JUDGMENT S.C. Manchanda, J. - This is a revision against the order of the Civil Judge, Varanasi, dated the 3rd December, 1962, upholding the objection of the Inspector of Stamps that paper 51/A dated the 20th of December 1960, whereby Shiv Kedar Singh released the right which he had acquired under the deed dated the 27th November 1959 (Ex. A1), was a conveyance within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Stamp Act and was liable to Stamp Duty under Article 23 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. In order to appreciate the contentions raised it is necessary to set out the relevant facts in brief: The plaintiff Shiv Kedar Singh had filed a suit for recovery of money against the firm Mukund Lal Durga Prasad and others. The plaintiff filed the document Ex. 51/A and the defendant filed paper 52-A. The Stamp Inspector reported that the stamp on these documents was insufficient and therefore they should be impound and ten times penalty imposed. The Civil Judge accepted the report of the Inspector impounding Ex. 51/A which was the document filed by the plaintiff-applicant and called upon the plaintiff to deposit the duty of Rs. 478/- and the penalty of Rs. 4780/-. In default the document was to be sent to the Collector for realisation of that deficiency in stamp duty and penalty according to law. 3. The document Ex. 51-A has a history behind it. On 15th May, 1959 one Sri Prakash entered into an agreement with Maharaj Kumar Vijay Nagram to take his cinema on lease for five years on a rent of Rs. 1,000/- per mensem and upon payment of a premium of Rs. 3,000/-. On 21.8.1959 the said Sri Prakash entered into a partnership agreement, dated 27th November 1959 with Mukund Lal and Abdul Haq with a view to run the said cinema. This partnership of three persons did not however have sufficient funds for this purpose and, therefore, invited one Shiv Kedar Singh, the plaintiff applicant to invest money in the Cinema business. As security for the advance to be made by Shiv Kedar Singh he was given the right to control and manage the Cinema business. This document is Ex. A-1. This partnership of three persons did not however have sufficient funds for this purpose and, therefore, invited one Shiv Kedar Singh, the plaintiff applicant to invest money in the Cinema business. As security for the advance to be made by Shiv Kedar Singh he was given the right to control and manage the Cinema business. This document is Ex. A-1. It recites that the first party is Shiv Kedar Singh, and the second party is the aforesaid partnership of three persons; that the second party are in need of a financier; that they had no funds and therefore they were obliged to request the plaintiff to come in as a financier and expend all further sums in running the said Cinema and that he was to realise his investment from the income from the Cinema. The terms, inter alia, were: (1) that when the plaintiff had realised whatever he had invested together with 12% interest thereon he would return the Cinema to the second party; (2) that the plaintiff will run the Cinema under his direct control so that the income therefrom may be appropriated by him towards his debt; (3) that when his debts are paid up out of the income he will cease to conduct this Cinema business and will have no concern with it thereafter; (4) that the parties agree that one Badri Prasad will be the Manager who will be employed by the plaintiff; (5) that after the Cinema is released the second party will run the Cinema in accordance with their partnership agreement dated the 21st August 1959, between Sri Prakash, Mukund Lal and Abdul Haq; (6) Responsibility for the proper management of the Cinema will be that of the plaintiff and the income will be appropriated by him towards the outstanding debt, if there is loss then the plaintiff will have to bear the loss as the management and control vests in him exclusively; (7) he will be entitled to interest at 1% per mensem, but he will not be entitled to any share of profit; (8) as and when his investment gets paid up interest will also get proportionately reduced; (9) the parties further agree that Badri Prasad Manager will get Rs. 150/- per mensem as his remuneration; (10) that Abdul Haq who is an operator will continue to work as such and get a remuneration of Rs. 125/- per mensem. 