Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to quash Ext. P2, and Ext. P4 orders. Two vacancies of Research Officers arose in the Statistics Department of the Kerala University in 1959, consequent on the permanent incumbents Sri R. Krishna Pillai and Sri N. Krishnan Namboothiri, leaving for America for higher studies. The petitioner and one Ayyappan Nair were selected and appointed to fill up the two vacancies, the former in the vacancy of Shri R. Krishna Pillai and the latter in the vacancy of Sri. N. Krishnan Namboothiri. A copy of the order of appointment of the petitioner is marked as Ext. P. 5; and from Ext. P5 it is clear that he was appointed only in the vacancy consequent on the deputation of Sri R. Krishna Pillai for foreign studies. Ext P5 runs as follows: "With reference to his application for appointment as Research Officer in Statistics in the University, Sri R. Narayana Pillai, Mannaplavila House, Kalady, Trivandrum-2, is informed that he has been appointed as Acting Research Officer in Statistics on Rs. 250-25-500 in the Department of Statistics, in the vacancy caused by the deputation of the permanent incumbent of the post for higher studies. His appointment is subject to S.34 of the Kerala University Act of 1957 and the conditions of service to be drawn up hereafter in accordance with this section." It is alleged by the petitioner that Shri R. Krishna Pillai should have taken charge of the department of Demographic Section on his return from America as that was the understanding on which Shri Krishna Pillai was deputed for higher studies. I am not very much concerned with the understanding on the basis of which Shri Krishna Pillai was deputed for foreign studies. The question is what was the nature of the petitioner's appointment. The petitioner's appointment was only to an acting vacancy. The allegation that he was functioning on a permanent basis in a substantive capacity cannot be accepted as correct. It is true that the petitioner had undergone probation and that he was granted increment, but these circumstances would not make the petitioner a full member of the service as contended by him. It is stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the University that probation is compulsory in the case of an employee of the University provided that the duration of the appointment is more than one year. It is stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the University that probation is compulsory in the case of an employee of the University provided that the duration of the appointment is more than one year. The temporary vacancy caused by Mr. R. Krishna Pillai's going for higher studies in America was for three years, and therefore no inference as to the character of the petitioner's service can be drawn from the fact that he underwent probation. When Shri Krishna Pillai returned from his foreign studies, the Professor of Statistics passed Ext. P4 order by which the petitioner was relieved and he was asked to hand over charge to Shri Krishna Pillai. That order was passed in pursuance of an earlier order passed by the Vice Chancellor, which is marked as Ext. P2, and in that it was stated that the petitioner will have to vacate the post when Shri R. Krishna Pillai returns after his higher studies. Ext. P2 order was passed at the time when Shri Krishnan Namboodiri who left for higher studies returned from America. Ext. P2 states: "When a person is appointed in a particular temporary vacancy created by the absence of another person, he should vacate the place when the vacancy ceased with the return of the person who was temporarily absent ... Similarly when Shri R. Krishna Pillai returns after higher training Shri R. Narayana Pillai who was temporarily appointed in his vacancy has to be relieved." It was in pursuance of the principle laid down in Ext. P2 that the Professor of Statistics passed Ext. P4 order. 2. Exts. P2 and P4 orders are challenged by the petitioner's counsel mainly on two grounds. His first contention was that the petitioner was appointed by the Syndicate and the Syndicate alone could have terminated his appointment, and therefore the order Ext. P4, passed by the Professor of Statistics in pursuance of the direction of the Vice Chancellor contained in Ext. P2 terminating his services was inoperative in law, and that he should be deemed to be in service. The second contention was that the order terminating the services of the petitioner was discriminatory as persons who were appointed subsequent to the petitioner are being allowed to be continued in service and that was inconsistent with the practice up till then followed by the University. The second contention was that the order terminating the services of the petitioner was discriminatory as persons who were appointed subsequent to the petitioner are being allowed to be continued in service and that was inconsistent with the practice up till then followed by the University. According to the petitioner the practice followed by the University was "first come fast go" and that the departure from that practice in the case of the petitioner was discriminatory. 