.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the opposite party. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party raised a preliminary objection that under sub-Section (2) of Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure the proper remedy for the applicant to follow was to file a suit and, therefore, the revision was in competent. In this connection he relied upon Birendra Bikram Singh v. Basdeo, A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 185, and Lachmi Dayal v. Sri Krishan Das, II A.L.J. 370. 6. It was held in the Oudh case that where a remedy is open to an applicant for revision by filing of a suit under Section 73 (2), an application for revision under Section 115 is not maintainable. 7. In the Allahabad case it was held that the High Court's powers of revision should not be exercised when another remedy is open to the applicant and when a court rejects an application for rateable distribution of assets, the High Court should not exercise its powers of revision inasmuch as another remedy, viz. a suit is allowed to the applicant. 8. It was held in Sidh Nath v. Tej Bahadur, A.I.R. 1932 All. 411-1932 A.L.J. 359, that "the position today with regard to revisions is that there is no hard and fast rule about the matter; and when it manifestly appears to be right and convenient and proper that the High Court should decide a revisional application in preference to allowing the parties to embark on long and expensive litigation, it is within the competence of the High Court so to decide the revisional application. In each case it is a matter for the Judge to exercise his discretion." 9. It was held by a Full Bench in Lila v. Mahange, A.I.R. 1931 All. 632-1931 A.L.J. 974, that "ordinarily the High Court would not interfere if another convenient remedy is open to an applicant, particularly when that remedy is by way of appeal to a lower court. But it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that the High Court has no power of interference at all or should not interfere where there is another remedy by way of a suit open to the applicant. But it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that the High Court has no power of interference at all or should not interfere where there is another remedy by way of a suit open to the applicant. Each case must be considered on its own merits and if the Court has acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity and the applicant has been seriously prejudiced and interference is called for in the interest of justice, there is no reason why High Court should drive the applicant to a more circuitous remedy by way of a separate suit." 10. In the instant case an important question of law is involved and I am of opinion that discretion should be exercised in favour of the applicant and that he should not be drive to a more circuitous remedy by way of a separate suit. 11. I, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection raised by Sri H.C. Sharma. 12. On merits the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that no application for rateable distribution was necessary to be filed in the court of the Munsif and since the same property belonging to the same judgment-debtor was under attachment through a court of superior grade, where the execution proceedings were pending since long, the learned Munsif erred in refusing rateable distribution of asset. The learned counsel further urged that the learned Munsif also erred in entertaining the objections filed by the opposite parties and in deciding those objections. Lastly it was urged that the assets held by a court are held for the benefit of all the courts and specially of a superior court and the date of the receipt of assets by a court will be the date on which the assets are transferred to the court of a superior grade. I find considerable force in these submissions. 13. It was held in Thanmull Sowcar v. K. Krishnaswami Reddiar, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 988, that "where execution has taken place and money has been realised by an inferior Court, the superior Court which had attached the property at an earlier date than the date of the sale, is entitled to call for the proceeds lying in court." 14. 13. It was held in Thanmull Sowcar v. K. Krishnaswami Reddiar, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 988, that "where execution has taken place and money has been realised by an inferior Court, the superior Court which had attached the property at an earlier date than the date of the sale, is entitled to call for the proceeds lying in court." 14. In the instant case the property of the judgment-debtor had been attached in the Civil Judge's Court earlier than the date of the sale in the Munsif's court and, therefore, the court of the superior grade was entitled to call for the proceeds lying in the Munsif's court. In my opinion Section 63 and not Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the facts of the present case. Section 63 reads as follows: "(1) Where property not in the custody of any Court is under attachment in execution of decree of more courts than one, the Court which shall receive or realise such property and shall determine any claim thereto and any objection to the attachment thereof shall be the Court of highest grade, or, where there is no difference in grade between such Courts, the Court under whose decree the property was first attached. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a court executing one of such decrees." 15. The receipt of assets by one of the courts contemplated in Section 63 amounts to a constructive receipt of assets by each of such courts and, therefore, attaching decree-holder in each court are entitled to a rateable distribution in the assets which are in the actual custody of one of the courts. 16. Sections 63 and 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be read together. It was held in Dhirendra Rao Krisharao Gunzikar v. Virbbadrappa G. Hosmani, A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 176, that "In a case in which the court is determining under Section 63 the right to rateable distribution, the true construction of Section 73 is that an application need only have been made to the Court which holds such assets. In other words that the Court to which application for execution must be made means appropriate Court and includes an inferior court which granted a decree to be executed." 17. In other words that the Court to which application for execution must be made means appropriate Court and includes an inferior court which granted a decree to be executed." 17. It is, therefore, clear that after the applicant had made an application for rateable distribution in the Court of the Civil Judge which had granted the decree before the assets had been received in the Courts of the Munsif it was not necessary for the applicant to make another application for rateable distribution in the Munsif's court which held the assets. In the present case it is clear from the record that the applicant had applied for rateable distribution much before the sale took place in the Munsif's court and also before the assets were deposited in that Court. The learned Munsif was, therefore, wrong in holding that the applicant had not observed the mandatory procedure prescribed by law and that an application for rateable distribution should have been filed in his court. 18. Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not require separate application for rateable distribution and an application which is really for execution of a decree includes a prayer for distribution of the assets. In the instant case the applicant had applied for rateable distribution in the Court of the Civil Judge after attachment of the property had already taken place in that Court and, therefore, the attachment really was for the benefit of all claimants and in such a case it was quite sufficient for the applicant to ask that the sale proceeds be distributed among all the decree-holders proportionately. 19. It was held in Godavaribai Govindrao Saswadkar v. Deekappa Mallppa, A.I.R. 1927 Bomb. 247, that "where in pursuance of an order passed by a superior Court assets realised in execution of a decree of a Subordinate Court are transferred to the Superior Court, the assets are deemed to be received within Section 73 by the transferee Court when they are actually received by that Court." 20. To the same effect is a ruling reported in Melarkoda Bank, Ltd. v. Damodaraswami Naidu, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 34. 21. To the same effect is a ruling reported in Melarkoda Bank, Ltd. v. Damodaraswami Naidu, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 34. 21. Therefore, the date of the receipt of the assets would be the date when they would be transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge from the Munsif's court and since the applicant had made an application for rateable distribution before the assets had been transferred he was clearly entitled distribution. 22. The Civil Judge, on 18th November, 1955, had ordered for rateable distribution of the assets of the judgment-debtor which may be realised in execution proceedings. Notice of the applicant's application for rateable distribution had been served on the opposite party but he filed no objection to the order passed by the learned Civil Judge and therefore, he was not entitled to raise the objection before the Munsif and the learned Munsif ought not to have entertained them. In my opinion the order passed by the learned Munsif is not in accordance with law. 23. The result, therefore, is that I allow this revision with costs and set aside the order of the learned Munsif dated 1st September, 1956. The case will now go back to the court of Civil Judge, Agra for rateable distribution of the sale proceeds to the various decree-holders.