KAN SINGH, J.—These are four writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and are directed against the judgments of the Revenue Board whereby the revision applications arising out of proceedings relating to preparation of record of rights in respect of certain lands, in the course of settlement operations, were dismissed. As the writ petitions are more or less of identical nature and common questions of law are raised therein, it will be convenient to dispose them of together. 2. We may mention the facts as contained in writ petition No. 101/61 for the purpose of appreciating the points that arise for consideration before us. The petitioner Hussain Beg was a co-sharer muafidar in village Makbara, Tehsil Toda Bhim, district Sawai Madhopur. The land of Khasra No.25 which is in dispute measures 4 bighas and 12 biswas and covers two fields. In the revenue records these fields were entered as Makbuza Panodar Jagirdar. In September, 1913 when Settlement operations were going on, the name of one Bhagwatilal was entered as a person in possession as mortgagee. It is the case of the petitioner that there were fruit trees on the boundries of the two fields and they were planted by Bhagwatilal and Kishorilal or their ancestors, and out of the produce of the trees the petitioner used to take 1/3 share whereas 2/3 share was retained by Bhagwati Lal and Kishori Lal. Bhagwati Lal and Kishori Lal or their ancestors are said to have planted these trees some 30 years ago. Sometime later, the petitioner had pledged the right to take 1/3 share of the produce with Bhagwati Lal and Kishorilal but that pledge was, according to the petitioner, redeemed in due course. On or about 3.8.50, respondent No. 4 Chhotey Khan is said to have purchased the trees on the land from Kishorilal and accordingly Chhotey Khan became liable to give 1/3 share of the produce of the trees to the petitioner. Chhotey Khan, op the other hand, claimed that the 1/3 share of the petitioner in the produce of the trees continued to be pledged with him, but regarding the existence or the redemption of the pledge there is no dispute before us. Chhotey Khan, op the other hand, claimed that the 1/3 share of the petitioner in the produce of the trees continued to be pledged with him, but regarding the existence or the redemption of the pledge there is no dispute before us. It is averred by the petitioner that as the trees were located on the boundaries of the fields he used to cultivate the remaining vacant space of the land and also used to take its natural produce such as grass or pala (bush leaves). During the course of settlement operations respondent No. 4 Chhotey Khan applied before the revenue officials for entering his name as Khatedar in the record and on 13.9.53 the Assistant Settlement Officer passed an order for entering his name in the record as a Khatedar tenant. On 14.9.53, the entered a caveat before the Assistant Settlement Officer whereby he questioned the correctness of the entry in favour of respondent No. 4 Chhotey Khan and prayed that his name be removed from the record and the petitioner be recorded as a Khatedar tenant instead, inasmuch as the land was the Knudkasht of the petitioner. This dispute was enquired into by the Assistant Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Record Officer, Kota, who after taking the evidence of both the parties came to the conclusion that there was no ground for modifying the entry already made. He held that the trees belonged to respondent No. 4, who had been paying 1/3 share of the produce thereof to the petitioner and therefore, his status was that of a Khatedar tenant. The learned Assistant Settlement Officer took note of the fact that there were 76 big trees on the land out of which 70 were mango trees and 6 were pipali jamun neem etc. Further there were 26 pits made ready for planting more trees therein out of which there were 18 saplings still in existence. The Assistant Settlement Officer also held that "the contention of the non-applicant (present petitioner) that they did cultivation in this land was untenable. It was further observed by him that "the land was banjar and has been recorded as such He also observed that even if the muafidars be doing some scratching of the ground and growing some fodder, the holding will still be held to be a grove land. It was further observed by him that "the land was banjar and has been recorded as such He also observed that even if the muafidars be doing some scratching of the ground and growing some fodder, the holding will still be held to be a grove land. In these circumstances he ordered that the land should continue to be entered in the khata of respondent No. 4. 3. He examined in this behalf the provisions of sec. 44(3) of the Jaipur Tenancy Act and held that "as mango trees were planted on the land rent was chargeable on the land and not on the basis of trees." In the end he directed that the rent be fixed according to the class of the soil. He repelled the suggestion of the petitioner that respondent No. 4 Chhotey Khan had interest only in trees, but had no interest in the land except that of growing trees thereon. He did not accept the suggestion that the possession of respondent No. 4 was only that of a licensee. 