JUDGEMENT MEHROTRA, C. J. :- These two petitions raise common questions of law and fact and arise out of one order passed by the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Shillong. The petition filed by Sanwarmal Purohit has given rise to Civil Rule No. 199 of 1962 and that filed by Hari Prasad Tharad has been numbered as Civil Rule No. 200 of 1962. The petitioner Sanwarmal Purohit resides in Gauhati. He contends that he carries on business in different commodities including cinnamon. On the 18th July 1961, the petitioner purchased two packages of cinnamon from a firm known as Dayalji Bhawanji of 12/13, Amratola Street, Calcutta, which imports cinnamon from foreign countries under permit and licences. The value, of the two bags of cinnamon was Rs. 1,993.13 nP. and the two bags weighed 175 Ibs. The goods were delivered to the petitioner on the 31st July 1961. The two bags were brought to Shillong by the petitioner where he tried to dispose them of; but, as he could not secure proper price, he decided to bring them to Gauhati. The petitioner was previously an employee of one Hariprasad Tharad, a betel nut dealer in Shillong for some time, about three years back. On the 6th August, 1961, he met Sri Hariprasad Tharad in his business premises and stayed with him for the night with the two bags of cinnamon. On the 6th July, 1961 he left Shillong and with the permission of Sri Tharad, left the two bags of cinnamon in his premises with a request to send the two bundles of cinnamon to Gauhati on hearing from the petitioner. On the 8th August, 1961, the petitioner sent a message to Sri Hariprasad Tharad to send the two bags of cinnamon to Gauhati. On the 9th August, 1961, Hariprasad's son, Madhoprasad Tharad who was a student, came to Gauhati in connection with his studies in Hariprasad's car No. ASA. 3688. The driver Binoyendra Das took the two bundles of cinnamon belonging to the petitioner and another bag of cloves belonging to Sanwarmal Tharad brother of Hariprasad Tharad. On its way to Fancy Bazzar, Gauhati the said car was intercepted by the Land Customs Staff. The car as well as the bags of cinnamon and cloves were seized. Subsequently the car was released on Hari Prasad Tharad depositing a cash security of Rs. 1,000/-. On its way to Fancy Bazzar, Gauhati the said car was intercepted by the Land Customs Staff. The car as well as the bags of cinnamon and cloves were seized. Subsequently the car was released on Hari Prasad Tharad depositing a cash security of Rs. 1,000/-. Sri Hariprasad Tharad gave his explanation to the Customs Authorities. The petitioner came to know of the seizure on the 12th August 1961 and on the 14th August 1961 he met the Customs Officer Gauhati and claimed the ownership of the cinnamon. On the 18th August 1961 he preferred his claim in writing by registered post to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Gauhati and in that letter he stated that he bona fide purchased the two packages of cinnamon for consideration from Dayalji Bhawanji of 12/13, Amratola Street, Calcutta, and then brought the same from Calcutta to Shillong and then from Shillong to Gauhati. On the 14th September, 1961, summons was issued to the petitioner by the Deputy Superintendent (Preventive), Central Excise and Land Customs, Shillong asking him to appear before him on the 20th September, 1961. Meantime, on the 20th August, 1961, the relevant voucher relating to the purchase of cinnamon was submitted by the petitioner to the Customs Officer, who recorded his statement also. 2. As already mentioned Sanwarmal Purohit claimed ownership of the two packages of cinnamon. Notices were issued to Sarvashri Hariprasad Tharad, Sanwarmal Tharad, Sanwarmal Purohit, Madhoprasad Tharad and Benoyendra Das, calling upon them to show cause why the seized goods should not be confiscated under Section 5(3) and Section 7(1) of the Land Customs Act, 1924, Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 read with Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 as made applicable by Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and under Section 168 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and why penalty should not be imposed upon them under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. In response to these notices, these persons filed objections and the Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Shillong, by his order dated the 9th March, 1962, directed that the seized cinnamon should be confiscated. The confiscation was to be absolute in terms of Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 read with Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. A penalty of Rs. The confiscation was to be absolute in terms of Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 read with Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. A penalty of Rs. 2,500/- was imposed on Hari Prasad Tharad and of Rs. 2,500/- on Sri Sanwarmal Purohit under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The car was also made liable to confiscation under Section 168 of the Customs Act, but as the car had already been released on the owner furnishing a security of Rs. 1,000/- the said amount was directed to be confiscated. No orders were passed against Sanwarmal Tharad, Madhoprasad Tharad and Benoyendra Das, driver, as these persons were held to be not responsible for the offence. By means of the present petitions, the said order has been impugned. 3. The matter came up before a Division Bench of this Court where a preliminary objection was raised that as no appeal was filed against the order of the Collector of Customs, under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court should not exercise its discretion in favour, of the applicants. Though the whole case has been referred to the Special Bench for disposal, the referring order shows that there was some divergence of opinion on this point and thus, the matter was referred to a Special Bench. A point is now taken again before the Special Bench by the Counsel for the other side that the present petitions are not maintainable, inasmuch as the petitioners had a right of appeal which they have not availed of. In my opinion, the existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to the grant of a writ of certiorari. The existence, however, of an alternative remedy may be taken into consideration by the High Court in exercising its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution. Without referring to the numerous authorities on this point it is sufficient to refer to the case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 . The law on this point has been set out in the following passage at p. 93, by S.R. Das, C.J. :- "In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will be only where there is no other equally effective remedy. The law on this point has been set out in the following passage at p. 93, by S.R. Das, C.J. :- "In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will be only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that provided the requisite grounds exists, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. n.p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had another adequate legal remedies". At p. 94, the Chief Justice again remarks as follows : "On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases-and the instant case is in point - where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play, the superior Court may we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and back-ground and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The Superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it . . ." It will appear from this enunciation of law that the existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is, however, to be taken into consideration while exercising its discretion. If the inferior Tribunal has no jurisdiction to act or in the exercise of its jurisdiction, violates the principles of natural justice, this Court will not refrain from granting the relief to the petitioner, simply because the alternative remedy by way of appeal has not been availed of. It is also equally clear that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as a Court of Appeal against the decision of a departmental Tribunal. Any defect in the appreciation of evidence can be no ground for the issue of a writ of certiorari. It is also equally clear that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as a Court of Appeal against the decision of a departmental Tribunal. Any defect in the appreciation of evidence can be no ground for the issue of a writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari will only lie when the inferior Court has either acted beyond its jurisdiction or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or in the exercise of its jurisdiction, has violated any principle of natural justice, or has committed any manifest error of law. It is also clear that a decision based on no evidence is a question of law and may in some cases, constitute a manifest error of law, so as to justify issue of a writ of certiorari. If, however, there is any wrong appreciation of evidence by the inferior Tribunal, this will not entitle this Court to issue a writ of certiorari. The points raised in the present case will thus have to be examined in the light of the principles enunciated above. 4. It is now settled that the Collector of Customs, when adjudging confiscations and imposing penalties under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, acts judicially. Under Section 182, the authority has to adjudge the confiscation and the penalty to be imposed. Section 188 provides for an appeal by any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed by an officer of Customs within three months from the date of such decision or order to the Chief Customs Authority. Section 191 provides for revision by the Central Government. A writ of certiorari would thus lie against an order of confiscation and imposition of penalty under Section 167(8). Dr. Medhi contends mainly that in ordering confiscation of the property seized and imposing penalties, the Collector of Customs has violated the fundamental principles of natural justice. The petitioner claimed ownership of the cinnamon. His case was that he purchased the cinnamon from a firm of Calcutta. On some secret enquiry made from the Calcutta firm, the Collector of Customs rejected the petitioner's defence that he purchased these goods from the Calcutta firm. Having rejected the defence, the Collector held that the goods were imported without a proper import licence and thus these were ordered to be confiscated. The enquiry was made from the Calcutta firm behind the back of the petitioner. Having rejected the defence, the Collector held that the goods were imported without a proper import licence and thus these were ordered to be confiscated. The enquiry was made from the Calcutta firm behind the back of the petitioner. He was not given any opportunity to test the information obtained behind his back by the Enquiring Officer. No enquiry report was submitted by the Enquiring Officer, a copy of which was to be supplied to the petitioner. None from the Calcutta firm, which is alleged to have given the information to the Enquiring Officer, was examined before the Collector of Customs so as to enable the petitioner to test the truth of his statement. The case of the petitioner further is that he brought the goods, after his purchase at Calcutta, to Shillong and there as he could not get a proper customer he brought them back to Gauhati. This story of the petitioner of bringing the cinnamon from Calcutta to Shillong has been disbelieved on a secret enquiry made by the authorities regarding the issue of any ticket on the date, when the petitioner states that he took the goods from Gauhati to Shillong. In this respect also, the contention of the petitioner is that the principles of natural justice were violated in making the enquiry. 