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1964 DIGILAW 165 (ALL)

Kedar Pandey v. Ram Din Kewat

1964-05-04

GANGESHWAR PRASAD

body1964
JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment under Section 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act). Briefly stated that facts of the case are as follows. One Ram Nandan Singh was the Sir-holder of the plots in suit. He died leaving his widow Smt. Ram Sahai Kunwar, as his heir. Smt. Ram Sahai Kunwar died in 1948 and thereafter Smt. Manakraji Kuer, sister of Ram Nandan Singh succeeded to his property. The plots in suit had been let out to the defendant by Smt. Ram Sahai Kunwar after the death of her husband. In 1955 Smt. Manakraji Kuer leased the plots in suit to the plaintiffs and by virtue of this lease they claimed the right to eject the defendant as an Asami. The defendant denied the claim of the plaintiffs and asserted that he was Sirdar of the plots in suit and was not, therefore, liable to ejectment. 2. The trial court decreed the suit but on appeal the learned Civil Judge reversed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs have appealed. 3. Originally the plaintiffs had alleged that they were Bhumidhars but, later, they abandoned that stand and claimed to be Sirdars. The trial court was of the view that as Smt. Manakraji Kuer was not a disable person in 1955 when the lease in favour of the plaintiffs was created, he plaintiffs became Sirdars under Section 165 of the Act. The learned Civil Judge, however, disagreed with this view on the ground that since the defendant was already in occupation of the land as an Asami it was not open to Smt. Manakraji Kuer to superimpose the plaintiffs and, therefore, the plaintiffs and, therefore, the plaintiffs did not acquire any interest at all under the lease in their favour. So far as the defendant is concerned there is no doubt that he is an Asami and the only question involved in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs are Sirdars. 4. So far as the defendant is concerned there is no doubt that he is an Asami and the only question involved in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs are Sirdars. 4. Superimposition, in the sense in which it is not permitted by law, involves an attempt by a person to create an interest in supersession or in derogation of the interest of another person holding under him, and it is on this account that a landlord is not allowed to superimpose a tenant on a sitting tenant. It is only when a lease of land supersedes or prejudicially affects the rights of a person in occupation of the land under an earlier subsisting lease that it can be said to amount to superimposition; but where such is not the case there is no superimposition in the sense in which it is not permitted by law. 5. A lease by the Bhumidhar of a land which is in occupation of an Asami leaves the rights of the Asami wholly unaffected and as such there is no reason why it should not take effect in the manner provided by Section 165 of the Act. What the learned Civil Judge seems to have thought is that such a lease will not be a lease at all and the consequences laid down in Section 165 of the Act will not ensue. In my view there is no warrant for this conclusion. The prohibition against letting is contained in Section 157 and the effect of a letting by a Bhumidhar is laid down in Section 165. The words of Section 165 do not, in my opinion, justify the view that the consequences mentioned therein would not follow in the case of a letting where an Asami is already in occupation. It should be remembered that the Asami in such a case does not owe his occupation to a letting by the Bhumidhar (after his having become a Bhumidhar) and it cannot, therefore, be said that the Bhumidhar having already let out the land once cannot relent it. Indeed, if the Bhumidhar had let out the land to the person in occupation the latter would not have been an Asami. The interest of the Bhumidhar would then have come to an end and there could be no question of any further letting by him. Indeed, if the Bhumidhar had let out the land to the person in occupation the latter would not have been an Asami. The interest of the Bhumidhar would then have come to an end and there could be no question of any further letting by him. It is only when there has been no previous letting by the Bhumidhar (after having become a Bhumidhar) that the possibility of a letting by him can arise. I therefore, think that the applicability of Section 165 of the Act is not excluded in cases where an Asami is already in occupation at the time of the letting by the Bhumidhar and that the results laid down in that section will follow even in those cases. 6. The legal position stated above is not open to the objection that a Bhumidhar cannot interpose an interest between his own and that of the Asami as no intermediate interest is recognised by law. This objection could be raised only if the interest of the Bhumidhar himself remained intact after such letting. But that situation does not arise. Under Section 165 the interest of the Bhumidhar himself is extinguished in consequence of the letting and there is no question of the creation of an intermediate interest between his own and that of the Asami. It is therefore, clear that as a result of a lease by a Bhumidhar of a land in occupation of an Asami there is no change in the status of the Asami and if the requirements of clause(a) of Section 165 are present the lessee becomes a Sirdar with all such rights as Sirdar has. 7. In the present case the trial court recorded a finding that the conditions of clause (a) of Section 165 of the Act were satisfied but this findings appears to have been based only on an affidavit filed by one of the plaintiffs. It is obvious that the affidavit could not constitute evidence in spite of the fact that there was no counter-affidavit by the defendant. The learned Civil Judge did not record any finding on this aspect of the case at all. In these circumstances, the proper course appears to be to remand the case. It is obvious that the affidavit could not constitute evidence in spite of the fact that there was no counter-affidavit by the defendant. The learned Civil Judge did not record any finding on this aspect of the case at all. In these circumstances, the proper course appears to be to remand the case. The learned Civil Judge will allow the parties to lead evidence on the question whether clause (a) of Section 165 of the Act applies to the plaintiffs and then decide the case in accordance with law. Since this question is covered by issue no. 8, no fresh issue need be framed. 8. The appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower appellate court for being disposed of in the light of the observations made above. Costs will abide the result.