3. As regards the first contention that the Syndicate being the appointing authority, the order terminating the services of the petitioner passed by the Professor of Statistics in pursuance of the directions in Ext. P2 was unauthorised, it was argued that neither the Vice Chancellor who passed Ext. P2 order nor the Professor could have passed an order terminating the services of the petitioner as the authority in that behalf was vested only in the Syndicate. Under S.19(h) of the Kerala University Act, the authority competent to dismiss the petitioner was the Syndicate and therefore the argument of the petitioner is technically correct. It is clear from the minutes of the proceedings of the Syndicate that the order passed by the Professor of Statistics in pursuance of the direction contained in Ext. P2 terminating the services of the petitioner was ratified by the Syndicate. But it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that ratification was of no avail as the orders passed by the Vice Chancellor and the Professor were not professedly passed for and on behalf of the Syndicate. It was submitted that ratification is possible only when a person having no authority to act on behalf of another person professedly acted on behalf of that person. Assuming that ratification was not possible, it is nevertheless correct to say that the Syndicate has decided to approve the action taken by the Vice Chancellor and the Professor of Statistics in passing Exts. P2 & P4 orders respectively. 4. Assuming that ratification was not possible, it is nevertheless correct to say that the Syndicate has decided to approve the action taken by the Vice Chancellor and the Professor of Statistics in passing Exts. P2 & P4 orders respectively. 4. Counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Tewari v. District Board, Agra (1964-1 LLJ 1) for the proposition that under Art.226 of the Constitution the court can inquire into the question whether the dismissal of an employee by a statutory body is wrongful, and that if it is found that the dismissal is wrongful it can pass appropriate orders restoring the person illegally dismissed to office by declaring the dismissal to be null and void. In that case the District Board of Agra resolved to terminate, after giving the salary for three months in lieu of notice, the employment of the appellant who held the Office of Engineer under the Board. The appeal preferred against that resolution before the State of Uttar Pradesh was dismissed. Thereupon the appellant filed a petition before the High Court under Art.226 for a writ of certiorari for quashing the resolution passed by the Board and the order passed by the State of Uttar Pradesh dismissing the appellant's appeal, and for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Board and the State to treat the appellant as the lawfully appointed engineer in the Board and not to give effect to the resolution terminating the services of the appellant. The High Court dismissed the petition and in appeal before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court said: "The question whether the Court would be justified in granting a declaration about the invalidity of the action of a statutory body terminating the employment of a servant was raised before the House of Lords in Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (LR 1957 AC 488). The plaintiff, a dock worker in the reserved pool, under the scheme set up under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order, 1947, failed to obey an order to report for work with a company of stevedores and the local board instructed their disciplinary Committee to hear the case against the plaintiff. The committee terminated the employment of the plaintiff giving seven days' notice, and this decision was confirmed by the appellate board. The committee terminated the employment of the plaintiff giving seven days' notice, and this decision was confirmed by the appellate board. The plaintiff then claimed in an action instituted by him a declaration that his purported dismissal was illegal, ultra vires, and invalid, and also damages for wrongful dismissal. The trial court granted the declaration, and also damages. The Court of Appeal set aside the declaration. The House of Lords restored the declaration, for in their view the purported dismissal was a nullity, since the local board had no power to delegate its disciplinary functions. Prima facie jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to declare an order passed by a statutory body, even if the order relates to the termination of the employment of a servant of the body, may not be denied." At page 4 of the report it is stated: "But this rule is subject to certain well-recognized exceptions. It is open to the Courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Art.311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognized. The Courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do." In this case the Syndicate has chosen to approve the decision of the Vice Chancellor embodied in Ext. P2 and the order of the Professor of Statistics to terminate the petitioner's services, and therefore I think, that on the facts here, there is closer approximation to the facts in the case decided by the Privy Council to be referred to hereinafter. 5. The discussion in the case extended over a wide range. I am of opinion that the case has to be disposed of on a short ground. The relation between the University and the petitioner was that of a master and servant. 