JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. A short question relating to easements is raised in this second appeal, The concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding facts have to be accepted; but the legal consequences of those findings have to be carefully scrutinised. 2. Ext. P. 1 is the plan prepared by the commissioner and Ext. P. 2 is his report. The A schedule property shown in Ext. P. 1 belongs to the plaintiff and he has a house thereon facing east. The B schedule property lying to the east of the A schedule belongs to the 1st defendant and defendants 2 and 3 are living in the house shown thereon. The property lying to the north of the A schedule belongs to the plaintiff's wife and the property on the west of the A schedule belongs to a third party. The plaintiff's suit was for declaration of a right of easement of way across the B schedule to the panchayat road on the east. The plaintiff has a gate on his eastern compound wall and there is a bridge across the canal shown in the schedule. Thus the way leads to the panchayat road. Both the lower courts have decreed the suit for declaration and have also granted an injunction against the defendants not to interfere with the use of the way by the plaintiff. The lower courts have held that the plaintiff has perfected a right of easement of way both by prescription and as an easement of necessity. Hence the second appeal by the 1st defendant. 3. The lower courts have found as a fact from the oral evidence as well as from the report of the commissioner that the alleged passage must have been used by the plaintiff and his predecessor for the last 30 to 35 years. They have also found that such user was as of right. Consequently, they have found that the plaintiff has perfected his easement by prescription. The finding of the courts below that the passage must have been used by the plaintiff and his predecessor for 30 to 35 years has to be accepted. Even so, the finding that such user was as of right cannot be sustained. One does not know whether the B schedule property was fenced during this period: it appears to be not. Even so, the finding that such user was as of right cannot be sustained. One does not know whether the B schedule property was fenced during this period: it appears to be not. If the B schedule property was not fenced and if the plaintiff and his predecessor just used the passage without any objection from the owner of the B schedule property, it does not necessarily mean that the user was as of right; for , it is well known that the owners of properties in India are not so zealous of their ownership as in England; and therefore, the user of the passage across the B schedule might be even traced to a tacit consent given by its owner. In this connection it will be worth while to remember that the A schedule has outlets both on the west and on the north, though across other properties, which fact will be adverted to in more detail later. (Vide Narayana Shenoi v. Narayan Kunjan, ILR 1956 TC 842). 4. The A schedule property originally belonged to the plaintiff's father and he purchased the B schedule property in Makaram 1095 under Ext. D1. In 1107 he was adjudged insolvent and the Official Receiver took possession of his properties including the A and the B schedule properties. Under Ext. P. 3 of Vrischikam 1111 the Receiver sold the A schedule property to the insolvent's son and the plaintiff is now the owner of that property. The B schedule property was sold by the Receiver under Ext. D. 3 again in Vrischikam 1111 to a person named Poulose, from whom the 1st defendant has subsequently purchased the same. 5. In the light of the facts mentioned in the previous paragraph, even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the user was as of right, even then, there is no evidence that such user continued for twenty years prior to Ext. D, 1. If by continuous user as of right for twenty years, a prescriptive right of easement was not perfected prior to 1095, the easement could not have been perfected thereafter when the ownership of both the A and the B schedule properties coalesced in one, the plaintiff's father. D, 1. If by continuous user as of right for twenty years, a prescriptive right of easement was not perfected prior to 1095, the easement could not have been perfected thereafter when the ownership of both the A and the B schedule properties coalesced in one, the plaintiff's father. Secondly, even if it is accepted, once again for the sake of argument, that a prescriptive easement was acquired even prior to 1095, still when both the dominant and the servient tenements came to be owned by the same person, such easement came to an end. I would here draw a distinction between the coalescing of ownership and the coalescing of possession in the same hands. If the ownership of the dominant and the servient tenements coalesced in a single owner, then the easement of the dominant tenement over the servient tenement came to an end. If, on the other hand, only possession of the two tenements merged and not ownership, then the easement would only be suspended; and on the severance of possession again, the easement would revive. (vide Durga Ram Das v. Bharat Ram Das, AIR 1926 Cal. 92). In the present case, even if there was an easement of way by prescription before 1095, on the merging of the ownership of the two tenements in the same owner in 1095, the easement came to an end. Therefore, the lower courts are not right in their conclusion that there was an easement by prescription. 6. Still, the decision of the lower courts is right; because, when the tenements came to be divided as a result of the sales by the Receiver in 1111 of portions of the property to different people, an easement of necessity sprang into existence if there was a necessity for the same. It is argued that there is no necessity for such an easement, because the plaintiff has a way out on the north as well as on the west. The northern property belongs to the plaintiff's wife; and merely because the owner Of the property is the plaintiff's wife, it does not mean that the A schedule property has egress on the north. Similarly the western property belongs to a third party. The northern property belongs to the plaintiff's wife; and merely because the owner Of the property is the plaintiff's wife, it does not mean that the A schedule property has egress on the north. Similarly the western property belongs to a third party. It is pointed out that there is a bridge on the canal lying on the west of the A schedule property, along which the A schedule property can have egress to the Vypeen - Pallipuram road on the west along the footpath connecting the bridge to the road. It must be remembered that it is not established that the A schedule property has perfected any right of easement of way along the bridge and the footpath. May be that if there is a road abutting the A schedule property on the west, then the A schedule property can be said to have egress to that road and there is therefore no necessity for the disputed passage. But, the egress pointed out is through a third party's property. Until it is established that the A schedule property has a right of easement along that third party's property, it cannot be said that the A schedule has egress to the Vypeen - Pallippuram road so as to obviate any necessity for having the disputed passage across the B schedule. May be that the plaintiff is now using the outlets only with the tacit consent of the owners of the respective, properties. Thus, both the outlets pointed out on the north and on the west are not sufficient to hold that there is no necessity. Hence, the passage to the east along the B schedule claimed by the plaintiff can be sustained as an easement of necessity. 7. In this view, I dismiss the second appeal; but I make it clear that the easement is only one of necessity as the result of the sales by the Receiver in Vrischikam 1111 to two different owners and not a prescriptive easement. In view of this modification in the findings "of the lower courts, I direct both parties to suffer their respective costs before me.