N. M. MIABHOY, N. K. VAKIL, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant Himatsingh Badharsingh a Rajput was tried for the murder of a Bhil girl Jivi on 16th of April 1962 and was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life by the Sessions Judge at Broach in Sessions Case No. 35 of 1962. He was also convicted for having committed the offence under section 19 (e) of the Indian Arms Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurr ently. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case may be briefly stated. The appellant was a resident of village Rampara in Taluka Rajpipla of Broach District. He was employed as a teacher in the primary school at village Nava Vaghpara which was also known as Jitpara. Between these two villages there was a village of Sengpura in which lived deceased Jivi with her parents Shaikhji Raysang and mother Uji. The appellant used to frequently visit the house of Shaikhji Raysang on his way back from school and even occasionally stayed at night with them. He had developed criminal intimacy with Bai Jivi. The appellant was married but still as he was infatuated by the girl Bai Jivi he had expressed a desire to marry her. It appears that even Jivi was at one stage prepared to accede to his desire. But she was already betrothed to a Bhil boy of village Vadiaone Bhikha Kuber and her parents therefore were not inclined to break their promise to marry her to that boy and allow her to be married to the appellant. On April 14 1962, which was a Saturday, the appellant after leaving his school came to the house of Jivi. At that time he told Shaikhji that he was going to Baroda on that day and would be returning on the next day evening and his meals may be kept ready. On the 15th evening he did return from Baroda and came to the house of Shaikhji. That day he again repeated his demand to marry Bai Jivi to him. But Shaikhji again answered the same way saying that as she was betrothed he would get her married to that Bhil boy and after that marriage if her husband showed the desire according to custom he can give dava to that Bhil and take her away. That day he again repeated his demand to marry Bai Jivi to him. But Shaikhji again answered the same way saying that as she was betrothed he would get her married to that Bhil boy and after that marriage if her husband showed the desire according to custom he can give dava to that Bhil and take her away. Nothing further seems to have happened between the father of Jivi and the appellant. That night the appellant slept in the Parsal on a cot and Jivi also slept in the Parsal but on the floor. she was in menses at that time. The other members of the family slept inside the house. Early next morning Shaikhji heard Velki wife of Khalpa Rama residing in the neighbouring Vada shouting that the accused was running away after firing a gun at Bai Jivi and that she was lying dead in her Vada. Shaikhji went to the spot and found his daughter Jivi lying dead on the ground. He also noticed gun shot wounds in her chest. Velki informed him that whilst she was on her way to answer the call of nature she had seen the accused running away towards the Khadi after firing a gun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As the appellant was not to be found the P. S. I. directed a police constable to keep a watch and trace out the accused. On the 19th of April 1962 the police constable Sitaram who was entrusted with that work got information that the appellant was found concealing himself in the Sim of village Gambhirpura and so he in company with one Chhota Chamadia went to that part of the Kotar. He noticed the appellant sitting at the khadi. According to Sitaram the accused fired a shot from his Tamancha, which he believed was meant for him whereupon he proceeded to P. S. I. Shri Patil and requested him to come with police force. When the P. S. I. arrived at that place in company with Deputy Superintendent of Police he found the appellant lying unconscious on the ground with pellet injuries in his chest and a Tamancha and an empty cartridge lying by his side. When the P. S. I. arrived at that place in company with Deputy Superintendent of Police he found the appellant lying unconscious on the ground with pellet injuries in his chest and a Tamancha and an empty cartridge lying by his side. It was noticed that at that time he had put on a long pajama a bush-coat and an under-waist as well as an under-pant. On a search being made in the presence of panchas from the pocket of the bush-coat of the appellant certain articles were found and amongst these articles there was one letter article 39, which was subsequently exhibited as Exhibit 65/a. The said letter was addressed to the District Superintendent of Police and therein the appellant had made a narration of the whole incident. We shall turn to this letter and its contents again a little later on. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) THE appellant in his statement before the Court admitted most part of the prosecution story and only controverted the allegation that he had murdered Jivi or that he had run away after murdering her and that Velki had seen him so running away. About the death of Jivi his case was that as Jivi was also inclined to marry him and as Jivis parents were not agreeable to allow her to marry him both of them had decided to commit suicide. Therefore on the 16th of April 1962 early in the morning at about 3-30 A M. both of them had got up and started to go to the Khadi but on the way he had a sensation to answer the call of nature and therefore he gave the Tamancha that he was carrying with him to Jivi and asked her to wait till he returned. But after he left her he heard a gun report. He thereupon rushed back to the place where Jivi was left by him and he found Jivi lying dead on the ground having shot herself with the Tamancha, which was lying by her side. It was his case that on seeing this sight he got confused became nervous and ran away with the Tamancha crossed the Khadi putting off his clothes on the bank of the Khadi and then he concealed himself in the Kotar of Gambhirpura Sim for about four days. It was his case that on seeing this sight he got confused became nervous and ran away with the Tamancha crossed the Khadi putting off his clothes on the bank of the Khadi and then he concealed himself