Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was assessed to sales-tax for the year 1957-58 on a net turnover of Rs. 4,61,837.52 p. under the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, hereinafter referred to as the Act. This included the turnover on the sugar estimated at Rs. 38,470.50 p. purchased by the petitioner from dealers at Mattancherry and Trichur. The tax payable by the petitioner was determined at Rs. 9,236.76 p. and the surcharge at Rs. 230-93 p. The copy of the assessment order is Ex. P-1. The petitioner had paid the tax. About five years after the end of the assessment year in question i.e., on 18th February 1963 the Deputy Commissioner, the 2nd respondent, in the exercise of his power under S.15(1)(i) of the Act, issued a notice to the petitioner informing him that the turnover of the sale of sugar purchased by him from the dealers at Mattancherry and Trichur was liable to an additional sales-tax of one anna per rupee and proposed to levy the additional sales-tax on a turnover estimated at Rs. 39,964.26 p. Ex. P-2 is a copy of that notice. The petitioner filed his objection, a copy of which is marked Ex. P-3. In the objection the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent to levy enhanced tax and contended that the proposed levy was barred by limitation under R.33 of the General Sales-tax Rules, 1950. The petitioner also contended that the quantum of the turnover estimated by the 2nd respondent was wrong. After the receipt of the objection the 2nd respondent communicated to the petitioner the details of the value of the sugar purchased by him from dealers at Mattancherry and Trichur as amounting to Rs. 37,349.78 p. The 2nd respondent thereafter passed the order dated 20th March 1963 holding that petitioner was liable to pay an additional sales-tax of one anna per rupee on the sale turnover of sugar purchased by the petitioner from the dealers at Mattancherry and Trichur. Ex. P-6 is the copy of that order. Pursuant to this order, the 1st respondent has revised the original order and assessed the petitioner to an additional tax at the rate of 6 p. in the rupee on the turnover of sugar estimated by the 2nd respondent at Rs. 39,964-26 p. and determined the additional tax payable by the petitioner at Rs. 2,397-84 p. and the additional surcharge at Rs. 9.99 p. Ex. 39,964-26 p. and determined the additional tax payable by the petitioner at Rs. 2,397-84 p. and the additional surcharge at Rs. 9.99 p. Ex. P-7 is the copy of the order. 2. From these orders it is clear that respondents 1 and 2 have enhanced the turnover of sugar from Rs, 38,470.50 p. to Rs. 39,964.26 p. and reassessed the same by levying the enhanced rate. The petitioner questions the validity of these orders mainly on the ground that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to reopen the matter after the period of limitation prescribed in R.33 of the General Sales-tax Rules, 1950. Sub-rules (1), (2), (4), (5) and (8) of R.33 are as follows: "(1) If for any reason the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer or licensee has escaped assessment to the tax in any year or if the licence fee has escaped levy in any year, the assessing authority or licensing authority as the case may be, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) may at any time within three years next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee relates determine to the best of his judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment and assess the tax payable or levy the licence fee in such turnover after issuing a notice to the dealer or licensee and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary. (2) Where in respect of the turnover referred to in sub-rule (1) an order has already been passed under S.14 or 15, the assessing authority shall make a report to the appropriate appellate or revising authority as the case may be which shall thereupon after giving the dealer concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it deems fit. (4) If for any reason any tax or licence fee has been assessed at too low a rate in any year, the assessing authority or the licensing authority as the case may be, may, at any time within three years next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee relates, revise the assessment or the licence fee after issuing a notice to the dealer or licensee and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary. (5) The powers conferred by sub-rules (1) and (4) on the assessing authority or licensing authority may also be exercised by the appellate authority referred to in S.14, or as the case may be, by the revising authority referred to in S.15, at any time within a period of three years next succeeding that to which the tax or as the case may be, the licence fee relates, provided that such authority shall give the dealer concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard before passing orders under this sub-rule. (8) The order passed under sub-rule (5) shall be given effect to by the licensing or assessing authority who shall collect any additional tax or fee which is found to be due, in the same manner as a tax or fee assessed by himself." It is clear from these Sub-rules that the 2nd respondent could take action to assess or reassess the turnover which has escaped assessment or the turnover which has been assessed at too low a rate only within three years next succeeding that to which the tax relates. The period of three years expired on 31st March 1961 as the assessment year to which the proceedings of the 1st and 2nd respondents related to that ending 31st March 1958. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent under S.15 of the Act is circumscribed by the fact that in the case of an assessment of escaped turnover he is bound to make the assessment within the period of three years prescribed in sub-clause (5) of R.33. It is clear that the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent to revise an order under S.15 is distinct from the power given to him under R.33. It is no doubt open to him to revise any order passed by the Sales-tax Officer at any time within a period of four years from the date of the assessment order. The dispute in this case is whether when he proposes to assess escaped turnover or to reassess the turnover at an enhanced rate of tax he could act within the ambit of S.15 of the Act and disregard the period of limitation prescribed by R.33 or whether he could act only within the period prescribed by that rule. The dispute in this case is whether when he proposes to assess escaped turnover or to reassess the turnover at an enhanced rate of tax he could act within the ambit of S.15 of the Act and disregard the period of limitation prescribed by R.33 or whether he could act only within the period prescribed by that rule. In State of Kerala v. M. Appu Kutty 14 S.T.C. 242 the Supreme Court, when dealing with the corresponding section of the Madras General Sales-tax Act, and the rules framed under it, said: "Therefore the Deputy Commissioner was not in the absence of any substantive proceeding for exercise of revisional powers competent to assess escaped turnover. But the power