JUDGMENT C.B. Capoor, J. - This appeal by the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi is directed against an appellate order of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Varanasi whereby an appeal preferred by the respondent against an order of a learned Special Honorary Magistrate, II class, Varanasi, finding the respondent guilty of having contravened the provisions of Section 307 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and sentencing him to a fine of Rs. 25/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month was allowed. 2. The respondent Ram Prakash Nagar was in occupation of house No. J-12/15 D in the Mohalla Dhoopchandi, Bolia Bagh, Varanasi in which at the relevant date, he carried on the business of electroplating and polishing. In order to carry on the aforesaid process, he had obtained the sanction of the Government, Uttar Pradesh, for 10 B.H.P. connection in the aforesaid premises and had paid a sum of Rs. 1,252/5/- as the installation charges to the Banaras Electric Light and Power Supply Co. Ltd. Adjacent to the aforesaid house were the premises No. J-12/15 (A)-1 of one Kanhaya Lal wherein he carried on the manufacturer of bells. There was a shaft connecting the machines installed in the premises of the respondent and those of Kanhaya Lal and through that shaft the respondent used to supply electric energy with which the machines installed in the premises of Kanhaya Lal used to work. On 18-1-1960 the Administrative of the Municipal Board, Varanasi issued a notice purporting to be under Section 245 of the U.P. Municipalities Act to the respondent requiring him to stop using his house No. J-12/15 D for manufacturing purposes as the machines installed therein were tantamount to public nuisance. He was required to comply with the notice within one week failing which legal action would be taken against him under sub-Section (2) of Section 245 of the Municipalities Act. The respondent failed to comply with the terms of the notice and his prosecution was sanctioned by the Administrator. A complaint was, accordingly, filed against the respondent wherein he was alleged to have contravened the provisions of Section 245/307 of the Municipalities Act. The respondent failed to comply with the terms of the notice and his prosecution was sanctioned by the Administrator. A complaint was, accordingly, filed against the respondent wherein he was alleged to have contravened the provisions of Section 245/307 of the Municipalities Act. The defence put forward by the respondent was that he was carrying on the business of electro-plating and polishing in his house, that no noise was created by the working of the machines and that, in any case, the working of the machines was not tantamount to a `public nuisance'. 3. The learned Magistrate held the respondent guilty under Section 307 of the U.P. Municipalities Act only, and sentenced him as indicated above. As against the aforesaid order an appeal was filed by the respondent and the learned court of appeal, on a consideration of the appeal, on a consideration of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the machines which were installed in the house of the respondent did not constitute a 'public nuisance.' In arriving at the aforesaid conclusions he relied upon the statement made by the Additional Medical Officer of Health to the effect that there was a shaft connecting the machines installed in the house of the respondent and the house of Kanhaya Lal. The working of the machines installed in the house of Kanhaya Lal amounted to a `public nuisance' and as the respondent supplied energy to the machines of Kanhaya Lal he was also responsible for the public nuisance. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of conviction. 4. The main contention advanced on behalf of the appellant has been that as the respondent did not prefer an appeal as provided by the U.P. Municipalities Act against the notice issued by the Administrator, the validity of that notice could not be questioned by the courts below in a complaint filed for the contravention of the provisions of Sec 307 of the aforesaid Act. 5. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the aforesaid question or to record a categorical finding thereon as this appeal can be disposed of on the short ground that legally the respondent could not be convicted under Section 307 for failure to comply with a notice issued under Section 245 of the Municipalities Act. 5. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the aforesaid question or to record a categorical finding thereon as this appeal can be disposed of on the short ground that legally the respondent could not be convicted under Section 307 for failure to comply with a notice issued under Section 245 of the Municipalities Act. We would, therefore, make a few observations of a general nature only with regard to the main contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. The broad proposition of law contended for on behalf of the appellant is not borne out by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Brij Behari Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Alld. 123 : 1943 A.L.J. 103. In that case, the Executive Officer of the Municipal Broad, Saharanpur served a notice upon the accused requiring him to demolish a temple and the circular platform alleged to have been raised by him without permission and contrary to the sanctioned plan within a stated period of time. The accused preferred an appeal to the Municipal Board under Section 61 read with Schedule II of the Act but the appeal was rejected. Thereafter he appealed to the District Magistrate under Section 318 of the Act but that was also dismissed on the ground that he had never obtained any sanction to build a temple. Subsequently he was prosecuted under Section 307 in the criminal court for non-compliance with the notice under Section 186. It was held by the Full Bench that the criminal court could go into the legality of the notice under Section 186 and it was open to the accused to plead that he was not in a position to comply with the notice and, therefore, was not guilty for non-compliance with the same. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish the aforesaid ruling on the ground that the notice in that case was issued by the Executive Officer and, as such, the Provisions of section 321 of the U.P. Municipalities Act were not attracted, whereas in the instant case the notice was issued by the board. A perusal of the judgment delivered in Dr. Brij Behari Lal's case, AIR 1943 Alld. A perusal of the judgment delivered in Dr. Brij Behari Lal's case, AIR 1943 Alld. 123 : 1943 A.L.J. 103 shows that three of the Learned Judges composing the Bench, namely, Collister, Dar and Mathur, considered the question in its general aspect and held that it is open to a person who is being prosecuted under Section 307 to impeach the validity of a notice or direction under Section 186 upon any ground which may be strictly referable to the terms and requirements of Section 186 but not otherwise. Under Section 186 of the U.P. Municipalities Act it is the Board which has been empowered to issue a notice. The conjoint effect of Section 60 of the U.P. Municipalities Act read with Schedule II thereto is that if in any Municipality there is an Executive Officer he alone shall have the power, inter alia, to issue a notice Under Section 186 of the said Act. Thus the issue of a notice by an Executive Officer of a Municipal Board under Section 186 of the Municipalities Act is on behalf of the Board. In principle, therefore, there is no distinction between a case in which in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act a notice is issued by an Executive Officer and a case in which a notice is issued by the Board. The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the case of Mohd. Basit Ali Khan v. Municipal Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1948 All. 112-1947 A. L.J. 427, in support of the contention that the 1943 Allahabad ruling will not apply to a case in which notice is issued by the Municipal Board. The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the case of Mohd. Basit Ali Khan v. Municipal Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1948 All. 112-1947 A. L.J. 427, in support of the contention that the 1943 Allahabad ruling will not apply to a case in which notice is issued by the Municipal Board. In repelling that argument we can do no better than to quote the following observations made in the 1948 Allahabad case (supra):- "It may further be pointed out that one of the conclusion with regard to which the decision in I.L.R. (1943) All., 317 was unanimous is thus summarised in the first paragraph of the head note: "A person who has been prosecuted under Section 307, Municipalities Act, is entitled to challenge by way of defence the validity of the notice issued to him under Section 186 for violation whereof he has been put on his trial." Here again, the facts of the present case are entirely different and no question of anything said by us in the present judgment being in conflict with the decision in I.L.R. (1943) All., 317 can arise." It is thus crystal clear that in the aforesaid case the correctness of the conclusion arrived at in the 1943 Allahabad case (supra) on the question that the validity of a notice issued under section 186 of the Municipalities Act can be challenged by an accused person prosecuted under Section 307 of that Act was not doubted. Without being understood to express a categorical opinion we are prone to think that in a prosecution under Section 307 of the U.P. Municipalities Act it is open to an accused person to plead that the notice for the disobedience of which it is proposed to punish him was not in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act or that it was physically impossible for him to comply with the terms of the notice or that the notice was mala fide. A notice which is based on considerations extraneous to the provisions of the Act is mala fide and cannot be said to have been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 6. A notice which is based on considerations extraneous to the provisions of the Act is mala fide and cannot be said to have been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 6. We now advert to the questions as to whether a person who carries on a manufacturing process in any building within the limits of the Municipal Board and such process occasions or is likely to occasion a public nuisance can be punished under Section 307 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Section 245 of the U.P. Municipalities Act empowers a Municipal Board to issue a notice to a person who carries on a manufacturing process in a building or place within the limits of the Municipal Board in such a manner that it occasions or is likely to occasion a public nuisance requiring him to desist from using the building in that manner and it also provides punishment for not complying with the notice. The relevant portions of Secs 245 and 307 of that Act read as below:- "245(1). If it is shown to the satisfaction of a board that any building or place within the limits of the Municipality which any persons uses or intends to use as a factory or other place of business for the manufacture, storage, treatment or disposal of any article, by reason of such use, or by reason of such intended use, occasions or is likely to occasion a public nuisance, the board may at its option require by notice the owner or occupier of the building or place- (a) to desist or refrain, as the case may be, from using or allowing to be used, the building or place for such purpose, or, (b) only to use, or to allow to be used, the building or place for such purpose under such conditions or after such structural alterations as the board imposes or prescribes in the notice with the object of rendering the use of the building or place for such purpose free from objections. (2) Whoever, after receiving a notice given under sub-Section (1), uses or allows to be used any building or place in contravention of the notice shall be liable on conviction to a fine, which may extend to the hundred rupees and to a further fine which may extend to forty rupees for every day on which he so uses or allows to be used the place or building after the date of the first conviction." "307. If a notice has been given under the provisions of this Act or under a rule or bye-law to a person requiring him to execute a work in respect of any property, movable or immovable, public or private, or to provide or do, or refrain from doing anything within a time specified in the notice, and if such a person fails to comply with such a notice, then- (a) the board may cause such work to be executed or such thing to be provided or done, and may recover all expenses incurred by it on such account from the said person in the manner provided by Chap. VI; and further, (b) the said person shall be liable on conviction before a Magistrate, to a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, and in case of a continuing rupees, and in case of a continuing breach, to a further fine which may extend to five rupees for every day after the date of the first conviction during which the offender is proved to have persisted in the offence." It will have been noticed that Section 245 (1) specifically relates to the user of any building or place within the limits of the Municipality as a factory or other place or business for manufacturer when such user