in the Kotar of Gambhirpura Sim for about four days. Then ultimately he attempted to commit suicide by firing a Tamancha at himself and became unconscious. He recovered his consciousness in the hospital where he was removed. As regards the letter article 39 he had a different story to give. He denied that that article was written and kept in his pocket and that it was recovered by the police from his bush-coat while he was lying unconscious in the Sim of Gambhirpura. According to him the P. S. I. had come to the Civil Hospital on the 20th of April 1962 to record his statement and at that time he had expressed a desire to the P. S. I. to say something to him. But the P. S. I. had told him to put in writing whatever he wanted to tell him. He was afraid at that time that the police will try to get his confession somehow and therefore he stated in that letter that he had murdered Bai Jivi. About the attempt on his own life his story was that as he was disappointed in love affairs he had tried to take his own life. ( 4 ) IN support of the appeal before us the appellant has urged that the conviction is bad in law as it is based on inadmissible evidence and further that it is also not justified by the evidence on the record. First then we will deal with the legal objections raised against the conviction now under appeal. ( 5 ) MR. B. H. Desai the learned Advocate for the appellant firstly contended that the letter article 39 Exhibit 65/a was not admissible in evidence as it was hit by the provisions of sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This aspect of the case was not considered at all by the trial Court. He contended that if it is held that the document falls within the prohibition of sec. 162 Criminal Procedure Code the Court need not even go to consider the second point of objection that he was raising that the said document was not admissible even under sec. He contended that if it is held that the document falls within the prohibition of sec. 162 Criminal Procedure Code the Court need not even go to consider the second point of objection that he was raising that the said document was not admissible even under sec. 25 of the Evidence act. ( 6 ) BEFORE we consider the purely legal aspect of the contentions raised it will be convenient to deal with the facts so far as they concern the controversial document. The prosecution case was as we have seen that this writing was found in the pocket of the bush-shirt, which the appellant had put on when he was still unconscious and it was attached by the police in the presence of the panchas. The appellant however had taken up the position before the trial Court that the said allegation was false and that he had written out that statement after he had recovered consciousness in the hospital and he did so because of the fear of the police as stated aforesaid. The fact therefore of Exhibit 65/a being in his own hand-writing was not disputed before the trial Court and it is not disputed before us. The learned trial Judge after examining the evidence before him came to the conclusion that the say of the accused could not be accepted. We see no reason to differ from his conclusion. Mr. Desai has also very fairly conceded that position and had urged his contentions on the assumption that the said letter was found from the pocket of the appellant when he was still lying unconscious. ( 7 ) THERE is no manner of doubt that the writing Exhibit 65/a contains a clear confession of the appellant that he had murdered Bai Jivi. It appears that there was some effort made in the lower Court on behalf of the prosecution to urge that it was admissible under sec. 8 even though it may amount to confession of guilt. The learned Judge very rightly rejected this submission. The learned Assistant Police Government Pleader Mr. Vidhyarthi has also not made any attempt to support such a submission. ( 8 ) WE now pass to the Consideration of the contention that this document is hit by sec 162 Criminal Procedure Code and therefore wrongly admitted in evidence. The learned Judge very rightly rejected this submission. The learned Assistant Police Government Pleader Mr. Vidhyarthi has also not made any attempt to support such a submission. ( 8 ) WE now pass to the Consideration of the contention that this document is hit by sec 162 Criminal Procedure Code and therefore wrongly admitted in evidence. It is a fact that this point was not considered nor raised before the trial Court. Mr. Desai formulated his submissions on the point before us as follows :-- (A) The heading of the document Exhibit 65/a is Jubani meaning evidence or statement. (B) It opens with the words To the D. S. P. My this statement will be of much use to you in preparing the case. I myself Himmatsinhji Badharsinhji do hereby state that I have committed this murder myself in my quite good health and without any intoxicated condition. The reason for the murder is as under. Before this I may first explain to you how I came into contact with Jivi which will perhaps make it more convenient to you to grasp the whole history. (C) The document then makes clear the object of making a clean breast of things. It was to see that unnecessarily innocent persons and relations on both sides were not harassed by police on suspicion or false allegation. (D) The writing bears the date 16-3-1962. It is obvious that the figure 3 indicating the month was a slip and the figure should have been 4 instead of 3all these facts indicated according to Mr. Desai that the appellant niter committing the crime on the 16th on that very day had put his tragic story in writing and he did so with the intention of communicating it to the District Superintendent of Police with the double object of confessing his guilt and also of saving innocent relations and persons from being harassed on suspicion by the police. Mr. Desai urged that the fact of this writing having not been actually put in possession of the police officer by the police appellant as he was unconscious made no difference whatever nor did the fact that it was recovered by the police officer in the presence of the panchas. Mr. Desai urged that the fact of this writing having not been actually put in possession of the police officer by the police appellant as he was unconscious made no difference whatever nor did the fact that it was recovered by the police