to asses escaped turnover does not arise out of the revisional jurisdiction. In exercising revisional jurisdiction the Deputy Commissioner would be restricted to the examination of the record for determining whether the order of assessment was according to law. R.17 confers power to assess escaped turnover which may normally be exercised on matters de hors the record of assessment proceedings before the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. It is true that the substantive provisions of the Act do not expressly deal with the power and procedure for assessment of escaped turnover. The Legislature has, left it to be dealt with by statutory rules to be framed under S.19, and R.17 has been framed thereunder." It was further observed in that ruling: "It cannot be said in view of R.17 that the power of revision by the Deputy Commissioners is limited to powers under S.12 (2). R.17 deals with a separate and independent jurisdiction in regard to the determining and taxing of escaped turnovers. The provisions of S. (2) are in no way in conflict with the powers conferred under R.17 (1),17 (1-A) and 17 (3-A)." If the jurisdiction under R.33 is a distinct and separate one from the revisional jurisdiction and does not arise out of it, the question is whether it was open to the 2nd respondent to have taken up the matter suo moto in revision under S.15 within the period prescribed for the same namely four years. It was submitted by the learned Government Pleader that what the 2nd respondent was doing was to correct an irregularity or an illegality in the order of assessment passed by the Sales-tax Officer and that he was not exercising his jurisdiction under R.33. It was submitted by the learned Government Pleader that what the 2nd respondent was doing was to correct an irregularity or an illegality in the order of assessment passed by the Sales-tax Officer and that he was not exercising his jurisdiction under R.33. His argument was that it was open to the 2nd respondent to have corrected the illegality in the order of assessment passed by the Sales-tax Officer in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, and therefore his action was perfectly legal even though it was done after the expiry of the period prescribed in R.33 (5). It was submitted that it is only if the 2nd respondent acted de hors the records and assessed the escaped turnover that he need have invoked his jurisdiction under R.33, and that where the records themselves showed that there has been an escapement of the turnover or that the turnover was assessed at too low a rate, it was open to him to correct the mistake or set right the illegality. I find it difficult to accept the argument, although there is great deal of force in it. 3. In Narayana Shenoi v. State of Kerala 12 STC. 665 it was held differing from the view expressed by the Full Bench in State of Madras v. Louis Drevfus and Company Ltd. 6 STC. 318 that R.33 was not confined to cases where the turnover has escaped assessment, where the officer by reason of inadvertence, omission or deliberate concealment failed to include the particular turnover, but would include also cases where the turnover escaped assessment because the officer committed an error in the original assessment. In that case the following observation of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Kumar v. Income-tax Commissioner 35 I.T.R.1 was quoted by the learned judges to support their conclusion. "We see no justification for holding that cases of income escaping assessment must always be cases where income has not been assessed owing to inadvertence or oversight or owing to the fact that no return has been submitted. "We see no justification for holding that cases of income escaping assessment must always be cases where income has not been assessed owing to inadvertence or oversight or owing to the fact that no return has been submitted. In our opinion, even in a case where a return has been submitted, if the Income-tax officer erroneously fails to tax a part of assessable income, it is a case where the said part of the income has escaped assessment." They ultimately came to the conclusion that by the use of the opening words of the rule where the framers have used the words 'any reason' it was intended not to confine the operation of the rule to cases where the turnover has escaped assessment due to its not being before the officer by reason of inadvertence, omission or deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee or because of the want of care on the part of the officer, but to include also all cases where legal errors were committed by the officer which resulted in the escapement of the turnover. Therefore if the turnover escaped assessment for any reason, and if it is proposed to assess the escaped turnover, the Sales Tax Officer has to act under R.33 and within the period prescribed thereunder. If that be so the revisional authority can assess the escaped turnover only under the jurisdiction derived by it from R.33 (5) and can do it only within the period of three years. Even if it be assumed that the powers conferred by sub-rules (1) and (4) of R.33 on the assessing authority are included in the revisional jurisdiction under S.15, the revisional authority can exercise these powers only subject to the limitation prescribed by sub-rule (5) of R.33. To what purpose does sub-rule (5) limit the period for assessment of escaped turnover or for reassessment of turnover which was assessed at too low a rate, if the revisional authority can disregard the limitation by saying that it is exercising its power of revision and therefore not bound by the limitation laid down by sub-rule (5) of R.33? 4. The learned Government Pleader placed before me the ruling reported in Deputy Commissioner v. K.P. Krishnan 14 S.T.C. 874 for the proposition that the revisional authority can correct any errors appearing from the record. 4. The learned Government Pleader placed before me the ruling reported in Deputy Commissioner v. K.P. Krishnan 14 S.T.C. 874 for the proposition that the revisional authority can correct any errors appearing from the record. I think the only point decided in that case is that the revisional authority should confine itself to the materials available from the records in the case and not to roam about and hunt for them outside the records. It is no authority for the proposition contended for by the learned Government Pleader in this case. It is a well-known canon of construction that when a special power is given to an authority and also a general one, the authority can only exercise the special power when the facts attracting the exercise of that power arise. So if there is an escapement of turnover or an assessment of the turnover at too low a rate, the revisional authority must resort to its jurisdiction under R.33 (5), and if it is to resort to that, the limitations attendant upon the exercise of that jurisdiction would also be attracted. I think the orders Exx. P-6 and P-7 have to be quashed. The other questions raised by the writ petitioner are not considered in this petition. 5. I allow the writ petition, but in the circumstances, make no order as to costs.