4. Against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, the petitioner went up in appeal to the Additional Collector, Sawai Madhopur, who affirmed the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer and dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then went in revision to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer. 5. The case was heard by a bench of the Board consisting of Sarvashri Kanwar Bahadur and R. N. Hawa, members. Shri Kanwar Bahadur held that the respondent No. 4-Chhotey Khan was entitled to get a parcha wherein he should be entered as a Khatedar and consequently the revision petition was directed to be dismissed. The other learned member Shri R.N. Hawa, however, dissented and came to the conclusion that the petitioner was the Khudkasht holder of the land and was, therefore, entitled to be recorded as a Khatedar tenant. Accordingly, he was of the view that the revision was fit to be accepted and the disputed land should be ordered to be made in the name of the petitioner by striking out the name of respondent No. 4 Chhotey Khan. The two members also differed regarding the effect of the resumption of the muafi land in the meantime on 29.10.54, by virtue of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act (Act No. VI), 1952. The two members also differed regarding the effect of the resumption of the muafi land in the meantime on 29.10.54, by virtue of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act (Act No. VI), 1952. Shri Kanwar Bahadur held that with the resumption of muafi land the right, title and interest of the petitioner therein came to an end and consequently he could not maintain an application for correction of entries in the record of rights. On the other hand, Shri R. N. Hawa held that the resumption of the muafi cannot put an end to the rights of the petitioner as a Khudkasht holder and he was entitled to maintain the petition. 6. The matter then went before the Chairman of the Board, Shri Shyamlal, as a third member. The learned Chairman agreed to the view taken by Shri Kanwar Bahadur and the result was that on the basis of the majority opinion the revision was rejected by the Board. 7. The petitioner has strenuously challenged before us the majority view of the Board and has placed reliance on the opinion recorded by Shri R. N. Hawa. It has been urged before us that no specific findings have been given by the revenue authorities including the Board regarding the cultivatory possession, over the said fields, of the parties. It is further urged that it has been wrongly held by the Revenue Board, merely on the basis of the existence of the trees, that the respondent No. 4 was in possession of the field. It has also been urged that the learned Chairman has not dealt with the matter properly, as he did not express in clear terms any opinion on the point on which the other two learned members differed namely, that according to one member Shri Kanwar Bahadur the respondent No. 1, could be held to be in possession of the holding as he was in possession of the trees, whereas according to the other learned member Shri R. N. Hawa, this could not be so, as there was evidence regarding the cultivatory possession by the petitioner over the land where trees were not growing. It was then argued in the alternative that the revenue authorities were clearly in error in applying the provisions of the Jaipur Tenancy Act to a grove land. It was then argued in the alternative that the revenue authorities were clearly in error in applying the provisions of the Jaipur Tenancy Act to a grove land. If the land in dispute were held to be a grove land as was done by Shri Kanwar Bahadur then the definition of the term land as given in the Jaipur Tenancy Act would not cover a grove land according to the petitioner with the result that there could be no tenancy rights in favour of the respondent No. 4 over the grove land and the only right that the respondent No. 4 could claim would be in respect of a share in the produce of the trees; the right, title and interest in the land itself remaining with the petitioner. According to the petitioner the revenue authorities had exceeded their jurisdiction when they resorted to the provisions of the Jaipur Tenancy Act in ordering the entries in favour of the respondent No. 4, specially when they came to the conclusion that it was grove land. As regards the grove lands, it is contended, the provisions of the general law would apply and the provisions of the Jaipur Tenancy Act would not apply. It is, therefore, prayed that as the revenue authorities had dealt with the case on a mistaken view of law and had not determined the question about the cultivatory possession over the fields, the judgments be quashed and the case be sent back for proper proceedings in the light of the correct position of law which should be laid down by this Court. 