Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.- The dispute, which has given rise to this appeal, concerns the right of succession to the management of certain charities founded by one Yagappa Nadar, an affluent Roman Catholic Christian of Thanjavur. To appreciate the genesis of the present litigation, the following genealogy will be found useful: Yagappa had two sons, Arulanandasami and Parisutham. Besides, he was treating with affection one Gnanaprakasam, a foster son of his father. By his will dated nth January, 1933, Yagappa disposed of all his properties. A portion of them was set apart for certain charities. The properties so set apart were contained in three Schedules A, B and C attached to the will. The income from those properties Was directed to be respectively utilised for the performance of the charities specified in Schedules D, E and F. The testator also provided by the same document for the management of the three sets of properties. The testator appointed his son Arulanandasami as the trustee for the A Schedule properties. No kind of beneficial interest was given to him. If there Were any surplus after meeting the expenses of the charities, they were directed to be accumulated for the benefit of the same charities. There were similar provisions in regard to the B and C Schedule properties, which were respectively entrusted to the management of Parisutham and Gnanaprakasam. The testator died on 16th March, 1938. It is not disputed that since then the charities have been duly performed in accordance with the directions of the founder by the persons designated in the will. There is no controversy in regard to the truth and genuineness of the will or of the validity of the dispositions contained therein. Arulanandasami died on 20th April, 1954, leaving behind him two sons, Arogyaswami and Arputham. The former succeeded to the management of the A Schedule properties, and, on his death in the year 1961, a dispute arose as to whether his minor son Yagappa was entitled to manage the properties or his brother Arputham should do so. The latter instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for a declaration that he was the trustee to manage the properties and administer the charities, and for recovery of possession thereof. This claim was contested on behalf of his brother’s son. The latter instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for a declaration that he was the trustee to manage the properties and administer the charities, and for recovery of possession thereof. This claim was contested on behalf of his brother’s son. The learned Subordinate Judge of Thanjavur held that it was Yagappa and not Arputham who would have a preferential right to the trusteeship of the properties. In this appeal the only question is, whether that view is correct. The consideration of that question depends upon the true construction of the relevant provisions, of the will, which is in Tamil. As the translation supplied to us does not bring out the force of the original, we prefer to set out verbatim the language of the will: This provision, freely translated, would be this: “My elder son and after him the seniormost male member amongst the heirs in his line, from generation to generation, shall manage the A Schedule properties without subjecting them to any alienation and perform the charities properly.” The provision for the management of the B Schedule properties is almost identical. But in regard to the C Schedule properties, which were entrusted to the management for Gnanaprakasam, the devolution of trusteeship was slightly different. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the trusteeship should devolve on the senior most male member for the time being among the descendants of Arulanandaswami Nadar. There can be little doubt that the document prescribed a special line of succession for the management of the trust properties. The female members are excluded from management. So too, the junior members of the family. The substantial question to be decided in the case is, whether the testator intended that the trusteeship should devolve by the ordinary rule of lineal primogeniture, as contended for on behalf of the respondent or, whether he intended that the trusteeship should vest in the senior most male member among Arulanandaswami’s descendants, as contended for by the appellant. The acceptance of the latter contention would mean that the testator intended a college to be created, as it were, from which the senior most should be selected-such college consisting of the male descendants of the testator’s family. The acceptance of the latter contention would mean that the testator intended a college to be created, as it were, from which the senior most should be selected-such college consisting of the male descendants of the testator’s family. It is argued that that must have been the intention of the testator, as he had stated in the will that the eldest male member in the family of Arulanandaswami for the time-being should manage the trust. But a careful readme of the clause would show that that could not have been his intention at all. The word " does connote the idea to successive generation. Again, the clause (that is, the eldest male heir at that time), indicates that the male heir should be to the deceased trustee and not to Arulanandaswami. This is therefore a plain case of succession by primogeniture, where if the last owner dies leaving sons, his eldest son will be entitled to succeed. Lineal primogeniture is a rule of inheritance under certain systems of jurisprudence. It is not unknown to the customary Hindu Law. What, therefore, the testator intended is a hereditary succession where the rule of primogeniture is to be applied. Now, hereditary succession is succession by the heir to a deceased under the law: it is the law that fixed up the successor or the heir and not the terms of the document. For example, originally the office or right might have been created by a document. It might prescribe the first trustee and provide for succession as if it were the property of the latter. Or it might itself prescribe a mode of selection of a trustee beyond the life time of the first trustee. In the first case trusteeship will hereditary. In Kalipada Chakrabarti v. Smt. Palani Bala Devi1 Mukherjea, J., while defining ? hereditary office, observed that “this means that the office goes from one person to another solely by the reason of the latter being a heir to the former.” The document in the present case clearly indicates that there should be a single trustee. The words " can only mean, when the succession opens or vacancy arises. In that context, the words " will mean the heir of the last holder and not of the testator or his son. The words " can only mean, when the succession opens or vacancy arises. In that context, the words " will mean the heir of the last holder and not of the testator or his son. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the document prescribes a special or peculiar rule of succession whereby the rule of primogeniture would apply only to a limited extent: the office will devolve on the senior most among the existing descendants of Arulanandaswami at the time when the office becomes vacant. To put it in other words every person succeeding will obtain the trustee ship by virtue of the document and not by reason of his heirship to the previous holder. If this contention were to be accepted, it would mean that the trusteeship would not be successive but ambulatory, in the sense of going up and down the genealogical tree of the family. There is no warrant for this view in the document. In Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Chandraban Singh1the privy Council, while construing a grant whereby succession was to be regulated by the rule of primogeniture, observed: “..............the language of the sanad emanating from the British authority was simply language conveying the ordinary meaning of the word” primogeniture “ in the Law of England.” Now, as we pointed out before, the peculiar rule of devolution contended for by the appellant is generally unknown in this country. It is said that such a rule obtains amongst the members of the Royal family of Cochin. But, having regard to the fact that the testator was a Roman Catholic Christian, it is more probable that his intention was to prescribe the rule of lineal promogeniture for the trusteeship rather than the complicated rule which will become more and more difficult to apply with the passing of generations. In our opinion, the Tamil word should be regarded as significant, as it conveys an idea which if expanded will be like this: “Just as my eldest son succeeds, his elder son should succeed him”. This therefore is a simple case of hereditary trusteeship under the law by which succession can be traced only to the last holder and not the document. As between Arputham, the appellant, and Yagappa, the respondent, there can be little doubt that the latter will be preferential heir and therefore he will be entitled to the trusteeship. This therefore is a simple case of hereditary trusteeship under the law by which succession can be traced only to the last holder and not the document. As between Arputham, the appellant, and Yagappa, the respondent, there can be little doubt that the latter will be preferential heir and therefore he will be entitled to the trusteeship. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.K. --------- Appeal dismissed.