Ramjas and others plaintiff appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional Commissioner, Bikaner dated 24-8-61. Briefly, the facts of the case are that a suit for division of the holding filed by the plaintiff appellant was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, Nohar by judgment dated 10-3-60. An application for obtaining the copy of the decree was filed by the appellants on 1-8-60. The decree by that time was not ready and was actually signed by the Presiding Officer on 2-9-60 and given to the appellants on 3-9-60. He filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Bikaner on 5-10-60. The Additional Commissioner, Bikaner heard the appeal and rejected it on the ground that it was time barred holding that the limitation would run from the date of the judgment. Aggrieved by that judgment of the first appellate Court, the appellants have come in the second appeal before us It is an admitted fact that the application for obtaining the copy of the decree filed by the appellant was made long after the expiry of the limitation period of 90 days reckoned from the date of the judgment dated 10-3-60. Art. 156 of the Limitation Act lays down 90 days within which the appeal should be filed from the date of the decree. According to O. 20, R. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure date of a decree has to be reckoned as the date of a judgment because the decree must bear the date of the judgment. Revenue Manual R. 136 requires that the decree should be prepared within 3 days after the date of the judgment. Therefore, the limitation period according to Art.156 of the Limitation Act would run from the date of the judgment i.e. on 10-3-60. Sec. 12 sub-sec. (2) of the Limitation Act allows that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, which is 90 days, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree therefrom shall be excluded. The counsel for the appellant therefore argued that as the decree was not prepared on the date of the judgment in this case by the trial Court but subsequently signed on 2-9-60 the appellant applied for the copy of the same on 1-8-60 i.e. a few days prior to the signing of the decree. The counsel for the appellant therefore argued that as the decree was not prepared on the date of the judgment in this case by the trial Court but subsequently signed on 2-9-60 the appellant applied for the copy of the same on 1-8-60 i.e. a few days prior to the signing of the decree. Since no decree was in existence the question of application for a copy of the decree did not arise. He therefore urged that the limitation in this case should run from 2-9-60 and he presented the appeal before the Additional Commissioner on 5-10-60 well within 90 days from the date the decree was signed and supplied to him. In support the counsel cited 75 Indian Cases page 265 of the Patna High Court to support his contention that an application filed after signing of the decree, the limitation should run from the date and not previous to it. The counsel for the respondent, however replied by saying that the judgment was given on 10-3-60 whereas the application for copy of the decree was made on 1-8-60 long after the limitation period had expired and therefore the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of sec. 12 sub-sec. 2 of the Limitation Act for the time spent between the date of the judgment and the date when a decree was given to him. This was not the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from. In support the counsel cited R.R.D. 1959 p. 164, R.R.D. 1959 p. 121, A.I.R. 1953 Raj. p. 165, A.I.R. 1960 Madhya Pradesh, p. 108. The counsel for the respondent further pointed out that all these rulings clearly support his case that where an application is filed for obtaining a copy of the decree long after the expiry of the limitation period reckoned from the date of the judgment that time in between the two documents cannot be excluded. We have considered the arguments advanced from both sides and examined the rulings. We have considered the arguments advanced from both sides and examined the rulings. There is no doubt that there is a conflict of judicial opinion among the High Courts on the question whether the time spent for obtaining the copy of the decree should be excluded or not when the decree is not ready and has not been signed by the Court concerned, but as pointed out in the rulings cited by the counsel for the respondent of the Revenue Board, referred to above, as well as the two rulings of the Rajasthan High Court, it is a settled law that the application for obtaining a copy of the decree if made long after the expiry of the limitation period from the judgment would not be entitled to the benefit of exclusion of time under sec. 12, sub-sec. 2 of the Limitation Act. Our own High Court in Rajasthan in Biharidas appellant vs. Jagdish and other reported in A.I.R. 1953 p. 7 has laid down the following law— "That an applicant is not entitled to claim deduction of the period between the date of judgment and signing of the decree when his application for copy has not been filed until after the signing of the decree nor can he claim deduction for a period between the date for the delivery and the date when it is ready for delivery. In doing so the Rajasthan High Court followed the full Bench decision in A.I.R. 1951 All. p. 122 and various other authorities mentioned therein." They have clearly stated that under O.20, R. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure the date of the decree shall also be the date of judgment and under Art. 156 of the Limitation Act the time for an appeal is to run from the date of judgment even though the decree was prepared and signed on a later date. If this rule of law is not followed the result would be that the time for appeal would have to be counted not from the date of the judgment but from the date of the signing of the decree which would be contrary to the provisions of the Limitation Act. If the time between the date of the judgment and the signing of the decree was to be excluded under sec. If the time between the date of the judgment and the signing of the decree was to be excluded under sec. 12 of the Limitation Act on a view that the appellant was not in a position to apply for the copy of a document which had not come into existence, it would run counter to the provision of law. Further their Lordships in decision in Babu Singh Jammu Rao vs. Sona Bai reported in I.L.R. 1946 Bom. p. 437, have laid down the following law in clear terms— "In our opinion the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree cannot refer to any period antecedent to the appellant asking for a copy or to any period subsequent to its being ready for delivery." This A.I.R. 1953 p. 7 has been followed by the Rajasthan High Court in A. I. R. 1955 Raj. 165. The law as applied to this case clearly shows that the appellant has been negligent in not filing an application for a copy of the decree well before the expiry of the limitation period or immediately after the date of the judgment. His appeal by the Additional Commissioner therefore was properly rejected as time barred. We accordingly dismiss this appeal.