NAYUDU, J. : The simple point that falls to be determined in this Civil .Rule is whether the dispute that has been decided by the Labour Court can be regarded as an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). (2) The petitioner is the Management of the Assam Rastra Basha Pracher Samity which claims to be a cultural and educational body for the sole object of promoting the Hindi language and pro­pagating it amongst the people of the State of Assam, Manipur and Tripura and towards this end it has been holding some examinations in Hindi in various centres in Assam, maintaining and running schools and compiling text-books in Hindi. It will also appear that the Samity was formed in Assam in 1938 with its head office at Gauhati and thereafter duly registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 in the year 1951 and affiliated with the Akhil Bharatiya Hindi Parishad, Agra. (3) The second respondent Sri Ram Chandra Talukdar was employed as a peon in the office of the petitioner and was dismissed from service on account of his behaving in an insulting manner towards the General Secretary of the Samity, who was his employer and abusing him in the presence of the staff. The propriety of the dismissal was questioned by the first respondent the Workmen of Assam Rastra Basha Prachar Samity represented by the Gauhati Chapakhana Karmi Sangha, Gauhati. The dispute that has been so raised was referred as an industrial dispute by the Government to the Labour Court. The Labour Court decided that the activity of the Samity amounted to an indus­trial activity and that consequently the dispute could be said to be an industrial dispute and proceeded to decide it on that footing. The Labour Court also recorded evidence in the case and came to the conclusion that the dismissal of the second respondent was not justified and accordingly ordered his reinstatement. The present petition is directed against this order of the Labour Court. (4) The question that falls to be determined in this civil rule mainly turns, as already pointed out above, on the question whether the activity of the Samity could be regarded as an industry within the meaning of the Act. The present petition is directed against this order of the Labour Court. (4) The question that falls to be determined in this civil rule mainly turns, as already pointed out above, on the question whether the activity of the Samity could be regarded as an industry within the meaning of the Act. In this connection it would be necessary to refer to the relevant pro­visions of the Act. Section 2(j) of the Act defines 'industry' as follows: " 'industry' means any business, trade, under­taking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handi­craft, or industrial occupation or avocation of work­men". Section a(k) defines 'industrial dispute' as follows: " 'industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between work­men and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of latiour, of any person". The expression 'workman' has been defined in Sec­tion 2 (s) as follows: " 'workman' means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person: (i) who .is subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 (34 of 1934); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a, prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him functions mainly of a. managerial nature." (5) It has been argued by Mr. Goswami, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the activity of the Samity was a purely social and cultural activity and did not partake of the nature of the activity of an industry and, therefore, the Act could not strictly speaking be applied to any dispute which might have arisen between the second res­pondent and the Samity, his employer. On the question whether the activity of the Samity could be said to be an industrial activity it will be useful to refer to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, AIR 1963 SC 1873 , where the question was whe­ther the University and the activity carried on by the University could be regarded as an industrial activity and whether any dispute that arose bet­ween the University and its employees could be made the subject of an industrial dispute. It was therein held as follows: "It is true that like all educational institutions the University of Delhi employs subordinate staff and this subordinate staff does the work assigned to it; but in the main scheme of imparting educa­tion, this subordinate staff plays such a minor, subordinate and insignificant part that it would be unreasonable to allow this work to lend its indus­trial colour to the principal activity of the Univer­sity which is imparting education. The work of promoting education is carried on by the University and its teachers and if the teachers are excluded from the purview of the Act, it would be unreason­able to regard the work of imparting education as industry only because its minor, subsidiary and incidental work may seem to partake of the charac­ter of service which may fall under S. 2(j)......... That is why we think it. would be unreasonable to hold that educational institutions are employers within the meaning of S. 2(g), or that the work of teaching carried on by them is an industry under Section 2(j), because essentially the creation of a well-educated, healthy young generation im­bued with a rational progressive outlook on life which is the sole aim of education, cannot at all be compared or assimilated with what may be described as an industrial process. Therefore, we are satisfied that the University of Delhi and the Miranda College for Women run by it cannot be regarded as carrying on an industry under S. 2(j) and so, the applications made by the respondents, against them under S. 33-6(2) of the Act must be held to be incompetent." In our opinion these observations apply with equal force to the activities of the Samity in this case which are purely cultural and educational. (6) It is argued that the Samity maintains a printing press to enable easy publication of its books for the advancement of the objects of the Samity. We do not consider that the mere cir­cumstance that it also maintains a press for the purpose of its general activity would alter the situation. We are satisfied taking the general activity of the Samity as a whole, that its object is purely cultural and educational and its activity cannot, therefore, be equated with that of an in­dustry. (7) It is contended that the press by itself should be regarded as an industry and the activity connected with the press adopted by the Samity would fall within the definition of 'industry' as given in the Act. This would really in effect run counter to the decision of the Supreme Court and the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. That apart, it is not established, and in fact, there is no evidence on the point that the second respondent had anything to do with the press or the running of it. According to the evi­dence given by the General Secretary before the Labour Court, the second respondent was employed as a peon in the general office of the Samity and he had nothing to do with the press. In either view of the matter we are, therefore, not satisfied that the dispute in this case would fall within the category of an industrial dispute that could be properly referred under the provisions of the Act to the Labour Court for adjudication. (8) In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary to consider whether the first respondent had any locus standi to maintain the industrial dispute in this case. In any view of the matter the rule is made absolute and the order of the Labour Court is set aside. In the entire circumstances we make no order as to cost. Rule made absolute.