Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. The defendant In an action for ejectment and recovery of arrear rent is the appellant. The respondent -- The Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. instituted a suit for evicting the defendant on the ground that he was a monthly tenant in respect of a homestead land in Sakchi, comprising of six plots in khata No. 157 measuring 1.59 acres and that premises was required for the use and occupation of the plaintiff. Rs. 32/10/0 pies in all were claimed by way of arrear rent for the period from April, 1953 to June, 1954, at the rate of Rs. 2/2/10 pies per month. The defence was that the land was originally settled by the plaintiff-company with the defendant about 30 years back for agricultural purposes and since then the defendant was making use of that land for the same purpose after reclaiming the land. He, therefore, claimed occupancy right over that land, and pleaded that the civil court had no jurisdiction as the case was to be covered by the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. The trial court dismissed the suit, against which the plaintiff appealed and succeeded. Hence, this appeal by the defendant. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lower appellate court was wrong in holding that the land was homestead land and the original purpose of tenancy was non-agricultural. In paragraph 1 of the plaint, it was stated that the defendant was a tenant from month to month under the plaintiff at a monthly rent of Rs. 2/2/10 pies, payable annually, the said rent being payable according to English calendar. No doubt, in the written statement it was pleaded that the purpose of tenancy and the nature of the land were agricultural. To prove that, the defendant did not produce any document. The witnesses examined on his behalf other than himself did not state what was the purpose of tenancy at the time the land was settled by the plaintiff-company with the defendant. All that those witnesses said was that the defendant was growing a garden on a portion of that land and in other portion he had a pucca room where he was living. This evidence is only about user. All that those witnesses said was that the defendant was growing a garden on a portion of that land and in other portion he had a pucca room where he was living. This evidence is only about user. The nature of the tenancy will depend upon the purpose for which it was originally taken and in this case the plaintiff asserted that from the very beginning it was for residential and not for agricultural purpose. This has not been successfully controverted by the defendant as held by the court below. This is a question of fact and the appeal is concluded in that. 3. About the nature of the land, it will be enough to say that in the survey settlement it was recorded as Dihi Bari. Mr. Laceys Settlement Report of Dhalbhum shows that there were numerous instances where purely non-agricultural persons had taken settlement of lands for building houses or for other non-agricultural purposes and in those cases those non-agricultural tenants were given khatians for the land with the status Dihi Bari recorded on them. This explanation and the entry in the Khatian leave no room for doubt about the nature of the land and that it was homestead and held for non-agricultural purpose. Learned counsel pointed out from the khatian that in respect of the suit land the marginal entry showed that there was some orchard in some portion. That will not make any difference because the survey settlement took place about seven years after the original settlement of the land with the defendant. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant further raised a point about the absence of jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the present suit with reference to Sec.139 (4) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. That provision bars all suits and applications to eject any tenant of agricultural land or to cancel any lease of agricultural land from the jurisdiction of the civil court and makes them cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner of the district. Since the suit land is not agricultural land, there can be no application of Sec.139 (4) to this case. 5. That provision bars all suits and applications to eject any tenant of agricultural land or to cancel any lease of agricultural land from the jurisdiction of the civil court and makes them cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner of the district. Since the suit land is not agricultural land, there can be no application of Sec.139 (4) to this case. 5. Another point, which was raised with emphasis, was about the notice that the plaintiff had served on the defendant for determining the lease of tenancy, in the written statement it was alleged that no notice at all was served and further it was contended that the notice pleaded in the plaint was illegal and invalid. The concurrent finding is that notice had been served. Learned counsel did not, as he could not dispute that. His point, however, was that the notice only gave fifteen days time for determining the lease. In the present case, as the rent was payable annually, he contended a six months notice was required under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This argument is misconceived. The liability of rent accrued in the present case at the end of every month, since the defendant was a monthly tenant of a homestead land. The payability of that rent, however, was postponed till the expiry of twelve months; that was the agreed manner of collection of rent. This condition about annual payment of the accumulated twelve months rent will not make the lease from year to year. If it were so, Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act would require such lease to be evidenced by a registered instrument. In absence of any such document, Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act will be attracted and there it has been provided that any lease not for agricultural or manufacturing purposes will be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable with fifteen days notice ending with the end of a month of the tenancy. In that view, the plaintiff was not required under the law to give six months notice for determining the lease. 