JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge of Meerut directing his ejectment from an accommodation. The material question of law which arises in this case is whether a landlord can file a suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground that the latter has caused substantial damage to the accommodation or materially altered the accommodation when the agreement of tenancy contemplated such damage being caused and provided for payment of compensation to the landlord for it. The facts, are these. The appellant Ratan Lal, took the house of the respondent haran Singh on rent on Rs. 40/- per month for the purpose of install in and running a factory. There was an agreement between the parties which this purpose is specified an which contains covenants. The material clauses of this agreement are 6 and 9, which translated in English are as follows:- "6. The party of the first par (the tenant) shall be responsible for the proper maintenance of the building in which the factory shall be situated and if damage is caused t the building by any act whatsoever of the party of the first part, it shall be liable to pay compensation to the party of the second part." "9. That on restoring possession to the landlord of the tin-shed etc. and the building in which the factory is to be installed, the party o the 1st part shall restore it in actually the same sound condition in which it is being delivered to it under this agreement and if there hash, been any damage or demolition (Toot Phoot) or if the tin sheets of the tin-shed are missing, the party of the 1st part shall be liable to pay the price (of the missing parts) or compensation to the party of the second part (in respect of such damage or demolition.)." 2. This agreement was made in 1954. It is common ground that the tenant installed in the premises an oil engine which was to run the factory. (The nature of the factory is not mentioned in the agreement but it is common ground that it was a saw-mill.) Subsequently he purchased a piece of adjoining land on which' he installed the mill itself. It is common ground that the tenant installed in the premises an oil engine which was to run the factory. (The nature of the factory is not mentioned in the agreement but it is common ground that it was a saw-mill.) Subsequently he purchased a piece of adjoining land on which' he installed the mill itself. As the engine in the premises was to provide the power for running the mil the plaintiff made extensive alterations in the building including t opening of three doors in a wall adjoining the factory. It is common ground that the belts connecting the engine with the mill pass through the apertures made in the wall. It appears that the completion of the factory took about 5 years and the mill started working in or about the year 1959. By this time the original landlord had sold the premises in dispute to Karan Singh the plaintiff in the present suit. He sued for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he had made material alterations in the premises and caused extensive damage which rendered him liable to ejectment under Cls. (b) and (c) of Section 3(1) of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The tenant resisted the suit and denied that he had caused any substantial damage or made any material alterations in the premises. This was a rather silly plea to take in defence and I am not surprised that both the courts below have held against the appellant that material alterations were made and extensive damage caused to the premises. The trial court passed a decree for his ejectment and the appellate judge con firmed it. He has now come to this Court in second appeal. In my opinion the plea that the damage was not extensive or that the alterations were not material cannot be taken seriously. I have seen a photograph of the alterations and there could be no doubt that change have been made which have materially altered the accommodation. If this were the only point I would have dismissed the appeal. 3. But the real question in this case is whether a landlord can invoke Cls. I have seen a photograph of the alterations and there could be no doubt that change have been made which have materially altered the accommodation. If this were the only point I would have dismissed the appeal. 3. But the real question in this case is whether a landlord can invoke Cls. (b) and (c) of Section 3 (1) of the is U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act and file a suit for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his having made material alterations and caused substantial damages to the premises, after he has made an agreement which not only permitted, expressly or impliedly, the making of these alterations but also provided for compensation to the landlord of substantial damage was caused by the premises being used in a manner which was made known to the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. In my opinion he cannot. 4. Clause (b) provides in effect that the land-lord may file a suit for the eviction of the tenant if the latter has "wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation." But, in my opinion, the right to sue under this clause is taken away where the landlord has permitted the tenant to use the premises in a manner which must necessarily cause damage to the building and the tenant has agreed to pay compensation to the landlord for such damage. Cl. (b) is based on the principle that the tenant must not use the premises in any unauthorised manner causing damage to the accommodation, but this principle is not violated where the parties make an agreement providing, expressly or impliedly for a particular manner of use involving damage to the building and compensation to the landlord in case of damage. 4. Cl. 4. Cl. (c) confers on the landlord the right to evict the tenant if the latter "has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value." The material words in this clause are "without the permission in writing of the landlord." Therefore this clause does not apply at all to a case where the tenant has obtained the permission of the landlord in writing to use the accommodation in a manner involving material alterations in the building or diminishing its value. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the agreement between the land-lord and the tenant in the present case did not give the latter any permission, expressly or by implication, to make material alterations in the building or cause damage. This contention is negatived by the plain words of the agreement. The preamble mentions the purpose for which the appellant was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation viz, running a mill (Vaste Karobar Karkhana). It is not denied that the landlord knew that Karkhana meant a saw-mill. He was letting out a residential house for the purposes of a factory being installed in it. It is idle to deny that he did not realise at the time that this would involve material alterations in the building pulling down a well here, opening a hole there and so on. That he realised all this is proved by the fact that he insisted on a provision. being included for compensation to him in case of damage to the building in the process of constructing or running a factory. Clause 6 of the agreement provided that the tenant was to pay compensation for any damage caused to the building by any act of his whatsoever. Again clause 9 provides that the tenant was under an obligation, on the termination of the tenancy, to restore the building to the landlord in exactly the same condition in which he got it and if there had been any demolition of any part of it (Toot Phoot Vagairagh), he was to pay compensation to the landlord. Again clause 9 provides that the tenant was under an obligation, on the termination of the tenancy, to restore the building to the landlord in exactly the same condition in which he got it and if there had been any demolition of any part of it (Toot Phoot Vagairagh), he was to pay compensation to the landlord. It is significant that the landlord did not reserve to himself the right to eject the tenant in case of damage and was satisfied with the provision for compensation, that the right of ejectment was deliberately excluded is proved by the fact that it is conferred in another clause of the agreement which prohibits the tenant to sub-let the premises and confers on the landlord a right to evict him in case of breach of this covenant. 6. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that though material alterations have been made in the, accommodation causing damage to it, the landlord cannot invoke clauses (b) and (c) of Section 3 (1) of U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, because he made an agreement with the tenant which contemplated such alterations being made and provided for compensation to the landlord, and thus permitted the tenant by implication to make them. 7. I allow this appeal, set aside the decree for ejectment and dismiss the plaintiff-respondent's suit with costs throughout. The rest of the decree namely, for recovery of rent and damages is confirmed with proportionate costs throughout. 8. A cross-objection has been filed by the landlord from a decree of Additional Civil Judge of Meerut refusing his claim for compensation for damages to the accommodation let out to the tenant from Rs. 500/ to Rs. 200/-. This judgment should be read along with the judgment in second appeal No, 414. The cross objection is based on the ground that assessment of damages by the lower court is erroneous as it was based on a report of a Commissioner who was not competent to assess the damages. The objection is opposed by the learned counsel for the tenant of the ground that the entire claim is premature. The cross objection is based on the ground that assessment of damages by the lower court is erroneous as it was based on a report of a Commissioner who was not competent to assess the damages. The objection is opposed by the learned counsel for the tenant of the ground that the entire claim is premature. It is not necessary for me to consider the cross objection on merits as the learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the cross-objection should be dismissed but the landlord's right to file the suit for damages at any subsequent stage shall not be affected by any decision in the present proceedings. In view of this agreement dismiss the cross-objection but permit the landlord to file another suit for damages at the proper time if he so desires. Parties shall bear their own costs of this cross-objection. Th decree for damages is consequently set aside.