JUDGMENT Gyanendra Kumar, J. - This is an appeal by the defendant Municipal Board of Balandshahr against concurrent decrees of the courts below, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff respondents. The case of the plaintiffs was that the disputed plot no. 788/1 measuring 15 biswas belonged to Smt. Bhagwati Kuer (Proforma defendant No. 2) as zamindars. The lady granted a permanent lease of 13 biswas out of this plot to one Shyam Mahohar Bhatia by means of a registered deed dated 24-4-1936. The said Shyam Manohar Bhatia made some constructions on the land and then sold the plot along with the constructions to the plaintiffs by means of a registered sale deed dated 31-7-1940. Thereafter, the plaintiffs also raised certain constructions thereon. Sometime later the plaintiffs wanted to make certain additional constructions over the land and for that purpose they submitted a plan to the Municipal Board for sanction. The appellant Board refused to sanction the plan on the ground that a portion of the land which was sought to be constructed upon consisted of a public way which had vested in the Municipal Board. The plaintiffs' case was that the aforesaid assertion of the Board was absolutely wrong. It was stated in paragraph 7 of the plaint that the plaintiffs wanted to make certain constructions on the plot in question and with that object in view they had submitted a plan for sanction to the Municipal Board but it refused to sanction the constructions on the plea that there was a public way on the disputed plot. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it was asserted that the Municipal Board had nothing to do with the land in suit nor was it in possession thereof. The aforesaid act of the Board being illegal and detrimental to the rights and interest of the plaintiffs, they were obliged to file the suit. 2. Smt. Bhagwati Kuer (proforma defendant no. 2) filed a written statement supporting the case of the plaintiffs and alleged that she had granted a permanent lease as alleged by the plaintiffs and had delivered possession thereof to the lessee Shyam Manohar Bhatia who in his turn, had sold away the plot to the plaintiffs. 3. The Municipal Board alone contested the suit on various grounds. 2) filed a written statement supporting the case of the plaintiffs and alleged that she had granted a permanent lease as alleged by the plaintiffs and had delivered possession thereof to the lessee Shyam Manohar Bhatia who in his turn, had sold away the plot to the plaintiffs. 3. The Municipal Board alone contested the suit on various grounds. Inter alia it denied the permanent lease and sale set up by the plaintiffs and further alleged that the land was a public way and had vested that the land was a public way and had vested in the defendant Board as such. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by Section 326 of the Municipalities Act, 1916 inasmuch as no notice had been given to the Board and the suit was filed without the expiry and the statutory period of six months. 4. It is note-worthy that the plaintiff had abstained from filing the original lease deed and sale deed or even certified copies thereof in proof of their title of the land. They simply relied upon the admission made by Smt. Bhagwati Kuer (proforma defendant No. 2) to the effect that she had granted a permanent lease to Shyam Manohar Bhatia, who in his turn had sold the plot to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs further relied upon the certified copy of a judgment dated 30th November, 1944 (Ex.10) in Suit No. 96 of 1943 Om Prakash and Lakshmi Devi v. Mohan Lal, in which the right and title of the plaintiffs to the land in suit was recognised. 5. The courts below did not satisfactorily deal with the case and failed to appreciate the real controversy between the parties as well as the question of law involved therein. In the result, they decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for the declaration sought by them. 6. Mr. Shri Gopal Singh, appearing for the appellant Board, has argued this case with ability and has pointed out the various illegalities committed by the courts below. In the result, they decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for the declaration sought by them. 6. Mr. Shri Gopal Singh, appearing for the appellant Board, has argued this case with ability and has pointed out the various illegalities committed by the courts below. In the first place, it was alleged that the permanent lease deed as well as the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiffs were required by law to be reduced to writing and were compulsorily registrable, and that in the absence of production of the aforesaid documents or even their certain copies, no evidence could have been adduced regarding the disposition of these properties in favour of the plaintiffs. He has relied on the clear terms of Section 91 of the Evidence Act which runs as follows:- "When the terms of a contract, or of a grant or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in case in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions here in above contained." 7. The plaintiffs were, therefore, bound to produce the original lease deed and sale deed or at least their certified copies in proof of their title to the property. No explanation has been rendered for their failure to do so. The so called admission of Smt. Bhagwati Kuer in her written statement that she had executed a permanent lease in favour of Shyam Manohar Bhatia and that the latter had sold the properties to the plaintiffs could be of no avail and is inadmissible in evidence. It is also note-worthy that Smt. Bhagwati Kuer has been arrayed merely as a proforma defendant cannot bind the Municipal Board, defendant No. 1. Similar is the case with the ipse dixit contained in the oral statement of P.W.1 Piarey Lal Bhatia who also deposed to the same effect. The result is that the plaintiff's have failed to substantiate their title to the property in question by any legal evidence. 8. Similar is the case with the ipse dixit contained in the oral statement of P.W.1 Piarey Lal Bhatia who also deposed to the same effect. The result is that the plaintiff's have failed to substantiate their title to the property in question by any legal evidence. 8. The plaintiffs having failed to prove their title to the property in question, they could not have filed the suit for mere declaration in respect of the property, as the same is barred by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 9. In Sheoparsan Singh v. Ram Nandan Prasad Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 78, it was observed by the Board that a plaintiff coming under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act must be entitled to a legal character or to a right as to property. Without such proof of right and title, a plaintiff cannot sue for mere declaration regarding a property alleged to be belonging to him. Likewise in Bandaru Subbaradu v. Satya Narain Raju, A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 25, Munikanniah J., relying on the aforesaid Privy Council decision, clearly pointed out that a suit for declaratory decree will not lie when the plaintiff is neither entitled to any legal character now to any right in the suit property. 10. The perusal of the plaint shows that the cause of action had arisen to the plaintiffs on 5-9-46 while the suit was filed on 1-10-46, without giving the requisite notice under Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it was clearly stated that the plaintiffs were dissatisfied against the act of the Municipal Board in refusing to sanction the plan of the proposed constructions submitted by the plaintiffs. Thus the suit was against the Municipal Board "in respect of an act done or purported to have been done in its official capacity." That being so the plaintiffs were bound to give two months' statutory notice to the Board before instituting the suit, as required by Section 326(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. There is no manner of doubt that the refusal by the Municipal Board to sanction the plan submitted by the plaintiffs was an act within the meaning of Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. There is no manner of doubt that the refusal by the Municipal Board to sanction the plan submitted by the plaintiffs was an act within the meaning of Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. Even an illegal refusal to grant the sanction prayed for by the plaintiffs would fall within the ambit and definition of the words "an act done" as used in Section 326 of the Act. If authority on the point were necessary, the same are to be found in Dargahi Lal Nigam v. Cawnpore Municipal Board, A.I.R. 1952 All. 382 (F.B.) : 1952 A.L.J. 122 and Haji Ahmad Raza v. Municipal Board, Allahabad, A.I.R. 1952 All. 711 (F.B.) : 1952 A.L.J. 223. 11. In the light of the above mentioned of law and authorities on the subject, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to have served a statutory notice under Section 326 of the said Act before instituting the suit. 12. In the end, it may be summarised that the plaintiffs have failed to adduce legal evidence in support of their title. They have also failed to give statutory notice to the Board before instituting the suit, which was bound to be dismissed. The courts below have acted illegally in decreeing the same. 13. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts and below and dismiss the suit. However, in view of the fact that the Municipal Board had set up a right of way over the land in question which it has failed to substantiate, I order that the parties shall bear their own costs.