6. In that view, the plaintiff was not required under the law to give six months notice for determining the lease. 6. Further argument on behalf of the appellant was that the notice that was served in the present case was neither valid nor sufficient, because it asked the defendant to quit and vacate the land on the 30th June, 1954, without stating on which day of a month the original tenancy had commenced. Unless it had commenced on the 1st day of a month, the end of a month of the tenancy will not coincide with the last date of a calendar month. Learned counsel stressed that there could be no eviction without proper determination of the lease according to law and in the present case, in absence of any material to indicate the commencement of the lease of a monthly tenancy, the plaintiffs notice cannot be said to have conformed to the conditions laid down under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In paragraph 1 of the plaint it was stated, as I have said before, that the monthly rent was payable according to English calendar. This in my view, means that the monthly tenancy was according to English calendar, that means, from month to month of that calendar, which in other words, would mean that the monthly tenancy was from 1st to the last day of a English month. 7. This was stated in the plaint and that was not denied specifically in the written statement, except saying that the notice was invalid and illegal. The defendant should have pleaded, that the date on which the defendant was asked to quit in the plaintiffs notice did not coincide with the last day of a month of tenancy. If it had been so specifically raised, it would have been possible for the plaintiff to meet that point and adduce evidence in that respect about the date on which the original tenancy commenced. If the statement made in paragraph 1 of the plaint means what I nave already stated, then on the rule of pleadings and in absence of any clear denial of that statement, the defendant will be estopped from contending now that the 30th June, 1954, did not coincide with the last day of a month of his tenancy. 7. I would like to refer to the case of Steuart and Co. 7. I would like to refer to the case of Steuart and Co. Ltd. V/s. C. Mackertich, AIR 1963 Cal 198 . There one of the contentions raised was that the plaintiff did not state the date of commencement of the tenancy in his plaint and, therefore, the validity of the notice determining the tenancy being connected with that question, the plaintiff could not have succeeded to terminate the tenancy under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the notice given for that purpose was not valid. The Court held that though the date of commencement of the new tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant-company was not expressly stated in the plaint (of the two suits which were decided together), the recitals in the plaint, however, contained the Implication that the new tenancies were according to English Calendar month, that is, tenancies beginning from the first and ending on the last day of each calendar month. 8. In paragraph No. I of the plaint, It was mentioned that the defendant company was a monthly tenant with rent paid according to English Calendar month. That statement was not denied anywhere in the written statement, although the validity of the notice was challenged. It was not raised by the defendant in its pleading that the notice was bad as the month of the tenancy did not end with the last day of an English Calendar month. On those facts and circumstances, the Court held that the statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint implied that the monthly tenancy was according to English Calendar month, which meant from the 1st to the last day of an English Calendar month. This supports the meaning that I have put on the statement made in paragraph 1 of the plaint in this case. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, wanted to distinguish the Calcutta decision AIR 1963 Cal 198 , on the ground that there were other materials In that case, as stated in the judgment elsewhere, that the defendant company commenced their business from the 1st of an English Calendar month after taking over from their predecessor-in-interest and that could be safely taken as the date of commencement of the new tenancy of the defendant company. That was, according to learned counsel, the main reason why the Calcutta High Court took the statement made in the plaint in that case to mean that the tenancy was according to English Calendar month beginning from the first of each calendar month and ending on the last day of each calendar month. 9. I do not think that the additional fact stated in the judgment with reference to the documents, by which the defendant-company acquired their interest, had any thing to do with the meaning that their Lordships put on the statement made in the plaint. When one speaks of an English calendar month, unless otherwise implied, It usually means a full month beginning from the first day of that month. When we say that the monthly salary of a person is so much, it necessarily implies that the salary for the month beginning from the first day of a month is so much. The statement made in paragraph 1 of the plaint in the present case, in that view, does not leave any doubt that the plaintiff wanted to assert that the monthly tenancy of the defendant was according to English Calendar month and in absence of denial of that fact In the written statement the plaintiff was not called upon to prove specifically the date of commencement of the tenancy of the defendant so as to show that the 30th June, 1954, will coincide with the last day of a month of his tenancy. It is true that in following a British calendar, there can be a monthly tenancy from a day other than the first day of a month to such day in the following month. But that will depend upon the facts of such a particular case. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant refer red to the case of Punjalal Bhagwandin V/s. Bhagwat Prasad, AIR 1963 S C 120, where their lord ships discussed about Sec.27 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act (Act 57 of 1947). The question was If a tenancy, which had begun in that case on the 14th of a month, could alter the period of monthly tenancy on account of the provisions of Sec.27 of that Act, which provided that the rent payable by the month or year or portion of a year shall be recovered according to the British Calendar. The question was If a tenancy, which had begun in that case on the 14th of a month, could alter the period of monthly tenancy on account of the provisions of Sec.27 of that Act, which provided that the rent payable by the month or year or portion of a year shall be recovered according to the British Calendar. At one place in the discussion their Lordships observed that "the tenancy must start on a particular date and, consequently, Its month would be the month from that date, according to the calendar followed ......................There is nothing In Sec.27 to Indicate that the month of the tenancy to such a lease will start from the first of a regular month. Sec.27 simply states that the rent would be recovered according to the British Calendar without fixing the first date of the month as the date from which the month, for the purposes of recovery of the rent, would be counted. It follows that the month of the tenancy which commences on the 14th of a month, would be from the 14th to the 13th of the next month, according to the British Calendar. The rent would be recoverable with respect to this period of a month. No interference with any such term of the contract has been made by any provision of the Act and therefore we hold that the provisions of Sec.27 of the Act and Rule 4 of the Rules, do not in any way convert the month of the tenancy according to the Indian Calendar to the month of the British Calendar." Learned counsel wanted to rely upon these observations to contend that reference to a particular calendar in connection with a tenancy will not mean that the tenancy commences from the first day of a month according to that calendar. If I can say so with respect, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court considered an entirely a different matter and passingly they said that there can be a lease according to British Calendar starting from an intermediate date of a calendar month. From that it does not follow that when one speaks that the monthly tenancy was according to a particular calendar, it will not ordinarily mean that such tenancy was from the first day of a month of such calendar. 11. From that it does not follow that when one speaks that the monthly tenancy was according to a particular calendar, it will not ordinarily mean that such tenancy was from the first day of a month of such calendar. 11. The other case, on which learned counsel relied, is reported in Surjya Kumar Manjhi V/s. Trilochan Nath, 59 Cal W N 526 : ( (S) AIR 1955 Cal 495 ). Referring to the statement of the plaintiff in evidence the Court found that the tenancy began in Baisakh. Explaining that, it was observed that such statement did not necessarily mean that it began from the first day of Baisakh. The witness did not say that the tenancy was according to Bengali Calendar. If he had said so, in addition to saying that the tenancy commenced from Baisakh, the reasonable meaning would have been, on that statement, to the effect that the monthly tenancy was from the first day of the month of a Bengali Calendar year. The notice in that case was held to be invalid and insufficient as at had been contended by the defendant, because, there was nothing to indicate in the plaint about the date of commencement of the tenancy and as such there was nothing to show what would be the last day of a month of the tenancy. I am, therefore, of the view that with reference to the statement made in paragraph 1 of the plaint in the present case, the plaintiff asserted and it was not denied that the monthly tenancy was from the first day of the month according to British Calendar. If that was so, then the notice calling upon the defendant to vacate on the 30th of June, 1954, was in conformity with the provisions of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice (Exts. 4 and 5/a) had been served on the 13th June, 1954, having been issued on the 17th May, 1954. It, therefore, left more than fifteen days time for the defendant to vacate the premises after the expiry of the 30th June, 1954. 12. There is an additional reason also in this case to counter-act the appellants contention about the validity of the notice. It, therefore, left more than fifteen days time for the defendant to vacate the premises after the expiry of the 30th June, 1954. 12. There is an additional reason also in this case to counter-act the appellants contention about the validity of the notice. The plaintiff asked the defendant in its notice to vacate the land on the 30th June, 1954, or at the end of the month of tenancy that will expire next after the end of fifteen days from the service of the notice. The latter clause was by way of abundant caution. Even if the plaintiffs assertion that the monthly tenancy was according to English Calendar month was not correct or not accepted by the defendant, then it gave the option to the defendant to vacate at the end of the month of tenancy, as according to him, it will expire after fifteen days of the service of the notice. The suit was filed on the 2nd February, 1955. Sufficient time was thus left to cover such period. 