JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for declaration and in the alternative for possession regarding certain plots of agricultural land. The suit has been decreed with respect to some of the plots and dismissed with respect to others. The plaintiff has not appealed but the defendants have come up in appeal to this Court. 2. The following facts are not in dispute; most of them had been admitted in the lower appellate court and all of them were admitted before me. The village in which the plots in suit are situate was granted by the Taluqdars of the village in Guzara to Madho Bux Singh who mortgaged them usufructuarily with Badullah in 1905 and 1906 although he had no power of transfer. The Court of Wards in management of the estate of Nageshwar Prasad Singh, the then proprietor of the Taluqa, brought a suit for possession against Badullah and Madho Bux Singh, and after obtaining a decree against them on 7th December 1908 took delivery of possession on 21st December 1908. Thereafter it transpired that Sarju and Musai, ancestors of the present defendants, were in possession of the plots in dispute whereupon suits were brought against them in which Sarju and Musai claimed to be mortgagees under two mortgage-deeds dated. 9th August 1890 and 23rd March 1898 executed by Madho Bux Singh. It was held in those suits that although Madho Bux Singh was incompetent to create the mortgages, Sarju and Musai had acquired mortgagee rights by adverse possession and the suits were accordingly dismissed. The plaintiff respondent is a grandson of Nageshwar Prasad Singh although he is not an heir of Madho Bux Singh and the defendants appellants are heirs of Sarju and Musai. The plots for which the suit has been decreed by the courts below were sir of the mortgagor when the mortgages of 1890 and 1898 were executed and they were in the personal cultivation of the defendants on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. The rights of the parties have to be determined on the basis of these admitted facts. 3. The only question involved in the case is whether by virtue of Section 14 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the plaintiff-respondent is a bhumidhar of the plots for which his suit has been decreed. The rights of the parties have to be determined on the basis of these admitted facts. 3. The only question involved in the case is whether by virtue of Section 14 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the plaintiff-respondent is a bhumidhar of the plots for which his suit has been decreed. The answer to this question clearly depends upon whether the plaintiff-respondent can be regarded as a mortgagor in relation to the mortgages executed by Madho Bux Singh in 1890 and 1898. The courts below were perfectly correct in holding that even though Madho Bux Singh was incompetent to execute the mortgages, Sarju and Musai prescribed mortgagee's title by having been in possession as such for a period of over 12 years. But the point to be considered is whether Nageshwar Prasad Singh and his heirs representing the grantors of the Guzara could be said to have become mortgagors, and it is in the view that the courts below took on this cardinal question that they were obviously mistaken. 4. The error appears to have been due to losing sight of the distinction between a mortgagor and a person entitled to redeem. While every mortgagor is entitled to redeem, it is manifest that every person entitled to redeem need not be a mortgagor. The opening words of Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act leave no room for doubt that although the right of redemption has been conferred upon a wide class of persons they are not all mortgagors. The persons enumerated in the various clauses of that section are, under the plain terms of the section, other than the mortgagor. For determining, therefore, whether a person is a mortgagor the test is not whether he may redeem or institute a suit for redemption but whether he is the transferor himself or a person deriving title from him. If he is not a mortgagor within the limited meaning of the expression under Section 58 or within the extended meaning given to it by Section 59(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, he cannot be regarded as a mortgagor although he may be interested in the mortgaged property and may be entitled to redeem the mortgage. 5. Nageshwar Prasad Singh or the plaintiff respondent could in no circumstances be described as persons deriving title from Madho Bux Singh. 5. Nageshwar Prasad Singh or the plaintiff respondent could in no circumstances be described as persons deriving title from Madho Bux Singh. The grantor of a Guzara does not derive any title from the grantee either during the existence of the grant or after its reversion following the extinction of the interest of the grantee. The reversion of the property to the grantor takes place by virtue of a pre-existing title in him or, in other words, by virtue of a title paramount. It is really speaking in the nature of an escheat which excludes derivation of title and is indeed destructive of that continuity which derivation of title presupposes. The concept of escheat has been distinguished from that of succession with lucidity and succinctness if I may say so with respect by Sen, J. in Secretary of State v. Girdhari Lal Shambhu Nath, AIR 1932 ALL 220 : 1932 A.L.J. 150 and since reversion of a Guzara to the grantor is in its legal incidents analogous to an escheat to the crown I may quote the following observations made in that case:- "Whether there is a vacant inheritance, the property lapses to the Crown by the rule of escheat. The escheat to the Crown is not due to any rule of succession. The right of escheat is a prerogative of the Crown and the said prerogative is recognised universally in every system of civilised jurisprudence. I would emphasise the fact that upon the death of a person without leaving any heirs his estate devolves upon the Crown under its general prerogative and not by the reason of any rule of succession. Escheat is the vanishing point in the law of inheritance. Where succession ends, escheat begins." 6. The position, therefore, that Nageshwar Prasad Singh or the plaintiff never became mortgagors of the mortgages created by Madho Bux Singh does not, in my view, admit of any doubt. All that happened as a result of the mortgagees of Madho Bux Singh having prescribed mortgagees' title was that the mortgages which were ineffective at their inception became valid mortgages after the lapse of 12 years and the mortgagees became entitled to retain their possession until the mortgages were redeemed. Nageshwar Pd. All that happened as a result of the mortgagees of Madho Bux Singh having prescribed mortgagees' title was that the mortgages which were ineffective at their inception became valid mortgages after the lapse of 12 years and the mortgagees became entitled to retain their possession until the mortgages were redeemed. Nageshwar Pd. Singh or his heirs did not, however, on that account acquire the legal character of a mortgagor although they incurred the obligation of redeeming and also had the right to redeem. In support of the view that I take of the legal situation I may refer to the case of Arjun Singh v. Maheshanand, AIR 1932 ALL 437 where on reversion of a tenant's interest to the landlord the letter's right to redeem a mortgage created by the tenant was upheld not because he was a mortgagor but because he had an interest in the mortgaged property and was thus included among the persons enumerated in Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. The plaintiff-respondent could not have become entitled to the benefits of Section 14 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act unless they were the mortgagors of the mortgages under which the defendants appellants were in possession. Section 14 is confined in its application to the mortgagor and that term may with the aid of Section 59(a) of the Transfer of Property Act be construed as embracing within its scope persons deriving title from the mortgagor; but it cannot be read as including all such persons as may be entitled to redeem. It seems, therefore, clear that the plaintiff-respondent did not become a bhumidhar of the plots in respect of which he has been granted a decree and he was neither entitled to a declaration that he was a bhumidhar nor to possession. His suit should have been dismissed in entirety. 8. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs throughout.