ORDER Naik, J.- l. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the division of the Rewa Municipality into wards into which it has been divided by the State Government, on the allegation that it has been made in contravention of section 29 (1) (b) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). 2. The petitioner is a tax-payer and voter in ward No. 16; and his sole purpose appeared to be to get the elections, which were scheduled for 14-2-1964, postponed on some pretext or the ether. 3. The Act, which governs the Rewa Municipality, came into force on 1-2-1964 repealing the Vindhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1946. Under section 29 (1) (b) of the Act, 'the State Government shall, from time to time generally or specially in respect of each Municipality, by notification, subject to rules framed under this Act— '(i) divide the Municipality into wards and define the limits of each such ward; (ii) fix the number of councillors to be elected for each ward; (iii) fix, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India, the number of seats to be reserved for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and allot them to the various wards.' 4. The State Government by notification No. 1262-XVIII-U, dated 31-1-1963, published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 1-3-1963, (Annexure 1), published its proposals for the division of the Municipality into wards and invited objections thereto within thirty days of the date of its publication. 5. There is no allegation in the affidavit of the petitioner that he had filed any objection to the said proposals within the time prescribed or ever. 6. On 13-5-1963, by notification No. 79-3766-U, published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 28-6-1963, (Annexure 1-A), the State Government, purporting to act under section 29 of the Act, finally divided the Rewa Municipality into 24 wards, defining the limits of each ward, fixining the number of councillors to be elected for each ward to be one, and fixing, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India, the number of seats to be reserved for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes at one for tee scheduled castes allotting it to ward No. 12. 7. 7. In the meanwhile, the State Government, in exercise of its powers under section 355 (2) (i), clause (XXXV), of the Act, by notification dated 20-4-1963, framed rules called the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act (Wards) Rules, 1963 and published them in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 10-5-1963. By these rules, it was provided that- "In dividing the Municipality into wards and defining the limits of each such ward and in fixing the number of councillors to be elected for each ward and of seats to be reserved for the scheduled casts and scheduled tribes, regard shall be had to the following provisions, namely— (a) every ward shall elect only one councillor; (b) all the wards shall, as far as practicable, be compact areas; (c) as far as possible, the number of voters in each ward shall be evenly distributed; (d) the limits of each ward shall be defined in all the four directions as follows:- (i) bounded on the North by, (ii) bounded on the East by, (iii) bounded on the South by, (iv) bounded on the West by, (e) each ward shall conform to the order in which the houses of electors appear in the electoral roll of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly relatable to the ward; and (f) seats reserved either for the scheduled castes or for the scheduled tribes shall, as far as practicable be allotted in the wards in which the population of the scheduled castes or, the case may be of the scheduled tribes is most concentrated." Under rule 5 ibid, the proposals were to emanate from the Collector who could, for the purpose, call for the necessary information from the Council. Under sub-rule (2) of rule 5, the State Government was to cause the proposals to be published by making a copy thereof available for inspection at the office of the Municipality and by displaying a notice in the from appended to the rules, at the office of the Collector and the office of the Municipality concerned and by beat of drum throughout the limits of the Municipality. Under sub-rule (3), and adult inhabitant could object to them within 15 days of the date of publication of the notice; and under sub-rule (4), the final division was to be done after the receipt and consideration of the objections along with the comments of the Collector. 8. Under sub-rule (3), and adult inhabitant could object to them within 15 days of the date of publication of the notice; and under sub-rule (4), the final division was to be done after the receipt and consideration of the objections along with the comments of the Collector. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the division of the Rewa Municipality into wards etc., mainly on the following grounds :- (1) The power of the State Government to divide the Municipality into wards being subject to rules framed under the Act, it could not be validly exercised until the rules were framed. (2) The notification dividing the Municipality into wards etc., being of the date 13-5-1963 (published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 28-6-1963), when the rules had already come into force, the said division had to conform to the rules; and as it did not so conform to the rules, it was invalid. (3) The State Government's division of the Municipality into wards etc., was done without giving the petitioner a right to effectively object to it, as envisaged in the rules, and had thus substantially prejudiced him. 9. The answer to the first objection depends on the construction to be placed on section 29 (1) (b) of the Act. The objection is that when power is given, subject to rules, it is conditional and cannot be exercised till the rules are framed. No doubt, ordinarily, when an agreement