ORDER Govinda Menon, J. 1. The petitioner has been convicted by the Additional First Class Magistrate of Shertallai for an offence punishable under S.355(1)(c) of the Kerala Municipalities Act -- Act XIV of 1961. S.355(1) reads: "(1) Whoever -- (a) contravenes any provision of any of the sections or rule specified in the first column of Schedule 5, or (b) contravenes any rule or order made under any of the specified sections or rule, or (c) fails to comply with any direction lawfully given to him or any requisition lawfully made upon him under or in pursuance of the provisions of any of the said sections or rule, shall on conviction be punished with fine which may extend to the amount mentioned in that behalf in the fourth column of the said schedule". Learned counsel for the respondent has agreed that the conviction if at all ought to have been under S.355(1)(a), because the offence here is contravention of any provision of any of the sections specified in the first column of schedule 5. 2. Coming to the merits, the provision that is said to have been contravened by the accused is S.367. S.367 reads: "The Commissioner may summon any person to attend before him and to give evidence or produce documents, as the case may be, in respect of any question relating to taxation or inspection, or registration or to the grant of any licence or permission under the provisions of this Act." It is a penal provision and the terms of the section have to be strictly construed. The section confers power on the Municipal Commissioner to summon any person for certain specified purposes. He can summon a person, omitting the unnecessary words, to give evidence in respect of any question relating to the grant of a licence. Here the licence has already been granted by the commissioner and the petitioner has filed an appeal to the Municipal Council under S.364 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent would argue that the power to summon would extend even to cases where the licence had already been granted, and the matter is pending in appeal. It is extremely doubtful whether S.367 would apply at the stage when the licence had already been granted and a person has filed an appeal against the grant of the said licence. It is extremely doubtful whether S.367 would apply at the stage when the licence had already been granted and a person has filed an appeal against the grant of the said licence. But it is unnecessary to decide this point as the Commissioner himself has admitted that he summoned, the petitioner only for the purpose of clearing his doubt whether the petitioner had really submitted the appeal and not for the purposes mentioned in S.367. Learned counsel for the respondent has fairly conceded that summoning for such a purpose would not be justified within the terms of S.367. If, therefore, the Commissioner cannot legally summon the petitioner, no offence can be said to have been committed for his failure to obey the summons. This aspect of the matter has escaped the notice of the learned Magistrate resulting in a wrong conviction. 3. On receipt of the summons from the Commissioner, the petitioner sent a reply stating that the action of the Commissioner in trying to record a statement from him is not legally permissible, that it is done with some ulterior motive and that if the Municipal Council so requires, he is always prepared to appear. Normally on receipt of the reply, the Commissioner ought to have been satisfied that the appeal had really been sent by the petitioner for which purpose alone he wanted to summon the petitioner. On receipt of the reply, one would have normally expected him to take the orders of the appellate authority, namely, the Municipal Council but probably chagrined at the attitude of the petitioner he hastily ordered an unnecessary prosecution. The powers given to the Commissioner under S.367 are very wide, but the plenitude of the powers requires great caution in the exercise of it. It is clear that when a statute confers upon an official, a specific power, it should not be extended to cover cases not specifically falling within its scope. There is considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel, that the action of the Commissioner was utterly lacking in bona fides, smacks of vindictiveness and intended only to harass the petitioner. In the result, I allow the revision petition, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit the accused. Fine, if paid, would be refunded.