ORDER Dixit C.J.- l. This revision petition has come up before this Division Bench for disposal on a reference made by one of us. 2. The matter arises thus. The petitioner Premdas instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur, for ejectment of the defendant-opponent from a house situated in Jabalpur and for recovery of arrears of rent. The ejectment is sought on the grounds that the defendant has fallen in arrears of rent for the period from 1st November 1961 to 1st March 1962 and that he has also sub-let the house without obtaining the plaintiff's permission. In his written statement the opponent has denied that he was ever the tenant of the plaintiff According to him, one M. M. Pande was the tenant of the premises which had been let out to' him by Baba Saraswatidas, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. The opponent has also raised the objection that the petitioner has no right to maintain the suit inasmuch as the plaintiff's claim to the property in suit rests on a will executed by the late Baba Saraswatidas and the plaintiff has not obtained any letters of administration of the will. The opponent admitted that he did not pay any rent to the petitioner and stated that he was under no obligation to pay any rent to him. He denied that he or anyone else had sub-let the premises. After the filing of the suit an order was made by the trial Judge under section 13 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) directing the opponent tenant to deposit rent. On 1st August 1963 it was stated on behalf of the tenant that he was not prepared to deposit the arrears of rent. Thereupon, the trial Judge made an order under section 13 (6) of the Act striking out the opponent's defence against eviction. The Court ordered that the opponent's "defence is struck out so far as it relates to eviction." 3. On the pleading, of the parties, the trial Judge framed only three issues, namely, whether the suit was maintainable as the petitioner had not obtained any letters of administration whether the opponent was the petitioner's tenant; and the relief to which the petitioner was entitled. Thereafter the plaintiff's evidence was recorded and closed. On the pleading, of the parties, the trial Judge framed only three issues, namely, whether the suit was maintainable as the petitioner had not obtained any letters of administration whether the opponent was the petitioner's tenant; and the relief to which the petitioner was entitled. Thereafter the plaintiff's evidence was recorded and closed. When the defendant-opponent began to lead his evidence, the petitioner raised the objection that the defendant-tenant was not entitled to tender any evidence as his defence had been struck out and that he was only entitled to cross-examine the Plaintiff's witnesses. This objection was overruled by the learned civil Judge by making the observation that the opponent's defence against eviction only had been struck out and that he still had other defences open to him and was, therefore, entitled to lead evidence in relation to the issues framed in the suit. It is against this order that the present revision petition is directed. 4. The reference was necessitated because of the importance of the question of frequent occurrence, namely, whether in a suit for ejectment on any of the ground, stated in section 12 of the Act it is open to the defendant-tenant, whose 'defence against eviction' has been struck out by an order under sub-section (6) of section 13, to raise other defences not falling under section 12 against ejectment. The petitioner's contention is that the effect of an order under section 13 (6) is to debar the defendant-tenant from raising any defence against ejectment and not merely the defence against ejectment resting on any of the grounds covered by section 12. 5. Before examining the tenability of this contention it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 13 of the Act which is as follows:- "13. When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction. 5. Before examining the tenability of this contention it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 13 of the Act which is as follows:- "13. When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction. (1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have mad, default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Civil Court shall fix a reasonable provision rent in relation to the accommodation to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub section (1) till the decision of the suit or appeal. If in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as to the persons to whom the rent is payable, the Court may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), and in such a case, no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same. (4) If the Civil Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. (4) If the Civil Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. (5) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub section (1) or sub-section (2), no decree or order shall be made by the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord. (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit." 6. It will be observed that the section bears the heading "When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction." The first three sub-sections deal with the making of a direction calling upon the tenant to deposit the rent. The fourth sub-section gives to the Court the power to strike out the tenant's defence against eviction if the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by the tenant falsely or frivolously. The next sub-section has obviously been enacted for the benefit of the tenant when it provides that if a tenant makes the deposit as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), then no decree for ejectment shall be passed against him on the ground of default in the payment of arrears of rent. The last sub-section empowers the Court to strike out the tenant's "defence against eviction" if he fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by an order made under the earlier sub section. 