Anantanarayanan, J. - In this appeal by the State of Madras, we are concerned with the allowance by Rajagopalan, J., of a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari by the respondent (P. Amalanathan), a Sub-Inspector in the Police Department, who was dismissed by orders of the Inspector-General of Police and the Government, upon charges framed and held established by the appropriate authorities. We are not now called upon to decide many of the points in controversy, which have been adverted by Rajagopalan, J., and discussed during the course of his judgment. There is a single ground before us, and the following background of facts will be adequate to elucidate this issue, as well as the necessity that has now arisen for a Reference to Full Bench. Very briefly stated, the enquiry into the charges against the respondent was commenced by one Mr. M.V. Rao, the then Assistant District Superintendent of Police, Hosur, in December, 1952. It is not in dispute that by March, 1953 thisOfficer had examined as many as 36 witnesses, for what may be broadly termed the prosecution. At that stage, Mr. Rao was replaced by another officer, Mr. Balasundaram, who on 15th April, 1953, served a notice on the respondent, intimating him (respondent) that the enquiry was to be continued, and that the respondent should state whether he required an altogether de novo, enquiry. It is not in dispute that the respondent replied that he did not require any such de novo, enquiry. At this stage, itself, it may be convenient to notice the explanation which the respondent requires us to take into consideration, in understanding his communication. According to the respondent, he had cited most of the prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses, so that in any event, they would be summoned again for effective cross-examination at a later stage. It was for this reason that the respondent dispensed with a de novo enquiry. However this might be, it is not in dispute that the succeeding officer, Mr. Balasundaram, did not actually examine any witnesses, and was not able to do so. He was succeeded by Mr. Rangabashyam, and Mr. Rangabashyam continued the enquiry, without holding any de novo enquiry, completed it ex parte (under the circumstances of abstension from the proceedings by the respondent, which need not be gone into now) and submitted his minute to the higher authorities. He was succeeded by Mr. Rangabashyam, and Mr. Rangabashyam continued the enquiry, without holding any de novo enquiry, completed it ex parte (under the circumstances of abstension from the proceedings by the respondent, which need not be gone into now) and submitted his minute to the higher authorities. These are the main facts. It was contended before Rajagopalan, J., that, apart from the other grounds of justification for the issue of a writ of certiorari, the proceedings before Mr. Rangabahsyam lacked jurisdiction altogether, being in violation of Police Standing Order 90 (3) (4). It is necessary for the purpose of this discussion to briefly set forth the history of that rule. As it originally stood, this was introduced by an amendment as Note 2 at page 57, Police Order No. 244, Volume I (Reprint 1926). In the following terms: “The officer who writes the minute, i.e., who appraises the evidence, should give the personal hearing and not some other officer.” The Government Order (Ms. No. 175) cites a letter from the Inspector-General of Police, and authorises this amendment. Later by Government Order Ms.No. 1335, dated 29th April, 1946, the words “oral enquiry were substituted for the words ”personal hearing “ found in this rule. The interpretation of this precise rule was the subject of a review petition before Rajamannar, C.J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 10486 of 1956, Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955 After setting forth the rule, the learned Chief Justice observed that, though the rule might not be couched in good English, the sense was clear, namely that the Officer who holds enquiry must write the minute, and not some other officer. The Bench, was of view that, in this interpretation the option of the accused to demand or to waive a de novo hearing was immaterial, and did not affect the substance of the objection. Where the minute was written by an officer who had not held the enquiry throughout, or held the enquiry de novo commencing from the first witness, the minute contravened the rule, so that the subsequent order of dismissal was vitiated by a lack of jurisdiction. Where the minute was written by an officer who had not held the enquiry throughout, or held the enquiry de novo commencing from the first witness, the minute contravened the rule, so that the subsequent order of dismissal was vitiated by a lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case Rajagopalan, J., appears to have felt considerable doubt about the correctness of the view taken by the Bench, and he refers to certain arguments of the learned Additional Government Pleader for a contrary view, with which he was apparently in concurrence. But, as a single Judge, he felt himself bound, by the view of the Division Bench and issued the writ. He has observed, in this context: ” It may be that these are factors to be taken into account should the matter come up before a, Division Bench on appeal even in this case. The questions before us are, therefore, two-fold in character. Firstly, there is, the question of interpretation of this rule 90 (3) (b) in relation to the given facts. On this matter, there is a difference of view between the Division Bench, and the point of view urged by the learned Advocate-General before us which also, apparently secured the concurrence of Rajagopalan J as his individual opinion. Secondly, there is the question, equally important if not more so, whether on the assumption that this is a statutory rule, the violation of it per se can give me to interference in writ jurisdiction, apart from any infringement of Article 311 (2) or of the principles of natural justice. Before framing these two questions for Reference to a Full Bench, we think that it is but right and proper that we should, briefly, notice the arguments upon either side, that have been urged in this matter at some length before us. Even before doing that, we might refer to a ground of objection that rule 90 (3) (b) itself is not a statutory rule, but a purely departmental instruction, directive and not mandatory, the infringement of which can give rise to no cause of action of any kind, as far as the accused officer (respondent) is concerned. In this connection, Sri Venugopal for the respondent draws out attention to section 9 of the District Police Act (XXIV of 1859), under which apparently the rule was issued by the Government. In this connection, Sri Venugopal for the respondent draws out attention to section 9 of the District Police Act (XXIV of 1859), under which apparently the rule was issued by the Government. The argument of the learned Advocate-General is that section 9 does not apply, and that the rule itself does not fall within any of the categories of power enumerated in that section. But we notice that the rule and the amendment thereto were both issued by the Government after a reference by the Inspector-General of Police. Apart from section 9, our attention has not been drawn to any specific enabling provision under which this rule could have been issued by the Government. Further, Sri Venugopal draws bur attention to the fact that, in the printed volume of the Police Standing Orders (1938 edition), the rule is marked with as asterisk, as being statutory in character. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the rule appears to be statutory, and it is on this assumption that the further discussion will follow. The main point of the learned Advocate-General is that the judicial principle that he who hears must determine the cause applies strictly to operative decisions of judicial bodies and not to any acts of a purely administrative character. He stresses, that in the present case, the report or minute is purely advisory in the strict sense. It is part of the preparation of record. It is not binding on the disciplinary authority, who alone has the jurisdiction to decide upon the punishment. The learned Advocate-General relied upon High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall1 for elucidation of this second stage in relation to an earlier stage at which the power of the disciplinary authority comes into play; his point is that any earlier minute by an officer holding the enquiry, is a purely persuasive or advisory document. Rengachari v. Secretary of State for India2 and Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India3 are also referred to. In Dr. M. Krishnamoorthy v. The State of Madras4the Bench of Rajamannar, C.J., and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., observed that the fact that rules were made to safeguard the rights of a civil servant in matters of disciplinary action, did not imply that the High Court had jurisdiction to quash the relevant orders of dismissal purely because one or other of the rules had been contravened. In Kuppuswami v. State of Madras5 Rajagopalan, J., stressed that a disciplinary Tribunal was not a judicial authority to decide either the question of guilt, or the question of punishment of the concerned officer. These powers related to the Government alone, as the ultimate authority. In A.N.D’Silva v. Union of India6 their Lordships of the Supreme Court again have emphasised the distinction between the enquiry officer and the ultimate punishing authority. Finally, in Sardar Kapur Singh v. The Union of India 7 the following observation of their Lordships occurs at page 582: “ The Constitution however does not guarantee an enquiry directed in exercise of any specific •statutory powers of administrative rules.” In other words, either it must be shown that Article 311 (2) was contravened, in the sense that there was a denial of a fair opportunity for defence, or alternatively, it must be shown that some principle of natural justice has been contravened. “Where either of these contingencies had not been established, but what has been established is the infringement of even a statutory rule of the procedure relating to disciplinary proceedings, such an infringement cannot per se give rise to a cause of action. Hence, the fact that the minute was drawn up by an Officer other than he who held the enquiry at the initial stage, cannot give any right to the respondent to assail the order of dismissal, because the minute itself is purely advisory in character, and no question of jurisdiction can really arise. According to the arguments of the learned Advocate-General, the Bench erred in their view on this aspect. We shall now very briefly refer to the arguments per contra of learned Counsel for the respondent. Learned Counsel has mainly argued that the infringement of a statutory rule whatever might be its scope, purport or, tenor, does give rise to a cause of action, provided that the rule relates to disciplinary matters within the scope of Article 311. We shall now very briefly refer to the arguments per contra of learned Counsel for the respondent. Learned Counsel has mainly argued that the infringement of a statutory rule whatever might be its scope, purport or, tenor, does give rise to a cause of action, provided that the rule relates to disciplinary matters within the scope of Article 311. He first relied upon Rajagopala Ayyar v. Madras State1, in which decision Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., has referred to the non-observation of certain rules which had statutory force under Article 313 of the Constitution, and held that this necessarily led to the conclusion that the preliminary conditions, subject to which alone the notice to show cause under Article 311 (2) could have been issued, were not satisfied in the case which, in its turn, vitiated the subsequent order of dismissal. Learned Counsel also relied on Kuppuswami v. State of Madras2cited by the learned Advocate-General, as the Bench held that, where there was the absence of good and sufficient reason, and the punitive measure was based purely on suspicion, this affected the jurisdiction itself of the Government. Next Gullapalli Nageswara Rao, etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh3was cited, for the proposition that where the Act and Rules framed thereunder imposed a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, divided responsibility was destructive of the concept itself.” If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. “ On this authority, it could even be held that the violation of the rule in the present case contravened the principles of natural justice. Finally, strong stress was laid upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Baku Ram Upadhya4. In this decision, their Lordships have proceeded to the length of holding that, where a statutory rule relating to disciplinary matters ex facie mandatory in its terms is infringed, the resulting order of dismissal would be illegal, even apart from an infringement of rights guaranteed under Article 311 (2) or of the principles of natural justice. In this decision, their Lordships have proceeded to the length of holding that, where a statutory rule relating to disciplinary matters ex facie mandatory in its terms is infringed, the resulting order of dismissal would be illegal, even apart from an infringement of rights guaranteed under Article 311 (2) or of the principles of natural justice. Consequently, in the light of these citations and arguments by the respective parties before us, we frame the following two questions for Reference to a Full Bench, the first because of substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the interpretation of rule 90 (3) (b) by the Division Bench in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 10486 of 1956 in Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955, and the second, because of the intrinsic importance of the question itself in the light of the authorities. The two terms of Reference will, therefore, be as follows: ” 1 Whether the provision in the Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b), namely, ‘The Officer who writes the minute, namely, who appraises the evidence, should give oral enquiry and not any other office ‘implies (on the assumption that it is a statutory rule) that the entire proceedings, namely, the recording of the evidence of the witnesses, the hearing by the Officer and the drafting of the minute or report should be conducted and made by the same person or merely means that the person who ultimately drafts the minute or report should not do so without giving a personal hearing to the delinquent officer, though he might not have himself examined every one of the witnesses: 2 Upon the assumption that rule 90 (3) (b) is a statutory rule, relating to disciplinary proceeding, does the violation of such provision per se involve the necessary results that the final order of punishment is void, irrespective of whether the Officer was given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself, or the proceedings were in conformity with the principles of natural justice. ‘We consequently direct that the papers might be placed before our Lord The Chief Justice for being posted before a Full Bench. The appeal then came on for hearing before the Full Bench. (Srinivasan, Ramakrishnan and Kailasam, JJ.) The Additional Government Pleader (V. Ramaswami), for Appellants. K.K. Venugopal, for Respondent. ‘We consequently direct that the papers might be placed before our Lord The Chief Justice for being posted before a Full Bench. The appeal then came on for hearing before the Full Bench. (Srinivasan, Ramakrishnan and Kailasam, JJ.) The Additional Government Pleader (V. Ramaswami), for Appellants. K.K. Venugopal, for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramakrishnan, J.- This Writ Appeal is directed against the order of Rajagopalan, J., in Writ Petition No. 1516 of 1956, presented under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was filed by one P. Amalanathan, who was a Sub-Inspector of Police. On complaints received that he was corrupt a departmental enquiry was undertaken against him, on the basis of sixteen charges. The details of the procedure at the departmental enquiry will be considered at length later in this judgment. At this stage, it will suffice to note that the preliminary enquiry which involved the examination of witnesses, was conducted by three Officers one after the other. The last of them Sri Rangabashyam prepared a detailed report, (or minute as it is called) embodying his findings on the charges, and submitted them to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police the authority empowered to punish the Sub-Inspector of Police under the departmental rules. He was dismissed from service by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. His appeal to the Inspector-General of Police was dismissed and a further representation to the Government was also rejected on 14th August, 1956. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for the quashing the order of dismissal on two principal grounds, viz., (i) During the departmental enquiry as a whole, the petitioner was denied a real and effective opportunity to defend himself against the charges; (ii) Mr. Rangabashyam, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who completed the enquiry, had no jurisdiction to draw up the minute which furnished the basis for the order of dismissal. His action was in contravention of Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b). This, Writ Petition came before Rajagopalan, J., who found on a consideration of the allegations and counter-allegations that ground No. 1 was not substantiated. In regard to ground No. 2, the petitioner relied in support on a decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955. This, Writ Petition came before Rajagopalan, J., who found on a consideration of the allegations and counter-allegations that ground No. 1 was not substantiated. In regard to ground No. 2, the petitioner relied in support on a decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955. The gist of the Police Standing Order is that the officer who conducts the preliminary enquiry should himself write the minute (the report of his findings) on the basis of which the punishing authority, viz., the Deputy Inspector-General of Police has to pass appropriate orders of punishment. In the present case as well as in the case which came up before the Bench in Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955, more than one officer has conducted the preliminary disciplinary enquiry. Therefore, the officer who drew up the minute (report of the findings) was not the officer who was in charge of the enquiry throughout. In such circumstances, the learned Chief Justice in the Bench decision afore cited held: "......the dismissal of the petitioner was vitiated by a lack of jurisdiction in the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nagapattinam, to complete the enquiry against petitioners and write the minute on the strength of which the petitioner was dismissed." Rajagopalan, J., felt himself bound by the aforesaid decision and quashed the dismissal order. An appeal was filed by the respondents in the Writ Petitions, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Coimbatore, the Inspector-General of Police, Madras and the State of Madras and this came up before a Bench of this Court consisting of Anantanarayanan, and Venkatadri, JJ. The learned Judges summarised the rival contentions urged before them and found that the dispute had to be resolved by a Reference to a Full Bench, because they entertained a substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the interpretation of Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b) by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955, and also because the matter itself was of intrinsic general importance. They formulated the terms of Reference thus: " 1. They formulated the terms of Reference thus: " 1. Whether the provision in the Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (A), namely, the Officer who writes the minute, namely, who appraises the evidence, should give oral enquiry and not any other officer implies (on the assumption that it is a statutory rule) that the entire proceedings, namely, the recording of the evidence of the witnesses, the hearing by the officer and the drafting of the minute or report, should be conducted and made by the same person, or merely means that the person who ultimately drafts the minute or report should not do so without giving a personal hearing to the delinquent officer, though he might not have himself examined every one of the witnesses? 2. Upon the assumption that rule 90 (3) (6) is a statutory rule, relating to a disciplinary proceeding, does the violation of such provision per se involve the necessary result that the final order of punishment is void, irrespective of whether the officer was given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself, or the proceedings were in conformity with the principles of natural justice." Though only the two terms formulated as above have been referred to the Full Bench, since the entire appeal is also now before us, we proceeded to hear the appeal both with reference to the points thus referred to us for decision, as well as the correctness of the orders of Rajagopalan, J., on the first point set down by him for decision, viz., whether the departmental enquiry was itself vitiated, because no effective opportunity was given to the respondent in the appeal to defend himself and thus there was violation of the principles of natural justice. We will take up first for consideration the two points in the order of Reference by Anantanarayanan, and Venkatadri, JJ., and which have been extracted above; It is a well-known practice in almost all the administrative departments in this State (presumably in other States also) to maintain what is known as Standing Orders for the guidance of the subordinate officers. Thus, we have the Board’s Standing Order for the guidance of the Revenue Department, Collector’s Standing Orders for the guidance of revenue officers in individual districts, and in the Judicial Department we have the High Court’s Circular Orders and Rules of Practice. Thus, we have the Board’s Standing Order for the guidance of the Revenue Department, Collector’s Standing Orders for the guidance of revenue officers in individual districts, and in the Judicial Department we have the High Court’s Circular Orders and Rules of Practice. The Madras Police Standing Orders have been similarly issued from time to time for the guidance of officers in the Police Department. Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b), before subsequent amendment, read as follows, at the time when the respondent was dismissed from service: " The Officer who writes the minute, that is, who appraises evidence, should give the oral enquiry and not some other officer." We will briefly refer to the prior history of this Standing Order. In the 1926 edition of the Police Order Book, Volume I, the appropriate rule for dealing with punishments of subordinate police officers were contained in rules 227 to 248. But at the time a rule similar to Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b) is not found. The present Standing Order had its origin in a G.O. No. 175, Public (Political), dated 1st April, 1932. The Inspector-General of Police wrote to the Government on 18th March, 1932, suggesting an amendment to Order 244 in the 1926 edition of the Police Order Book, Volume I by adding the proviso: " The Officer who writes the minute, i.e., who appraises the evidence, should give the personal hearing and not some other officer." This letter of the Inspector-General of Police itself purports to be in pursuance of an earlier confidential memorandum of the Government, dated 7th March, 1932. We were shown by the learned Additional Government Pleader a copy of this memorandum, in which the Government pointed out some irregularities in the disposal of a charge against a Sub-Inspector and observed that it would be desirable that the officer who writes the minute, i.e., who appraises the evidence should give the personal hearing and not some other officer. The Government in the G.O. above cited approved the proposal and issued the amendment. The Government in the G.O. above cited approved the proposal and issued the amendment. The Standing Order thus issued read: "The officer who writes the minute, i.e., who appraises the evidence, should give the personal hearing and not some other officer." The Standing Order in the above terms could well imply, that it would suffice if a personal hearing is given to the delinquent officer, by the officer who writes the minute, but it may not be necessary that the officer who writes the minute should be the one who conducted the enquiry against the delinquent officer throughout. But in 1946, the order underwent a substantial alteration and it was recast in the form mentioned already. This amendment was made in pursuance of a letter from the Inspector-General of Police to the Government, dated 23rd January, 1946, and thereupon the Government, by its order, G.O. No. 1335, Home, dated 29th April, 1956, substituted the words oral enquiry for the words personal hearing or regular enquiry wherever they occurred in the order. Thereafter, the order in the form it stood at the time of the dismissal of the