officer in the presence of the panchas. As the writing was kept ready and intended to be communicated to the police and as a matter of fact it was addressed to the District Superintendent of Police and as it reached the hands of the Police officer this writing stressed Mr. Desai was nothing short of a statement made to the police officer during the course of investigation in respect of the offence of murder of Jivi and therefore according to him it fell within the four corners of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and was thus inadmissible in evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) HAVE therefore no hesitation in accepting that part of the submission on behalf of the appellant that Exhibit 65/a is a statement and is a statement reduced to writing. We also accept the fact that having regard to the evidence on record this statement may be said to have been made during the course of investigation of the murder of Jivi. We have also no manner of doubt that under law now a statement made by an accused person would also be within the mischief of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It also does not require any arguments to persuade us to hold that a statement volunteered or made to a police officer would also be hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But in our view all these conceded propositions do not go to resolve the important problem raised for our consideration. What is most important to note is that it is only a statement that is made to a police officer by any person that is barred from being admitted in evidence and no other statement. Therefore what we are called upon to concentrate on and decide is what is the true construction of these words made to a police officer and whether Exhibit 65/a can be said to be a statement made to a police officer. ( 10 ) MR. Therefore what we are called upon to concentrate on and decide is what is the true construction of these words made to a police officer and whether Exhibit 65/a can be said to be a statement made to a police officer. ( 10 ) MR. Desai submitted that under the facts and circumstances of this case and particularly in view of the contents of the writing which clearly showed that it was addressed to the District Superintendent of Police and that they were intended to be communicated or made known to the District Superintendent of Police it must be held to amount to a statement by the appellant made to a police officer. In order to emphasize his submission Mr. Desai argued that to bring a statement under section 162 it was not at all necessary for an accused or any other person to write the statement in the presence of a police officer and a statement written in the absence of a police officer but which is given to him by the accused or the person writing it later would all the same fall within its purview. We may not have any objection to accept this contention of Mr. Desai. But Mr. Desai then stretched his argument to submit that when the accused prepared the written statement kept it ready and intended to give it to the police and it actually came to be recovered by the police officer in the course of investigation it must be construed to have been made to a police officer and the fact of his being unconscious at that time cannot endure for the benefit of the prosecution nor should it take away the protection intended to be given to the accused This is indeed a point which requires careful consideration before it can be accepted or rejected. ( 11 ) SECTION 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been one of the most controversial sections in the Code which had given rise to conflicting decisions as regards its construction and effect thereof which has compelled the Legislature to amend it more than once to make its intention clearly put into effect. It is legislative history that at one stage there was a section of opinion, which proposed the complete deletion of that section. It is legislative history that at one stage there was a section of opinion, which proposed the complete deletion of that section. But as late as 1955 this was opposed and the Select Committee felt and therefore recommended that its deletion would do away with the protection intended to be given to the accused against possible resort by the police officers to undesirable pressures or tactics prejudicial to the accused in obtaining statements from persons to be witnesses in the trial Court or of the accused himself by way of an admission This made the Legislature to accept the substitution of the new section instead of its deletion. In our judgment the words statement made. . . . . . . . . . . . to a police officer necessarily connote the idea of communication or in other words a statement being communicated to a police officer by any person. The significant words to be noticed are made and to and these should be given their due weight. A statement to attract the prohibition of this section must be made to a police officer. These words in our view also definitely imply that there should be some direct or indirect nexus or connection between the person making the statement and the police officer. A statement reduced to writing with no further steps to communicate it to the police if recovered by the police officer himself would not in our judgment amount to a statement to a police officer. This legislative provision does not contemplate the mere making of a statement but it contemplates the making of it to a police officer. It is difficult there fore to hold that the mere fact of written statement containing a writing addressed to a police officer without anything further being done by that person or without the police having had any thing to do with it would amount to a statement made to a police officer within the meaning of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We do not think that the words made to a police officer merely connote the making of a statement in the abstract or only notionally but contemplates some positive element to connect the two the making of a statement and the police officer. ( 12 ) BUT Mr. We do not think that the words made to a police officer merely connote the making of a statement in the abstract or only notionally but contemplates some positive element to connect the two the making of a statement and the police officer. ( 12 ) BUT