Judgment 1. THIS is an appeal by the plaintiff Dhasranidhar Guin whose suit for a declaration for a private right of way fails in the court of first instance, and on appeal, also in the court of appeal below. What bulks large in this litigation is plot no. 488 admeasuring. 56 acre and recorded as saiyam land (paddy land of an inferior type) in the names of two brothers, Bholanath Rooj and Pashupati Rooj, in khatian no. 452, exhibit 3/b, of mouza Srifala within the jurisdiction of Rampurhat police-station in the district of Birbhum. The Roojs have been entered as settled raiyats. A look at the cadastral survey map, exhibit 4, and the case map prepared by the pleader commissioner shows how this plot stands. It is bounded-on the north by plots 844, 848, 857 and 851 of which "844" is on its north-west and "851" on its northeast ; on the south by plot no. 847 ; on the east by the whole of plot no. 850 and the northern portion of plot no. 849 ; and on the west by more than a moiety of plot no. 845 in its northern portion "845" being a plot of an irregular shape which extends south to north. 2. ON the immediate west of the last named plot-"845"-is the District Board road recorded in the cadastral survey map as plot no. 877. On the immediate west of plot no. 844 is plot no. 1039 on the adjacent west of which is the same District Board road. This road also runs south to north with a slant towards the west as it goes north arm with a slant towards the east as it goes south. More, this is the only road in this part of Shrifala mouza, as the indications (sanketik) given in the cadastral map itself go to indicate: rasta (road)877. No doubt this map is sheet no. 2. But that cannot matter. Because the boundaries set out in the map, sheet no. 2, of Shrifala mauza are-north ramrampore no. 29; south rampurhat no. 77; east batail no. 104; west sheet no. 1 of Shrifala no. 78. So the roads in the three mouzas just named or in the other part of Shrifala represented by Sheet No. 1 of the cadastral survey map will not avail the appellant. The only road which avails him is plot no. 29; south rampurhat no. 77; east batail no. 104; west sheet no. 1 of Shrifala no. 78. So the roads in the three mouzas just named or in the other part of Shrifala represented by Sheet No. 1 of the cadastral survey map will not avail the appellant. The only road which avails him is plot no. 877 depicted in Sheet No. 2 of the map, exhibit 4. And to reach this very road-the only road-from plot no. 846, a twofold private right of way is claimed. One is a pathway straight from the District Board road along the ails, three cubits broad enough, through the southern part of plot no. 1039 on the adjacent east of the said road, wending a little south when roughly it skirts on the west of the southern part of plot no. 844, then turning east and reaching plot no. 846 after almost skirting on the south of plot no. 844. Another is a cartway issuing from the District Board road on the west and running straight and east through the northern portion of plot no. 845 and the southern portion of plot no. 844, and thus reaching plot no. 846. The appellant Guin claims this sort of a private right of way, because his father, now dead, had auction-purchased plot no. 846 along with many other plots on May 7, 1937, in execution of his own decree against the Rooj: money execution case no. 50 of 1932, as is apparent from the relevant sale certificate, exhibit 1, and also got delivery of possession through court on July 22, 1937, as is apparent from the process-server's return in the relevant writ, exhibit 2. The claim of an easement as that is rested on four grounds-statutory prescription, lost grant, one of necessity and custom-all of which the learned munsif, and on appeal, the learned additional district judge negative. Hence this second appeal. Mr. Chaudhuri, the learned advocate for the appellant, does not challenge the finding of fact on prescription but places the easement of necessity in the forefront of his submissions. How plot no. 846 is situate has been noticed. Hence this second appeal. Mr. Chaudhuri, the learned advocate for the appellant, does not challenge the finding of fact on prescription but places the easement of necessity in the forefront of his submissions. How plot no. 846 is situate has been noticed. Without some such easement as the appellant claims, it becomes difficult to reach the District Board road from the appellant's land or to reach the land from the road, though evidence discloses that an alternative route over a neighboring drain, after it is filled up with earth, has been improvised. But only because it is so, I shall not find an easement of necessity. Indeed, it is now well held that necessity simpliciter, far less convenience, does not foster an easement of necessity. As G. N. Das, J. holds, Lahiri, J. (as he then was) agreeing, in (1) Nanigopal Dutta and others v. Kshitish Chandra Banerjee and another: A. I. R. 1952 Cal. 108 at page 110: "the popular notion that whenever a man has no other way, he can claim the right to go over his neighbors lands is not supported either by principles or authorities. Easements of necessity, or quasi easements as they are called, are founded on an implied grant or reservation." 