5. Mr. Goswami, who appears for the department, has countered this argument by contending that no principles of natural justice were violated in the present case. The letter sent by the Calcutta firm was shown to the petitioner's counsel. At no stage, they expressed any desire to cross-examine the man from the Calcutta firm. They were fully aware of the results of the enquiry made by the department from the Calcutta firm and thus, having regard to the nature of the enquiry by the customs authorities and the nature of the offence, the principles of natural justice were satisfied in the present case. On the face of it, the marking of the goods given in the voucher filed by the present petitioner does not tally with the marking of the goods alleged to have been sold by the Calcutta firm to the petitioner. The goods thus can be presumed to have been imported without any licence and in contravention of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. They were thus rightly confiscated. The goods thus can be presumed to have been imported without any licence and in contravention of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. They were thus rightly confiscated. It is also urged that under the Indian Tariffs Act, they were liable to pay duty. Under S. 5 of the Land Customs Act, 1924, such goods cannot be imported without a permit and the petitioners were not in a position to produce any permit. In these circumstances, if any goods are imported without a permit, and the goods are liable to duty, such goods can be confiscated under the Land Customs Act, 1924. It is also contended that the Collector of Customs was appointed for the whole of Shillong and Gauhati and thus the Land Customs frontier extended up to Gauhati and any goods found in Gauhati without the requisite permit could be confiscated. 6. The Collector of Customs in passing the impugned order has acted under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act read with Section 19 as made applicable by Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The only question thus before the Special Bench is the validity of the said order. There is no question as to whether the order of confiscation is justified under Section 7 of the Land Customs Act or not. This has now been settled that the Collector of Customs making an inquiry under Section 182 acts judicially and his order is amenable to a writ of certiorari by this Court. The broad grounds on which a writ of certiorari can be is also no longer in dispute. This Court can issue a writ of certiorari if the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has in the exercise of its jurisdiction failed to observe any principles of natural justice or has committed any manifest error of law. 7. The broad grounds on which a writ of certiorari can be is also no longer in dispute. This Court can issue a writ of certiorari if the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has in the exercise of its jurisdiction failed to observe any principles of natural justice or has committed any manifest error of law. 7. In the case of Hiralal Sarawgi v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs for Assam, Manipur and Tripura at Shillong reported in AIR 1962 Assam 39 a Bench of this Court to which myself and Dutta, J. were parties, has held that although under S. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act a special jurisdiction is conferred on the authorities to confiscate certain goods which have been imported in contravention of the order of prohibition issued by the Central Government either under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act or under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, still the person contravening being tried of an offence the rule of criminal jurisprudence that the burden is on the prosecution applies with equal force to the proceedings under the Sea Customs Act. This principle was laid down in the following terms in the case of Amba Lal v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1961 SC 264 : "This Court has held that a customs officer is not a judicial tribunal and that a proceeding before him is not a prosecution. But it cannot be denied that the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Land Customs Act are penal in character. The appropriate customs authority is empowered to make an inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a person under the said Acts summon and examine witnesses, decide whether an offence is committed, make an order of confiscation of the goods in respect of which the offence is committed and impose penalty on the person concerned. * * * To such a situation though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Evidence Act may not apply except in so fat as they are statutorily made applicable, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and of natural justice must necessarily apply. * * * To such a situation though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Evidence Act may not apply except in so fat as they are statutorily made applicable, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and of natural justice must necessarily apply. If so, the burden of proof is on the customs authorities and they have to bring home the guilt to the person alleged, to have committed a particular offence under the said acts by adducing satisfactory evidence." Dealing with the question of Section 106 of the Evidence Act it was further remarked by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case at p. 267 as follows : "We cannot also accept the contention that by reason of the provisions of S. 106 of the Evidence Act the onus lies on the appellant to prove that he brought the said items of goods into India in 1947. Section 106 of the Evidence Act in terms does not apply to a proceeding under the said Acts. But it may be assumed that the principle underlying the said section is of universal application. Under that section when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This Court in Sambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, 1956 SCR 199 : AIR 1956 SC 404 after considering the earlier Privy Council decisions on the interpretation of S. 106 of the Evidence Act, observed at p. 204 (of SCR) : (at p. 406 of AIR) thus : "The section cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts." In another Bench decision of this Court in the case of Narendra Chandra Das v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Shillong, reported in AIR 1962 Assam 145 it has been held that the information gathered by the inquiring officer secretly from sellers of the watches to the petitioner without giving him an opportunity to cross-examine them cannot be relied upon on the ground that the information was collected on the basis of vouchers filed by the petitioner and so no extra evidence had been derived and it was held that the Collector had in so doing acted in violation of the principle of natural justice. The burden was on the Department to prove that the goods had been brought to India without the necessary permit. I do not find any reason to change my opinion expressed in that case. It has been also finally settled that in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution when this Court issues a writ of certiorari, lit does not sit as a Court of appeal against the order of the tribunal and thus it cannot substitute its own estimate of the evidence, to that of the tribunal, nor can the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence be a ground for interference with the order of the tribunal under Article 226 of the Constitution. The principles of natural justice cannot be defined exhaustively. It will depend upon the nature of the tribunal, the matter which the tribunal has to consider and the right affected by such determination. 8. Mr. Goswami who appears for the Department has very strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa reported in AIR 1963 SC 375 . In this case the order of dismissal of the respondent who was an employee in the Police Department was challenged and the contention was that the procedure adopted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in admitting the statements of witnesses examined before Mr. Majumdar in evidence was opposed to the rules of natural justice. Mr. Goswami has particularly referred to the following passage at p. 377 : "For a correct appreciation of the position, it is necessary to repeat what has often been said that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not Courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity had been given the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in Courts." The contention is that in the present case the tribunal in course of the inquiry came to know from the Calcutta firm that the goods which were alleged to have been purchased under a bill relied upon by the petitioners, were not the goods of the description found on the goods seized from tie possession of the petitioners. This information was placed before the petitioners in the course of the inquiry and if they thought of rebutting them it was open to them, to produce someone from the Calcutta firm to substantiate their case. In the Supreme Court decision several earlier decision have been considered and their Lordships have held that the purpose of an examination of witnesses in the presence of a party against whom an enquiry is made, is sufficiently achieved, when a witness who has given a prior statement is recalled, that statement is put to him, and made known to the opposite party and the witness is tendered for cross-examination by that party. In this view their Lordships held that the order dated July 5, 1956 was not liable to be set aside on the ground that the procedure followed at the inquiry by the Deputy Superintendent of Police was in violation of the rules of natural justice. 9. The grievance of the petitioner is that the Collector of Customs has rejected the contention of the petitioner that he purchased the goods from the license-holder and thus he bad not imported it in contravention of the order of the Government, solely on the ground that in the course of the verification of the plea advanced it was given out by Messrs. Dayalji Bhawanji of 12/13, Amratola Street. Calcutta in their statement dated 7-9-61 that two bundles of cinnamon (China 'Junk Brand') weighing 76,665 Kg. Dayalji Bhawanji of 12/13, Amratola Street. Calcutta in their statement dated 7-9-61 that two bundles of cinnamon (China 'Junk Brand') weighing 76,665 Kg. nett imported by them from Hongkong were sold to Shri Sanwarmal Purohit petitioner in Civil Rule 199/62 in original condition @ Rs. 25.45 nP. per Kg. under their bill No. 347 dated 18-7-61. The bundles had matpackings and weighed 80 Ibs. nett each. The markings on the packages were "D DB S Calcutta - Produce of China". What was the statement of Messrs. Dayalji Bhawanji as recorded on the 7th September 1961 was never placed before the petitioner. Nor was Dayalji Bhawanji who made that statement ever produced for cross-examination. The officer who took the statement and conducted the verification was not produced. The contention of the petitioner that he brought the goods from Gauhati to Shillong and on that behalf purchased the ticket has also been repelled by the Collector of Customs relying upon the information obtained behind the back of the petitioner from the Transport Department. 