Mr. Desai contended that such a construction would be too narrow a construction and a wider construction is possible and that should be accepted. To support this contention the learned Advocate argued that the words statement made by any person to a police officer should be interpreted to mean that if it is a statement in writing then that writing is done by that person or if it is an oral statement then it must be a statement spoken by such person or if the statement consists of any gesture or pointing out then it must be done by that person. In other words the words made by only connote according to him the idea as to whether the statement in writing or the oral statement or the action or gesticulation can be ascribed to that particular person or not. In the instant case he argued the writing is not only proved to be admitted to have been done by the appellant but it is also admitted to be so by the appellant himself. Therefore it must be construed to have been made by him and as it is addressed to the District Superintendent of Police that must mean that it was made to The police officer. In our judgment in the first place it is not correct to say that the way in which the learned advocate wants us to interpret the words is a wider or a bolder construction. In construe the word made only to connote the physical act of writing or speaking of the statement or narration is to narrow down the connotation of the bunch of words statement made by any person to a police officer. If we are right in this view of ours then also under the acknowledged principle of law of interpretation of statutes the Court should accept the wider construction, which would be in consonance with the intent and purport of the particular enactment. If we are right in this view of ours then also under the acknowledged principle of law of interpretation of statutes the Court should accept the wider construction, which would be in consonance with the intent and purport of the particular enactment. Even if two interpretations are possible then the Court will have to accept the one, which would signify or be more compatible with the intention of the Legislature in designing that section. In our view the intention of the Legislature as already mentioned was only to protect the accused and the other persons from being prejudicially affected by any dishonest or questionable methods of the police officers in forcing or devising or influencing a statement from an accused or from any other person. We cannot read in this provision any legislative intent to debar any statement though it may be addressed to a police officer which is recovered by a police officer during the course of an investigation with the making of or bringing into existence whereof the police had no direct or indirect hand or connection of any sort till it was so recovered. If that be the intention of the Legislature and there is no transience in our mind about that being the legislative intent then the only reasonable and proper interpretation of the said section would be the one which we are inclined to place. ( 13 ) IT was then argued on behalf of the appellant that the words statement made to a police officer given their ordinary connotation would only indicate that the statement must be addressed or directed to a police officer and imply an intention on the part of that person to communicate the contents thereof to a police officer and nothing further. When the appellant in this case wrote down the statement and made a clean breast of things addressed it to the District Superintendent of Police it clearly indicated his intention to communicate that statement to that police officer and therefore the statement would be hit by sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Assuming for arguments sake that it is possible to adopt this line of reasoning whether a particular statement would fall under a class of statements as contemplated by sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Assuming for arguments sake that it is possible to adopt this line of reasoning whether a particular statement would fall under a class of statements as contemplated by sec. 162 or not would still depend on the fact as to whether that statement was definitely and unequivocally intended to be communicated to a police officer or not. In our view even on the line of that reasoning there must certainly be a difference to be made between the preparatory stage of the making up of the mind of the person or preparing or writing out a statement and the stages of taking of the ultimate decision by that person definitely intending to communicate the statement or its contents to the police officer and the act of actual communication either personally or through an agent. The animus to communicate must be shown to be existent in the maker at the point of time when the statement goes to the hands of the police. In the present case it cannot be said that such was the position The learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Vidhyarthi rightly pointed out that as a matter of fact though he wrote out this statement on the 16th he did not do anything to communicate it to the police. He on the contrary had intended to commit suicide and only kept it in his pocket so that after his death it may be found from him and the police may know the truth. Therefore it would be justifiable to assume that there was no intention to make or to communicate this statement to the police during his life-time at all. The facts therefore do not reveal any positive intention on the part of the accused to actually make that statement to the police. Even if from the language used and the present tense utilised in the language it were possible to assume that when he wrote it out he had an intention to go to the police and hand it over as his statement or when the police came to arrest him to hand it over even then the fact that he did not do either would show that he had no intention to make or communicate that statement to the police. ( 14 ) THE necessary result of this trend of reasoning is that the statement Exhibit 65/a does not fall within the scope of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code if regard be had only to the words of the section. We may however see whether there is anything in the decided cases relied upon by the learned Advocate for the appellant which would preclude us from accepting this reading of the section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Under these circumstances we hold that Exhibit 65/a is not barred under the provisions of sec 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 15 ) ON behalf of the appellant however it was further contended that even if Exhibit 65/a is admitted in evidence it should not be relied upon to base a conviction on it without due corroboration from other evidence on record and particularly so as it is a retracted confession. The questions therefore that arise for our consideration are firstly whether the confession was voluntary and whether it was true and secondly whether the confession could be relied upon without corroboration and if not whether there was such corroboration to be found from the evidence as would entitle the conviction to be based thereon. As regards the question of the statement being voluntary there can hardly be any doubt. There are no facts or circumstances which would show any pressure or inducement from any one to have been brought on the appellant when he prepared the statement Exhibit 65/a. He was a primary school teacher and he prepared that statement when he was quite alone after he left the place where Bai Jivi was found murdered. On the question of the confession being true or not also we have no hesitation to hold that it is a true confession. No doubt Mr. Desai pointed out to us particularly one point from that statement and urged that the appellant had obviously not stated the truth as regards the manner in which he came into possession of the Tamancha. No doubt Mr. Desai pointed out to us particularly one point from that statement and urged that the appellant had obviously not stated the truth as regards the manner in which he came into possession of the Tamancha. As regards this Tamancha the appellant has said that the Tamancha with twelve number cartridges were given to him by unknown person whom he did know. But this he had obviously said with a view to protect the person from whom he must have obtained the Tamancha and the ammunition. The fact remains that the appellant on that day was out to make a statement to see that no one else suffered at the hands of the police It was therefore a natural reaction on his part to see that he did not make any statement with regard to the Tamancha which would put anybody in trouble. Prom this it cannot be said that it indicated that the appellant was not prepared to make a true statement or a true confession of his guilt as he recorded in exhibit 65a. There are no such infirmities pointed out or facts established as would induce us to believe or even make us suspect that it was not a true confession of guilt. ( 16 ) BUT then it was contended by Mr. Desai that in any case the prosecution had failed to prove any facts as can be said to corroborate the main factum of murder as confessed by him in Exhibit 65a so as to eliminate the possibility of the story of suicide by Jivi. Mr. Desai argued that under law even if it was not a rule of law it was a rule of unimpeachable practice laid down even by the Supreme Court even if it were found to be true and voluntary unless it was corroborated by some facts. He urged that in this particular case there is not an iota of evidence, which can be said to lend any corroboration to the confession of the accused of having killed Jivi. As regards the position of law he relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court to support his contention. He urged that in this particular case there is not an iota of evidence, which can be said to lend any corroboration to the confession of the accused of having killed Jivi. As regards the position of law he relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court to support his contention. We need not go through them in details as the law that stands crystalised now by these decisions is to be found in the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Pyare Lal Bhargava v. The State of Rajasthan A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 1094. In the said decision it has been observed as follows :-- a retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. is not a rule of law but is only a rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances sucha conviction can be made without corroboration for a Court may in a particular case be convinced of the absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it without corroboration but it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession much less on a retracted confession unless the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars. In law therefore there is nothing as a rule of law to prohibit reliance being placed on an uncorroborated confession to convict a person confessing. But only as a rule of prudence or practice it is recommended that no conviction may be based only on the confession without any corroboration from other evidence on record. This decision even shows that there may be cases where the conscience of the Court may be convinced as regards the absolute truth or the voluntary nature of a confession where it may be prepared to act upon it without corroboration. Therefore as a matter of law there is no prohibition. It is left to the conscience of the Court as to what corroboration it will seek if at all to rely upon a confession and convict the accused. Therefore as a matter of law there is no prohibition. It is left to the conscience of the Court as to what corroboration it will seek if at all to rely upon a confession and convict the accused. There is no measure as such that can be laid down of the extent of corroboration which a Court would expect before it will act upon the confession and convict the accused. It will all depend upon the particular facts of each case. In this case we are fully satisfied that the confession was absolutely voluntary and true. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 17 ) THESE are all the material contentions that are raised on behalf of the appellant to challenge the order of conviction. We are satisfied that inspite of one or two possible infirmities that were pointed out in the judgment of the learned trial Judge on the whole we agree with him that this was a case of murder by the appellant and the appeal must fail. Appeal stands dismissed. .