respondent, emerged. As pointed out by the learned Judges who disposed of Writ Appeal No. 51 of 1955, the wording of the order thus amended is inelegant. While the predicate give can appropriately be use d in regard to personal hearing it cannot be the appropriate one for oral enquiry. The word holds would be more appropriate for oral enquiry. But apart from this inelegant use of language, the meaning of the Standing Order, after its amendment in 1946, is quite plain, namely, that the officer who writes the minute should be the one who was throughout in charge of the preceding preliminary departmental enquiry. If more than one officer had conducted this departmental enquiry, and the finding or minute was prepared by one of them, there would be a violation of the Standing Order, as found by the Division Bench. The first question pressed on us for consideration by the learned Additional Government Pleader is that this Standing Order is not a statutory rule, but that it partakes the character only of administrative instructions. The relevant statutory enactment for consideration is Act XXIV of 1859. The first question pressed on us for consideration by the learned Additional Government Pleader is that this Standing Order is not a statutory rule, but that it partakes the character only of administrative instructions. The relevant statutory enactment for consideration is Act XXIV of 1859. Section 9 of that Act reads thus: " The Inspector-General may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the State Government frame such orders and regulations as he shall deem expedient, relative to the general Government and distribution of the force, the places of residence, the classification, rank and particular service of the members thereof, their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them, to the collecting and communicating intelligence and information and all such other orders and regulations relative to the said Police force as the said Inspector-General shall, from time to time, deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect and for rendering such force efficient in the Section 10 of the Act reads thus: " Subject to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and to such rules as the State Government may, from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce to a lower post, or time-scale, or to lower stage in time-scale, any officer of the subordinate police whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or otherwise unfit for the same and may order the recovery from the pay of any such police officer of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by his negligence or breach of orders." The language of section 10 clearly shows that the rules framed by the State Government under that section relate to the punishment of subordinate police officers for negligence of duty and other reasons. The reference to Article 311 of the Constitution in that section also reinforces this inference. Section 9 also enables rules to be passed thereunder having statutory force. But the language of that section indicates that the rules framed thereunder do not cover the punishment or disciplinary action against subordinate police officers. The words used in section 9 imply that the rules contemplated therein are rules which relate to the administrative aspect of the police force. Section 9 also enables rules to be passed thereunder having statutory force. But the language of that section indicates that the rules framed thereunder do not cover the punishment or disciplinary action against subordinate police officers. The words used in section 9 imply that the rules contemplated therein are rules which relate to the administrative aspect of the police force. We were shown the original Government Order of the year 1932, which led to the framing of Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b) as well as the Government Order which amended it in 1946. Though these Government Orders purport to have been issued on a correspondence which originated from the Inspector-General of Police, on issuing the orders in question, the Government do not purport to exercise their statutory power under section 9. A perusal of the several provisions in the Police Standing Orders shows that many of them are of an administrative nature. The margin gives the Government Order in which the instructions were issued. It is quite likely that the Government in exercise of their administrative control over the Police Department have issued orders from time to time, and that the more important of these orders found their way into the Police Standing Orders. Reference was made by the learned Counsel for the respondent, to Note 2 (1)of the Pre factory Note of the Madras Police Standing Orders to the effect that orders marked with asterisk are issued by the Inspector-General of Police under section 9 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (XXIV of 1859), with the approval of the Government. Order 90 retains an asterisk in the margin. But one cannot be quite sure that these asterisks in spite of the Prefatory Note above could be used safely as the guiding factor in all cases for determining whether a rule is statutory or not. We have been shown edition of the Police Standing Order Book issued in 1950 in which Order 90 does not contain an asterisk. A perusal of several portions of Order 90 gives the impression that the order includes a great deal of material of an advisory or directory character issued from an administrative point of view for the guidance of subordinate officers and they do not appear to be worded in the formal manner which one associates with statutory orders. A perusal of several portions of Order 90 gives the impression that the order includes a great deal of material of an advisory or directory character issued from an administrative point of view for the guidance of subordinate officers and they do not appear to be worded in the formal manner which one associates with statutory orders. Thus, there are two notes under Order 90 (2) (c) (vi) and (vii) in the 1950 edition of the Madras Police Standing Orders. The note under sub-clause (vi) is to the effect that “ in grave cases it is often desirable to conduct an oral enquiry whether the delinquent wants it or not”. The Note under sub-clause (vii) is to the effect that “ every item of the charge should be carefully and accrurately framed, and that it should be remembered that an exact copy of items (i) and (iii) of Order 90 (2) (c) will have to go into the minute”. This type of instruction found in Order go appears to indicate that the above order was intended merely for the guidance of officers when they apply the statutory rules for disciplinary action, framed under section 10 of the Madras District Police Act, and which are embodied in Annexure III of the Police Standing Orders. It is also necessary to point out that Order 90 (1) makes a reference to Annexure III, as containing the procedure to be followed for imposing the penalty of reduction, suspension, etc., and thereafter it proceeds to give several instructions for the guidance of the Officers who have to apply the statutory rules contained in Annexure III. Another item of intrinsic evidence furnished by the order itself to show its non-statutory character is the cross-reference to statutory orders found in Order 90. Thus, Order 90 (4) (a) (1938 edition) reads: “ From the moment the investigating officer makes up his mind to proceed against an officer, the requirement of the statutory orders must be observed.” In the same edition, Order 90 (4) (d) reads: “It is particularly important that the formalities described in the statutory crdcr should be relieved if the investigating officer is in the position of a prosecutor............” The above reference to a statutory order is de novo Standing Order go. This would show that Order go does not itself have the force of a statutory order and that the appropriate statutory orders for disciplinary purposes must be looked for outside Order 90 ; they are found in Annexure III of the book of Police Standing Orders. Our attention was drawn to a reference to the use of the asterisk made by the Supreme Court in one of the cases State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venugopal1that came up before it. But in that decision apparently no attack was made as was done in this case that the asterisks themselves did not provide the essential clue for making the distinction. The Government Order under which the particular Police Order was issued did not also show that it was issued under statutory authority. In view of the discussion mentioned above, it appears to us to be safer to go to the original Government Order itself for the purpose of deciding whether a particular order in the Police Order Book is one issued under the statutory power, or whether it is merely an order which embodies an administrative direction. It will not be sufficient if the Government is shown to have issued a particular order, but it will be necessary to prove that the order was issued in exercise of the statutory power under section 9 of the Madras District Police Act. In this connection, we refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 453 of 1962, where a rule issued under a provision closely analogous to section 9 of the Madras District Police Act, namely, section 12 of the Central Police Act (V of 1861) was referred to, for the purpose of finding out whether certain Standing Orders in force in Uttar Pradesh should be deemed to be statutory orders issued under section 12 of Central Act V of 1861. Section 12 of that Act reads: The Inspector-General of Police may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the State Government, frame such orders and rules as he shall deem expedient relative to the organisation, classification and distribution, of the Police Force the places at which the members of the force shall reside, and the particular services to be performed by them..............“ A comparison of this section with section 9 of the Madras District Police Act shows their close analogy. The Standing Order under examination in that decision, dealt with a rule providing for guidance in the matter of promotion as well as confirmation of subordinate police officers. Taking up for consideration the question whether the order, which purported to have been issued by the Inspector-General of Police, had any legal efficacy, the Supreme Court observed: This would depend upon the Standing Orders having been issued by a competent authority under the provisions of a statute which empowered that authority to prescribe ‘conditions of service . For undoubtedly if it were not so, it would be merely an administrative instruction issued by the Inspector-General of Police for the guidance of his officers but could not determine service conditions fixed by statutory rules by competent authorities or confer any legal rights which in the event of non-observance could be the subject of complaint in a Court.” Then, after referring to section 12 of Central Act V of 1861, the Supreme Court observed: “It is clear that the orders and rules referred to in this section have nothing to do with the determination of the service conditions of the officers recruited to the police force.” Prima facie, bearing in mind the purpose for which section 9 of the Madras District Police Act was enacted as stated in that section itself if could not deal with framing of rules for disciplinary action, for which the relevant section is section 10 of the Act. Therefore, Order 90 (3) (b), which relates to disciplinary action, to have legal validity as a statutory rule, would have to be framed under section 10 of the Act. But it is not the case of either party that it was so framed. It must be considered to be only a rule of a non-statutory and administrative nature. The next question for consideration is whether, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Order aforesaid in the Madras Police Standing Orders is a statutory order, its violation must necessarily lead to the quashing of the order of dismissal. Sri K.K. Venugopal, appearing for the respondent referred to a judgment of Ramachandra Ayyar, J. (as he then was) in an unreported decision — Writ Petition No. 1525 of 1956. Sri K.K. Venugopal, appearing for the respondent referred to a judgment of Ramachandra Ayyar, J. (as he then was) in an unreported decision — Writ Petition No. 1525 of 1956. In that case, the question for consideration was whether the order of Government transferring the petitioner as a Sub-Inspector of Police from the Police Service, where he was a probationer, to the Excise Service, was proper or not. Observing that probation, once commenced, could be terminated only under the rules, that the terms and conditions of the service of a probationer would be governed