5. The discussion in the case extended over a wide range. I am of opinion that the case has to be disposed of on a short ground. The relation between the University and the petitioner was that of a master and servant. The petitioner has no right to be reinstated as there is no statute or rule regulating the terms of his service in the University. Nor is he entitled to a declaration that he continues to be in service. I confess that I find it difficult to understand the petitioner's contention that he was appointed in a permanent vacancy. Assuming that he was so appointed, I am not sure what that denotes, when there is no statute or rule to define its content. The bold attempt made in Ward v. Barclay Perkins & Co. Ltd. (1939-1 AER 287) to equate the position of a person appointed to the permanent staff of a company to the case of one holding a life tenure in an office and its failure, ought to be a reminder to us, that the expression 'permanent' has no fixed meaning in relation to an employment not regulated by statute or rules having the force of statute. "With respect to the duration of a contract to give a person permanent employment, the general rule is that in the absence of some further express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of a good consideration in addition to the services contracted to be rendered, the employment is no more than an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party. An agreement to give 'permanent employment' means to give a steady employment a steady job, a position of some permanence, as contrasted with a temporary job or temporary employment. Such agreement does not mean that the employment shall be for life, or for any fixed or certain period, but only that it shall continue indefinitely, and until one or the other of the parties shall wish for some good reason to sever the relation." (See S.24 at page 460 of 35 American Jurisprudence.) The relationship between the petitioner and the University was only contractual. There is no statute regulating the terms and conditions of the service of the petitioner. Therefore even assuming that his services were illegally terminated, his only remedy would be to file a suit for recovery of damages. There is no statute regulating the terms and conditions of the service of the petitioner. Therefore even assuming that his services were illegally terminated, his only remedy would be to file a suit for recovery of damages. The contention of the petitioner that he is entitled to a declaration that his dismissal was illegal and that he should be deemed to be in service cannot be countenanced in view of the decision of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Francis v. Municipal Councillors etc. (1962-3 AER 633). In that case the appellant before the Privy Council entered the employment of the respondent Municipality, and in 1953 he was taken on to the permanent staff of the respondent. By virtue of S.16(5) of the Municipal Ordinance, the President had the power to dismiss the appellant. In October 1957 the appellant was dismissed not by the President but by the Council and therefore the dismissal was technically wrongful. The appellant sought a declaration that the termination of his employment was wrongful and that he had the right to continue in service. It was held by the Privy Council that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsisted would rarely be made because of the principle that the courts would not grant specific performance of contracts of service. The main contention of the appellant in that case was that inasmuch as purported dismissal has been found to be ultra vires it should be held that the dismissal was null and void and that he was still employed by the respondent and that it should be so declared. At page 637 of the judgment it was held by their Lordships: "...When there has been a purported termination of a contract of service a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsists will rarely be made. This is a consequence of the general principle of law that the courts will not grant specific performance of contracts of service. Special circumstances will be required before such a declaration is made and its making will normally be in the discretion of the court." It was further held that the remedy of the appellant lay in damages. This is a consequence of the general principle of law that the courts will not grant specific performance of contracts of service. Special circumstances will be required before such a declaration is made and its making will normally be in the discretion of the court." It was further held that the remedy of the appellant lay in damages. The Privy Council distinguished the case of Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (1956-3 All E.R. 939) with the following observation: "In that case, however, the circumstances were very special. The plaintiff was and had been for some thirty years a dock labourer. As a result of legislation designed to remove the objection of those so employed that theirs was a purely casual occupation, so that their right to work depended on the accident of its availability at the docks, all dock labourers were registered as employed by the National Dock Labour Board-though they never in fact worked for the board. In the circumstances of that case it was held to be right that the plaintiff-whose dismissal was shown to have been without proper authority - should have the benefit of a declaration that he was still in the employment of the National Board, since unless, he was, he would be disabled from carrying on at all his chosen trade of a dock labourer." Later on it is stated: "A declaration as sought in the present case would inevitably amount to or involve specific performance of the appellant's contract of service - if it were practically effective. But, having regard to the president's powers under S.16(5) of the Ordinance, it is clear (as observed by the majority in the Court of Appeal) that the president could, notwithstanding the declaration forthwith terminate the contract and could at any time in the past have done so". 