occasions or is likely to occasion a public nuisance and sub-Section (2) provides the punishment for the user of any building for such a purpose even after the service upon the offender of a notice under sub-Section (1). The punishment provided under sub-Section (2) is fine which may extend to Rs. 200/- and to a further fine which may extend to Rs. 40/- every day on which he so uses or allows to be used the place or building after the date of the first conviction. The punishment provided under sub-Section (2) is fine which may extend to Rs. 200/- and to a further fine which may extend to Rs. 40/- every day on which he so uses or allows to be used the place or building after the date of the first conviction. Section 307 covers a case of disobedience to a notice issued to an individual requiring him to execute a work in respect of any property movable or immovable or to provide or do or refrain from doing anything within the time specifying in the notice. The punishment provided for failure to comply with the notice is fine which may extend to Rs. 500/-. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the words, "do, or refrain from doing anything within a time specified in the notice" are wide enough to cover a notice under sub-Section (1) of Section 245 of the Municipalities Act and, as such, a person who does not comply with the notice issued under Section 307. It is a well-settled principle of law that where there are two provisions in the same statute one of which is particular and the other general, the latter should be deemed to cover those cases only which do not fall under the former. This rule of interpretation has been embodied in the maxim "Generalia specialibus non derogant." Effect was given to the aforesaid dictum in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1170, Das Gupta, J. speaking for the Court made the following observations in the case:- "There will be complete harmony however if we hold instead that Clause 5(a) will apply in all other cases of proposed dismissal or discharge except where an inquiry is pending within the meaning of Clause 23. We reach the same result by applying other well known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provisions in one Act and the special provisions in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier directions should have effect. In Pretty v. Solly, (1859) 58 E.R. 1032, quoted in Craies on Statute Law at p. 206, (6th Edition) Romily, M.R., mentioned the rule thus- "The rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply." The rule has been applied as between different provisions of the same statute in numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned: De Winton v. Brecon, (1958) 28 L.J. Ch. 598, Churchill v. Crease, (1828) 5 Bing. 177, United States v. Chase, (1889) 135 U.S. 255, Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co, (1905) 199 U.S. 401. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provisions and a general provisions the special provision prevails over the general provisions and the general provisions applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provisions, we must hold that Clause 5 (a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of Clause 23 are applicable." In view of the aforesaid decision it is not necessary to notice in detail other cases on the point. References may, however, be made with advantage to the cases reported in Harnam Singh Modi v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 Pun. 186, Jethmal v. Heeralal, A.I.R. 1958 Rajas, 48, Cherukuri Kutumbayya v. the Municipal Council, A.I.R. 1959 And. Pra. 1. 7. References may, however, be made with advantage to the cases reported in Harnam Singh Modi v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 Pun. 186, Jethmal v. Heeralal, A.I.R. 1958 Rajas, 48, Cherukuri Kutumbayya v. the Municipal Council, A.I.R. 1959 And. Pra. 1. 7. There is a vital difference between a case in which of the two provisions of law contained either in the same statute or in different statutes one is general and the other specific or special and a case to which of the two provisions of law contained in the same statute or different statutes one is not embraced by the other and both are not identical though to a certain extent one overlaps the other. In the former category of cases the specific or special provisions will override the general, while in the latter category effect may be given to both the provisions simultaneously. As an illustration of the latter category of cases the offences under Section 161 of I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act may be cited, vide Ramautar Mahton v. The State, A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 203. In our opinion, the instant case falls under the first category. 8. It would thus follow that where a case falls squarely under Section 245 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, Section 307 of that Act can have no application to it. In this connection, it may also be mentioned with advantage that the punishment provided in Section 307 is severer than the punishment provided in Section 245 and it would not be proper to punish a person under Section 307 if he is liable to be punished under Section 245. We are therefore, of the opinion that the respondent was not liable to be punished under Section 307 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The respondent, it is true, was alleged to have contravened Section 245 of the Municipalities Act but he was not found guilty of having contravened that provisions of law and he must be held to have been acquitted of the same. The appellant has submitted to that portion of the order of the learned trial court and it is not possible to punish the respondent under Section 245 of the said Act. The principle underlying Section 403 of Cr.P.C. would be applicable to such a case. The appellant has submitted to that portion of the order of the learned trial court and it is not possible to punish the respondent under Section 245 of the said Act. The principle underlying Section 403 of Cr.P.C. would be applicable to such a case. In the case of Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, 1950 A.C. 458, the following observations were made at page 479: "The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trail is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim "Res judicata proveritate acciptur" is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings." 9. Thus on a ground different from that assigned by the learned Assistant Session Judge, we uphold the order made by him acquitting the respondent of the offence under Section 307 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 10. The appeal accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed.