JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is an appeal by judgment-debtors and arises out of an objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent is holder of a decree realisable from the assets of Smt. Durga Kuer deceased in the hands of the judgment-debtors. In execution of the decree certain plots of land held by the judgment-debtors-appellants as Bhumidhars were attached. Admittedly Kulfat Singh, husband of Smt. Durga Kuer, was occupancy tenant of the plots and upon his death which took place when the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 was in force they devolved upon Smt. Durga Kuer as his heir. Sub-Sequently Smt. Durga Kuer acquired the rights of a Bhumidhar in the plots by making the requisite deposite. After her death in 1957 the appellants succeeded to the plots as heirs of Kulfat Singh under Section 172 read with Section 171 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act). The question that has to be determined is whether the plots which the appellants have so inherited are the assets of Smt. Durga Kuer in their hands. The learned Alunsif was of the view that the appellants having succeeded as heirs of Kulfat Singh the plots in question could not be regarded as assets of Smt. Durga Kuer deceased in their hands and they were, therefore, not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree obtained by the respondent. The objection filed by the appellant was accordingly accepted and the plots were ordered to be released from attachment. On appeal the learned Civil Judge, disagreeing with the view taken by the Munsif, held that the plots constituted the assets of Smt. Durga Kuer in the hands of the appellants and dismissed their objection. It is against this order of the learned Civil Judge that the present appeal has been filed. 2. The holding having been inherited by Smt. Durga Kuer as a widow of Kulfat Singh, succession to it after her death was obviously governed by sub-Section (2) (b) of Section 172 of the Act. What has to be considered is whether a person succeeding to a holding under the aforesaid provision gets it as a property of the deceased female holder. What has to be considered is whether a person succeeding to a holding under the aforesaid provision gets it as a property of the deceased female holder. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative the holding is certainly liable to sale in execution of the decree passed against the assets of Smt. Durga Kuer. If, on the other hand, the answer is in the negative it is manifest that the decree is not executable against it. 3. The estate of a woman of the class mentioned in sub-Section (2) (b) of Section 172 is not an estate of inheritance and she does not form a stock of descent. The person who succeeds to the holding after her death does not do so by virtue of his relationship with her but by virtue of his relationship with the last male tenant. As such he is not an heir to the woman but to the male tenant whom the woman had herself succeeded. This is quite apparent from the words employed in sub-Section (2) (b) of Section 172 which say that on the happening of any of the events mentioned therein the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir of the last male tenant, such tenant being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171. These words go to show clearly that although the devolution of the holding is occasioned by events which are connected with the female holder and which mark the extinction of her estate it is not a devolution derived from the female holder but independently of her. The language employed in clause (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 172 docs not admit of the construction that the person succeeding to the female holder may be ascertained with reference to the provisions of Section 171 but he is nevertheless an heir of the female holder. The meaning attributable to the words of the clause is that succession to the last female tenant opens after the extinction of the intervening female estate in any one of the modes enumerated therein and the person succeeding receives the holding in his own right and directly as assets of the last male tenant, whose successor he is. The meaning attributable to the words of the clause is that succession to the last female tenant opens after the extinction of the intervening female estate in any one of the modes enumerated therein and the person succeeding receives the holding in his own right and directly as assets of the last male tenant, whose successor he is. This view of the meaning and effect of clause (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 172 does not involve the importation of any concept peculiar to the Hindu Law of succession into the scheme of statutory succession provided by the Act, but is based on and is indeed the only view permissible under the language of the Act. I may in this connection point out the difference between the headings prefixed to Sections 172 and 174 of the Act. In the former section the heading is 'succession in the case of a woman holding an interest inherited as a widow, mother, daughter etc' Whereas in the latter section the heading is 'succession to a woman holding an interest otherwise." it is doubtless true that headings cannot control the substantive provision of an enactment, but they certainly furnish a key to the mind of the legislature. As their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in Bhinka v. Charan Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 960, if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in a section the heading will certainly help the court in resolving that doubt.' 4. Not that the words used in sub-Section (2) (b) of Section 172 of the Act are obscure or there is any doubt in their interpretation, but in case of obscurity or doubt the heading may serve to remove it. According to the headings succession under Section 174 is 'to a woman holding an interest otherwise', but as distinguished from it succession under Section 172 is only 'in the case of a woman holding an interest inherited as a widow, mother, daughter etc.' It is true that no such distinction was made in i:he headings prefixed to Sections 36 and 37 of the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 but that will not take away the significance of the distinction made in the headings of Sections 172 and 174 of the Act. It may reasonably be inferred that the legislature discovered the inappropriateness of the heading provided to Section 36 of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 and deliberately chose for Section 172 of the Act a heading which would stand in contrast to the heading given to Section 174 of the Act and would bring out the difference between the legal situations arising under Sections 172 and 174 of the Act. At any rate the legislature realised that in view of the variety of events on the happening of which succession under Section 172 of the Act is to take place, the succession could not be to the female holder. 5. It will be noted that devolution under clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 172 of the Act takes place not only upon the death but also upon abandonment or surrender and in the case of some female holders upon their marriage as well. Surely, a person cannot be said to have succeeded to another person on the latter's abandonment, surrender or marriage. Indeed abandonment and surrender altogether snap the link of succession to the person who abandons or surrenders; and abandonment, surrender and marriage in the cases mentioned in clause (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 172 of the Act all have the effect of wiping out the estate held by the female holder even in her lifetime. A person succeeding in any of these eventualities cannot legitimately be described as succeeding to the female holder. It is also not possible to suggest that while a person succeeding in the above manner succeeds to the male tenant a person succeeding on the death of the female holder succeeds to her. The provision under discussion does not provide for or contemplate different kinds of succession with different legal incidents depending upon the kind of event that opens the succession. Succession in all cases covered by the provision must bear the same meaning and be subject to the same legal incidents. The provision under discussion does not provide for or contemplate different kinds of succession with different legal incidents depending upon the kind of event that opens the succession. Succession in all cases covered by the provision must bear the same meaning and be subject to the same legal incidents. If it would not be correct to say that a person on whom a holding devolves under Section 172 (2) (b-of the Act after abandonment or surrender by the female holder receives it as the assets of the female holder it would also not be correct to say that a person on whom a holding devolves under the said provision after the death of the female holder receives it as assets of the female holder. It seems clear, therefore, that a holding which devolves upon a person under Section 172 (2) (b) of the Act upon the death of a female holder comes to him as a property to which he has succeeded as an heir of the last male tenant and it does not in his hands partake of the nature of the assets of the female holder whose death has opened the succession. 6. The result is that the appellants inherited the property in question from and as heir of Kulfat Singh and the property does not passess the nature of assets of Smt. Durga Kuer in their hands. It is certainly true that Kulfat Singh was only an occupancy tenant of the holding and the rights of a Bhumidhar were acquired by Smt. Durga Kuer herself. But, by virtue of Section 172A of the Act the rights acquired by Smt. Durga Kuer shall for the purposes of devolution under Section 172 be deemed to be accession to the holding of Kulfat Singh. No change is, therefore, introduced into the situation on account of the fact that Kulfat Singh himself was not a Bhumidhar and the rights of a Bhumidhar were Smt. Durga Kuer's own acquisition. 7. It was urged that as Smt. Durga Kuer was an absolute owner of the property in question with powers of transfer and a transfer made by her would have been effective even after her death the appellants must be regarded as having received the property as her assets. This argument was based upon the assumption that transferability and transmissibility of an interest in a property must necessarily go together. This argument was based upon the assumption that transferability and transmissibility of an interest in a property must necessarily go together. Although these two incidents are ordinarily associated there is in law no necessary connection between them and an interest may not be capable of being transmitted although it may be capable of being permanently transferred. The question, therefore, whether, a person succeeding to a property under Section 172 (2) (b) of the Act upon the death of a female Bhumidhar receives it as a property of the female Bhumidhar cannot be answered on considerations of a general nature but only with reference to the statutory provisions governing the succession. In the case of Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigu Nath, 1964 A. L. J. 197 F.B. it was contended before the Full Bench that having regard to the mode of succession provided by Section 172 of the Act a transfer by a female holder mentioned therein could not enure beyond her lifetime. The argument in other words appears to have been that an interest which is not transmissible is also not transferable. While rejecting this argument Desai, C. J. observed that 'life interest is not a sine qua non of succession reopening to the previous holder' and that 'merely because the line of succession laid down in the Act; reminds one of the lines of succession to Hindu widows it cannot be said that a female Bhumidhar has only a life interest like a Hindu widow' because 'such line of succession can exist even when the deceased female had an absolute estate'. In the case before me the contention advanced is only the converse form of the contention put forward before the Full Bench. What is urged is that the interest of a female Bhumidhar being an absolute interest (in the sense of being transferable subject to the conditions mentioned in the Act) the property devolving upon a person under Sec.. 172 of the Act devolves as her property. The answer to this contention is, to put in a converse form what was observed by Desai C. J., that merely because a female Bhumidhar has an absolute estate in the sense of having the power of transfer it cannot be hold that succession opens to her and it does not reopen to the last male tenant. The answer to this contention is, to put in a converse form what was observed by Desai C. J., that merely because a female Bhumidhar has an absolute estate in the sense of having the power of transfer it cannot be hold that succession opens to her and it does not reopen to the last male tenant. And if succession in such a case is not to her but to the last male tenant it should follow as a corollary that the property received by succession is received as the property of the last male tenant. It should be borne in mind that expressions like `absolute estate' etc. may be used in this context only as convenient modes of conveying different aspects of the estate created by the statute buy they cannot be regarded as accurately descriptive of it and no conclusions can be drawn regarding the nature of the estate from these handy descriptions independently of the statute. A special kind of estate having been created by the statute, the legal incidents and characteristic of the estate have to be determined on the basis of the statute itself. 8. Before disposing of the question I have to advert to Section 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the Code) which provides that where a decree is passed against a party as the legal representative of a deceased person and the decree is for the payment of money out of the property of the deceased, it may be executed by the attachment and sale of any such property. It may be urged that all that is necessary for making a particular property liable to attachment and sale under the above provision is that the property should have been the property of the deceased at the time of his death and should have thereafter come into the possession of the person against whom the decree was passed. But this, in my opinion, would not be correct. The controlling words of the section are `as the legal representative of a deceased person' and in order that the liability to attachment and sale may exist the property must have come to the judgment-debtor in the capacity of a Legal representative of the deceased-debtor. But this, in my opinion, would not be correct. The controlling words of the section are `as the legal representative of a deceased person' and in order that the liability to attachment and sale may exist the property must have come to the judgment-debtor in the capacity of a Legal representative of the deceased-debtor. The person against when the decree has been passed may have been the legal representative of the deceased debtor by virtue of his representing the estate of the deceased in the sense that the descendible part of the estate has descended to him either partially or wholly. But if a particular property was not descendible as a property of the deceased at all the liability to attachment and sale does not arise under Section 52 of the Code by the mere fact that it is in the possession of the legal representative against whom the decree has been passed. A property may have belonged to the deceased debtor right upto the moment of his death and it may also have reached the hands of a person immediately after and on account of the death of the debtor; but it will still be not liable to attachment and sale under Section 52 of the Code if that particular property has not devolved upon such person as an heir to the deceased but as an heir to somebody else and independently of the deceased. Indeed, if an estate is in its inherent nature such that it terminates upon the death of its holder nobody can represent that estate thereafter and nobody can therefore, be a legal representative of the deceased holder of the estate on account of being in possession of it. Representation of an estate naturally presupposes its continuity and if the estate comes to an end with the death of its holder nobody can be a legal representative of the deceased holder with regard of that estate. Plainly, Section 52 of the Code does not fasten the liability of attachment and sale to a property which a person inherits not form the deceased debtor but from another person in his own individual right and independently of the deceased. Plainly, Section 52 of the Code does not fasten the liability of attachment and sale to a property which a person inherits not form the deceased debtor but from another person in his own individual right and independently of the deceased. That is why Section 53 has been added for enlarging the scope of Sections 50 and 52 of the Code, because without Section 53 property coming into the hands of a son or other descendant by survivorship under Hindu Law could not be deemed to have come to him as a legal representative of the deceased ancestor. Without referring to the decisions which led to the enactment of Section 53 of the Code (Act V, of 1908), I may only refer in this connection to the case of Rao Bhim Singh v. Sher Singh and others A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 1 where their Lordships of the Privy Council had to deal with Section 50 of the Code, but they referred to Section 52 of the Code also and what they laid down is equally applicable to Section 52 of the Code. The question in that case was whether Bhim Singh appellant who, upon the death of his father Kishore Singh, had succeeded to an ancestral impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture was a legal representative of Kishore Singh within the meaning of Section 50 of the Code. While holding that the appellant was a legal representative of his deceased father Kishore Singh their Lordships observed: "Their Lordships think that the appellant is the legal representative of Kishore Singh, and the respondents were entitled therefore under Section 50 to apply to the Court to execute the decree against him. By itself, however, Section 50 would not assist the decree-holder since there was no property of Kishore Singh which had come to the hands of his legal representative. But then comes Section 53, which appears to be designed to enlarge the class of property liable to execution under Sections 50 and 52. This is effected by deeming certain property to have come into the hands of the legal representative as property of the deceased which in fact has not done so." 9. But then comes Section 53, which appears to be designed to enlarge the class of property liable to execution under Sections 50 and 52. This is effected by deeming certain property to have come into the hands of the legal representative as property of the deceased which in fact has not done so." 9. This decision appears to me as putting it beyond doubt that in the hands of the appellants in the present case the property in question was not a property of Smt. Durga Kuer within the meaning of Section 52 of the Code. I may here mention that the words 'as his legal representative' at the end of Section 53 of the Code clearly indicate, if any indication is needed, that for being liable to attachment and sale under Section 52 of the Code a property must have come into the hands of the judgment-debtor as legal representative of the deceased debtor. 10. I consider it unnecessary to refer by way of analogy to decisions dealing with the question whether and in what circumstances a decree for a pecuniary liability incurred by a woman as a limited owner under the Hindu Law can be executed against the property in the hands of reversioners, because an analogy is apt to mislead and because such cases have turned upon the nature of the liability, the frame of the suit in which the decree was obtained, and the peculiar characteristics of the estate held by a woman as a limited owner under the Hindu Law. In the instant case the answer to the question involved must rest on the relevant provisions of the Act and the Code. On a consideration of those provisions I have come to the conclusion that the property in question does not form part of the assets of Smt. Durga Kuer in the hands of the appellants and as such it is not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree held by the respondent. It may be a little anomalous that a property which was transferable while it was held by Smt. Durga Kuer should escape the liability to attachment and sale for her debt by reason of her death, but the nature of the estate possessed by Smt. Durga Kuer under the statute in respect of that property appears to lead inevitably to that result. 11. 11. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree of the court of first instance allowing the objection of the appellants is restored. In the circumstances of the case, however, parties will bear their own costs in all the courts.