is 'subject to' something, the words 'subject to' introduce a condition or proviso: [see Watson Vs. Mcallum, (1902) 87 L T 547]. But, this is by no means a universal rule. The meaning of these words depends on the context in which they are used. Thus, in In re Grosvenor, Peacey Vs. Grosvenor, (1944) 1 Ch. Mcallum, (1902) 87 L T 547]. But, this is by no means a universal rule. The meaning of these words depends on the context in which they are used. Thus, in In re Grosvenor, Peacey Vs. Grosvenor, (1944) 1 Ch. 138 CA, where section 184 of the Law of Properly Act, 1925 enacted that in all cases where after the commencement of the Act, two or more persons have died in circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other or others, such deaths shall 'subject to any order of the Court' for all purposes affected the title to property be presumed to have occurred in order of seniority; and accordingly the younger shall be deemed to have survived the elder, it was held that the expression 'subject of any order of the Court' did not give the Court power to depart from the presumption in cases where the section says that it is to arise Even in cases of contracts, Lord Sterndale, M. R. in Rossdale Vs. Denny, (1921) Ch. 57 CA at pp. 66, 67 said: "I am far from saying that there may not be an unconditional offer and acceptance of a binding contract although the letters may contain the words 'subject to a formal contract', but certainly those words do point in the direction of the offer or acceptance being conditional." The question is what the intention of the Legislature was in using the words 'subject to' in any particular context. When the Act came into force, the rules had not been framed and the language of section 29 (1) (b) was not 'subject to rules to be framed under this Act' which would have been more appropriate language if the intention was that the power under section 29 (1) (b) was not to be exercised till the rules were framed, In our opinion, in the context of the Act, the intention was not to take away the right of the State Government to divide the Municipality into wards until the rules were framed but to channelise that power in accordance with the rules if and when the rules were framed. All that the expression 'subject to rules framed under this Act' meant to connote was that the power could not be exercised by ignoring the rules but only in conformity with them. All that the expression 'subject to rules framed under this Act' meant to connote was that the power could not be exercised by ignoring the rules but only in conformity with them. Thus, the power could be exercised even when there were no rules framed; but once the rules were framed, the power was 'subject to' the rules and had to conform to them. The first contention, therefore, fails and is hereby rejected. 10. The second contention is more or 'less a corollary of the first and must also fail. The act of division and definition of limits etc. envisaged in section 29 of the Act is not a single act but is an integrated process. In the instant case, it started with the publication of the proposals and inviting of objections thereto (Annexure 1) and ended with the publication of the final decision Annexure 1-A). The final shape was given to its decision in this respect on 13-5-1963, about 3 days after the publication of the rules. There is no allegation that any essential procedure envisaged in the rules, which had to be followed after the receipt of objections and their consideration, had not been followed; nor is there any material on record to establish that it was so. Consequently, there was no infraction of the rules after they came into force, and nothing was done contrary to them thereafter. 11. We may here also mention that all the essential steps envisaged in the rules had been followed. The essential steps envisaged in the rules were (a) publication of proposals, (b) inviting of objections thereto, and (c) final decision after considering the objections; and these were all followed. In the matter of publication of proposals, the further details provided in the rules envisage the preparation of the proposals by the Collector with the assisance of the Council and at its expense, their publication by making a copy thereof available for inspection at the office of the Municipality and by displaying a notice at the office of the Collector and the office at the Municipality concerned and by beat of drum throughout the limits of the municipality, and the inviting of objections within fifteen days of the publication of the notice. Even in the matter of these details, there is no allegation, nor is there anything to show that the proposals did not originate from the Collector. Even in the matter of these details, there is no allegation, nor is there anything to show that the proposals did not originate from the Collector. In the nature of things, as these are matters of detail requiring special knowledge of the Municipality concerned, they must have been initiated by the Collector. The Council has no say in the matter of these proposals, except that it had to furnish such factual data to the Collector as he may require for the purpose. These proposals were published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette and objections invited thereto. No doubt, there is no proof that these proposals were published in the manner provided by the rules; but there is no allegation that because of such non-publication, the petitioner or others had no notice of them or prevented from filing their objections to them. According to respondents 1 and 2, no objection was received from the petitioner and such objections as were received with the comments of the Collector were considered before the final decision was taken. In the matter of giving time for the making of objections, the procedure followed was more liberal than the one envisaged in the rules, because the notice gave thirty days' time for