8. The writ petitions are opposed by the respondents and it is urged by them that this Court should decline to deal with the matter in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution as the matters regarding entries in the record of rights are disposed of by a summary inquiry and such making of entries does not result in final determination of the rights of the parties who are still free to get them determined through the agency of revenue courts, by a suit. As regards the plea that the petitioner was in cultivatory possession of the land it is urged that it is for the first time in this Court that the petitioners aver that all the trees are located on the boundaries of the field and the space within the boundaries is available for cultivation and was accordingly cultivated by the petitioners. The respondents also join issue on the question of the applicability of the provisions of the Jaipur Tenancy Act to grove lands. It is contended by them that the definition of the term land is not exhaustive and on a proper consideration of the scheme of the Act the term land can be taken to include grove land as well. It is further argued that the matter could properly be dealt with by the revenue officers, as the petitioner himself approached them with the case that he was in cultivatory possession of the fields and on his own showing the holding is an agricultural one and this could properly be taken note of in preparing the record of rights and issuing pachas on the basis thereof. 9. Before we deal with the points raised by the petitioner it will be convenient to mention the relevant statutory provisions. 10. In respect of the tenancies in Jagir areas and for the rights of the tenants therein in the former Jaipur State there was the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947, hereinafter to be referred as the 1947 Act for brevity. 11. Sec. 4(2) of 1947 Act provides that the terms agriculturist, land and rent (omitting terms which are not applicable) shall have the same meaning as provided in the Jaipur Tenancy Act, 1945, hereinafter to be referred for brevity as the 1945 Act. 12. The term tenant has been defined in 1947 Act to mean the person by whom rent is, but for a contract, express or implied would be payable and except when the contrary intention appears includes a sub-tenant. This definition of the term tenant is almost the same as that given in the 1945 Act with this difference that the 1945 Act excludes an ijaredar from the purview of the definition, whereas 1947 Act does not so exclude it. 13. This definition of the term tenant is almost the same as that given in the 1945 Act with this difference that the 1945 Act excludes an ijaredar from the purview of the definition, whereas 1947 Act does not so exclude it. 13. The term agriculturist has been defined in sec.4 of the 1945 Act to mean any person whose livelihood is derived wholly or mainly from cultivation of the soil by himself or with the aid of his own family or hired labour. 14. The term land has been defined in this Act to mean land which is let or held for agricultural purposes. 15. The term rent has been defined to mean whatever is, in cash or kind, or partly in cash and partly in kind, payable on account of the use or occupation of land or on account of any right in land and includes sayar. 16. The present dispute about the making of entries and issuing of parcha arose during the course of settlement operations while preparing the record of rights and it will be material to consider the effect of secs. 57, 58 and 59 of the 1947 Act and, therefore, they too are reproduced below: "Sec. 57. Determination of class of tenant—(I) case of any dispute respecting the class of tenure of any tenant, the record officer shall decide according to the principles laid down in Chapter II. (2) In the trial of disputes under this section, the record officer shall observe the procedure prescribed for the trial of suits under this Act. Sec.58. Procedure when rent payable is disputed— In case of any dispute regarding the rent payable by any tenant, the record officer shall not decide the dispute, but shall record, as payable for the year in which the record of rights is framed, the rent payable for the previous year, unless it has been enchanced or abated by a decree order or agreement under this Act. In Sec.59. Settlement of disputes as to entries in record of rights—(1) All other disputes regarding entries in the record of rights shall be decided on the basis of possession. In Sec.59. Settlement of disputes as to entries in record of rights—(1) All other disputes regarding entries in the record of rights shall be decided on the basis of possession. (2) If in the course of inquiry into a dispute under this section the record officer is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession, he shall ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled and shall put such person in possession. (3) No order as to possession passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing his right in any revenue court having jurisdiction." 17. It has been urged by the petitioner that as the respondent No. 4 had only a right to the produce of the trees and had no right in or over the land the revenue officers were in error in making an entry in the record that the respondent No. 4 was a Khatedar tenant. It was emphasised that the definition of the term land as given in the 1945 Act is limited to land which is let or held for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient thereto, and will not include a grove land. Reliance was placed on Kesho Prasad Singh vs. Shiva Prasad Ojha in this behalf (1). It was pointed out in that case that the definition of the term land in the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 did not cover grove land with the result that the period of limitation for suits provided under sec. 179 of the Agra Tenancy Act was not applicable to suits for possession of grove lands and the limitation thereof would be governed by the general law of limitation. 