ORDER Dixit C.J. l. By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, who was a Sub-Inspector of Police, seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing an order dated the 5th December 1962 of the Inspector General of Police dismissing him from service. That order was upheld in appeal by the Government and a writ of certiorari has also been sought for quashing the order in appeal. 2. When the petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police at Bagicha Station House in Jashpur Sub-Division of, Raigarh district, certain complaints were received against the applicant which led to the holding of a preliminary enquiry against him by the Circle Inspector, Shri Awasthy. At the end of the preliminary enquiry the applicant was suspended, and then a departmental enquiry was held against him on the charges that during the verification of A.D. No. 46/60 of village Sutari, he extorted a sum of Rs. 100 from one Durjan Gyar on the pretext that he was responsible for the death of his own child who had died in an accidental fire, and threatened to challan him and his wife if the money demanded was not paid to him (the petitioner); and that similarly during the investigation of another A.D. No. 3/61 of village Bend relating to the death of Ahibaran-Nagesia's child, who had also died in an accidental fire, he extorted a sum of Rs. 50 from Nagesia threatening him that in the event of non-payment the body of the child would be sent for post-mortem examination to ascertain whether the child's death was in suspicious circumstances; The departmental enquiry was first conducted by Shri K.K. Puri, the Sub-Divisional Officer. When Shri Puri was transferred, the enquiry was entrusted to Shri Batria. At the conclusion of the enquiry, Shri Batria found both the charges amply proved against the applicant and made a report accordingly. Thereafter a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner gave his reply which did not satisfy the Inspector General of Police, who then made the impugned order. 3. Thereafter a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner gave his reply which did not satisfy the Inspector General of Police, who then made the impugned order. 3. Apart from the general allegations of bias and prejudice which the applicant has made against Shri Puri in the conduct of enquiry, his main grievance is that he was not furnished with copies of the complaints made against him by Durjan, Nagisia and John Umraon on the strength of which the preliminary enquiry was started against him; that he was also not given in time copies of the statements of the witnesses who had given evidence at the preliminary enquiry and who were also examined in the departmental enquiry; and that the non-supply of these copies deprived him of his right to cross-examine effectively the witnesses who gave evidence against him. It appears that copies of the complaints made by the three persons referred to above were given to the applicant on 26th December 1961 and copies of the statements of witnesses who gave evidence at the preliminary enquiry and who were examined in the departmental enquiry were given as and when each witness was examined at the departmental enquiry. They were not given sometime before the witnesses were examined. The applicant cross-examined the witnesses tendered to support the charge against him with the aid of copies of the statements supplied to him at the last moment and without the copies of the complaint made by Durjan, Nagesia and John Umraon. After the delivery of copies of the complaints to him, the applicant was allowed to cross-examine further the three complaints. He was, however, not permitted to cross-examine the other witnesses. In the return filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been stated in paragraph 5 that no request was made by the petitioner for being allowed to cross-examined the other witnesses with reference to the written complaints "nor could such a request have been allowed as the other witnesses could not have been cross-examined with reference to complaint filed by third party." The petitioner also complains that one witness Kheruram was examined in his absence. In regard to this allegation, it has been suggested in the return, which has been filed not by the officer who conducted the enquiry but the successor Superintendent of Police, that it appears from the record that the applicant was present at the time of the examination of Kheruram inasmuch as a copy of his statement was supplied to the petitioner. 4. In the above circumstances, and having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Chintaman AIR 1961 SC 1632, the order passed by the Inspector General of Police dismissing the petitioner cannot be sustained. In the case of Chintaman (supra) also, a Sub-Inspector of Police, against whom a departmental enquiry was held on some charges, was not given copies of prior statements of two witnesses who were examined in the departmental enquiry and whose statements had been recorded earlier in a preliminary enquiry; He also wanted a copy of the application which led to the holding of the preliminary enquiry against him. The Supreme Court held that Chintaman, the Sub-Inspector, should have been furnished with these copies and that failure to supply them made it almost impossible for him to submit the principal witnesses produced against him in the departmental enquiry to an effective cross-examination and that in substance deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges against him. It was observed by the Supreme Court:- "It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice." In Sharmanand Vs. Supdt, Gun Carriage Factory 1960 JLJ 205 = AIR 1960 MP 178 , this Court has expressed the view that the delinquent in a departmental enquiry should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend, which includes not only a right to cross-examine the witnesses for the department but also to cross-examine them effectively; and that it is not for the department to decide whether the statements would lead to an effective cross-examination but for the delinquent to use the statements for cross-examination in his own way. In the present case, admittedly the copies of the complaints made by Durjan, Nagesia and John Umraon were not given to the applicant in the beginning. They were made available to him later on after he had subjected these witnesses and others to some cross-examination. Likewise, copies of statements of the witnesses, who had given evidence at the preliminary enquiry, were given only at the time when they were being examined and not before. In order to enable the petitioner to cross-examine effectively the principal witnesses produced against him, it was very essential that these copies should have been furnished to him long before the witnesses were actually examined. True, the applicant, feeling himself helpless, cross-examined the witnesses who gave evidence against him, even before the copies of the complaints were given to him. But it is elementary that the cross-examination of a witness done with the aid of material documents is quite different in effect and result that a cross-examination done at random without the help of the documents. It is also true that the petitioner was given an opportunity to further cross-examine the three complaints after the copies of their complaints had been given to him. But then again, it is well known that the answers which a witness gives in a cross-examination done and completed on one day are quite different from those given by him in his piecemeal cross-examination conducted on different dates. The copies of the complaints were material for cross-examining not only the three complainants but also the other principal witnesses. The Superintendent of Police, who filed the return, is altogether wrong in thinking that the petitioner could not have been allowed to cross-examine the "other" witnesses with reference to the complaints made by Durjan, Nagesia and John Umraon. 5. As regards the supply of copies of the statements given by the witnesses at the preliminary enquiry, they were given to the applicant only at the last moment when the witnesses were about to be examined at the departmental enquiry. This virtually prevented the petitioner from making any use of the copies for cross-examining the witnesses. It was unreasonable for the Enquiry Officer to think that the applicant could go through the copy then and there and think of the questions that he should put to the witness concerned in cross-examination. This virtually prevented the petitioner from making any use of the copies for cross-examining the witnesses. It was unreasonable for the Enquiry Officer to think that the applicant could go through the copy then and there and think of the questions that he should put to the witness concerned in cross-examination. Again, the supply of a copy of the previous statement of a witness as and when he was examined proceeded on the erroneous assumption that it is only the previous statement of a witness that can be of any use of for cross examining him and that the previous statements of the other material witnesses are of no assistance. It is trite to say that cross-examination of a witness is done with the aid of all the material that is to be found in documents and previous statements of the principal witnesses and not only with reference to the witness's previous statement. In our opinion, the supply of the copies of complaints and of the previous statements at the last moment and belatedly totally deprived the applicant of an opportunity of effective cross-examination of the witnesses who gave evidence against him. 6. As to the allegation of the petitioner that Kheruram was examined in his absence, there is no clear answer in the return. Merely because a copy of the statement of the witness was given to the applicant on the day when he was examined, it does not follow that the petitioner was actually present when he was being examined. 7. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action of dismissal proposed to be taken in regard to him within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The result is that this petition is allowed, and the order dated 5th December 1962 of the Inspector General of Police dismissing the applicant as also the order in appeal, upholding the order of the Inspector General of Police, are quashed The applicant shall have costs of this petition. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 100. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.