by the rules framed in that behalf, and that the petitioner would be entitled to the protection which those rules provide, the learned Judge held: “The Madras District Police Act and the rules framed thereunder have statutory force, and if there is a contravention of these provisions, the officer affected would have a right to approach the Court, as the contravention of a statute or rules framed thereunder would be justiciable in the absence of any provision therein to the contrary. Even in a case where there was a mere breach of the service rules framed by the Executive Government without a violation of the constitutional safeguards, it has been held that the High Court could issue a writ to quash the order in disciplinary proceedings against an officer where the order was void.” Thereafter, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition. A somewhat different view has been held by Rajagopalan, J., in Sambandhan v. Regional Traffic Superintendent1, where at page 304 of the report he observed: “.........................the fact that the Executive has framed rules to regulate the conditions of service does not by itself clothe the civil servant with a right to seek the aid of the Court, when he has been wronged by violation of any of those rules. To hold that the Court has that jurisdiction would it appears to me, constitute an inroad on the concept, that the civil servant holds office during the pleasure of the Executive, not warranted by the terms of the Constitution.” The learned Judge purported to follow earlier decisions, which he had cited in his judgment Rajagopalan, J., also observed that the rules constitute solemn assurance on the part of the Executive that its pleasure would be exercised in accordance with the rules but they do not bring into existence rights and obligations enforceable in a Court and that the wrong suffered by a civil servant by any contravention of the rules has to be redressed by the Executive itself to whose pleasure the Constitution has committed him. But the above view has to be reconsidered in the light of the later decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya1wherein there is an analysis of the history of what can be called, for brevity, the pleasure doctrine, in regard to the holding of office by Government servants, as evolved in the successive Government of India Acts and finally embodied in the present Constitution The same decision also contains weighty observations which are binding on this Court, and which relate to the effect of statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, in the context of the pleasure doctrine enunciated in Article 310 of the Constitution. Though the learned Counsel for respondent Sri K.K. Venugopal took us through the history of the pleasure doctrine, it is unnecessary to recapitulate them in this judgment, because they have been adverted to in several decisions both of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court. But it is important to make a note of the result of the Supreme Court s decision in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya1, on the statutory principles. The Supreme Court reached two crucial conclusions, which are binding on this Court . Firstly the pleasure, subject to which a public servant holds an office as expressed in Article 310 (1) of the Constitution, is the individual pleasure of the President in the case of Central Government servant, of the Governor in the case of a State Government servant. The Supreme Court reached two crucial conclusions, which are binding on this Court . Firstly the pleasure, subject to which a public servant holds an office as expressed in Article 310 (1) of the Constitution, is the individual pleasure of the President in the case of Central Government servant, of the Governor in the case of a State Government servant. This power of the President or the Governor to dismiss a civil servant at pleasure, cannot be delegated to any subordinate officer and can be exercised only by the named authorities, namely, the President or the Governor. The only restriction in the exercise of the pleasure by these two authorities is the one provided in Article 311 of the Constitution ; this inference has to be spelt out from the use of the words “except as expressly provided by this Constitution” in Article 310 (1) of the Constitution. Secondly so far as the rules and laws framed or enacted under Article 309 of the Constitution are concerned, they cannot override the power conferred upon the President or the Governor under Article 310 as qualified by Article 311. The authorities mentioned in Article 309, can make laws and frame rules subject to this overriding power. While so doing they can also lay down laws and frame rules regulating the scope and content of the doctrine of reasonable opportunity embodied in Article 311 of the Constitution. This discussion would lead to the result that rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution can include rules which are intended to regulate the scope and content of the doctrine of reasonable opportunity under Article 311 of the Constitution. The violation of such rules will be justiciable. But, rules can also be framed under the statutory power under Article 309 of the Constitution, which need not have the aforesaid object. There can be rules designed purely for the purpose of administrative guidance. The question is how far the violation of such rules will be justiciable. This question about the justiciability of rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution came up for consideration before the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya1. The question is how far the violation of such rules will be justiciable. This question about the justiciability of rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution came up for consideration before the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya1. Taking up the specific Question of the justiciability of the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, which might not fall within the category of rules regarding the scope and content of the doctrine of reasonable opportunity the learned Judges proceeded to discuss the conditions which would be necessary before the violation of such rules could be held to be justiciable. For this purpose, they applied a distinction well-known in the law of interpretation of statute, the distinction between directory and mandatory rules. Learned Counsel Sri K.K. Venugopal, appearing for the respondent, took us through several chapters of Craies on Statute Law dealing with absolute and directory enactments. He stressed on the use of negative in the Order under consideration in this case and urged that this would provide a clue to a mandatory character., But even Craies observes that this fact cannot be laid down as a universal rule, and that while no universal rule can be laid down for this purpose, it is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed, As pointed out by the Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya1. "..............the Court may consider, inter alia the nature and the design of the statute and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by come penalty the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered. Examining the Police Standing Order No. 90 (3) (b) under consideration, from this point of view, we note first of all, that decisions of the Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the findings of the officer who conducted the preliminary enquiry are not conclusive so far as the delinquent officer is concerned. They can be differed from or accepted according to the decision of the punishing authority In Union of India v. H.C. Goel2, the Supreme Court observed at page 367: " The object of the enquiry is plain. It is to enable the Government to hold an investigation into the charges framed against a delinquent public servant, so that the Government can in due course consider the evidence adduced and decide whether the said charges are proved or not The interposition of the enquiry which is held by a duly appointed enquiry officer does not alter the true legal position that the charges are framed by the Government and it is the Government which is empowered to impose punishment on the delinquent public servant. Therefore on principle it is difficult to see how the respondent is justified in contending that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer bind the appellant in the present case." Likewise, the Supreme Court in Sardar Kapur Singh v. The Union of India3 at page 590 observed: " The President of India was not bound before passing an order dismissing the appellant to hear the evidence of witnesses. He could arrive at his conclusion on the evidence already recorded in the enquiry by the Enquiry Commissioner." The Supreme Court followed the observation of Lord Thankerton in the Privy Council decision in High Commissioner for India v. I. M. Lall4: " In the opinion of their Lordships no action is proposed within the meaning of the subsection (section 240, clause (3)) until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Prior to that stage the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. (Italics ours)." At the same time it should be made clear that the enquiry officer is not an amanuensis regarding the deposition of witnesses. Prior to that stage the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. (Italics ours)." At the same time it should be made clear that the enquiry officer is not an amanuensis regarding the deposition of witnesses. He is entitled to give his findings and the punishing authority is bound to take a note of them, but there is this overriding qualification that the findings of the enquiry officer are supplied to the delinquent, who has got a right to make his representations to the punishing authority against those findings, and it is the conclusion reached by the punishing authority, after he had considered the findings of the enquiry officer on the one hand and the representations of the delinquent officer on the other, that is really binding and conclusive in the case. ‘ This shows that the requirement in the Order in question that the officer who holds the oral enquiry, should himself write the report or minute of the findings’ must be deemed to be only of a directory character, and not mandatory, because the findings of the enquiry officer do not have a conclusive or binding effect on the punishing authority. The position in the case of such preliminary enquiries is therefore, different from criminal trials, where one Judge is transferred and another Judge takes his place. In such a case, the accused has the right to ask for a de novo trial under section 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The implications of this right to ask for a de novo trial given to the accused, have been considered at length by a Full Bench of this Court in Fernandez, In re1 where the question arose whether a right of de novo trial can be claimed by the accused in a case of trial by a special Judge and the Bench laid down the principle that except-in cases where the statute made a provision for the purpose, the entire oral evidence should be heard by the Presiding Officer before he could pronounce judgment in a criminal case. But this statutory principle is applicable to cases where the binding judgment, or decision has to be given by the Officer who holds the enquiry. That there may be an appeal against his decision, is a different matter. But this statutory principle is applicable to cases where the binding judgment, or decision has to be given by the Officer who holds the enquiry. That there may be an appeal against his decision, is a different matter. There is a fundamental distinction between an officer who holds a preliminary departmental enquiry against a delinquent officer and submits his findings to the punishing authority with the limitation that the findings have no final or conclusive value, but are only provisional and may or may not be accepted by the punishing authority, and a Court engaged in the trial of a criminal case, which has got the power to pronounce, on the guilt of the accused and the decision, is final so far as the trial Court is concerned. Further reinforcement to the inference now drawn, that the rule is directory rather than mandatory is provided by the fact that subsequent amendments to Order 90 have treated the present provision as involving a lacuna requiring amendment. The new amended Order reads: “ The officer who conducts the oral enquiry and appraises the evidence should ordinarily write the minute. But if for any reason the officer is not able to complete the enquiry; another officer may continue the enquiry and write the minute with the evidence so recorded by the previous officer or partly recorded