13. Learned counsel, however, contended that this portion of the notice was vague and was unsustainable In law; it should therefore, be omitted from consideration as a part of a valid notice. Such contents of a notice for determining monthly lease were held to be valid in the cases of Sanker Ram V/s. Tulsi Bhagat, AIR 1921 Pat 307, Ganga Frasad V/s. Prem Kumar, AIR 1949 All 173, Jatindra Nath V/s. Malai Ram, AIR 1953 Cal 352 and Krishenji Alaharaj Virajman Mandir V/s. Chuttan Lal, AIR 1963 All 54 . Some of these cases were sought to be distinguished by learned counsel on the ground that in some of them the commencement of the tenancy was otherwise available from some materials. In my view, it does not make any distinction. It is well settled that a notice should be construed liberally and it should be seen if the noticee could understand what was really meant by that notice. After all, notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is intended to give a reasonably sufficient time to the defendant before his lease is determined. Another purpose of such notice is to make him aware of the intention of the lessor to terminate the lease. After all, notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is intended to give a reasonably sufficient time to the defendant before his lease is determined. Another purpose of such notice is to make him aware of the intention of the lessor to terminate the lease. If it appears from the facts and circumstances of a case and from the contents of a notice that there was no room for any misunderstanding on the part of the lessee, the notice should be taken to be valid and sufficient. The decisions in the cases cited above are based upon the basic principle about construction of a notice of this kind. That was enunciated in the case of Harihar Benerji V/s. Hamsashi Roy, 45 Ind App 222: (AIR 1918 PC 102). The earliest decisions in this connection are referable In Kings Bench case of Williams and Ayrane V/s. Smith, (1836) 5 Ad. and E. 350: 5 LJKB 216, and Queens Bench case of Wride V/s. Dyer, (1900) 1 QB 23. 14. I should in this connection refer to the other two cases on which, at a later stage, learned counsel for the appellant relied in support of his contention. In the case of Mozam Shaikh V/s. Annada Prasad, AIR 1942 Cal 341 there was a kabuliat executed by the defendant on the 26th Falgoon, 1305 B.S. corresponding to the 9th March, 1899. The notice to quit mentioned the 30th Chaitra, 1343 B.S. as the date on which the defendant was asked, to leave the land. In the written statement It was specifically pleaded that the tenancy was permanent and the notice did not expire it with the end of either the year or the month of tenancy, in that view, it was necessary for the plaintiff in that case to prove definitely the date of commencement of the tenancy so as to end with the 30th Chaltra. In the present case, the plaintiff was not called upon to prove that in absence of such specific plea. The notice In the reported decision of the Calcutta High Court was held to be invalid In absence of any proof of the date of commencement of the tenancy. In the present case, the plaintiff was not called upon to prove that in absence of such specific plea. The notice In the reported decision of the Calcutta High Court was held to be invalid In absence of any proof of the date of commencement of the tenancy. In the other case of Jagannath Upadhyay V/s. Amarendra Nath Banerjee, 61 Cal W N 841 : ( AIR 1957 Cal 479 ) the kabuliyat was of the 8th Sravan, 1344 B.S. corresponding to the 24th July, 1937 for seven years from Sravan 1344, to end of Ashar, 1351 B.S. One of the pleas in defence was about the invalidity and insufficiency of the notice for determination of the tenancy. The main contention during the argument in the High Court on behalf of the defendant was that neither in the plaint nor in evidence did the plaintiff ever say any thing about the date of commencement of the disputed tenancy and in absence of such proof there could bo no finding in favour of the plaintiff on the question of sufficiency and validity of the notice to determine the lease. It was further argued that as the kabuliyat was dated the 8th Sravan, 1344, the tenancy should be presumed to have commenced from that date, that is, not from the first day of a Bengali Calendar month, but from an intermediary date. In that view the notice calling upon the defendant to vacate on the last day of a Bengali Calendar month could not be valid. This was repelled by the learned Judges in whose opinion the reference to the Kabuliyat in paragraph 1 of the plaint was sufficient to make it clear that the plaintiffs case was that the suit tenancy commenced with effect from Sravan 1, 1344 B.S. or, in other words, that its date of commencement was the beginning of the Bengali month of Sravan so that, the tenancy being according to the Bengali Calendar, its months would correspond to the Bengali calendar months. The kabuliyat itself In that case contained a statement that the tenancy was for a period of seven years from the month of Sravan, 1344, up to the end of Ashar, 1351 B.S. 15. I do not understand how the appellant can have any help from this decision. The kabuliyat itself In that case contained a statement that the tenancy was for a period of seven years from the month of Sravan, 1344, up to the end of Ashar, 1351 B.S. 15. I do not understand how the appellant can have any help from this decision. It only conies to this that if there are any materials about the date of commencement of the tenancy or the period of tenancy, it will be enough, although there may not be any express statement to that effect in the plaint. In the present case, I have already come to the conclusion that paragraph 1 of the plaint mentioned the period of a monthly tenancy according to British, Calendar. 16. The result, therefore, is that none of the points advanced on behalf of the appellant succeeds and the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. A.B.N.Sinha, J. 17 I agree.