150/- per mensem as his remuneration; (10) that Abdul Haq who is an operator will continue to work as such and get a remuneration of Rs. 125/- per mensem. Similarly, Sri Prakash and Mukund Lal will also render services on payment of Rs. 125/- each as remuneration. It was further specifically provided that the aforesaid three partner of the second party will have no control and management which will be exclusively in the hands of the first party; lastly, it was provided it will be open to the second party to pay off the amount advanced by the first party and put an end to his control and management of the Cinema at any time. 4. On the 9th of November 1960,the partnership between Sri Prakash, Mukund Lal and Abdul Haq was dissolved and this document recited that as the parties did not want to continue business in partnership, henceforth, Sri Prakash and Abdul Haq will cease to have any connection with the partnership business and would leave Mukund Lal as exclusive owner of the erstwhile partnership business. Specific mention was made in this document of the said Ex. A-1 which was entered into by these partners on 27.11.1959. It was agreed that henceforth Mukund Lal alone would be responsible for dealing with Sheo Kumar Singh, and for paying up his debt. 5. On the 20th December, 1960 vide Ex. 51A, accounts were settled by Mukund Lal and Shiv Kedar singh was paid whatever was found outstanding together with interest at 12% which worked out to Rs. 12,000/-, by means, of a bond in his favour executed by the firm of Mukund Lal Durga Prasad and in which the said Mukund Lal was a partner. This document recited the aforesaid history, made reference to the deed dated the 27th November, 1959, Ex. A-1 and to the deed of dissolution dated the 9th of November, 1960 as a result of which Mukund Lal had come to be the sole lessee of the Cinema from the Maharaja of Vijyanagram. It was further recited that Shiv Kedar Singh because of the investment made by him under the agreement dated 27.11.1959, was given the power to control, manage and run the Cinema on certain terms and conditions and as his accounts had now been settled and the sum of Rs. It was further recited that Shiv Kedar Singh because of the investment made by him under the agreement dated 27.11.1959, was given the power to control, manage and run the Cinema on certain terms and conditions and as his accounts had now been settled and the sum of Rs. 12,000/- which was found due had been discharged by the grant of a Sarkhat by Mukund Lal's firm, therefore, now the management and control as per agreement dated 27.11.1959 which rested in Shiv Kedar Singh had ceased and he no longer would have any control over the management of the Cinema which would, henceforth, revert to Mukund Lal. 6. It was this document which was sought to be produced in evidence by the plaintiff and as it bore only a stamp of Rs. 2/- viz. the stamp required for an agreement, an objection to its admissibility was taken by the Inspector of Stamps. The Civil Judge proceeded to impound it and treating it as a"conveyance" called upon the applicant to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs. 478/-and a penalty of Rs. 4,780/-. Hence this revision. 7. A preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Gupta for the State that no revision was competent as a complete machinery is provided under the Stamp Act and in any event the provisions of Section 115(c) of the C.P.C. were not attracted as no question of jurisdiction was involved in the case. Reliance was placed on the case of Vasudevan v. Krishna Rammath A.I.R. 1953 Tra. Co. 559 and of Pyarelal v. Sukhan Ram A.I.R. 1926 All. 478. In these cases it was held that Chapter IV of the Stamp Act provided a complete procedure and that Section 63 of the Stamp Act only gave a right of revision to a superior court when insufficient stamp duty and penalty is levied by the trial court. Vasudevan's case A.I.R. 1953 Tra. Co. 559, was a decision by the Travancore Cochin High Court and it was followed by Dalal, J. of this Court in Pearey Lal v. Sukhan Ram (Supra). Vasudevan's case A.I.R. 1953 Tra. Co. 559, was a decision by the Travancore Cochin High Court and it was followed by Dalal, J. of this Court in Pearey Lal v. Sukhan Ram (Supra). Para 6 of the judgment of the Travancore Cochin High Court however, would seem to indicate that the position would have been different, if a party at whose instance the document was brought to the Court and who wanted to produce it as a part of his evidence in the case had first asked for an adjudication by the Collector as to the proper stamp duty and penalty leviable on it and in that event the court would have had to accede to that request and could not proceed to impose a decision which the party did not want. No doubt, in that case the party had first invited the Court to decide the matter but before the court pronounced its order, he had resiled therefrom. In these circumstances, it was held that the court had only to follow the procedure prescribed in Section 33 and 38(2) of the Indian Stamp Act. It is, therefore, manifest, that the facts of that case were, distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 8. In the Allahabad case Pearey Lal v. Sukh Ram A.I.R. 1926 All. 478, the subordinate Judge had discovered that the instrument presented to him was insufficiently stamped and he