by that officer and partly recorded by himself. If, however, the officer is of opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, he may resummon any such witness and after such further examination, cross-examination and re-examination, if any, as he may permit the witness shall be discharged.” In other words, the requirement that the same officer should hold the enquiry and write the minute cannot in all cases, be treated as absolute, to ensure justice to the delinquent. It has to be applied only subject to reasonable safeguards. One such safeguard will be an option given to the delinquent officer to ask a de novo enquiry or to waive it. In the present case, it has to be pointed out that the delinquent officer waived a de novo enquiry at an earlier stage when there was change in the personnel of the Enquiry Officer. One such safeguard will be an option given to the delinquent officer to ask a de novo enquiry or to waive it. In the present case, it has to be pointed out that the delinquent officer waived a de novo enquiry at an earlier stage when there was change in the personnel of the Enquiry Officer. Only when there was a further change in the personnel of the officer and dispute arose about the order in which the P.W.4 was to be recalled for cross-examination and the D.W. 4 had to be examined did he insist upon a de novo enquiry. As already pointed out the delinquent officer, unlike the accused in a criminal case, has got an opportunity to make a further representation against the findings of the Enquiry Officer when the matter comes up before the punishing authority at the final stage. The representation may include very well a representation about the inadequacy of the preliminary enquiry, or even include a necessity for a direction for a fresh enquiry. It, therefore, appears to us that as long as the findings of the officer holding the preliminary enquiry have no value as a conclusive determination of the case against the delinquent officer, the Order now under consideration should be considered to be directory rather than mandatory. We would also like to point out in this connection that when we asked the learned Government Pleader whether there is a similar provision in the rules for departmental enquiry in the case of other departments, he was not able to show us any such rule. In State of Mysore v. S.S. Makapur2the Supreme Court accepted the position that even a reading over of the prior statements of witnesses to the delinquent officer would satisfy the requirements of natural justice. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent referred to certain decisions in this connection dealing with the demeanour of witnesses. One of them is a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Hemaraisinhji v. I.G. of Police1where at page 67 there was an observation to the effect that the enquiry was vitiated because the officer who had the occasion to see the witness and observe the demeanour had not written any summing up, but it was written by his successor. One of them is a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Hemaraisinhji v. I.G. of Police1where at page 67 there was an observation to the effect that the enquiry was vitiated because the officer who had the occasion to see the witness and observe the demeanour had not written any summing up, but it was written by his successor. The first point to observe is that the Gujarat High Court had also taken into account several other irregularities in the trial including the addition of a charge at a subsequent stage and the absence of proof for one of the charges. It is after taking all these into consideration together that the Gujarat High Court set aside the decisions. Further the Gujarat High Court did not have the opportunity of reading the observations in Union of India v. H.C. Goel2referred to above and wherein stress has been laid on the value to be given to the findings of the officer who conducted the preliminary enquiry. Again another decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent is a decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Amulya Kumar v. L.M. Bakshi3. The Calcutta High Court construed the decisions of the Privy Council in Chinchal Singh v. King Emperor4and of the Calcutta High Court in Sarba Ranjan v. Sm. Haripriya Dassi6which referred to the trial of civil or criminal cases. Those decisions laid down the principle that it is an elementary right of an accused person in a criminal case, or a litigant in a civil suit, that a witness who is to testify against him should give his evidence before the Court trying the case which then has the opportunity of seeing the witnesses and observing their demeanour. The Calcutta High Court also referred to another criminal case King Emperor v. Sakharam6where it was held that under the Code of Criminal Procedure the Sessions Judge was not authorised to try a case partly upon evidence not recorded by himself and that he could not do so although the accused had given consent to such a course. The Calcutta High Court also referred to another criminal case King Emperor v. Sakharam6where it was held that under the Code of Criminal Procedure the Sessions Judge was not authorised to try a case partly upon evidence not recorded by himself and that he could not do so although the accused had given consent to such a course. The Calcutta High Court after noting that departmental proceedings were not governed by the Indian Evidence Act, observed that to satisfy the rules of natural justice, the officer who has to come to a conclusion as to the guilt of the delinquent, should be the same officer who heard the evidence and observed the demeanour of the witnesses. Here again, the essential distinction between a preliminary departmental enquiry where the findings are purely tentative and do not have a finding force, and a criminal or a civil case where the trial Court has got the duty to come to a conclusive decision on the dispute has not been adverted to by the Calcutta High Court. This substantial distinction between the proceedings in a civil or criminal Court on the one hand and the proceedings in a departmental enquiry on the other, has to be borne in mind when the procedure wherein the officer who held the enquiry did not write the minute, but a different officer, has been challenged as having vitiated the enquiry. Gullapalli Nageswara Rao, etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh7which was relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent in this connection, dealt with an entirely different set of circumstances. There a question arose as to the implementation of the scheme framed by the Andhra Government for a State Transport Undertaking, taking over the transport of buses to the exclusion complete or partial of other persons. The scheme provided for an enquiry followed by disposal of the objections. For carrying out the scheme, the rules framed by the Government imposed a duty on the Secretary to the Government to hear the objections and the Chief Minister to decide on the objections. The scheme provided for an enquiry followed by disposal of the objections. For carrying out the scheme, the rules framed by the Government imposed a duty on the Secretary to the Government to hear the objections and the Chief Minister to decide on the objections. The Supreme Court observed that the above divided responsibility was restrictive of the concept of judicial hearing and such a procedure defeated the object of personal hearing, that personal hearing enabled the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned arguments to accept his point of view, and that if one person heard and another decided, then personal bearing became an empty formality. The Supreme Court then observed that the said procedure followed in the case offended another basic principle of judicial procedure. The first point to note is that in the above case there is a clear finding that though a body constituted under the rules to decide the objections was an administrative Tribunal, if it is called upon to decide the respective rights of contesting parties, in other words, if there is a lis, the Tribunal has got a duty to decide the dispute judicially and in that particular case, it is obvious that the State Government has to act judicially in approving the scheme proposed by the State Transport Undertaking. But in the present case of an enquiry for punishing a departmental subordinate for irregularities, there is no question of two parties or a lis pending between them. Secondly several decisions cited above have held that there is no irregularity where such departmental enquiries provide for a preliminary enquiry which involves the writing down of depositions of witnesses being held by one officer as delegate of the punishing authority, and the punishing authority thereafter acting upon the statements so recorded, taking into consideration the findings given by the Enquiring Officer and after giving an opportunity to the delinquent officer to make his representations, dispose of the case by punishing or exonerating the delinquent officer. The principles laid down in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh1must, therefore, be applied only to proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature and cannot be invoked for dealing with a departmental enquiry conducted according to the statutory rules against a delinquent Government Officer. The principles laid down in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh1must, therefore, be applied only to proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature and cannot be invoked for dealing with a departmental enquiry conducted according to the statutory rules against a delinquent Government Officer. In our opinion for the reasons mentioned above, the order in question is a directory order and not a mandatory order, and no error of jurisdiction vitiating the enquiry has resulted in the present case, through its non-compliance. Next, we come to the second point regarding the merits of the allegation that the procedure adopted for punishing the respondent involved a violation of the rules of natural justice, in the sense that the opportunity given to him to defend himselt was not a real one. We will briefly summarise the procedure adopted at the enquiry. First of all, there were complaints from anonymous persons and other sources that the respondent was corrupt. Investigation was undertaken by the X Branch of the Crime Investigation Department and based on the report of the officer, who conducted this investigation charges were framed against the respondent, and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Hosur, Mr. M.V.N. Rao, was directed to hold the enquiry into sixteen charges of alleged corruption. The respondent submitted his explanation on 16th December, 1952. The enquiry before Mr. M.V.N. Rao began on 19th December, 1952. On 7th January, 1953, twenty-nine prosecution witnesses were examined and on 2nd March, 1953, another seven prosecution witnesses were examined. By 2nd March, 1953, the case against the delinquent officer i.e., the prosecution evidence so to say was over. While this enquiry was proceeding, the respondent felt that he had not been given an opportunity of persuing all the records of the prior investigation so that he could cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. In particular, he mentioned in a petition, dated 14th January, 1953, to the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Hosur that he would like to peruse the petition on which the Crime Investigation Department took up investigation on the allegation of corruption against him and also the report of the Inspector of Police, X Branch, Crime Investigation Department who conducted the investigation. He also requested that some of the prosecution witnesses might be recalled for further cross-examination besides defence witnesses. Mr. He also requested that some of the prosecution witnesses might be recalled for further cross-examination besides defence witnesses. Mr. M.V.N. Rao the Enquiry Officer, informed the respondent on 21st January, 1953, that the defence should be completed and then such of the prosecution witnesses whom the respondent wished to recall for further cross-examination would be recalled if the officer holding the enquiry was satisfied that further questions which he wished to put to such witnesses were relevant. Mr. M.V.N. Rao drew the respondent’s attention to Police Standing Order 90 (6). On 24th January, 1953, the respondent made a representation to the Enquiring Officer that further cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses should precede the examination of the defence witnesses. Sometime after this Mr. M.V.N. Rao was transferred and one Mr. Balasundaram was posted in his place as Deputy Superintendent of Police and commenced the enquiry. This new officer sent a memorandum to the respondent on 15th April, 1953, asking him if he required a de novo enquiry. The respondent stated that since he had cited most of the prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses, he was dispensing with a de novo enquiry. Thereafter, Mr. Balasundaram drew up a programme for examining the defence witnesses as well as the prosecution witnesses, whose examination was required by the respondent, and this programme was communicated to the respondent by a memorandum, dated 27th April, 1953. A perusal of this memorandum shows that under each heading of charge, the names of defence witnesses were first given and then the names of the prosecution witnesses whom the respondent required for being recalled were given subsequently. Thus, for the hearing on 3rd May, 1953, two witnesses cited as defence witnesses were given ranks as 1 and 2 and P.Ws. 1 and 2 recalled were given the ranks 3 and 4. In the meantime, the respondent was pursuing his request for perusal of documents for the purpose of the cross-examination of the witnesses already examined by the prosecution at a time when he did not have access to the records. Apparently, most of the records were given to the respondent for perusal and he informed the Enquiring Officer on 24th January, 1953, that he was grateful to the officer for having allowed him to peruse the statement recorded by the X Branch Inspector and he requested the officer to grant him copies of statements of six witnesses. Apparently, most of the records were given to the respondent for perusal and he informed the Enquiring Officer on 24th January, 1953, that he was grateful to the officer for having allowed him to peruse the statement recorded by the X Branch Inspector and he requested the officer to grant him copies of statements of six witnesses. Thus, it would appear that the statements of important witnesses already recorded during the investigation were given to the respondent for perusal before 24th January, 1953, and that he had no objections outstanding in regard to those statements. In the meantime, Mr. Balasundaram was transferred and one Mr. Ranga-bashyam was posted to his place and directed to conduct the enquiry. Mr. Rangabashyam posted the enquiry before him on 25th June, 1953, and 30th June, 1953. At this stage, the respondent came forward with two requisitions, one was for perusal of the records that he had already called for and the other was for further examination of the recalled prosecution witnesses before the examination of the defence witnesses. In regard to the second request, Mr. Rangabashyam, the Enquiring Officer, insisted that the respondent should examine his defence witnesses first before the prosecution witnesses were recalled to enable the respondent to cross-examine them. The respondent also sent a petition to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on 2nd July, 1953, representing among other requests, that he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the recalled prosecution witnesses first before the defence witnesses and to peruse all the records. The Deputy Inspector-General of Police in his reply, dated 7th July, 1953, stated that the respondent would be permitted to peruse at the oral enquiry, (i.e.) in the presence of the officer holding the enquiry, any records having a bearing on the enquiry other than any statements or notes, records or any preliminary or confidential documents. He also stated that if any record was considered unnecessary to be produced at the enquiry, written reasons would be recorded by the officer holding the enquiry. The officer holding the enquiry was made responsible for obtaining the presence of all witnesses including those cited by the respondent. No specific direction was given regarding the prayer for the examination of the re-called prosecution witnesses first before the examination of the defence witnesses. Mr. The officer holding the enquiry was made responsible for obtaining the presence of all witnesses including those cited by the respondent. No specific direction was given regarding the prayer for the examination of the re-called prosecution witnesses first before the examination of the defence witnesses. Mr. Rangabashyam informed the respondent on 26th June, 1953, peremptorily that the respondent had been already informed by the previous Enquiring Officer that under the provisions of Police Standing Order 90 (6) the defence witnesses would have to be examined first before recalling the prosecution witnesses. This memorandum also pointed out that on 25th June, 1953, when the respondent appeared before the Enquiring Officer, he gave a typed petition and walked away abruptly without waiting for orders. The memorandum also informed the respondent that if he did not appear before the Enquiring Officer within five days after the receipt of the memorandum, the oral enquiry would be closed and the charges against him would be disposed of against him on merits. After the Deputy Inspector-General’s directions, dated 7th July, 1953, were received, the Enquiring Officer again gave a memorandum directing the respondent to appear before him, on 13th July, 1953, and 14th July, 1953. On 14th July, 1953, the respondent again insisted upon the recalled prosecution witnesses being examined first before the examination of the defence witnesses. He again asked for an opportunity to inspect the records at Salem on 13th July, 1953, and 14th July, 1953. If this request could not be complied with, he prayed for a de novo enquiry. In this letter the respondent drew attention to the memorandum of Mr. Balasundaram, Deputy Superintendent of Police, dated 27th April, 1953, in which all the witnesses and the records that he had cited in his defence had been summoned and stated that he was unable to know why the new officer Mr. Rangabashyam has cancelled the earlier order. The Enquiring Officer replied to this, refusing the alteration in the order of examination of the witnesses and also refusing a de novo enquiry. The memorandum mentioned that as many as twenty witnesses cited as defence witnesses had been summoned and were present on that day for examination, that the remaining witnesses could be called as and when necessary, and that if the respondent was not prepared to examine the defence witnesses present on that day, the proceedings would be conducted ex parte. The memorandum mentioned that as many as twenty witnesses cited as defence witnesses had been summoned and were present on that day for examination, that the remaining witnesses could be called as and when necessary, and that if the respondent was not prepared to examine the defence witnesses present on that day, the proceedings would be conducted ex parte. Soon afterwards, the respondent gave a written reply to the Enquiring Officer that the oral enquiry might be stopped at that stage, so that he could take up the matter to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police or the Inspector-General of Police for redress. Thereafter the respondent did not take any further part in the enquiry. But it appears from the record that one defence witness was examined on 22nd July, 1953, and afterwards D.Ws. 2 to 12 were examined on 29th August, 1953, and D.Ws. 13 to 15 were examined on 30th August, 1953. Immediately after he was told that the proceedings would be continued’ ex parte against him without granting a de novo enquiry, he sent a petition to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on 24th July, 1953, for a de novo enquiry and the Deputy Inspector-General refused his request by an order passed on 25th August, 1953. This order of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police can be extracted below: “(i) You have already been given an opportunity to examine witnesses who may have anything to state which has any bearing on the enquiry in which you are concerned. It has been reported that you did not wish to examine them when the opportunity was given to you. It has therefore been correctly taken that you have changed your mind and did not wish to examine them. (ii) As you are not the officer holding the enquiry you cannot be permitted to hold the enquiry as you wish. The officer holding the enquiry had been examining the witnesses in the order most suitable to the enquiry. (iii) You have been trying to adopt stupid and obstructive tactics during the enquiry by asking: for witnesses to be questioned and documents to be produced which have no bearing on the enquiry. The officer holding the enquiry had been examining the witnesses in the order most suitable to the enquiry. (iii) You have been trying to adopt stupid and obstructive tactics during the enquiry by asking: for witnesses to be questioned and documents to be produced which have no bearing on the enquiry. The enquiry of course will not be started all over again.” It was presumably after the above order of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police that the Enquiry Officer examined eleven defence witnesses on 29th August, 1953, and 3 defence witnesses on 30th August, 1953, at a time when the respondent was not present. Thereafter, Mr. Rangabashyam drew up a minute finding the respondent guilty of most of the charges and these findings were accepted by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the respondent was dismissed from service and the Inspector-General of Police rejected the appeal preferred by the respondent. The respondent in the writ petition attacked the procedure as being opposed to the principles of natural justice and amounting to a denial of reasonable right of defence, under several headings. We will refer to them briefly: (i) There was refusal to supply to the respondent the former statements of witnesses recorded by the X Branch Crime Investigation Department Inspector. We have already referred to the fact that though at the earlier stages of the enquiry of the prosecution witnesses these statements were not made available to the respondent, he was allowed to peruse them at a subsequent stage and he expressed his gratitude to the Enquiring Officer Mr. M.V.N. Rao for allowing him to peruse the records. It is possible that he could have taken notes of these statements and kept them for the purpose of cross-examining the witnesses, when they were expected to appear at a subsequent stage after being recalled. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why he should insist upon perusing these statements again at the subsequent stage of the enquiry. We, therefore, do not consider that this objection has any substance. (ii) The second objection is that he wanted copies of certain documents which were not supplied to him. The first item is a copy of the petition on which the X Branch investigation commenced. This petition is said to be a pseudonymous one vide paragraph 3 of the affidavit. We, therefore, do not consider that this objection has any substance. (ii) The second objection is that he wanted copies of certain documents which were not supplied to him. The first item is a copy of the petition on which the X Branch investigation commenced. This petition is said to be a pseudonymous one vide paragraph 3 of the affidavit. The respondent referred to a prior communication, dated 17th February, 1953, in which the Department had offered to make the petition available as soon as it was received, but he was subsequently informed on 23rd July, 1953, that the petition on which the Crime Investigation Department took up the investigation was not available. But in the counter affidavit in paragraph 40, the State Government stated that the petition was of pseudonymous nature and it was sent by the Inspector-General of Police to the Enquiring Officer. If it was an essential document it could have been obtained from the Inspector-General of Police. Since it was admittedly a pseudonymous petition, there would be no question of confronting any of the prosecution witnesses with a prior statement, even if a copy of this pseudonymous petition was supplied to the respondent. We, therefore, consider this ground to be baseless. Reference was next made to the request of the respondent for being supplied with a copy of the accident register kept in the hospital at Salem. It was urged by the respondent that this accident register would show that he was present in the hospital, to which place he had taken a person injured in the course of an accident, at a time, when according to the Department, he is alleged to have been engaged in receiving bribes to release a person on bail. The respondent’s contention was that this accident register, if produced, would be an effective alibi for him. The respondent wanted this document to be summoned because, after his suspension, he could not go about in his uniform to peruse the entries in the