3. SO that way the appellant cannot succeed. Even if I share his discomfiture in the predicament which is his and go all out to find a way for him from and into his land, I cannot rise above the law. Mr. Chaudhuri's contention about an implied grant-and this is his second submission-cannot receive effect either. Mr. Chaudhuri is no doubt right in his criticism of the learned judge's finding that because the statutory prescription fails, the presumption ob" a lost grant fails too. This is just the reverse of what Sen, J. holds in (2) Abdul Hamid and others v. Ahmed Ali: 43 C. W. N. 486 : an easement by long user can be acquired apart from section 26 of the Limitation Act, 9 of 1908. Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) observed as much in (3) Jatindra Nath Mullick and others v. Satya Kinkar Sain: 42 C. W. N. 445 at page 447: "it is true that rights could be acquired by fiction of a lost origin where, as in the present case, they could not be acquired by prescription. " Let that be left alone. Still, as Mr. " Let that be left alone. Still, as Mr. Mukherjee and Mr. Ghose who between themselves appear for all the appearing respondents rightly submit, in order to found a claim of easement of necessity which again is founded on an implied grant (vide Nanigopal Dutta's I case ante), unity of ownership of the I dominant and servient tenement at 1 some time or other is essential; no less severance thereof. In a word, no severance of tenement, no fiction of a lost grant Mr. Chaudhuri seeks to counter this submission by the averments in paragraphs 9 and 12 of the two sets of written statements the pith of which on this point is that plot no. 846 and all the other plots over which the right of private way is claimed-plots belonging to the defendants between themselves-have a common landlord. From this, say, if you will, unity of the dominant and servient tenement was there at some time or other. But in saying so, all you say is that and no more. (4) Augrahit Napit v. Nabnatnnessa Bibi: 29 C. L. J. 51, upon which Mr. Chaudhuri relies, is a Bench decision where Fletcher, J., Newbould, J. agreeing, comes to the conclusion of an implied grant on two considerations. One, the two litigating tenants for a right of way hold their tenancies of different lands under a common landlord, as here. Two, the length of time during which the right of way has been enjoyed is more than 20 years, nothing like which is found in the instant case by the courts below. True it is that the last court of facts discusses the whole of the evidence when he considers the question of acquiring easement by prescription-a finding which Mr. Chaudhuri does not and cannot assail. But even that is enough to show that the long enjoyment of the right of way is not found as a fact. I cannot enter into it-a prohibited area for me. Even if I do, as I feel tempted to, I also say that evidence on long enjoyment is so poor. I have been left wondering why evidence is so, though plot no. 846 is landlocked, as noticed. Is it because it was lying fallow all along, as is the respondents' case ? I raise this question. Even if I do, as I feel tempted to, I also say that evidence on long enjoyment is so poor. I have been left wondering why evidence is so, though plot no. 846 is landlocked, as noticed. Is it because it was lying fallow all along, as is the respondents' case ? I raise this question. But I do not feel called upon to answer it, the appellant's suit coming to shipwreck on evidence and findings of fact based thereon. I realize, even hearsay evidence is allowable to prove an ancient right founded on custom, for example, as Biswas, J. observes in (5) Panchanon Roy and others v. Fazlur rahman Chaudhury and others: 46 C. W. N. 743. But here evidence on long enjoyment has been practically disbelived by each court of facts. Then, it becomes impossible for a court of law to allow a person to go over his neighbour's land with cart and all that in absence of evidence that tells. 4. IN vain does Mr. Chaudhury refer me to (6) Dakshina Ranjan Chowdhury v. Surendra Lal Das Gupta: 39 C.W.N. 1202, which can help matters forward for his client only if the finding of fact is that there is a formed or defined road over the quasi-servient tenement. But the finding of fact by the last court of facts is just the other way about: "now there is no evidence on record of the fact that the different plots at the time of any severance had any formed road." For all I see, this finding is not vitiated by any error of law. A formed road apart, no indicia can be spelt out of the recorded evidence in support of such a right having been openly enjoyed. So, (7) Hansford v. Jago: [1921] 1 Ch. 322, cannot help the appellant either. There can, therefore, be no implied grant. The second contention of Mr. Chaudhuri also fails. The last submission he makes, and very faintly to my thinking, is about the customary right. But when the paucity of materials to sustain custom is pointed out to him, he is so good as not to press it. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal. But the appellant's land-plot 846 -being what it is, it is but natural that he should come to court. I, therefore, direct that each party do pay and bear its costs throughout. But when the paucity of materials to sustain custom is pointed out to him, he is so good as not to press it. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal. But the appellant's land-plot 846 -being what it is, it is but natural that he should come to court. I, therefore, direct that each party do pay and bear its costs throughout. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. It is now well-held that leave cannot be had for the mere asking. In the judgment I have just pronounced, I have governed myself by well-known authorities which lay down the law. There is no obscurity anywhere. In the circumstances, I regret, I cannot allow the leave asked for.