was, therefore, bound to impound it. After impounding he had to proceed under Section 38 of the Stamp Act. The instrument had been admitted in evidence upon payment of penalty and of deficient duty and therefore, he was bound to send to the Collector an authenticated copy of the instrument on which the duty and penalty were levied together with a certificate in writing stating the amount of duty and penalty were levied together with a certificate in writing stating the amount of duty and penalty in respect thereof. It was presumed that the copy of the instrument was sent to the Collector as laid down in Section 38 of the Act. The learned Judge then considered the instrument and held that as the provisions of Section 38 of the Act must be taken to have been complied with, the decision rested with the "Collector to determine whether the instrument was really insufficiently stamped or not. The learned Judge then considered the instrument and held that as the provisions of Section 38 of the Act must be taken to have been complied with, the decision rested with the "Collector to determine whether the instrument was really insufficiently stamped or not. He has also the power of remitting the penalty in excess of Rs. 5/- under Sections 39 and 41 of the Stamp Act. The duty cannot be discharged by the appellate court." These observations of Dalal, J. are obiter as is clear from the concluding portion of the judgment that the appeal in any case was to be dismissed as no appeal lay. 9. As against these two decisions there is a string of cases where revisions have been entertained in similar circumstances, when a document was impounded under Section 33 of the Stamp Act by a Civil Court during the pendency of the suit. In Paiku Kashi Nath v. Gaya A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 214, it was pointed by Hidayat Ullah, J., as he then was, that the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 115 to revise an order under Section 33 of the Stamp Act. It was observed:- "However the learned Judge purports to reopen the case and has in fact passed an order in impounding the document in the civil suit itself. That is enough to give me jurisdiction. What would have happened if he had drawn up certain proceedings, I need not discuss." The application in revision was allowed and the order of the lower courts was set aside. 10. Similarly, in Rangaraju Naidu v. Kamesan A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 698 Govind Menon, J. as he then was held- "The action of a subordinate judge in impounding a document and forwarding the same to the Collector, with an accompanying letter amounts to a decision of a case as contemplated under Section 115, C.P.C. when he comes to the conclusion that the document in question has not properly been stamped decides the case and that decision so far as the Judge is concerned is final. The finality that attached to the view taken by the Judge makes it a case decided by him." See also in this connection the cases of L. Uttam Chand A.I.R. 1952 Lah. 265 K.K.R.M. v. Veera Kalai A.I.R. 1931 Rang. 193, Mst. Hubraji v. Deputy Commissioner A.I.R. 1963 Oudh 169 and Balram Das Agarwal v. Kedarnath A.I.R. 1958 Alld. 659. The finality that attached to the view taken by the Judge makes it a case decided by him." See also in this connection the cases of L. Uttam Chand A.I.R. 1952 Lah. 265 K.K.R.M. v. Veera Kalai A.I.R. 1931 Rang. 193, Mst. Hubraji v. Deputy Commissioner A.I.R. 1963 Oudh 169 and Balram Das Agarwal v. Kedarnath A.I.R. 1958 Alld. 659. 11. Therefore, it is quite clear that the revision is perfectly competent. The preliminary objection is accordingly overruled. 12. On the merits, the revision must succeed on the short ground that the impugned document was misread and misunderstood by the Inspector of Stamps and the court below. The report of the Inspector of Stamps was made on the promise that Shri Kedar Nath the plaintiff applicant was a partner along with Sri Prakash, Mukund Lal and Abdul Haq and taking him to be a partner, it was concluded that by the deed of dissolution dated 9.11.1960, he had acquired certain rights which he transferred by the impugned document paper No. 51A, for a consideration of Rs. 12,000/- and therefore it was a conveyance of a chose in action within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Act and liable to stamp duty in accordance with Article 23, Schedule I of the Act. The learned Civil Judge disagreed with the opinion of the Inspector of Stamps only to the limited extent that by the impugned instrument a chose in action was not conveyed but as the document in question recited that the first party had received Rs. 12,000/- by execution of a Sarkhat in his favour and that the second party alone will have the right to run the cinema business after the execution of the document, the document according to him clearly conveyed the proprietary and managerial rights of the first party in the cinema business to the second party and therefore the Inspector of Stamps had rightly reported that this was a deed of conveyance liable to duty as such and the document should have been stamped like a conveyance. 