accident register. The respondent cited this document as a document for his defence in respect of charge No. 7. The Assistant Superintendent of Police, Mr. M.V.N. Rao, who conducted the enquiry, intimated the respondent that he would meet the District Medical Officer, Salem, and see that he was allowed to peruse the accident register. The respondent cited this document as a document for his defence in respect of charge No. 7. The Assistant Superintendent of Police, Mr. M.V.N. Rao, who conducted the enquiry, intimated the respondent that he would meet the District Medical Officer, Salem, and see that he was allowed to peruse the accident register. But nothing is known as to what happened to the summoning of this document but it is admitted that this document refers only to one of the sixteen charges against the respondent under fourteen of which he has been found guilty. Therefore, even assuming that this document should have been summoned to give an opportunity to the respondent for his defence, it would affect only one of the fourteen charges, and cannot be construed as a document which had prejudiced the disposal of the rest of the charges. The third item referred to was refusal to supply of a list of investigation records received by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Salem. After several reminders the respondent was told by the Enquiring Officer that the list of records received by the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not relevant and was not evidence by itself. It was open to the Enquiring Officer to admit only such of the documents as he considered relevant and, therefore, this objection appears to us to be ground- The fourth item related to the denial of the list of records handed over to Assistant Superintendent of Police, Hosur, by the Inspector on 21st December, 1952. On 13th July, 1953, respondent’s request for the list was refused on the ground that it was not relavant. The respondent contended that the Enquiring Officer had admitted on an earlier occasion that he had given the document to the respondent for perusal on 7th January, 1953. But that will not affect the merits of the decision given on 13th July, 1953, about the irrelevancy of the document. The fifth item was denial to supply a copy of the petition sent to the Deputy Superintendent of Police on which he investigated the case. This was a pseudonymmous communication sent to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The respondent alleged in his affidavit that on the allegations in the pseudonymous petition, the District Superintendent of Police had submitted a report that there was no such allegation against the respondent when he was in charge of the Mecheri Police Station. This was a pseudonymmous communication sent to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The respondent alleged in his affidavit that on the allegations in the pseudonymous petition, the District Superintendent of Police had submitted a report that there was no such allegation against the respondent when he was in charge of the Mecheri Police Station. To the request of the respondent for this document, he was told that the document was probably in the Chief Office, Madras, and steps would be taken to get it, if possible. The document was thereafter never supplied to him. Learned Counsel for the respondent stated that the counter affidavit in regard to this allegation stated that the pseudonymous petition related to a Crime Investigation Department enquiry and it was not made available for perusal by the respondent. This may not be quite a satisfactory explanation. What we have already observed earlier in connection with another pseudonymous petition will apply to this, document also. Similarly, another petition by one Perumal Goundan to the Inspector-General; of Police was also summoned by the respondent. The petition was to the effect that some Congressmen were coercing the respondent and other villagers to give false evidence against a Delinquent Officer. On 13th July, 1953, the Enquiring Officer informed the respondent that steps were being taken to ascertain whether a copy of it was received by the Inspector and make it available if possible. But subsequently the enquiry was conducted ex parte. We are of the opinion that none of the above grounds are adequate for holding the enquiry to be vitiated because of denial of natural justice or of reasonable opportunity to the respondent. (iii) Another ground urged was that the enquiry was vitiated because, Mr. Rangabashyam, the third Enquiring Officer, declined to grant a de novo enquiry. It was pressed on us by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the enquiring authorities had conceded the principle that whenever there was a change in the personnel of the Enquiring Officer, a de novo enquiry could be claimed by the Delinquent Officer, vide the procedure adopted by Mr. Balasundaram, the second Enquiring Officer, when he took the place of the first Enquiring Officer Mr. M.V. N. Rao. In our opinion, the fact that the second Enquiring Officer, Mr. Balasundaram, the second Enquiring Officer, when he took the place of the first Enquiring Officer Mr. M.V. N. Rao. In our opinion, the fact that the second Enquiring Officer, Mr. Balasundaram, gave an opportunity to the respondent to state whether the respondent would require a de novo enquiry, would not lead to the conclusion that a similar opportunity should be given at all subsequent stages when there was a change of personnel of the Enquiring Officer. No rule has been shown to us that the respondent could insist on a de novo enquiry in such circumstances as a matter of right. It is quite possible that Mr. Rangabashyam considering the time taken and considering the stage at which the enquiry had reached, when he took charge (by that time the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was already taken) could have very well refused a de novo enquiry on the ground that it was bound to lead to protraction of the proceedings unduly. A similar ground was urged before us that the previous Enquiring Officer Mr. Balasundaram had arranged for the examination of the prosecution witnesses and the defence witnesses in a programme by his notice, dated 27th April, 1953, and that this programme clearly showed that he was prepared to concede the request of the respondent to examine the defence witnesses after the examination of the recalled prosecution witnesses. A perusal of this memorandum of Mr. Balasundaram, dated 27th April, 1953, shows that on the days when he had posted the enquiry for examining the witnesses, the names of defence witnesses are mentioned first and the names of recalled prosecution witnesses are mentioned next under each heading of charge. It cannot, therefore, be held that the principle that the recalled prosecution witnesses should be examined first before the examination of the defence witnesses had been conceded by the second Enquiry Officer Mr. Balasundaram and that, therefore, Mr. Rangabashyam, the third enquiring Officer, deliberately ignored this principle and thereby caused a failure of natural justice. ‘However, there is one important difference in the procedure adopted by Mr. Rangabashyam when he took up the enquiry. He had not adopted the procedure of hearing the witnesses both for the defence as well as the prosecution charge by charge. Rangabashyam, the third enquiring Officer, deliberately ignored this principle and thereby caused a failure of natural justice. ‘However, there is one important difference in the procedure adopted by Mr. Rangabashyam when he took up the enquiry. He had not adopted the procedure of hearing the witnesses both for the defence as well as the prosecution charge by charge. There was a large number of defence witnesses whom he had summoned for the hearing on 22nd June, 1953, and without any reference to the grouping of witnesses under each charge, Mr. Rangabashyam insisted upon all the defence witnesses being examined first before the recalled prosecution witnesses could be cross-examined on any of the charges. Mr. Rangabashyam by this procedure seems to have proposed a rather summary method of dealing with the defence witnesses and ignored the more logical method suggested in the memorandum, dated 27th April, 1953 But on that ground it cannot be held that any principle of natural justice had been violated. It would appear that Police Standing Order 90 (6) contains a clause that after the completion of the defence the Enquiring Officer should allow the delinquent officer to recall any witness for further examination, when the delinquent officer expresses his desire for that purpose. This provision has been relied upon by Mr. Rangabashyam and also by Mr. Balasundaram, when they insisted that the defence witnesses should be examined first before the recalled prosecution witnesses. But they have differed as to whether this rule should be applied charge by charge after splitting up the witnesses over the different charges for which they had to speak - the procedure adopted by Mr. Balasundaram - or whether they should be examined together irrespective of the charges - the procedure adopted by Mr. Rangabashyam It can be stated that the delinquent officer cannot insist upon the Enquiring Officer following any particular order for the examination of the witnesses cited by him. But whit is important to bear in mind is that neither Mr. Balasundaram nor Mr Rangabashyam conceded the demands of the respondents that the recalled prosecution witnesses should be examined first before the defence witnesses. It is also important to note that the respondent did not demur to the procedure adopted by Mr. Balasundaram when, in respect of such charge, the defence witnesses were proposed to be examined first before the recalled prosecution witnesses. It is also important to note that the respondent did not demur to the procedure adopted by Mr. Balasundaram when, in respect of such charge, the defence witnesses were proposed to be examined first before the recalled prosecution witnesses. For the aforesaid reason, one may reasonably hold that the respondent adopted an obstructive attitude when he insisted before Mr. Rangabashyam that the defence witnesses should be examined last after the recalled prosecution witnesses were examined Since he had only to cross-examine the recalled prosecution witnesses wherever’ there was a prior statement, for the purpose of contradiction he could have very well submitted to the direction of Mr. Rangabashyam instead of taking the obstructive attitude which he did in refusing to take part in the enquiry any further. However we are of the opinion that, after what happened on 22nd July, 1953, before the Enquiring Officer, the subsequent procedure adopted by the department cannot be supported on any reasonable interpretation, of the principles of natural justice We recall that on 22nd July, 1953, the delinquent officer asked Mr. Rangabashvam to stop further enquiry. Since the order in which the defence witnesses had to be examined was not conceded to his satisfaction, he asked for a de novo enauiry. He stated that if de novo enquiry was not to be granted, he would address the Deputy Inspector-General of Police for clarifying the matter and in the meantime the proceedings should not go on. On that day, twenty of the defence witnesses cited by the respondent were present. But for some reason, which is not very clear one of the defence witnesses was examined by Mr. Rangabashyam on that day itself The enquiry seems to have been thereafter adjourned for nearly a month The long interval up to 29th August, 1953, shows that the Enquiring Officer was prepared to postpone the proceedings from 22nd July, 1953, for a sufficiently long period to allow the result of the respondent’s petition to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to be known. The Deputy Inspector-General turned down the request of the respondent on 25th August, 1953, and informed the respondent of that fact He must have also informed the local police officers of that fact. But on 29th August, 1953, the Enquiring Officer examined D.Ws.2 to 12 and again on 30th August, 1953, he examined D.Ws.13 to 15. The Deputy Inspector-General turned down the request of the respondent on 25th August, 1953, and informed the respondent of that fact He must have also informed the local police officers of that fact. But on 29th August, 1953, the Enquiring Officer examined D.Ws.2 to 12 and again on 30th August, 1953, he examined D.Ws.13 to 15. This part of the enquiry was held behind the back of the respondent. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent urged that the respondent applied for the postponement of the proceedings on 22nd July, 1953, only for the purpose of obtaining orders from the higher authorities about the propriety of the procedure, but after the Deputy Inspector-General of Police turned down his request by order, dated 25th August, 1953, the Enquiring Officer was bound to give a notice to the respondent stating that he was going to recommence the enquiry in the light of the orders of the Deputy Inspector-General. The Enquiring Officer was not at all justified in proceeding to examine a large number of the respondent’s own witnesses without giving notice to him and behind his back. This grievance has been put down in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the affidavit of the respondent thus: “.........Unfortunately the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Western Range...... turned down my petition asking for the four reliefs................ Even though I was waiting for intimation for the further dates of the holding of the enquiry and the witnesses to be examined on each date, in view of the fact that my petition to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police had been disposed of by him by his order, dated 25th August, 1953, no such notice was ever received by me. It came rather as a shock to me, therefore, when I received the show cause notice, dated2nd November, 1953 on 5th November, 1953 enclosing a copy of the minute drawn up by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mettur..........asking me why I should not be dismissed from service for having been found guilty of 12 out of 16 charges. Fifteen days’ time was given to me for submits my explanation to this lengthy minute. Fifteen days’ time was given to me for submits my explanation to this lengthy minute. It was then I understand that some of the defence witnesses cited by me were examined on 29th and 30th July, 1953, without notice to me and behind my back.” The reply of the State in the counter-affidavit to this allegation was this: “Defence witnesses present on 22nd July, 1953 were refused to be examined by the petitioner (respondent), and when he had walked out refusing to participate in the enquiry, the Enquiring Officer in all fairness examined them himself. It is submitted that no notice was necessary to be sent to the petitioner (respondent), when he had been informed that the proceedings would be completed ex parte without further reference to him.” Not merely were these defence witnesses examined behind the back of the respondent, but as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent in the minute prepared by the Enquiring Officer, the evidence of these witnesses had been incorporated while dealing with charges 4 and 5. It appears to us on the facts of the case that on 22nd July, 1953, there was a clear representation by the respondent that he was making a submission to the Deputy Inspector-General on the propriety of the action of the Enquiring Officer in the matter of examination of the witnesses, and that until the orders of the Deputy Inspector-General were received, he was not going to take part in the enquiry The fact that the enquiry thereafter was not taken up for nearly a month would lead to the inference that the Enquiry Officer was not prepared to put into force immediately after 22nd July, 1953, his decision to proceed with the enquiry ex parte, and that the Enquiring Officer decided to adjourn the proceedings to await the result of the representation to the Deputy Inspector-General. No doubt one defence witness was examined on 22nd July, 1953. It is not clear whether he was examined either before or after the contest arose in the matter of the procedure. But the substantial number of defence witnesses were examined only after the decision of the Deputy Inspector-General was given. No doubt one defence witness was examined on 22nd July, 1953. It is not clear whether he was examined either before or after the contest arose in the matter of the procedure. But the substantial number of defence witnesses were examined only after the decision of the Deputy Inspector-General was given. It was, therefore the duty of the Enquiring Officer to intimate the respondent, after the orders of the Deputy Inspector-General were received, that in view of those orders the enquiry against him would be resumed, and give him a chance to appear at the further stage of the enquiry. It appears to us that, in the circumstances of the case, such a notice to the respondent was clearly called for. We cannot support the attitude of the Department in holding that by reason of the conduct of the respondent on 22nd July, 1953 it was no longer necessary to intimate him the fact that in view of the orders of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police the enquiry against him would be proceeded with according to the direction of Mr. Rangabashyam, which was confirmed by the Deputy Inspector-General. It was because of this unfortunate omission on the part of the Department that the respondent has made a complaint at all subsequent stages, that there was a denial of natural justice to him by reason of the fact that after the rejection of his request by the Deputy Inspector-General, he was not given a further opportunity to take part in the subsequent stages of the enquiry when his own witnesses were examined by the Enquiring Officer. Rajagopalan, J., in his order, now under appeal, observed: “ As the learned Additional Government Pleader pointed out, the petitioner (respondent) himself did not urge in the written representation he submitted to the Deputy Inspector-General in response to the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment, that the petitioner (respondent) had been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence by the examination of the witnesses by Mr. Rangabashyam on 22nd July, 1953 and onwards.” This representation of the learned Additional Government Pleader, which was accepted by Rajagopalan, J., was clearly inaccurate, because in the written representation made by the respondent to the Deputy Inspector-General on 17th November, 1953, in response to the show cause notice he stated: “ The fact that the defence witnesses were examined in my absence also proved another denial to me of a chance to put forth my case as against the prosecution case.” Thus, the respondent at all material stages, after the preliminary enquiry was. over, had taken the stand that the enquiry conducted by Mr. Rangabashyam after 22nd July, 1953, and after the orders of the Deputy Inspector-General were received amounted to a denial to him of a chance to put forth his case as against the prosecution. As against this argument, the learned Additional Government Pleader contended that even, if these two charges (charges 4 and 5) for which the evidence of defence witnesses taken behind the back of the respondent were relied upon, were to be ignored, there were still other charges for which the respondent had been found guilty and they would support the order of dismissal against him. But the objection raised by the respondent to this procedure goes somewhat deeper than the point that the evidence of defence witnesses were relied upon only for two of the charges. What happened at the enquiry before the Enquiring Officer after 22nd July, 1953, was that a brief note was made of what each defence witness; had to depose. Several of these witnesses were official witnesses. It was surely the function of the respondent to decide which of these witnesses cited by him should be examined and what questions should be put to them in the light of the materials in his possession. The procedure adopted by the Enquiring Officer of taking formal statements from these defence witnesses could not take the place of their being properly examined by the delinquent officer, who had cited them in his defence. The procedure adopted by the Enquiring Officer of taking formal statements from these defence witnesses could not take the place of their being properly examined by the delinquent officer, who had cited them in his defence. The learned Additional Government Pleader argued that it is open to us to treat the hearing of the case closed as on 22nd July, 1953, when the examination: of the prosecution witnesses was over and ignore charges 4 and 5 about which the defence witnesses had spoken on 29th September, 1953, and 30th August, 1953, and hold the dismissal to be valid in regard to the rest of the charges. But this contention would amount to saying that it is open to the Department to split up the enquiry into two stages, one representing a valid stage and the other representing an invalid stage and ask the Court to affirm the findings in so far as what transpired at the valid stage. The departmental enquiry against an officer must be treated as a single and entire proceeding leading up to the findings against him. If that enquiry involved a stage where the proceedings were vitiated, it will not be proper to speculate that what transpired during the invalid stage of the enquiry was not material and that what had happened prior to the invalid stage would be sufficiently material to support the findings of the guilt of the delinquent officer and consequently the order of dismissal against him. Where there are number of charges against a delinquent officer, and some of them are proved and some of them are held to be not proved, it is open to the High Court in writ proceedings to hold that the order of punishment would be valid even on the basis of the charges found proved as has been held by the Supreme Court in the Orissa case. But that principle cannot be extended to this case in the manner sought by the learned Additional Government Pleader by breaking up the enquiry itself into portions and ignore a stage of the enquiry that must be treated as invalid, and rely on the evidence elicited at the anterior stage where the enquiry was valid. But that principle cannot be extended to this case in the manner sought by the learned Additional Government Pleader by breaking up the enquiry itself into portions and ignore a stage of the enquiry that must be treated as invalid, and rely on the evidence elicited at the anterior stage where the enquiry was valid. For this last-mentioned reason, we are of the opinion that the respondent was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, that the enquiry was opposed: to the principles of natural justice and that the order of dismissal requires to be quashed. Learned Counsel for the respondent referred us to some other grounds for attacking the propriety of the order. Thus, he claimed that after the closing of the enquiry the respondent should have been given an opportunity to file a further written statement, that the time given for submitting his explanation to the show cause notice, namely, 15 days, without extension was inadequate, that the punishing authority should have granted him permission to interview him, as requested by him and that the non-compliance with these requests also vitiated the enquiry. But so far as the last-mentioned point is concerned, the relevant rule of the disciplinary rules contained in Appendix III of the Police Standing Order is rule 2 (b) (i) which entitles the delinquent officer to put in a further written statement of his defence ; but it is for him to offer to put a further written statement and there is no suggestion that that offer was turned down. It is provided in the same rules that if no oral enquiry had been held and if the delinquent officer desires to be heard in person, he shall be so heard by the punishing authority. Similarly, under rule 2 (b) (ii) the officer empowered to impose the penalty, who acts upon the report of the Enquiring Officer, is required to call upon the delinquent officer to show cause within a reasonable time not ordinarily exceeding one month against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted and any representation in this behalf submitted by the person charged shall be taken for consideration before the passing of the final orders by the punishing officer. This rule does not make it mandatory that at this last-mentioned stage, the punishing officer should give to the delinquent: officer an oral interview. This rule does not make it mandatory that at this last-mentioned stage, the punishing officer should give to the delinquent: officer an oral interview. The word used is representation and it is not the same thing as a personal hearing. The other contentions mentioned above do not appear to us to be material ones for the purpose of vitiating the enquiry. In view of our finding above, we are of the opinion that this is a case where the order dismissing the respondent has not been in conformity with Article 311 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice have been violated. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, though for reasons different from those mentioned by Rajagopalan, J. There will be no order as to costs. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.