7. The question that arises for determination is whether the expression "defence against eviction" used in sub section (4) or sub-section (6) of section 1 is wide enough to include defence of any kind against eviction or whether it means only the defence of protection given to a tenant by section 12 of the Act. 7. The question that arises for determination is whether the expression "defence against eviction" used in sub section (4) or sub-section (6) of section 1 is wide enough to include defence of any kind against eviction or whether it means only the defence of protection given to a tenant by section 12 of the Act. In order to understand the true meaning of the expression, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, is a special enactment which restricts the ordinary rights of landlord and tenant arising out of their mutual contracts and relationship and it undoubtedly affects their proprietary rights. The Act gives protection against eviction to tenants notwithstanding the fact that the landlord has terminated the tenancy. It allows a tenant whose tenancy has been terminated by a notice given by the landlord in accordance with law to remain in possession of the tenanted premises and gives him the status of a statutory tenant. This is clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. K.A. Dhairayawan Vs. J.R. Thakur, AIR 1958 SC 789 , and Punjalal Vs. Bhagwatprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120 . In the latter case the Supreme Court considered section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, sub-section (1) of which said that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant paid, or was ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observed and performed the other conditions of the tenancy. In regard to this Act the Supreme Court said ;- "The Act intended therefore to restrict the rights which landlords possessed either for charging excessive rents or for evicting tenants. A tenant stood in no need of protection against eviction by the landlord so long as he had the necessary protection under the terms of the contract between him and the landlord. He could not be evicted till his tenancy was determined according to law and therefore there was no necessity for providing any further protection in the Act against his eviction so long as his tenancy continued to exist under the contract. " Ordinarily, the landlord will have a right to recover possession from the tenant when the tenancy had determined. He could not be evicted till his tenancy was determined according to law and therefore there was no necessity for providing any further protection in the Act against his eviction so long as his tenancy continued to exist under the contract. " Ordinarily, the landlord will have a right to recover possession from the tenant when the tenancy had determined. The provisions of this section therefore will operate against {he landlord after the determination of the tenancy by any of the modes referred to in section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. What this section of the Act provides is that even after the determination of the tenancy, a landlord will not be entitle; to recover possession, though a right to recover possession gets vested in him, so long as the tenant complied with what he is required to do by this section. It is this extra protection given by this section, which will be useful to the tenant after his tenancy has determined. The section does not create a new right in the landlord to evict the tenant when the tenant does not pay his rent. It does not say so, and therefore, it is clear that a landlord's right to evict the tenant for default in payment of rent will arise only after the tenancy is determined and the continued possession of the tenant is not on account of the contractual terms but on account of the statutory right conferred on him to continue in possession so long as he complies with what sub-section (1) required of him. The landlord is restricted from evicting the tenant till the tenant does not do what he is required to do for peaceful possession under sub-section (1) of section 12. Later in the judgment the Supreme Court observed: "The right to possession is to be distinguished from the right to recover possession. The right to possession arises when the tenancy is determined The right to recover possession follows the right to possession, and arises when the person in possession does not make over possession as he is bound to do under law, and there arises a necessity to recover possession through Court. The cause of action for going to Court to recover possession arises on the refusal of the person in possession with no right to possess, to deliver possession. The cause of action for going to Court to recover possession arises on the refusal of the person in possession with no right to possess, to deliver possession. In this context, it is clear that the provisions of section 12 deal with the stage of the recovery of possession and not with the stages prior to it and that they come into pay only when the tenancy is determined and a right to possession has come in existence Of course, if there was no contractual tenancy and a person is deemed to be a tenant only on a count of a statute giving him right to remain in possession, the right to possession arises on the person in possession acting in a manner which, according to the statue, gives the landlord right to recover possession and no question for the determination of the tenancy arises, as really speaking there was no tenancy in the ordinary sense of that expression. It is for the sake of convenience that the right to possession, by virtue of the provisions of a statute has been referred to as statutory tenancy” 8. The above principles enunciated by the Supreme Court apply equally in the case of the Act before us. Under this Act the position of a tenant remaining in possession of the tenanted premises after the determination of the tenancy is of a statutory tenant, and the protection against eviction which he has under the Act is the protection given by section 12 thereof. Section 12 only gives protection to the tenant from ejectment and furnishes him a new defence. The Act being thus a special enactment affecting the ordinary tenancy rights of landlord and tenant and giving special protection to tenants in certain cases must, therefore, be strictly construed. The well settled rule with regard to construction of special or emergency statutes is that "regard must, of course, as in other statutes first be had to the plain meaning of the statutes themselves as a matter of construction, but..., restricting as they do, the ordinary rights' of individuals arising from their mutual contracts and relationship the Acts should not be needlessly extended beyond the particular mischiefs which they are designed to avoid or remedy" See Wilcock. Vs. Booth, (1920) 89 LJKB 864 at p. 866. 9. Vs. Booth, (1920) 89 LJKB 864 at p. 866. 9. Now, the object of section 13 is clearly to prevent a tenant from stopping the payment of rent, when an ejectment suit is filed against him. It is also, as is evident from sub-section (3), to relieve the landlord from the necessity of filing a separate suit for rent for the period covered by the pendency of the suit. So also, it is to give protection to a tenant who has fallen in arrears of rent, but who makes a deposit as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). Having regard to this object of the provision and regard being had to the fact that section 13 is a provision of a special Act giving to the tenant, whose tenancy has been determined, the status of a statutory tenant and special protection against eviction under section 12, it is difficult to construe the expression "defence against eviction" as meaning defence of any kind, no matter falling under the special Act or under the general law against eviction. In the context of the special Act the phrase "defence against eviction" used in sub-section (4) or sub-section (6) can only mean that defence against eviction which is given by section 12. The expression "defence against eviction" by itself is no doubt ambiguous, but the ambiguity is resolved by the nature of the Act and of the provisions of section 13 thereof and by the heading of that section. That heading speaks of the circumstances in which a tenant can get "benefit of protection against eviction" "Benefit of protection" referred to is clearly the benefit given by the Act and not under the genera, law. The heading of the section can clearly be taken into consideration for resolving any doubt as to the meaning of the ambiguous term "defence against eviction". See Bhinka Vs. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 . 10. The petitioners submission that a tenant whose defence has been struck out under section 13 (4) or 13 (6) is not entitled to put up defence of any kind against eviction, if accepted, would involve a serious interference with the valuable substantive right of defence that a tenant has under the Code of Civil Procedure-going beyond the purpose of the Act and of section 13 (4) and 13 (6) thereof. In Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal. In Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal. Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 , the Supreme Court emphasized that the right which a party has under the Code of Civil Procedure of defending a suit is a valuable right and a party cannot be deprived of it lightly. It is easy to see that in a suit for ejectment the defendant tenant can, as the opponent has done in the present case, question the competency of the plaintiff to file the suit; he can also deny the tenancy set up by the plaintiff. In a general way, these are all defences against ejectment but they are not any defences given to a tenant by the special Act If in an i I-founded suit for ejectment by a person claiming to be the landlord, the tenant refuses to make a deposit in compliance with an order made under section 13 and his defence is struck out under sub-section (4) or sub-section (6) of section 13 so as to deprive him of the right of putting up any defence against eviction at all, then the result would be to strike out the defence of the defendant under section 13 (4) or 13 (6) even if the Accommodation Control Act, 1961, itself may not be applicable to the suit. In our judgment, the expression "defence against eviction" used in sub-section (4) or sub-section (6) of section 13 means the defence against eviction resting on section 12 of the Act and when an order under those sub-sections is made striking out the tenant's defence against eviction, the tenant does not lose his right of putting up a defence to the ejectment suit which does not fall under section 12. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Debendra Nath Vs. Satyabala Dasi, AIR 1950 Cal. 217 ; S.B. Trading Co. Vs. O. T. Corporation, AIR 1952 Cal. 685 ; D. R. Gellatly Vs. J.R.W. Canaan, AIR 1953 Cal. 409 and Satya Narain Vs. Naraindas, AIR 1954 Cal. 41 . The decision in D.R Gellatly Vs. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Debendra Nath Vs. Satyabala Dasi, AIR 1950 Cal. 217 ; S.B. Trading Co. Vs. O. T. Corporation, AIR 1952 Cal. 685 ; D. R. Gellatly Vs. J.R.W. Canaan, AIR 1953 Cal. 409 and Satya Narain Vs. Naraindas, AIR 1954 Cal. 41 . The decision in D.R Gellatly Vs. J.R.W. Cannon (supra) is no doubt to the effect that when a tenant's defence against ejectment is struck out under section 14 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, then the effect is to strike out his defence against ejectment not only on the grounds mentioned in section 12 (1) of that Act but other defences against ejectment as well. In Debendra Nath Vs. Satyabala Dasi (supra) and S.B. Trading Co. Vs. O. T. Corporation (supra), it was held that when the defence is struck out, the defendant is not entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses on their evidence as to the facts establishing the claim to ejectment and address the Court with regard to that claim. It is no doubt true that when a party's defence on a certain matter is struck out, then he cannot have the opportunity of cross-examining the plaintiff's witnesses and address the Court in regard to that matter. A suit may be defended not only by filing a written statement, but also by able and successful cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses and arguments. In Satya Narain Vs. Naraindas (supra), it was observed that when the tenant's defence is struck out under section 14 (4), there is no occasion for him to appear in the suit. With all due deference to the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, we do not find ourselves in agreement with the wide meaning given to the term "defence against ejectment" in the above cases. In D.R Gellatly Vs J.R.W. Cannon (supra), the question of the meaning of the expression "defence against ejectment" was not approached keeping in view the cardinal principle of strict construction of special statutes and the nature of statutory tenancy and the special protection given to a tenant by the special Act. In D.R Gellatly Vs J.R.W. Cannon (supra), the question of the meaning of the expression "defence against ejectment" was not approached keeping in view the cardinal principle of strict construction of special statutes and the nature of statutory tenancy and the special protection given to a tenant by the special Act. In that case, the learned Chief Justice made the observation that the language of section 14 (4) was in no way qualified so as to land support to the contention that the defence contemplated by that provision was only the defence against ejectment on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12 (1). If we may say so with respect, the qualification for restricting the meaning of the expression "defence against ejectment" is to be found in the very nature of the special Act and the special protection given by it to the tenants. 12. Learned counsel also referred us to the decision of Tare, J. in Vansraj Vs. Kusumwati, 1962 JLJ-SN 115. In that case the learned Judge held with reference to the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 that the result of striking out the tenant's defence under section 5 of that Act was that the tenant's defence had to be ignored altogether, and it should be taken that the tenant had not filed any written statement. It is not necessary to examine the correctness of this decision for the reason that Vansraj's case is distinguishable on the language of section 5 (2) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955. That provision laid down that on the failure of the tenant to deposit rent, his right "to defend" shall be terminated. 13. In the present case, the issues framed, namely, whether the petitioner was entitled to file the suit when he had obtained any letters of administration and whether the opponent was his tenant, are not founded on any defence of the opponent resting on any of the grounds specified in section 12 of the Act. That being so, the learned civil Judge was right in permitting the opponent to lead evidence in regard to those issues. Therefore, this petition is dismissed. Having regard to the question decided, we make no order about costs of this petition.