6. This ruling would go to show that the petitioner cannot claim a mere declaration that the purported termination of his service was null and void as that would be enforcing the contract of employment. A declaration of this nature would in the language of the Privy Council inevitably amount to or involve specific performance of the petitioner's contract of service. Having regard to the power of the Syndicate to dispense with the service of the petitioner at any time, a declaration of this nature would be futile. A declaration of this nature would in the language of the Privy Council inevitably amount to or involve specific performance of the petitioner's contract of service. Having regard to the power of the Syndicate to dispense with the service of the petitioner at any time, a declaration of this nature would be futile. In this connection I would refer to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Dr. S.B. Dutt v. University of Delhi (1959 SCR. 1236). In that case a professor in the Delhi University who was illegally dismissed claimed reinstatement and the matter was referred to arbitration. The Arbitrator passed an award directing reinstatement: the award was set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground that the award purported to enforce a contract of employment and therefore was bad. In these circumstances it is idle to contend that the petitioner wants only the declaration by this Court that the purported dismissal was inoperative, and that he does not want any consequential relief. Counsel for the petitioner relied on the ruling reported in Cochin Devaswom Board v. Akhileswara Iyer (1961 KLT 290) in support of the contention that such a declaration can be given. The facts in that case were peculiar. I am not quite certain whether the observation of the learned judges in that case that the dismissal of the respondent there, was null and void on the ground that the appellant in the case was biased against the respondent and therefore incompetent to dismiss him, after making the enquiry contemplated by the rule in question in that case, was correct. 7. In Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal and others (1852-3 HLC 759) the House of Lords held that an adjudication by one who is disqualified on the ground of interest or likelihood of bias makes the proceedings voidable and not void. In the recent case of Ridge v. Baldwin, the House of Lords held by a majority that the proceedings of the Watch Committee, which ended in the dismissal of a constable without giving an opportunity to him to be heard was void. In the recent case of Ridge v. Baldwin, the House of Lords held by a majority that the proceedings of the Watch Committee, which ended in the dismissal of a constable without giving an opportunity to him to be heard was void. "Lord Evershed and each member of the courts below held that a breach of the rules of natural justice would render a decision voidable but not a nullity; Lord Devlin was of the same opinion, but held that the watch committee's decision was invalidated by disregard of the regulations; Lords Reid, Morris and Hodson held that the committee's decision was invalid both because of breach of the regulations and because of breach of natural justice. We must now take it, on the authority of three members of the House of Lords, that a decision reached in breach of the audi alteram partem rule is not voidable but null and void. Yet we have equally good authority for the proposition that if the proceedings have contravened the other rule of natural justice, nemo judex in casusa sua, the decision is merely voidable. This is surely a very curious state of affairs." (See S. A. De Smith 1963 Modern Law Review, page 543 at 546.) Under the rules in question in the case reported in 1961 KLT 290 above referred to, the dismissal could be made only for a cause: I do not wish to express any opinion on the question whether that was a sufficient circumstance to justify the granting of a declaration which would have the effect of reinstatement of the respondent in that case. 8. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1963-2 WLR 935) Lord Reid said that cases of dismissal fall into three classes. It is stated at page 940: "So I shall deal first with cases of dismissal. These appears to fall into three classes: dismissal of a servant by his master, dismissal from an office held during pleasure, and dismissal from an office where there must be something against a man to warrant his dismissal. The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he must pay damages for breach of contract. There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he must pay damages for breach of contract. So the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence." As regards the case where a man holds an office at pleasure, Lord Reid said: 1 fully accept that where an office is simply held at pleasure the parson having power of dismissal cannot be bound to disclose his reasons. No doubt he would in many cases tell the officer and hear his explanation before deciding to dismiss him. But if he is not bound to disclose his reason and does not do so, then, if the court cannot require him to do so, I cannot determine whether it would be fair to hear the officer's case before taking action." 9. As the Syndicate by approving Ext. P2, has adopted a principle in the matter of relieving its employees and has consistently applied that principle thereafter, I do not think that there was any discrimination in not applying the so called principle of 'first come last go' in the case of the petitioner. The writ petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs.