Judgment.- This Appeal is filed by the Public Prosecutor appearing for the State against the acquittal of the accused by the learned Sessions Judge of Tiruchirappalli in Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 1962. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The accused is a grocery merchant at Ariyalur. On 26th October, 1961 from a total stock of 8 measures P.W. 1, the Sanitary Inspector, purchased three-fourth measure of dhall for the purpose of analysis He followed the usual procedure of dividing the sample into three parts and gave one to the accused under receipt and sent one of the samples to the Public Analyst whose report, exhibit P-4 gives the following account of the sample: “The sample contains water soluble yellow dye derived from coal-tar and I am of opinion that the sample is therefore misbranded. Lac dhall is injurious to health.” The trial Court namely, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ariyalur, convicted the accused under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs 400 In Appeal, the learned Sessions Judge, acquitted the accused for the following reasons. Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides the approximate quantity to be supplied to the Public Analyst of samples of different articles of food. In the case of pulses and cereals the approximate quantity is 250 grams which will be 8 ounces. The quantity of the sample sent by the Sanitary Inspector in the present case works to about half the quantity, that is 4 ounces. The learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that rule 22 had been contravened in the present case and further, to use the language of the learned Sessions Judge, “if a test is conducted with quantity less than the prescribed quantity, the opinion arrived at on such test cannot be taken to be one arrived at in accordance with law and no conviction can be based on the strength of the opinion arrived at on the basis of such an imperfect test.” The learned Sessions Judge also referred to the decision in Raju Konar, In re1, wherein the error in the procedure alleged was the failure to take the sample in the presence of not less than two witnesses, a contravention of section 7(10) of the Act. The decision cited by the learned Sessions Judge deals with an entirely different set of facts and has no application to the facts of the case on hand. It is not the contravention of every rule framed under a statute,that would lead to the conclusion that the conviction of the accused is vitiated. It might happen in a particular case, that the omission to obtain the signature of mahazar witnesses for the recovery of sample might lead to a reasonable doubt about the circumstances of the recovery and the Court might be justified in giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused. The question, whether the sending to the analyst of a quantity of the sample less than the one prescribed in the rule, has made the report of the analysis unreliable must be considered independently on the facts of the case. The learned Sessions Judge has not done this. Actually this question was not at all raised in the trial Court, and it was raised for the first time only during the arguments in appeal. It appears to me, that the provision under rule 22 was intended to enable the analyst to have samples in an adequate quantity for the purpose of making his analysis and to provide guidance for the authorities who take the sample. If the sample sent was less than the prescribed quantity, it was for the analyst in any particular case to express his difficulty in analysing, and insist upon the prescribed quantity being sent. But there is nothing in the present case to show that the analyst had felt any difficulty in making the analysis. The conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge, that the analysis was vitiated, is based on the sole reason that the quantity sent was only half of the quantity prescribed under the rule and such a conclusion would not necessarily follow. A similar question arose before Sadasivam, J., in Public Prosecutor v. Muthu Naicker2, and he expressed himself thus: “The quantity of 8 oz. A similar question arose before Sadasivam, J., in Public Prosecutor v. Muthu Naicker2, and he expressed himself thus: “The quantity of 8 oz. mentioned in rule 22, Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is only an approximate quantity and sending of a smaller quantity would be proper compliance with the rule unless the Central Food Laboratory finds difficulty in analysis because of the smallness of the quantity and prejudice is caused to the accused.” I agree respectfully with the above opinion and hold that in the absence of any evidence to show that the Analyst felt any difficulty in making the analysis, it could not be inferred that from the mere circumstance that the quantity was less than the one prescribed in the rule, the analysis was inaccurate and, therefore, the accused should be acquitted. Learned Counsel for the respondent referred me to two decisions, one of the Kerala High Court in City Corporation, Trivandrum v. Antony3, and State v. Sahati Ram4wherein the Court had to reject the evidence of the Public Analyst on the ground that data supplied by him were quite meagre for leading to the inference that the article was adulterated. But here there is no such difficulty. The data supplied are quite clear and there is no ground for rejecting the report of the analysis on this ground. Finally, there was an argument by the learned Counsel for the respondent that rule 29 of the Rules framed under the Food Adulteration Act is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. It may be pointed out that the accused has been prosecuted in this case for contravention of rule 29 along with the appropriate provisions in the Food Adulteration Act. Rule 29 of the Rules under the Adulteration Act, prohibits the use of coal-tar dye upon any food other than the items specified in that rule. The items specified in that rule do not include pulses and cereals which are the articles dealt with in the case. A perusal of the items mentioned in that rule shows that they contain a list of articles which have generally a fancy value by reason of the colour which is imparted to them by the admixture of the coal-tar dye. A perusal of the items mentioned in that rule shows that they contain a list of articles which have generally a fancy value by reason of the colour which is imparted to them by the admixture of the coal-tar dye. Presumably, these items were listed out for exemption because the admixture of the colouring matter to those items was not likely to mislead the customer into believing that he was buying different quality of the stuff because of its colouring, than what it really was. But in the case of items like pulses, the colouring-matter may indicate a real difference in the quality of the stuff and it may tend to deceive and defraud the purchasers. Again, it may happen that certain items may be listed out in rule 29 because they are not likely to be affected adversely by the admixture of the dyes. Unless we have more data to show that the listing out of particular items in rule 29 was not based upon any rational principle like those mentioned above, it cannot be held that an unfair element of discrimination was involved. The discrimination alleged is in separating some items for the grant of exemption from other items. There is no allegation of discrimination inter se between dealers who sell a particular item which is not covered by the exemption. All of them alike fall under the prohibition. For the reasons set out above, I am unable to find adequate grounds to hold rule 29 to be ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. I, therefore, hold that the judgment of acquittal is based on totally inadequate and non-maintainable reasons. I allow the appeal, set aside the acquittal and restore the judgment of the trial Court. The conviction of the accused and the sentence which is one of fine will be restored. V.K. ----- Appeal allowed.