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1964 DIGILAW 168 (MAD)

The Municipal Council, Tiruchirappalli by its Commissioner v. H. H. The Maharana of Limbdi by power Agent Sri V. C. Gopalaratnam, Advocate, Lady Desikachari Road, Mylapore, Madras

1964-04-03

S.RAMACHANDRA.IYER

body1964
ORDER- By G.O. No. 2710, (Health) dated 29th July, 1950, the Government ofMadras sanctioned a Town Planning Scheme for the Tiruchirappalli Municipality,known as Salai Road Extention Town Planning Scheme. The Maharana of Limbdi hadtwo items of properties within the scheme area. Although the scheme waspromulgated as early as the year 1950, the Municipality appear to have beenquite indifferent about the levy of betterment contribution for some time. InMay, 1953, it appears to have approached the Government for the appointment ofan Arbitrator under section 27 of the Madras Twn Planning Act. The time fixed bythe Scheme for filing claims for betterment contribution before the Arbitratorhad already expired. The Government was also moved, in pursuance of clause 21 (a)of the Scheme, to extend the time. The Government responded to the request ofthe Municipality and issued G.O. Ms. No. 683, Health, dated 22nd March, 1954,appointing an Arbitrator to discharge the duties under clauses (a) to (d)of sub-section (I) of the section 27 and also extending the time till 21stNovemeber, 1954 for submission of the Municipality's claims for bettermentcontribution under a power vested in it under clause 21 (a) of thescheme. The Arbitrator then entered upon his duties and fixed the market valueof the properties which were liable Maharana of Limbdi, principally on theground that the Government had no authority to extend the period of timeoriginally fixed under the scheme. The learned District Judge accepted that contention and set aside the assessment of betterment contribution. Chapter III of the Madras Town Planning Act provides for the making, variation and revocation of schemes. Section 14 which occurs in that Chapter empowers the Government to sanction the Scheme as passed or adopted by the Municipal Council, after hearing objections, if any, and making such enquiry as it may think fit. Once the Scheme is sanctioned and published it will have effect, from the date of publication of the notification and the execution of the Scheme should be commenced forthwith. Section 15 of the Act provides for variation or revocation of the Scheme once promulgated. Once the Scheme is sanctioned and published it will have effect, from the date of publication of the notification and the execution of the Scheme should be commenced forthwith. Section 15 of the Act provides for variation or revocation of the Scheme once promulgated. Section 23 which confers a power in the Municipal Council to levy betterment contribution, states: “Where by the making of any town-planning scheme (the value of any property has increased or is likely to increase), the municipal council, if it makes a claim for the purpose within the time (if any) limited by the scheme (not being less than three months) after the date of publication of a notification of the (State Government) sanctioning a scheme under section 14, shall be entitled to recover from the owner of such property an annual betterment contribution for such term of years and at such uniform percentage of the increase in value, not exceeding ten per centum, as may be fixed in the scheme: Provided that the aggregate amount of the contributions so recovered shall not exceed one-half of the maximum increase in value during the aforesaid term of years as ascertained under the next following section.” In the present case the relevant clause which is clause 21(a) of the Scheme, as originally sanctioned, ran as follows: “Claims for betterment contribution under section 23 of the Act shall be submitted to the Arbitrator within two years of the date of the Scheme unless the Government order otherwise..........” The case for the Municipality is that inasmuch as the Government by G.O. Ms. No. 683, Health, dated 22nd March, 1954, has extended the time till 21st November, 1954, the proceedings now initiated by the Municipality would be valid. The learned District Judge, however, thought that the clause “ unless the Government otherwise order” could not relate to the period within which the claim had to be made, but it would relate to the person to whom the claim for betterment contribution should be made. We cannot accept this interpretation. Clause 21 is clear and there is not even any ambiguity in it. What it intends to do is to confer on the Government a power to limit the period of time within which the claim for betterment contribution should be made. But that view does not dispose of the matter. We cannot accept this interpretation. Clause 21 is clear and there is not even any ambiguity in it. What it intends to do is to confer on the Government a power to limit the period of time within which the claim for betterment contribution should be made. But that view does not dispose of the matter. It has been argued for the respondent that the expression in clause 21 (a), namely, “unless the Government order otherwise,” which has the effect of conferring power on the Government to extend or modify the period of time fixed by the Scheme, is ultra vires. The time within which the claim for betterment contribution is to be made, is a matter coming within the provisions of the Scheme in the instant case. Any alteration of it would involve an amendment of the Scheme, which can be done only after the formalities prescribed by the statute have been gone through. Section 23 of the Act says that the Municipality should make a claim for betterment contribution within the time limited by the Scheme. That implies that it is only the Scheme that can fix the time and that it will not be open to any other authority to do so ; at any rate where the Scheme has fixed a time no other authority can change it. The Scheme therefore which should be in conformity with the statute, cannot authorise the Government to fix the time within which the claim for betterment contribution should be made. I am, therefore, of opinion that the clause “ unless the Government order otherwise,” which implies a power in the Government to extend or reduce the time fixed by the Scheme, will be invalid, being contrary to the provisions of section 23 of the Act. Mr. V. Ramaswami, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has invited my attention to the decision in Ranganathan v. Krishnayya1where it was held that it was not essential for a Scheme under the Act to prescribe the time within which the claim for betterment contribution has to be made. That may be so. But the question here is, where the Scheme does fix a time, whether it will be open to any other authority to modify it except by amending the Scheme. That may be so. But the question here is, where the Scheme does fix a time, whether it will be open to any other authority to modify it except by amending the Scheme. Section 15 (2) of the Act recognises a power in the Government at any time, to vary or revoke a Scheme sanctioned under section 14. The power to vary can be exercised only after publishing, in the prescribed manner, a draft of such variation and observing the other formalities prescribed in that provision. In the present case the Government could have exercised its undoubted powers under section 15 for amending the Scheme, so as to alter the date of receipt of claims for betterment contribution. But that is not what they did. It was then argued on behalf of the petitioner that the entirety of clause 21 (a), relating to the time within which the claims have to be made, should be regarded as invalid and in that event, the principle of the decision in Ranganathan v. Krishnayya1 would apply to the case. I am unable to accept this argument, as the objectionable clause in it is severable from the rest of it. It was within the competence of the authority which made the Scheme to prescribe the time within which the claims for betterment contribution should be made. It fixed it as two years. That was a valid provision. Instead of stopping there, it proceeded to confer a power on the Government to modify that time. This, in my view, cannot be done, having regard to the provisions of section 23, which contemplates the Scheme itself fixing the time. The clause “unless the Government order otherwise” being severable from the rest, can be regarded as invalid without the rest of that clause being considered invalid. The result is that the assessment of betterment contribution, in the present case, should be regarded as illegal. It will be open to the authorities to recommence the proceedings, in case the Government sanctions a modification of the Scheme. The Civil Revision Petitions fail and are dismissed. No costs. P.R.N. ------------ Petitions dismissed.