10. In the case of Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. The Workmen, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1914 , where the question was whether an inquiry by a domestic tribunal in an industrial matter was properly held it was laid down that an enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held unless, (i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him, (ii) the witnesses are examined - ordinarily in the presence of the employee - in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant matter, and (v) the enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the same in his report. It is, therefore necessary that the person against whom the enquiry is held must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on whose statement reliance is placed by the inquiring officer. 11. On the 22nd November, 1961 notice was issued to the petitioners to show cause why the seized goods should not be confiscated and why penalty should not be imposed on the petitioners. The petitioners were further asked to produce all evidence, documentary or otherwise in their possession in support of the explanation given by them. 11. On the 22nd November, 1961 notice was issued to the petitioners to show cause why the seized goods should not be confiscated and why penalty should not be imposed on the petitioners. The petitioners were further asked to produce all evidence, documentary or otherwise in their possession in support of the explanation given by them. They were also asked to indicate whether they desired to be hoard in person or through their legal representative hi their defence. A brief statement of the facts was given along with the notice. In the statement of facts it was mentioned that on 14-8-61 Shri H.P. Tharad, owner of the car No. ASA 3688 subscribed a statement to the effect that the seized cloves belonged to one Sanwarmal Tharad of Shillong and the seized cinnamon belonged to one Sanwarmal Purohit of Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. He also stated that the car was being taken to Gauhati by his eldest son in connection with his studies and the packets of cinnamon and cloves were being sent by the car as per request of the owners of the goods. Shri Sanwarmal Purohit claimed the seized cinnamon by his letter dated 18-8-61 and he was examined on 26-8-61 and 24-9-61. The brief statement contained the following further statement : "He (Shri Sanwarmal Purohit) stated that he came to Shillong from Calcutta on 6-8-61 along with, two packages of cinnamon purchased from M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji and Co., Calcutta with the intention to dispose of those at Shillong. While bringing the goods from Calcutta he did not book those. Being unable to dispose of the goods at Shillong he left the packages with Shri H.P. Tharad and requested him to send the packages to Gauhati by his car. Accordingly when the cinnamon packages were being sent on 9-8-61 by car No. ASA- 3688, those have been seized. An enquiry was made by the Customs Officers of Calcutta and it is learnt that the seized cinnamon packages were not sold by M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji and Co., Calcutta. The marks on the packages sold by M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji and Co., Calcutta was "JUNK BRAND, Produce OF CHINA, 'CALCUTTA" and each package contained So Ibs. of cinnamon whereas marks on the seized cinnamon packages are "JUNK BRAND, PRODUCE OF CHINA, CHITTAGONG" and each package contained 85 Ibs. of cinnamon." 12. The marks on the packages sold by M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji and Co., Calcutta was "JUNK BRAND, Produce OF CHINA, 'CALCUTTA" and each package contained So Ibs. of cinnamon whereas marks on the seized cinnamon packages are "JUNK BRAND, PRODUCE OF CHINA, CHITTAGONG" and each package contained 85 Ibs. of cinnamon." 12. On the 3rd February, 1962 from the office of the Collector of Land Customs a letter was sent to Shri Hariprasad Tharad with which was enclosed a copy of the statement dated the 7th September 1961 of M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji Calcutta. It was further stated in this letter that no such letter was received from him earlier. 13. From the counter-affidavit it also appears that personal hearing was given on the 5th February, 1962. In paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit filed m reply to the petition of Shri Sanwarmal Purohit it is definitely stated that the copy of the letter of the 7th September 1961 was supplied to Shri Hariprasad Tharad the petitioner in rule No. 200 of 1962 and not to the petitioner Shri Sanwarmal Purohit. The only ground on which it is contended that the petitioners had ample opportunity to rebut the letter is that both the petitioners and all others concerned were represented by the same legal representative at the time of the personal hearing of the case on the 5th February, 1962. It is very difficult to believe that the petitioner could have given answer to the statement of the Calcutta firm dated 7th September 1961 on the 5th February 1962 when the copy was sent to Hari Prasad Tharad by a letter dated 3rd February, 1962. Besides this no attempt was made to establish the correctness of the statement made by the Calcutta firm on the 7th September, 1961 in the proceedings before the adjudicating officer. The adjudicating officer cannot be said to have followed the proper procedure in determining the liability of the petitioners and the liability of the goods being confiscated. The Collector, as I have already pointed out, relied upon the results of verification made by the Customs officers earlier without giving the petitioner an opportunity to either cross-examine the Customs officers or the Calcutta firm. 14. Mr. The Collector, as I have already pointed out, relied upon the results of verification made by the Customs officers earlier without giving the petitioner an opportunity to either cross-examine the Customs officers or the Calcutta firm. 14. Mr. Goswami contended that there was sufficient material on the record and there were circumstances including the conduct of the petitioners in coming forward with their explanation at a later stage, from which the Customs authority was justified in coming to the conclusion that the goods were imported to India without proper permit. This court cannot say that there was no evidence for the finding of the adjudicating authority and thus this Court could not interfere with the confiscation order and the imposition of penalty by the adjudicating authority. The fallacy in this contention of Mr. Goswami is that he has assumed that the ground on which the finding is challenged is want of any evidence. The ground on which the petitioners have challenged the order of the Customs authority is that the Collector has violated the principles of natural justice in making the enquiry and as we have held above, the adjudicating authority before relying upon the statement made by the Calcutta firm and the results of verification by the Customs officers, should have either examined the Customs officers or Dayalji Bhawanji, in not doing so, the Customs authority acted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 15. It may be pointed out that the contention of the petitioners is not that the inquiring officer should have observed the procedure of trial, but it is said that no fair opportunity was given to the petitioner to explain the information obtained behind his back by the Department and the procedure followed violated the principles of natural justice. Regarding the case of the petitioner that he travelled with the goods in a second class vehicle from Pandu to Shillong, the case in the counter-affidavit filed by the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs is that the receipt filed by the petitioner was verified from the State Transport authorities. But the verification stowed that Shri Purohit did not actually travel from Pandu to Shillong on 6-8-61. The only one 2nd class ticket No. 4959 dated 6-8-61 was issued on that day in the name of another person. But the verification stowed that Shri Purohit did not actually travel from Pandu to Shillong on 6-8-61. The only one 2nd class ticket No. 4959 dated 6-8-61 was issued on that day in the name of another person. The result of the inquiry was made known to the petitioner and he has been given an opportunity by a letter dated 14th February 1962 to submit his further explanation, if any, in the matter. After the personal hearing on the 5th February, 1962 was over, a letter was sent on the 14th February, 1962 to the petitioner Shri Sanwarmal Purohit by the Collector to the effect that further enquiries into the matter were made and it was revealed that the petitioner did not undertake the journey against the ticket mentioned above in the letter and referred to in the receipt in question. The records of the Assam State Transport Department also showed that the petitioner did not undertake the said journey on 6-8-61 by the State Transport as per timings stated by the petitioner. The petitioner was given an opportunity by this letter to give any explanation. In reply to this letter the petitioner sent a letter in which he demanded the copies of the statements recorded from the persons in this case behind his back. He further stated that the question that he did not travel on the 6th August 1961 from Pandu to Shillong was raised at the time of personal hearing. He definitely stated in his letter that he sent one Shri Madho who came along with him from Calcutta to purchase a 2nd class ticket for him. When the enquiry was held by the Preventive Officer he could not produce the ticket because the ticket had already been handed over by him and thus he got a certificate for his travelling on the above date from the officer concerned which he filed. It was in that certificate that the number of the ticket was supplied by the officer concerned and thus the petitioner could not be held responsible for any discrepancy in the number of the ticket. He further demanded that if the Department was not satisfied with his explanation he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the officer who had granted the receipt. 16. He further demanded that if the Department was not satisfied with his explanation he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the officer who had granted the receipt. 16. The contention of the respondent is that as soon as the results of any inquiry made behind the back of the petitioner is brought to the notice of the petitioner, the only opportunity which he is entitled to is to give his explanation and if such an opportunity is given, the principles of natural justice have been complied with and the petitioner cannot complain of any violation of such principles. In that event, as soon as the authorities communicate to the petitioner that by their inquiry made behind the back of the petitioner they are satisfied that the goods seized were imported without license, the requirement of a fair opportunity would be satisfied and beyond denying the charges the petitioner could do nothing. This argument cannot be accepted. The inquiring officer has to adjudicate whether the goods are liable to be confiscated and an order of confiscation cannot be passed unless the authority is satisfied that the goods have been imported without license. The adjudication required under Section 182 is necessarily the satisfaction of the inquiring officer on the inquiry made by him and not on materials which were before the verifying officer or to act on the decision of the verifying officer. 17. I would therefore, allow the petitions and quash the order. 18. NAYUDU, J. :- I have perused the judgement of my Lord the Chief Justice and with great respect I regret I am unable to agree with the reasonings and conclusion reached therein. I am clearly of opinion that for the reasons to be given hereunder the rules issued in these two cases should be discharged and the petitions dismissed. 