18. The matter that directly arose for determination in that case was whether a decree in a suit filed by one of the reversioners for setting aside an alienation by the Hindu window was not only binding on the reversioner who brought the suit, but also bound the whole body of reversioners because the reversioner who brings the suit does so in a representative capacity for the protection of the estate. No reversioner can be thought to claim through another, but as the reversioner who brings the suit does so in a representative character, the decision in the suit would be res judicata against all the reversioners. 19. We could not look into the previsions of sec. No reversioner can be thought to claim through another, but as the reversioner who brings the suit does so in a representative character, the decision in the suit would be res judicata against all the reversioners. 19. We could not look into the previsions of sec. 179 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, as the parties could not lay their hands on it. 20. We are, however, not convinced that this decision can help the petitioner in any manner in interpreting the provisions of the 1945 Act or the 1947 Act. The case before the Allahabad High Court eventually went in appeal to the Privy Council and it had been affirmed by it vide A.I.R. 1924 Privy Council-247. But here again their Lordships of the Privy Council directed their attention to the effect of the decision in a suit filed by a reversioner impeaching the alienation made by a Hindu widow as being res judicata against the body of reversioners. 21. As neither the 1945 Act, nor the 1947 Act define the term agriculture we have to construe the term in the sense it is understood in common parlance. In Murugesa Chetti vs. Chinnathambi Goundan and others (2) the question that came up for consideration was whether the lease of a betel garden was a lease for agricultural purposes within the meaning of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, so that it was not required to be registered. As the term agriculture was not defined in the relevant enactments that were examined the learned Judges looked to its dictionary meaning and after referring to several dictionaries came to the conclusion that the term agriculture will include horticulture. It was observed by the learned Judges a follows:— "The primary meaning of agriculture is the cultivation of the ground (The Century Dictionary) and in its general sense, it is the cultivation of the ground for the purpose of procuring vegetables and fruits for the use of man and beast including gardening or horticulture and the raising of feeding of cattle and other stock (Andersons Dictionary of Law). Its less general and more ordinary signification is the cultivation with the plough and in large areas in order to raise food for man and beast (The Century Dictionary) or, in other words, "that species of cultivation "which is intended to raise grain and other field crops for man "and beast", (Andersons Dictionary of Law) Horticulture, which denotes the cultivation of gardens or orchards, is a species of agriculture in its primary and more general sense. In sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act the word "agriculture" is, in my opinion, used in its more general sense as comprehending the raising of vegetables, fruits and other garden products as food for man and beast, though some of them maybe regarded in England as products of horticulture as distinguished from agriculture. A reference to sec. 106 which deals with all cases of immovable property and in which the same expression agricultural purpose" occurs, would clearly show that the Legislature could not have intended that the word "agriculture" was to be understood as excluding a large class of leases of garden lands in this country, some or many of which in England may perhaps be regarded as horticultural." 22. In King Emperor vs. Alexander Allan(3) the High Court had to consider whether the lands on which potatoes, green vegetables etc., are grown can be said to be used solely for agricultural purposes, so that the same can be said to be exempted from some municipal tax. As the term agriculture was not defined in the relevant enactments the learned Judges construed the term according to its dictionary meaning and they relied on the following extract from Oxford English Dictionary: "Oxford English Dictionary edited by Dr., J. A.H. Murray, which is admitted to be the standard authority in such matters, agriculture is defined as follows: "The science and art of cultivating the soil, including the allied pursuits of gathering in the crops and rearing livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming, (in the widest sense.)" 23. In Imamali Abdul Radar vs. Rani Priyawati Devi (4), the question that came up for consideration was whether cultivation of lac bearing trees amounted to agriculture, so that a lease therefor was not required to be in writing and registered in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge held that the term agriculture is a very wide one and it includes horticulture and forestry. 24. The learned Judge held that the term agriculture is a very wide one and it includes horticulture and forestry. 24. In Shujaat Haider vs. Mst. Habibunnissa (5), it was considered whether the land used for growing grass can be said to be one for agricultural purposes so as to be exempted from the requirement of registration and it was so held on the ground that the term agriculture has to be construed in the wide sense in which it is commonly understood. 25. To the same effect is the case of Babunandan Singh vs. Phunesh Singh (6), which related to the land over which bananas were grown. 26. Besides the dictionaries that have been referred to in the cases cited above, we would like to refer to the meaning of the term agriculture as given in Strouds Judicial Dictionary(7). "Agriculture" includes horticulture and the use of land for any purpose of husbandary, inclusive of the keeping or breeding of livestock, poultry or bees, and the growing of fruit, vegetables, and the like." In Corpus Juris the term "agriculture" has been understood to mean : "art or science of cultivating the ground, especially in fields or large quantities including the preparation of soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the rearing, feeding and management of live-stock, tillage, husbandry and farming. In its general sense the word also includes gardening or horticulture." 27. The definition of the term agriculturist in the 1945 Act will also give a clue for proper consideration of the question whether the term agriculture would include horticulture or the growing of trees on the land. Agriculturist is a person who cultivates the soil and the dictionary meaning of the word cultivate is to till; take care of; to bestow labour and attention upon land in order to the raising of crops; to improve and render fertile by husbandry (vide The Oxford English Dictionary. Almost the same meaning is given to the term in Websters New International Dictionary. 28. Preparing of the soil for the planting of trees, placing the seed therein and thereafter rearing the plant is nothing but an operation of husbandry. Thus we are satisfied that even though the definition of the term land, as given in the 1945 Act does not expressly include a grove land it will do so by necessary implication. 29. 28. Preparing of the soil for the planting of trees, placing the seed therein and thereafter rearing the plant is nothing but an operation of husbandry. Thus we are satisfied that even though the definition of the term land, as given in the 1945 Act does not expressly include a grove land it will do so by necessary implication. 29. Now the next question that calls attention is as to what was the nature of the jural relationship between the parties. It has been admitted by the petitioner in para 2 of his writ petition that the trees were planted more than 30 years back by Bhagwatilal and Kishorilal or their ancestors who used to enjoy share of the fruits of the trees and used to pay 1/8 share to the petitioner. Bhagwatilal and Kishorilal were the predecessor in interest of respondent No. 4. Thus, there is no doubt in our mind that what was being taken by the petitioner from Kishorilal and Bhagwatilal or their ancestors was nothing else than the rent within the meaning of the 1945 Act and the position of Bhagwatilal and Kishorilal or their ancestors was none else than that of Tenants. As observed by us already definition of the term tenant in the 1947 Act is wider than that given in the 1945 Act and would not exclude an Ijaredar. When Bhagwatilal and Kishorilal were retaining a definite share of the produce of the trees growing on the land there was in existence a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In the circumstances we are satisfied that the entry in the revenue record showing respondent No. 4 as a Khatedar tenant has been correctly made. 30. Again in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act grove land has been expressly included in the definition of the term land and therefore, even if the matter be sent back to the revenue authorities for examining the correctness of the entries in the records afresh it will not serve any useful purpose now, in our view, because under sec. 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act every person who, at the commencement of this Act was a tenant of land subject to the exceptions contained therein which are, however, not applicable, shall be deemed to be a Khatedar tenant. 31. 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act every person who, at the commencement of this Act was a tenant of land subject to the exceptions contained therein which are, however, not applicable, shall be deemed to be a Khatedar tenant. 31. We may then advert to the provisions of secs.57, 58 and 59 of the 1947 Act which have been reproduced above. Sec. 57 relates to disputes respecting the class of tenure of any tenant. In this case both the parties claim to be Khatedar tenants and, therefore, sec. 57 will not cover such a dispute. Sec. 58 relates to disputes about rent and, therefore, that section too will be inapplicable. The dispute, therefore, clearly fell under sec. 59 of the Act. According to this section such disputes regarding entries in the record of rights have to be decided on the basis of possession and the record officer has to satisfy himself regarding possession by making a summary inquiry as to whose name is to be entered in the record of rights. Then sub-sec. 3 of sec. 59 provides that no order as to possession passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing his right in any revenue court having jurisdiction. 32. Mr. Rastogi does not dispute before us that the petitioner could have filed a suit to establish his rights that may be taken to have been affected by the making of entries in favour of respondent No. 4. In the very nature of things the entries in revenue records have a very limited purpose namely, that of enabling the authorities to collect rent. The entire produce of a holding remains charged for the payment of rent and the rent is realisable not only from those who are the tenants, but also from the actual occupants of the soil who may have grown the produce (vide sec. 106 of the 1947 Act). 33. It is contended by the petitioner that the revenue authorities have clearly erred when they did not deal with the evidence adduced by the petitioner that he was cultivating the vacant land that was available to him in between the trees. 34. Shri Kanwar Bahadur has referred to the statement of Hussain Beg that he used to cultivate land and he also used to take 1/9 of the produce of the fruit trees. 34. Shri Kanwar Bahadur has referred to the statement of Hussain Beg that he used to cultivate land and he also used to take 1/9 of the produce of the fruit trees. He also referred to the statement of Chhotey Khan that after he had taken the Bagichi from Kishori Lal he had been in possession since long. The learned member then referred to the evidence that was recorded by the trial court and observed that "the land was in the form of a grove and all the trees standing thereon belong to the non-applicant." Shri R. N. Hawa, on the other hand, came to the conclusion that "the applicant has been able to prove that the land was under his Khudkasht and it was he who cultivated grass, pala etc., therefrom." The learned Chairman, however, observed that "the land in dispute has trees planted thereon in such numbers as they preclude and when full grown will preclude such land from being used primarily for any other agricultural purpose except horticulture. The opposite party have been in possession of the same long since, inclusive of their predecessors in interest." 35. It will be thus evident that the learned members of the Board have held different opinions about the cultivatory possession of the land by the petitioner. As observed by us earlier marking entries in the record of rights have a limited purpose and cannot result in settlement of disputes regarding the rights of the parties. We do not find it convenient to enter into disputes about facts specially when the members of the Board are not unanimous in recording their conclusions of facts. As regards the question whether a grove land is included in the definition of the term land in the Acts of 1945 or 1947, we have already held that it should be taken to be so included and further the position of respondent No. 4, to our mind also appears to be that of a tenant. If the petitioners feel aggrieved on account of the refusal of the revenue authorities to record him as a Khatedar tenant, then it is for him to establish his rights in a proper court and proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution are by no means appropriate for the purpose. 36. If the petitioners feel aggrieved on account of the refusal of the revenue authorities to record him as a Khatedar tenant, then it is for him to establish his rights in a proper court and proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution are by no means appropriate for the purpose. 36. As regards the view taken by the majority of the members of the Board regarding the right of the petitioner to file an application for correction of the entries after the resumption of muafi land we need only observe that if the petitioner were a Khudkasht holder then he would undoubtedly have the right to apply for getting an entry made to that effect notwithstanding the resumption of the Jagir Land As laid down in sec. 23 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, Khudkasht lands are exempted from resumption and they will continue to remain Khudkasht lands of the ex-Jagirdar and by operation of sec. 10 of that Act an ex-Jagirdar shall be deemed to be a Khatedar tenant of Khudkasht land and will be liable to be assessed at the village rate. 37. The parties agree that the other writ petitions are of indentical nature and they will share the fate of the present writ petition (Civil Writ Petition No. 101/61). In writ petition No. 133/61, it was asserted by the petitioner that when Assistant Settlement Officer inspected the site he found that the land had been ploughed and also there was a Kacha well. As observed by us earlier it is not possible for us to determine the question of facts as to whether the petitioner was cultivating the land not covered by the trees or not. In this view of the matter all the four cases present common features must meet the same fate. 38. In the circumstances we came to the conclusion that there is no force in the writ petitions. 39. Accordingly we hereby dismiss all the four writ petitions. In the circumstances of the case we pass no order as to costs.