Judgment 1. In this case the petitioner has applied to the High Court for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for calling up and quashing the order of the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, dated the 9th May, 1961 requiring the petitioner to obtain a Pakistan passport from the nearest Pakistan Mission in India and threatening that in default action under the Foreigners Act will be taken against the petitioner. 2. Cause has been shown by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given. 3. On behalf of the petitioner the main argument put forward by learned Counsel is that the order of the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, dated the 9th May, 1961 is illegal and ultra vires. It was submitted that the petitioner was a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution and the question whether he had renounced Indian citizenship and acquired citizenship of Pakistan can be determined by adopting the procedure prescribed in Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act. It was pointed out on behalf or the petitioner that the proper procedure for such a case was for the Central Government to determine the status of the petitioner under Section 9 of the Citizenship Act read with Rule 8 of Schedule 8 of the Citizenship Rules, It was submitted that in the present case there was no enquiry by the Government of India on the question of the petitioners status and until that enquiry was made by the Government of India, the respondent was not legally entitled to take proceedings against the petitioner under the Foreigners Act. In support of his argument learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Govt. of Andhra Pradesh V/s. Mohd. Khan, AIR 1962 SC 1778 . We are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel as correct. The question for determination in the present case is not whether the petitioner has renounced Indian citizenship or acquired citizenship of Pakistan under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act. of Andhra Pradesh V/s. Mohd. Khan, AIR 1962 SC 1778 . We are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel as correct. The question for determination in the present case is not whether the petitioner has renounced Indian citizenship or acquired citizenship of Pakistan under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act. On the contrary, the question to be decided is whether the petitioner was an Indian citizen at the commencement of the Constitution under Article 5 of the Constitution which states as follows: the commencement of this Constitution, every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and- (a) Who was born in the territory of India; or (b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or (c) Who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India." Having read the affidavit of the petitioner and the counter-affidavit of the respondent in this case, we are not satisfied that the petitioner has produced sufficient materials to show that he was an Indian citizen under Article 5 of the Constitution. On behalf of the petitioner learned counsel laid stress upon the fact that from the 1st of May 1942, the petitioner was working in Sinidih Colliery as a boiler fireman. It was also pointed out that the petitioner had married "one Chand Bibi daughter of Keshar Bauri of village Sinidih, Police Station Baghmara, district Dhanbad". We do not think that in the circumstances of this case the mere fact that the petitioner resided in India from 1942 up till 1961 sufficiently proves the question of the petitioners domicile, nor is it a relevant circumstance that the petitioner had married "one Chand Bibi daughter of Keshar Bauri of village Sinidih, Police Station Baghrnara, district Dhanbad". It is not stated in the petitioners affidavit that Chand Bibi was an Indian citizen nor is it stated anywhere by the petitioner that his intention was to make India his home. It is well settled by numerous authorities that although residence may be some prima facie proof of domicile, it is by no means to be inferred from the fact of residence that domicile results, even though the person had no other residence in existence or in contemplation--Bell V/s. Kennedy, (1868) 1 Sc and Div. 307. It is well settled by numerous authorities that although residence may be some prima facie proof of domicile, it is by no means to be inferred from the fact of residence that domicile results, even though the person had no other residence in existence or in contemplation--Bell V/s. Kennedy, (1868) 1 Sc and Div. 307. "Residence and domicile are two perfectly distinct things..... Domicile is an idea of law. It is the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality or country. To every adult person the law ascribes a domicile and that domicile remains his fixed attribute until a new and different attribute usurps its place." In the present case, the facts stated in the counter-affidavit of the respondent suggest on the contrary that the petitioner had no motive of making his domicile in India. In the first place it is not seriously controverted by the petitioner that he applied for and obtained a Pakistan passport (No. 351193) III describing his status as a citizen of Pakistan. It also appears that the petitioner deliberate!) withheld his passport, as Annexure I to the counter-affidavit indicates, that he alleged that he had lost the passport a few months from the date of its issue. It also appears that in his application for registration as a citizen of India (Annexure II to the counter-affidavit) the petitioner admitted that he was born in village Alampur, P. O. Kajrahat, Police Station Sonagaje, district Noakhali, East Pakistan. Having regard to the admission of the petitioner in his affidavit and the facts stated in the counter-affidavit of the respondent, we are satisfied that the petitioner has not produced prima facie materials to suggest that he had acquired domicile in India at the commencement of the Constitution, and, therefore, had acquired Indian citizenship under Article 5 of the Constitution. 4. For these reasons we hold that the petitioner has made out no case for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, dated the 9th May, 1961. In our opinion, the application fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.