19. The facts of the case which are more or less beyond dispute may be stated as follows : An Ambassador car bearing registration No. ASA 3688 coming from Shillong to Gauhati was intercepted near the Uhibari Police Point at Gauhati on 9-8-61 at about 4.30 P.M. by the Land Customs-Officers acting on information received through intelligence reports. The car was searched and it was found to contain two packages of cinnamon inside the luggage booth of the car and a bag of cloves on the rear seat. The car was searched and it was found to contain two packages of cinnamon inside the luggage booth of the car and a bag of cloves on the rear seat. The driver of the case was one Binoyendra Das and the car belonged to Hariprasad Tharad of Shillong, the petitioner in Civil Rule No. 200 of 1962. One Madhoprasad Tharad, son of the said Hariprasad Tharad, was in the car. The bag of cloves and the packages of cinnamon were loaded into the car at the shop of Hariprasad Tharad and under his instructions. The two packages of cinnamon weighed 90 Ibs. gross-and 85 Ibs. nett each, and these packages had on them foreign markings. Neither the driver of the car nor Madhoprasad Tharad, the passenger, were able to give information where these packages has to be delivered. In the circumstances., the Customs Officers having had reasons to believe that the goods were illegally imported from Pakistan, detained the same, weighed the packages and seized them for contravention of Section 5 of the Land Customs Act, 1924, and Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878,. as made applicable by Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 read with Imports Control Order No. 17/55 dated 7-12-55 issued under Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The car in question was also seized as being liable to confiscation under Section 168 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. 20. On 14-8-61 Hariprasad Tharad, the petitioner in Civil Rule 200 of 1962, made a statement to the Customs authorities to the effect that the packages of cinnamon seized belonged to one Sanwarmal Purohit, the petitioner in Civil Rule 199 of 1962. Subsequently the said Sanwarmal Purohit put forward his claim on the seized packages of cinnamon on 18-8-61 by post addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Gauhati and received by them on 23-8-61, wherein he stated that he bona fide purchased the two packages of cinnamon for valuable consideration from M/s Dayalji Bhawanji of 12/13 Amratala Street, Calcutta, and brought the same from Calcutta to Shillong and then from Shillong to Gauhati. Subsequently, on 26-8-61, the said Sanwarmal Purohit submitted a voucher in evidence of the purchase of cinnamon made by him from M/s Dayalji Bhawanji. Subsequently, on 26-8-61, the said Sanwarmal Purohit submitted a voucher in evidence of the purchase of cinnamon made by him from M/s Dayalji Bhawanji. He also submitted a receipt to show that he travelled from Panda to Shillong on 6-8-61 against Ticket No. 04596 dated 6-8-61. As the voucher produced by Sanwarmal Purohit to evidence his purchase from Dayalji Bhawanji described the goods as "Junk Brand China", which differed materially from the description marked on the packages, and as the nett weight also differed, the latter description being "Junk Brand Produce of China, Chittagong", show cause-notices were issued to the petitioners in the two Civil Rules calling upon them to show cause why the seized goods should not be confiscated under the relevant provisions of the Land Customs Act and the Sea Customs Act, etc. Hariprasad Tharad, the petitioner in Civil Rule 200, denied the charges levelled against him and stated that he was not the owner of the goods in question but that Sanwarmal Purohit had kept the goods with him to be sent to Gauhati. Opportunities were given to the petitioners in the two Civil Rules by way of personal hearing and they were also permitted to appear by Counsel. After giving opportunities to the petitioners to represent their case and after hearing them, the Collector of Customs passed the order confiscating the goods in question and imposing a penalty of Rs. 2,500/- on Hariprasad Tharad and Rs. 1,500/- on Sanwarmal Purohit under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The car No. ASA 3688, from which the cinnamon packages were recovered, had previously been provisionally released on execution of a bond with a cash security of Rs. 1,000/-, and it was ordered by the Collector that the amount in deposit should be confiscated, with the option of paying a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as fine. 21. It is this order of the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs that is questioned before us in these two civil rules. 1,000/-, and it was ordered by the Collector that the amount in deposit should be confiscated, with the option of paying a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as fine. 21. It is this order of the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs that is questioned before us in these two civil rules. It is contended in main by the petitioners in these civil rules that as the Collector was a quasi-judicial body, he should conform in the disposal of the matter before him to the principles of natural justice and that in the instant case the petitioners were not given the opportunity of meeting certain information which the Customs authorities gathered in the course of the enquiry into the case and that no opportunity was given to the petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses who had given the information. It was also contended that the petitioners cannot be regarded as persons concerned within the meaning of S. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act; that the burden of proving the charges was on the Department which they failed to prove and that the fact that the petitioners have an alternate remedy is no bar in moving this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. As against this the learned Senior Government Advocate contended that Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act provided for an appeal against the judgement of the Collector of Customs and S. 191 of the Act provided for a revision to the Central Government against the decision on appeal under Section 188, and that without filing the appeal, it is not open to the petitioners to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was also contended that the principles of natural justice. In so far as they are applicable to the tribunals of the description of a Collector of Customs, have been fully complied with in this case; that the petitioners had been extended ample opportunities of meeting the information as and when received against them and the charges levelled against them, and that therefore, there is no substance in the contention that any principle of natural justice has been violated at all in this case. It was further contended that the packages containing cinnamon, which were in the original packing showed a foreign origin that they had been received from Pakistan, and that in the absence of any satisfactory proof, produced by the petitioners that the goods in question were bona fide purchased from a person who had imported the same under a licence held by him for the purpose, the inference is inevitable that the goods in question had been imported without a licence or a permit, neither of which the petitioners could produce in support of their possession of the dutiable articles. 22. Before the respective contentions of the parties are taken up for consideration, it would be advantageous to refer to the relevant legal provisions applicable to the case. Under the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, the levy of duties on imported articles liable to such duty was specified in the first and second schedules. Item 9(3) of Schedule I is as follows: "Item No. Name of atricle. Standard rate of duty. 9(3) The following spices, whether ground or un-ground, namely : cardamoms, cassia, cinnamon, cloves, nutmegs and pepper. 100 percent, ad valoren Under this item therefore, cinnamon when imported is liable to the levy of duty. 23. Section 2(d) of the Land Customs Act (Act XIX of 1924) defines 'dutiable goods', and it is as follows : "2(d) "Dutiable goods" means any article on which a duty of land customs is leviable by virtue of a notification issued under Section 5 of the Indian Tariff Act, 1894." Section 2(c) of the Act defines "Collector of Land Customs" as meaning a Collector of Land Customs appointed under Section 3 of the said Act. S. 2(e) defines "foreign frontier" as meaning the frontier separating any foreign territory from any part of India. Under Section 3(1) of the Act, the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, for any area adjoining a foreign frontier and specified in the notification, a person to be the Collector of Land Customs and such other persons as it thinks fit to be Land Customs Officers. Section 2(g) of the Act defines "land customs area" as meaning any area adjoining a foreign frontier for which a Collector of Land Customs has been appointed under Section 3. Section 2(g) of the Act defines "land customs area" as meaning any area adjoining a foreign frontier for which a Collector of Land Customs has been appointed under Section 3. Section 5(3) of the Act which is relevant, is as follows : "Any Land Customs Officer, duly empowered by the Chief Customs authority in this behalf, my require any person in charge of any goods which such Officer has reason to believe to have been imported, or to be about to be exported by land from, or to, any foreign territory to produce the permit granted for such goods; and any such goods which are dutiable and which are unaccompanied by a permit or do not correspond with the specification contained in the permit produced shall be detained and shall be liable to confiscation:......" Section 7 of the Act deals with penalties and Section 9(1) makes applicable the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and is as follows : "9. (1) The provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 which are specified in the Schedule, together with all notifications, orders, rules or forms issued, made or prescribed thereunder shall, so far as they are applicable, apply for the purpose of the levy of duties of land customs under this Act in like manner as they apply for the purpose of the levy of duties of customs on goods imported or exported by sea." In this connection, it would be necessary to refer to the Imports Control Order, 1955, issued under Sections 3 and 4A of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. Clause 3 of this Order runs as follows : "Save as otherwise provided in this Order, no person shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I except under, and in accordance with, a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II." In Schedule I, Item 26 of Part IV is as follows : "The following spices, whether ground of ungrouped namely :- Cardamoms, cassia, cinnamon, and pepper." 24. A consideration of the above provisions leaves no room for doubt that the import of cinnamon is restricted and could only be effected under a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by a specified officer under the Imports Control Order. 25. A consideration of the above provisions leaves no room for doubt that the import of cinnamon is restricted and could only be effected under a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by a specified officer under the Imports Control Order. 25. It is on the basis of this that it is contended by the learned Senior Government Advocate that as the two packages of cinnamon were admittedly in the original packing and contained foreign markings, indicating clearly their foreign origin, namely, China and Pakistan possession of the same is prima facie indication of their having been imported into India from foreign territory, and the person in possession must be in possession also of a licence or a customs 'clearance permit' failure to produce either of which would justify the imposition of penalty leviable under law, namely, of confiscation and fine, and that as in this case neither of the petitioners were found to be in possession of any such permit or licence the goods had been rightly confiscated and the penalty of fine rightly imposed. The learned Senior Government Advocate also contended that these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution do not lie in view of the fact that the Sea Customs Act provides for questioning the validity and the maintainability of the order passed by the Collector in an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue, and that against any order made by the Central Board of Revenue on such appeal, a revision to the Central Government has also been advisedly provided. This being the case, these provisions cannot be by passed and rendered nugatory by having resort to Article 226 of the Constitution. He pointed out that if High Courts entertain applications under Article 226 of the Constitution even before the remedies provided by way of an appeal and revision under the statute under which the action complained of was taken, then it would be running counter to the statute itself and would amount to defeating the provisions of the statute which could hardly have been in the contemplation of the Constitution making authorities in conferring the power under Article 226 of the Constitution on the High Court to issue writs in appropriate cases. He also contended that the provisions relating to appeal and revision cannot be regarded as mere alternative remedies. He also contended that the provisions relating to appeal and revision cannot be regarded as mere alternative remedies. They are the only remedies provided by the statute and they must be availed of, and it is only when the appellate authority and the Central Government exercising powers of revision do not give satisfaction to the petitioner and the petitioner feels still aggrieved that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in appropriate cases may be entertained and that would be against the final order passed in the case on revision by the Central Government. He further contended that the petitions should be dismissed in limine on this ground. 26. This matter came up before me and Dutta, J. in the first instance and we felt that the question involved is one of importance namely, whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in a matter where a regular right of appeal is provided by the statute under which the impugned action is taken and which right of appeal has not been availed at or exhausted, and, accordingly, we made an order referring these cases to a Special Bench for disposal. 27. Before I deal with this point in detail, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which are extracted below. "Section 188. Appeal from subordinate to Chief Customs authority. Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision or order passed by an officer of Customs under this Act may, within three months from the elate of such decision or order, appeal therefrom to the Chief Customs-authority, or in such cases as the Central Government directs, to any officer of Customs not inferior in rank to a Customs-collector and empowered in that behalf by name or in virtue of his office by the Central Government. Such authority or officer may thereupon make such further inquiry and pass such order, as he thinks fit, confirming, altering or annulling the decision or order appealed against : Provided that no such order in appeal shall have the effect of subjecting any person to any greater confiscation, penalty or rate of duty than has been adjudged against him in the original decision or order. Every order passed in appeal under this section shall subject to the power of revision conferred by Section 191, be final." "Section 189. Every order passed in appeal under this section shall subject to the power of revision conferred by Section 191, be final." "Section 189. Deposit, pending appeal, of duty demanded. Where the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty or penalty leviable in respect of any goods, the owner of such goods, if desirous of appealing against such decision or order, shall, pending the appeal, deposit in the hands of the Customs-collector at the port where the dispute arises the amount demanded by the officer passing such decision or order. When delivery of such goods to the owner thereof is withheld merely by reason of such amount not being paid, the Customs-collector shall upon such deposit being made, cause such goods to be delivered to such owner. If upon any such appeal it is decided that the whole or any portion of such amount was not leviable in respect of such goods, the Customs-collector shall return such amount or portion (as the case may be) to the owner of such goods on demand by such owner." "Section 190. Power to remit penalty or confiscation. If, upon consideration of the circumstances under which any penalty, increased rate of duty or confiscation has been adjudged under this Act by an officer of Customs, the Chief Customs-authority is of opinion that such penalty, increased rate or confiscation ought to be remitted in whole or in part, or commuted, such authority may remit the same or any portion thereof, or may with the consent of the owner of any goods ordered to be confiscated, commute the order of confiscation to a penalty not exceeding the value of such goods." "Section 191. Revision by Central Government. The Central Government may, on the application of any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by any officer of Customs or Chief Customs authority and from which no appeal lies, reverse or modify such decision or order." 28. Revision by Central Government. The Central Government may, on the application of any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by any officer of Customs or Chief Customs authority and from which no appeal lies, reverse or modify such decision or order." 28. The expression "Chief Customs-authority" has been defined in Section 3(a) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which is as follows : "Chief Customs-authority" means the Central Board of Revenue constituted under the Central Board of Revenue Act 1924, and includes, in relation to any power or duty which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, transfer from the Central Board of Revenue and entrust to a State Government or to an officer of a State Government under Article 258(1) of the Constitution, such Government or officer as the case may be." 29. In the instant case, as the authority who passed the order impugned against is the Customs-collector, the appeal under Section 188 lies to the Central Board of Revenue and the powers of revision under Section 191 are exercisable by the Central Government. From a consideration of the above provisions it is clear that an appeal in the instant case lay to the Central Board of Revenue against the order of the Customs-collector, and the order passed in appeal by the Central Board of Revenue shall be final subject, however, to the power of revision vested in the Central Government under Section 191. It has also to be noticed that this appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of the decision of the Customs-collector complained against, and having regard to Section 189 the petitioner would have been obliged to deposit the penalty levied in respect of the goods in question in the hands of the Customs-collector. It may thus be seen that the provisions in this behalf in the Sea Customs Act are comprehensive and fairly complete. 30. Further the appellate power given by Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act to the Central Board of Revenue is much wider and of greater amplitude than the power that could be exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is so because the appellate authority can, on appeal, make such further enquiry as it may deem fit into the matter, which this Court obviously cannot do acting under Article 226. This is so because the appellate authority can, on appeal, make such further enquiry as it may deem fit into the matter, which this Court obviously cannot do acting under Article 226. The power to make further enquiry gives the appellate court opportunity to set right any mistake or omission made by the Customs-collector in the disposal of the matter and this opportunity has been excluded in the instant case by this Court interposing itself in the matter, under Article 226 of the Constitution. 31. This being the case, in my considered opinion, it was not open to the petitioners in the instant case to by-pass these provisions, avoid the filing of the appeal under Section 188, avoid making the deposit under Section 189 and to come to this Court for invoking its most extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, where Parliament has advisedly provided for a judicial machinery including a right of appeal and a right of revision. The party affected is bound under the law to follow those provisions and comply with them if he desires to question the decision of the Customs-collector. As no appeal has been preferred under Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act within the time allowed the order of the Customs-collector under the statute has become final, and it is not open to the petitioners to get rid of this statutory consequence resulting from the application of the provisions of the Act and the failure of the petitioners, to comply with them by seeking the assistance of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; much less would this Court extend its hand to enable the petitioners to by pass and defeat the provisions of the statute by offering to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. To do so would amount to nullifying the provisions of a statute of Parliament, and Article 226 certainly, in my opinion, ought not to be used for the purpose of defeating the provisions of a statute and rendering them nugatory. 32. In this connection reference may be made to some of the decisions cited. To do so would amount to nullifying the provisions of a statute of Parliament, and Article 226 certainly, in my opinion, ought not to be used for the purpose of defeating the provisions of a statute and rendering them nugatory. 32. In this connection reference may be made to some of the decisions cited. In the case of W. Saldanna v. S. Amarjit Singh, reported in AIR 1954 Punj 73, the following observations of the learned Judges may be referred to : "With very great respect I am unable to agree that an appeal under the Sea Customs Act which has been laid down by the statute itself should be by-passed merely on the ground that it is an appeal from one administrative tribunal to another, because that is the policy of the law and as has been held by so many cases to which I have made reference that an application under Art. 226 is no substitute for these appeals and cannot be made a ground for by-passing them. If the law has laid down a particular procedure for redress of grievances, another remedy would, in my opinion, be not available as was held in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in Council AIR 1947 PC 78, to which I have already referred. "As I have held that the proper remedy for the petitioner Amarjit Singh was to resort to the procedure provided by the Sea Customs Act, I am, of the opinion that his petition under Art. 226 should be dismissed. In view of this finding I do not think it necessary to give any decision in regard to the question debated before us as to whether there has been a transgression of the principles of natural justice, because, any opinion expressed by us may prejudice the rights of one or the other party. In view of this finding I do not think it necessary to give any decision in regard to the question debated before us as to whether there has been a transgression of the principles of natural justice, because, any opinion expressed by us may prejudice the rights of one or the other party. I have no doubt that the appellate authority with the appeal under Section 188 of Sea Customs Act, if one is brought, will give the petitioner Amarjit Singh such hearing as under the principles of natural justice he should be entitled to and will take every fact into consideration which may be urged by him and Sections 188 and 190 are wide enough to give to the petitioner all the relief that he may be entitled to." In the case of Annie Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras, reported in AIR 1919 PC 31, their Lordships observed : " 'Certiorari' according to the English rule is only to be granted where no other suitable remedy exists." Again, in AIR 1947 PC 78, Lord Uthwatt observed as follows : "Under the Act (S. 45) there arises a duty to pay the amount of tax demanded on the basis of that assessment of total income. Jurisdiction to question the assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly provided by the Act would appear to be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay arising by virtue of the assessment.' In this context it would be useful to refer to the observations of Chagla, C.J. in the case of Walchandnagar Industries Ltd. v. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1953 Bom 195 - "It was never the intention of our Constitution-makers that Art.226 should supplant the ordinary remedies open to a citizen. If that had been the case, then it would have been left to the option of a party aggrieved whether to file a suit in the ordinary Court of law or to approach us to exercise our jurisdiction under Art.226. Surely that could not be the interpretation of Art.226. Once it is conceded, as it is conceded by Mr. If that had been the case, then it would have been left to the option of a party aggrieved whether to file a suit in the ordinary Court of law or to approach us to exercise our jurisdiction under Art.226. Surely that could not be the interpretation of Art.226. Once it is conceded, as it is conceded by Mr. Joshi, that the exercise of our jurisdiction under Art.226 is discretionary certain principles must be laid down for the exercise of that discretionary jurisdiction, and one of the most important principles is that if a citizen can obtain equally adequate, equally efficacious, equally prompt remedy in the ordinary Courts of law, ordinarily this Court would not exercise its discretion in his favour under Art.226." 33. In this context, it would be necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the two sets of cases - one where a statutory right of appeal and revision is expressly provided for questioning the decision objected to and the other where some other alternate remedy, such as by way of a fresh suit or other action, is available to the citizen. In the former case, as observed by the learned fudges of the Punjab High Court, with whose opinion I fully concur, there is no question of the exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The judicial machinery provided by the Parliament in the statute must be followed and the resort cannot be had to Article 226 so as to defeat and nullify and render nugatory these provisions. If the contrary view were correct then no citizen need file an appeal against a judgement in a civil or criminal court which goes against him, although each appeal may be provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and can directly approach the High Court under Art.226 without filing the said appeal. It would indeed be most extraordinary to envisage such a situation. An employee of a management, whose dispute with it is the subject matter of an industrial dispute, need not follow the machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act but can straightaway come under Article 226 of the Constitution as this Court to interfere in the dispute. It would indeed be most extraordinary to envisage such a situation. An employee of a management, whose dispute with it is the subject matter of an industrial dispute, need not follow the machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act but can straightaway come under Article 226 of the Constitution as this Court to interfere in the dispute. The same situation could arise under the Indian Income-tax Act where although a set machinery is provided by way of an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner against an order of assessment and against his decision to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal a. citizen could brush aside all these provisions ignoring them altogether and by-passing them come straight to this Court and ask for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the assessment order. Is this done by any High Court ? Can it be done ? These are the questions which one must ask oneself seriously before a decision is reached to extend the aid of Article 226 of the Constitution in cases where a judicial machinery is advisedly provided for and prescribed by the Parliament in the statute governing the case. Hence, in a case of this kind where a clear and specific right of appeal is provided to a judicial tribunal charged with the duty of acting judicially, and is not availed of, this Court should on that very ground refuse to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. I do not agree with the observations of Sir Trevor-Harries, C.J. in the case of Assistant Collector of Customs v. Soorajmull Nagannull, reported in AIR 1952 Cal 656 , where the learned Chief Justice referred to appeals under the Sea Customs Act "as appeals from Caesar to Ceasar which might not inspire great confidence in aggrieved persons". This Amounts, with great respect to overlooking the fact that these tribunals are charged with the duty of acting and deciding judicially and are judicial tribunals whose judgement s are subject to scrutiny by the Supreme Court to appeal preferred to it under Article 136 of the Constitution as recently laid down by the Supreme Court. 34. This Amounts, with great respect to overlooking the fact that these tribunals are charged with the duty of acting and deciding judicially and are judicial tribunals whose judgement s are subject to scrutiny by the Supreme Court to appeal preferred to it under Article 136 of the Constitution as recently laid down by the Supreme Court. 34. Even in cases where there is no special right of appeal and revision provided under the statute, under which the impugned action is taken, the decisions discourage the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by the issue of a writ of certiorari where any other alternative remedy is available, which takes us to the second category of cases referred to earlier in tins judgement. 35. In the case of Union of India v. T.R. Varma, reported in AIR 1957 SC 882 , it was observed by their Lordships as follows : "At the very outset we have to observe that a writ petition under Art.226 is not the appropriate proceeding for adjudication of disputes like the present. Under the law, a person whose services have been wrongfully terminated is entitled to institute an action to vindicate his rights, and in such an action, the Court will be competent to award all the reliefs to which he may be entitled, including some which would not be admissible in a writ petition. "It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ but as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCR 566 : AIR 1950 SC 163 the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs" : Vide also K.S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission 195.) SCR 738 at p. 747 : ( AIR 1954 SC 207 at p. 210). And "where such remedy exits, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art.226, unless there are good grounds therefor . . . . And "where such remedy exits, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art.226, unless there are good grounds therefor . . . . " In the case of N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar reported in AIR 1959 SC 422 at p. 429, their Lordships observed as follows : "The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against orders of the Tribunal is undoubted; but then it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided, the Court may properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Art.226. It should be remembered that under the election law as it stood prior to the amendment in 1956, election petitions were dismissed on preliminary grounds and the correctness of the decision was challenged in applications under Art.226 and in further appeals to this Court, with the result that by the time the matter was finally decided, the life of the Legislatures for which the election as held would have itself very nearly come to an end, thus rendering the proceedings infructuous. A signal example of a case of this kind is to be found in the decision reported, in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyan AIR 1955 SC 610 . It is to remedy this defect that the Legislature has now amended the law by providing a right of appeal against a decision of the Tribunal to the High Court under S. 116-A, and its intention is obviously that proceedings before the Tribunal should go on with expedition and without interruption, and that any error in its decision should be set right in on appeal under that section. In this view, it would be a proper exercise of discretion under Art.226 to decline to interfere with interlocutory orders." In this connection. Dr. Medhi placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 at p. 94. That was a case of a departmental enquiry and of the departmental appeal and revision provided in the departmental regulation having been availed of but without success. Dr. Medhi placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 at p. 94. That was a case of a departmental enquiry and of the departmental appeal and revision provided in the departmental regulation having been availed of but without success. Obviously, that was not a case of a statutory right of appeal and revision, advisedly provided against a decision proving adverse to the party affected and yet it was observed that it is only in very extraordinary circumstances and cases that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is exercised, and such circumstances are pointed out by S.R. Das, C.J. in that decision, and is extracted below : "On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases - and the instant case is in point - where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot he obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's senses of fair play the superior court may we think quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunal hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The superior court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. The superior court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that." Even these observations must be taken alongside of the facts of that particular case where the learned Chief Justice was only dealing with a case of mere departmental tribunals and not statutory authorities charged with the duty of exercising judicial functions. 