13. It is manifest that the learned Civil Judge has given no reasons, whatsoever for coming to the conclusion that the document in question was a conveyance. It is, so to speak, the imse dixit of the Civil Judge. 13. It is manifest that the learned Civil Judge has given no reasons, whatsoever for coming to the conclusion that the document in question was a conveyance. It is, so to speak, the imse dixit of the Civil Judge. There is no critical examination of the disputed document or the documents which preceded it and wherein there was specific reference thereto. Therefore, by confirming the opinion of the Stamp Inspector the best that can be said is that the learned Civil Judge also agreed with the Inspector that Shiv Kedar Nath was a partner along with Mukund Lal and two other not only in the lease from the Maharaj Kumar of the cinema-house but also in the matter of dissolution of that firm and the subsequent rights acquired by him as a result of the dissolution. 14. The substance of the documents has been set out herein above and a cursory reading thereof would show that there was never any question of Shiv Kedar Nath being a partner with the other three. The agreement that was arrived at was in substance and reality a plain and simple financing agreement with a security and that security was in the shape of the management and control of the Cinema business till such time as the financiers' investment and 12% interest thereon was realised by him. The moment Mukund Lal and others were in a position to pay off Shiv Kedar Nath, the latter would have no further rights and would cease to manage or control the cinema business. There was no clause wherefrom it could possibly have been inferred that he was to share in the profits of the cinema business. His interest was limited and restricted to the realisation of his investment plus interest thereon and nothing more. 15. Mr. H.P. Gupta, the learned counsel for the State submitted that as Shiv Kedar Nath was to bear the losses, if any, a partnership could be inferred. The clause when read as a whole makes it clear that the bearing of loss was only for the purpose of ensuring that Shiv Kedar Nath would manage the cinema business efficiently and would not use the cinema hall merely for the pleasure and entertainment of his friends. The clause when read as a whole makes it clear that the bearing of loss was only for the purpose of ensuring that Shiv Kedar Nath would manage the cinema business efficiently and would not use the cinema hall merely for the pleasure and entertainment of his friends. The management, having been placed entirely in his hands it was perfectly legitimate for the second party to say that they will not be responsible for the losses in running the business. That, however, did not mean that Shiv Kedar Nath would not get his full interest on the investment made because there happened to be a loss. The right to receive the amount advanced together with interest was not subject to any conditions whatsoever. The agreement, to manage and run the cinema business was, therefore, entirely by way of security for the advances made by him and cannot possibly be construed as a partnership agreement. The very premise on which the report of the Inspector was based having been found to be non-existent it is manifest that the order of the Civil Judge demanding additional stamp duty and penalty constitutes a material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of the Supreme Court decision in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 492 and in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad 1963 A.L.J. 1068. 16. I would, therefore, hold that the document in question did not purport to transfer any property, movable or immovable within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act. The right to manage the cinema, and its business was proprietary right which could be the subject of a bargain or sale to any one and much less in the open market. The main purpose of that document, as already stated, was merely to furnish security for the advances made till such time as the advances were paid off by the other party and the moment that happened, Shiv Kedar Nath would cease to have any right to manage the cinema business and was under an obligation to handover the management. 17. For the reasons given above, I would set aside the order of the Civil Judge so far as the impounding and demand of additional duty and penalty in respect of paper no. 51A is concerned. 18. The revision is accordingly allowed with costs.