objections instead of fifteen days provided by the rules. As for rule 3, it only says that 'regard shall be had' to the provisions contained therein. They only provide certain relevant considerations for the guidance of the State Government and the State Government, on affidavit, has asserted that these were kept in view in formulating its proposals and in finalizing them. The rules in their very nature are directory and as there has been substantial compliance with them, the final notification of the State Government under section 29 (1) (b) of the Act cannot be challenged. On the question of prejudice, the learned counsel for the petitioner frankly admitted that he was not resting his case on the ground of prejudice to him but on the broad ground that the 'Rule of Law' had been violated. According to him, it was for the vindication of this 'Rule of Law' that the petition had been filed. 12. We also note that the petitioner thought about this vindication of the 'Rule of law' a little too late. The notification under section 29 (1) (b) of the Act dividing the Municipality into wards etc. According to him, it was for the vindication of this 'Rule of Law' that the petition had been filed. 12. We also note that the petitioner thought about this vindication of the 'Rule of law' a little too late. The notification under section 29 (1) (b) of the Act dividing the Municipality into wards etc. was published on 28-6-1963 and yet he did not consider it necessary to move to have it quashed for over 17 months, and only though about it on the eve of the general elections to the Municipal Council with the sole object to have them postponed. His bona fides, therefore, become suspect, and he cannot escape the charge that the petition has been made with an ulterior purpose. 13. As for the third contention, we have already pointed out that there was no explanation why the petitioner did not object to the proposed division of wards etc. When the proposals therefor were published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette, dated 1-3-1963. It is not his case that he was unaware of the proposals, nor is it his case that he could not, for any other reason, make his objections to them. The State Government has, on affidavit, averred that all the relevant considerations, which are mentioned in rule 3, were before it when it finalized the proposals. The petitioner has not been able to show how the final division of wards etc. done by the State Government has prejudiced him by reason of the fact that one or the other of the considerations mentioned in rule 3 were not followed. Under the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that he was prevented from effectively representing against the proposals because they were published before the rules were published, inasmuch as he never objected to those proposals on any ground when objections thereto could have been made, and the complaint of prejudice to him on this account, as admitted by his counsel, is more academic than real. This contention, therefore, also fails and is rejected. 14. This contention, therefore, also fails and is rejected. 14. Apart from the fact that all the contentions raised by the petitioner are without substance and have been raised merely for the sake of raising them, the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary and are not claimable by a petitioner as of right, especially where his petition is inordinately delayed and the circumstances further show that it was not made in good faith. 15. Conduct of a petitioner has always been a relevant consideration in determining whether he is entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is expected that a petitioner, when applying for a writ or order, must show due diligence and not be guilty of laches or undue delay. Consequently, except in cases where the delay has been duly accounted for, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of a party guilty or undue delay. In the instant case, the final proposals of the State Government under section 29 (1) (b) of the Act were published on 28-6-1963. Even the rules on which so much emphasis has been laid by the petitioner were published on 10-5-1963. His objection was only to these proposals. He could have moved this Court for the vindication of his 'Rule of law' within a reasonable time of the publication of the proposals. He did not choose to do so till 12-11-1964, for reasons best known to him. There is no explanation for the delay of about 17 months; and under the circumstances, we do not feel that the petitioner is entitled to the discretionary reliefs claimed by him under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution, even if he were otherwise entitled to them. 16. We may further add that apart from the inordinate delay in moving this Court for the reliefs claimed, the petition also lacks in bona fide as adverted to by us earlier. Its timing was such that its sole purpose appears to be to get the Rewa Municipal elections scheduled for 14-12-1964 postponed on one pretext or the other. 16. We may further add that apart from the inordinate delay in moving this Court for the reliefs claimed, the petition also lacks in bona fide as adverted to by us earlier. Its timing was such that its sole purpose appears to be to get the Rewa Municipal elections scheduled for 14-12-1964 postponed on one pretext or the other. It is settled law that not only must it appear that the petitioner is himself a person having a real interest in the performance of the duty sought to be enforced, but also that he makes the petition in good faith and not for an indirect purpose: [see Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 11, para 197, p. 106]; and in this case, the petition suffers from both these disabilities. For this reason also, the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in these proceedings. 17. The petition, therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150.