36. Further, it must be noted that the write petition tinder Article 226 of the Constitution was filed in that case only after the petitioner had exhausted all his remedies under the Police Act read with the Regulations, and the learned Judges in that case were dealing with an extreme and extraordinary type of case where the Presiding Officer himself gave evidence in the case counter to the evidence of the petitioner and the situation was, therefore, such that the Judge in the cause played the two roles of a Judge as well as a witness and had to weigh and consider his own evidence as-against that of the petitioner. It is because of these facts that the learned Chief Justice held that the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by the tribunal leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which could not be obliterated or cured except by the issue of a writ of certiorari. 37. In my considered opinion, this case has no application to the instant case where the facts and circumstances are entirely different. 38. In the view I have taken that the instant case falls within the first category of cases, and, therefore relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is not available to the petitioners, it is unnecessary to examine the matter on its merits. Yet as the question has been considered by my Lord the Chief Justice, who has come to the conclusion on such consideration that a writ of certiorari should issue in the case, I propose to briefly refer to the points relied on. 39. The objection is based on the contention that principles of natural justice had been violated in this case by the learned Customs-collector and that such violation would justify the intervention of this Court by the issue of a writ of certiorari. 39. The objection is based on the contention that principles of natural justice had been violated in this case by the learned Customs-collector and that such violation would justify the intervention of this Court by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The alleged violation of the principles of natural justice is based on the assumption, that the contention of the petitioner that he purchased the goods from a licence holder in Calcutta, and had not imported it in contravention of the law was sought to be controverted by making use of a statement said to have been made by the said licence holder Messrs. Dayalji Bhawanji Calcutta to the effect that the two bundles of cinnamon bearing marks "China Junk Brand" were sold to Sri Sanwarmal Purohit, petitioner in Civil Rule 199 of 1962 in the original packing and that the bundles weighed 80 Ibs. nett each, without the statement being placed before the petitioner; and without the said Dayalji Bhawanji being produced for cross-examination by the petitioner. Another contention on which the violation of the principles of natural justice is sought to be supported is that the Customs-collector repelled the contention of the petitioner that he brought the goods from Gauhati to Shillong relying upon the information obtained from the Transport Department behind the back of the petitioner. 40. It would be necessary to examine whether it was at all obligatory on the Customs-collector to have taken the steps as contended by the petitioners. 41. The matter can be appreciated by a consideration of the admitted facts in the case. Cinnamon, which is a controlled commodity, and the import of which from outside, to this country could only have been effected under an import licence was seized within the area of the customs frontier, contained in two packages, which were in original packing and which bore marks of the packages having come from outside India. Neither of the petitioners in these civil rules had any permit or licence under which they could have imported the cinnamon in question. Neither of the petitioners in these civil rules had any permit or licence under which they could have imported the cinnamon in question. Prima facie, therefore, a case was made out against the petitioners, which was sought to be rebutted by them by claiming that the petitioner, Sanwarmal Purohit, in Civil Rule No. 199 of 1962 had purchased these packages from one M/s Dayalji Bhawanji of 12/13 Amratola Street Calcutta and in support of the alleged purchase, the said petitioner produced a Bill No. 347 dated 18-7-61, appended to the petition as Annexure-'B', in Civil Rule 199 of 1962, and brought the packages by train to Pandu and from there by bus to Shillong. Obviously, it is up to the said petitioner to establish the genuineness of Annexure-'B' and the circumstance that he had in fact brought the packages from Calcutta to Pandu and from Pandu to Shillong. It is true, the Department had to verify for their own satisfaction as well as in the public interest whether the plea advanced was true or not, and in the course of such verification it was found that the description of the packages seized as well as their weight did not tally at all with the description contained in the Bill No. 347, and these discrepancies were brought to the notice of the petitioners from time to time during the consideration of the case. If the petitioners did not care to place the necessary evidence before the Customs-collector in support of their defence, they have themselves to be blamed. It was quite unnecessary for the Customs-collector to bring evidence to rebut the plea of the petitioners when the petitioners themselves did not bother to lead evidence in support of the plea. It is seen from the order of the Customs-collector as well as from the materials placed on record that from time to time the attention of the petitioners was drawn to the information that was received or collected by the Department. It was perfectly legitimate for the Customs-collector to have rejected the plea of Sanwarmal Purohit that; he purchased the packages that were seized by the Customs, under Annexure B, if he was not satisfied on the evidence, placed before him, of the truth of this purchase. 42. It was perfectly legitimate for the Customs-collector to have rejected the plea of Sanwarmal Purohit that; he purchased the packages that were seized by the Customs, under Annexure B, if he was not satisfied on the evidence, placed before him, of the truth of this purchase. 42. On the question that the plea of the petitioner that he travelled from Calcutta to Shillong with the two packages was not accepted, basing on evidence collected behind the back of the petitioner, does not also appear to be correct. If it was the case of the petitioner, Sanwarmal Purohit, that he had purchased the seized packages bona fide from a licence-holder at Calcutta and that he brought them from Calcutta to Shillong and that under his instructions they were being despatched to Gauhati, that case had to be made out by the petitioner, as it is a plea on which he relies to rebut the prima facie case that is made out by the evidence supplied by the seizure of the articles in question. Even here, the evidence gathered by the Department, which was against the plea of the petitioners, was, in fact, put to the petitioners and they were given an opportunity to offer their explanation, and if the explanation was not found to be satisfactory by the Customs-collector, he would be perfectly justified hi rejecting it. This is not, therefore, a case where certain evidence is being used against the petitioners without their having had an opportunity to meet the same. It is not therefore understood how any principles of natural justice could be said to have been violated in these matters. 43. In this context it would be necessary to consider what exactly would be the principles of natural justice that could be held to be applicable to a tribunal like the Customs-collector. Obviously, we cannot apply the same rigid principles which we may have to apply to Courts of law and justice presided over by legally qualified and experienced officers, a fact recognised by the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 1963 SC 375 . The following passage may be quoted : "The sole point for determination in this appeal therefore is whether the procedure adopted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in admitting the statements of witnesses examined before Mr. Mujumdar in evidence is opposed to the rules of natural justice. The following passage may be quoted : "The sole point for determination in this appeal therefore is whether the procedure adopted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in admitting the statements of witnesses examined before Mr. Mujumdar in evidence is opposed to the rules of natural justice. The question is one of importance because as appears from the cases, which have come before us the procedure followed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in this case is the one followed by many tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. For a correct appreciation of the position, it is necessary to repeat what has often been said that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not Courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity had been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in Courts." These observations, in my opinion, apply to the facts of the instant case. The Customs-collector had given opportunities to the petitioners by way of personal hearing to explain the material or information that was obtained by him from time to time. For instance, a copy of the letter received from M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji of Calcutta was furnished to the petitioner in Civil Rule 209 of 1962, who was appearing by the same Counsel as the petitioner in Civil Rule 199 of 1962, and the attention of both the petitioners was drawn to the discrepancies between the Bill, Annexure-'B', produced by the petitioner in Civil Rule 199 of 1962, and the markings on the packages seized. Again, when information was received by the Department that the petitioner in Civil Rule 199 had not booked the packages, said to have been brought by him from Calcutta, either from Calcutta to Pandu or from Pandu to Shillong, which was a most extra-ordinary thing to do, this, as also the discrepancy in the proof sought to be produced by him with reference to the ticket that was purchased, were all brought to the notice of the petitioner by Office letter No. VIII-.10/34/61 dated 14-2-62, and he was asked whether he had anything to say in this matter, and a copy of this letter was endorsed to the petitioner Hariprasad Tharad, in Civil Rule 200 of 1962. In fact, on a careful consideration of the order of the Customs-collector, which is questioned in these proceedings, I am satisfied that adequate opportunity was given to the petitioners to explain the circumstance and the information that was received or collected by the Department and which was against them. An opportunity was given to offer explanation both in writing as well as at a personal hearing. This is certainly a sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice that could be said to be applicable to a tribunal like the Customs-collector, and what has been done in this case, in my opinion, satisfies the standards laid down in the Supreme Court case, reported in AIR 1963 SC 375 , quoted above. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the principles of natural justice have not at all been violated in these cases and what has been done was in full conformity with such principles of natural justice as could reasonably be held to be applicable to the proceedings of the Customs-collector, and that as the petitioners had failed to rebut the case against them by adducing satisfactory proof that they were in bona fide possession of the goods in question, having purchased the same from a person who had validly imported the same under a licence, the conclusion reached by the Customs-collector cannot be assailed, and the petitions, therefore, must fail and be dismissed. 44. I would accordingly discharge! the rules issued in these cases and dismiss the petition with cost which is assessed at Rs. 100/- in each case. 45. 44. I would accordingly discharge! the rules issued in these cases and dismiss the petition with cost which is assessed at Rs. 100/- in each case. 45. DUTTA, J. :- I have had the opportunity of going through the judgement of my Lord the Chief Justice as well as of my learned brother Nayudu, J. I agree with the views expressed by my Lord the Chief Justice, but I want to say a few words of my own. 46. The facts of the case are in a very narrow compass. On 9-8-61 the Land Customs Officers stopped a car at Gauhati as it was coming from. Shillong and recovered from it two packages of cinnamon and one package of cloves. They were seized as the Customs Officers believed them to be illicitly imported goods. One Binoyendra Das was the driver of the car and one Madhoprasad Tharad, son of accused Hariprasad Tharad of Shillong, was travelling in the same. Madhoprasad said that he did not know anything about these goods, whereas the driver said that he loaded them in Shillong at the shop of his master Hariprasad Tharad, but did not know where they were to be delivered. The car which belonged to Hariprasad Tharad was also seized. On 14-8-61 Hariprasad Tharad made a statement saying that the cloves and the cinnamon belonged to one Sanwarmal Tharad and one Sanwarmal Purohit respectively. He further stated that while his eldest son was going to Gauhati in connection with his studies, he sent the three packages in the car but could not give detailed instructions as the car left when he was not in the shop. Sanwarmal Tharad and Sanwarmal Purohit subsequently claimed the cloves and the cinnamon respectively. After enquiry the seized package of cloves was released and Sanwarmal Tharad was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. Proceedings against the driver and Madhoprasad were also dropped. But penalties were imposed on Hariprasad Tharad and Sanwarmal Purohit, to the extent of Rs. 2,500/- and Rs. 1500/- respectively. The car was seized but an option was given to redeem it on payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. These two civil rules relate to the writ petitions filed by Hariprasad Tharad and Sanwarmal Purohit respectively against that order. 47. The two accused persons have been penalised under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act by the Collector. The car was seized but an option was given to redeem it on payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. These two civil rules relate to the writ petitions filed by Hariprasad Tharad and Sanwarmal Purohit respectively against that order. 47. The two accused persons have been penalised under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act by the Collector. Section 188 of the Act provides for appeal against an order passed by the Collector. Therefore, the first question that arises is whether this Court can issue a writ of certiorari when there was an alternative remedy been to the accused persons which they did not avail of. The law is, however well settled that a High Court will not refuse to issue a writ of certiorari merely because there is a right of appeal. No doubt, ordinarily the High Court will require the petitioner to have recourse to his ordinary remedies, but if it finds that there is a breach of any fundamental principle of justice, the High Court will certainly not hesitate to issue a writ of certiorari. The law has been stated thus by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 . "There is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will be although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute." 48. It was further observed that a superior Court would readily issue a certiorari in a case where there had been a denial of natural justice. 49. Moreover, to be a bar the issue of certiorari, the other remedy must be adequate. It is the inadequacy and the failure of justice, and not the mere absence of another remedy, that determines the right to certiorari. The adequacy of a remedy was considered by the Supreme Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 403 . This was an appeal from the judgement of the High Court of Nagpur dismissing a writ petition by which certain provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 were questioned. The adequacy of a remedy was considered by the Supreme Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 403 . This was an appeal from the judgement of the High Court of Nagpur dismissing a writ petition by which certain provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 were questioned. The petitioner firm refused to pay sales tax on purchases of cotton made by it and apprehending that it might be compelled to pay the tax, filed the writ petition before the High Court. One of the arguments before the Supreme Court was that because a remedy under the impugned Act was available, the petitioner was disentitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court repelled this argument by pointing out that the remedy provided by the Act was of an onerous and burdensome character inasmuch as before the appellant could avail of it, he had to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Similarly in the case before us the effect of the provisions of Section 189 of the Sea Customs Act is that before a person can appeal under Section 188 of the Act, he has to deposit in the hands of the Customs Collector the amount of duty, or penalty adjudged against him. In the present case heavy penalties were imposed and it would have been very burdensome for the accused to prefer an appeal under Section 188. For this reason alone the writ petitions are maintainable. 50. The next question is whether there was any failure of justice in the trial of the accused. Of course there is no fixed definition of the term "natural justice" and what is natural justice will depend on the circumstances of each individual case. But there are certain cardinal principles of law which must be followed in every trial. Thus a man must not be condemned without being given a reasonable opportunity to meet the case against him. Again the prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt and this burden never shifts. These are two of the cardinal principles which if not observed lead to complete failure of justice. We may examine if there was any such failure in the present case. Again the prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt and this burden never shifts. These are two of the cardinal principles which if not observed lead to complete failure of justice. We may examine if there was any such failure in the present case. Sanwarmal Purohit submitted a bill in support of his contention that he purchased the cinnamon from a firm known as Dayalji Bhawanji of Calcutta. The Central Excise authorities made some inquiries in Calcutta and took a statement from that firm. It is said that whereas in the bill the cinnamon was described as "Junk Brand China", in a written statement it was stated by the firm that the cinnamon sold to 'Sanwarmal Purohit was "China Junk Brand". Again the import mark on the packages sold, according to the firm, was "Calcutta, Produce of China". But the Collector on examination of the outer gunny cover and the inner mattings of the seized packages found the words "Chittagong - Produce of China" in the inner mattings. Another piece of evidence was that Sanwarmal "Purohit produced one receipt issued by the Assam State Transport, Shillong, saying that the receipt was issued against ticket No. 4959 with which ha travelled in a Second Class carriage on 6-8-61 from Pandu to Shillong when he brought the cinnamon. Certain inquiries were then made by the Central Excise authorities and it was said to have been stated by the Station Superintendent, State Transport, Gauhati that only one Second Class ticket was issued on 6-8-61 and it was ticket No. 4959 issued to one A. Singh On further inquiries, a clerk of State Transport, Shillong was said to have alleged that Sanwarmal Purohit got the receipt by misrepresentation. 51. The Collector of Central Excise bases his findings mainly on the above facts. But no copy of the written statement of the firm Dayalji Bhawanji was given to Sanwarmal Purohit. It is not even known who gave that statement. The person who gave it was neither produced nor named nor was it disclosed what position he held in the firm. Neither the Superintendent of State Transport nor the clerk who made allegations of misrepresentation by Sanwarmal Purohit was questioned in presence of the accused or their lawyer. All these inquiries were made behind the back of the accused. 52. The person who gave it was neither produced nor named nor was it disclosed what position he held in the firm. Neither the Superintendent of State Transport nor the clerk who made allegations of misrepresentation by Sanwarmal Purohit was questioned in presence of the accused or their lawyer. All these inquiries were made behind the back of the accused. 52. It may be noted that, as observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 264 , the provisions of the Sea Customs Act being penal in character, a proceeding under it should be governed by principles of criminal jurisprudence. The following observation made in that case may serve as a guidance, viz. "This Court has held that a customs officer is not a judicial tribunal and that a proceeding before him is not a prosecution. But it cannot be denied that the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Land Customs Act are penal in character. The appropriate customs authority is empowered to make an inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a person under the said Acts summon and examine witnesses, decide whether an offence is committed, make an order of confiscation of the goods in respect of which the offence is committed and impose penalty on the person concerned : see Ss. 168 and 171-A of the Sea Customs Act and Ss. 5 and 7 of the Land Customs Act. To such a situation, though the provisions of the Code may not apply except in so far as they are statutorily made applicable, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and of natural justice must necessarily apply. If so, the burden of proof is on the customs authorities and they have to bring home the guilt to the person alleged to have committed a particular offence under the said Acts by adducing satisfactory evidence." 53. Under Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act if goods to which this section applies are seized on a reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods is on the person from whose possession the goods are seized. Cinnamon is not goods to which this section applies. Under Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act if goods to which this section applies are seized on a reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods is on the person from whose possession the goods are seized. Cinnamon is not goods to which this section applies. Yet the Collector has dealt with the present case in a manner as if when a person was found with cinnamon which could not be imported without a licence, the burden was on him to prove that he came by it honestly. The Collector wanted the accused to prove that he got the cinnamon legally and actually took it from Calcutta to Shillong. When the accused came with some explanation, these were rejected on some inquiries made behind his back. Thus the whole procedure adopted by the Collector was completely wrong and consequently there was failure of justice. In the result, this is a fit case where a writ of certiorari should issue. 54. PER CURIAM :- In view of the decision of the majority, these two petitions are allowed. The order of the Collector of Customs is quashed. In Civil Rule 199 of 1962 the petitioner is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 100/-. The other petition is allowed without costs. Petitions allowed.