ORDER C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this revision, Mr. M. A Joseph, learned counsel for the opposite party before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act in P.W.C 1/60 challenges the order of the learned District Judge, Ernakulam, rejecting as time-barred an appeal filed by the petitioner being A.S. 312/61 2. It is seen that the respondents in this revision filed applications before the payment of wages authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, for payment of what according to them was delayed wages. They also claimed compensation to be payable by the management for non-payment of the wages due to them. 3. It is seen from the order of the authority concerned, dated 13th October 1961 that the petitioner-management appears to have been taking time on several occasions; and ultimately it is seen both from the order as well as from the B Diary which has been placed before me that when the matter was posted on 29th September 1961 and was taken up for recording evidence the petitioner and her advocate were absent. The petitioner appears to have sent an application making a request for time to engage a counsel. It is also seen that the request was acceded to by the authority and she was given two, week's time as desired. The case was posted to 11th October 1961 for further hearing; and so far as this posting is concerned, there is no controversy, that the petitioner was informed by Registered Post and it is also seen that in that notice the authority appears to have communicated that no further adjournment will be granted and the matter is posted to 11th October 1961 as a last chance. That notice was accepted by the petitioner on 4th October 1961 ; but she does not appear to have engaged a counsel and she made a further request for adjournment. But it is seen that on 11th October 1961 when the proceedings were again taken up, a request for adjournment made through letter by the petitioner was rejected by the authority and she was set exparte. The evidence on behalf of the respondents was recorded. After all these formalities it is mentioned in the entry on 11th October 1961 to the effect: " Reserved for passing orders ". The evidence on behalf of the respondents was recorded. After all these formalities it is mentioned in the entry on 11th October 1961 to the effect: " Reserved for passing orders ". Pausing here for a minute it will be seen that more or less the trial of the application filed by the workers concerned appears to have come to a close on 11th October 1961 and what was left to be done was only the pronouncing of orders by the authority. Admittedly so far as the entries in the B Diary go, there no indication as to when exactly the authority proposes to pass orders in respect of the claim made by the workmen concerned. 4. Actually it is seen that the order was passed on 13th October 1961 and it is no doubt mentioned in the said order: " Pronounced in the open court to-day, the 13th October 1961 " 5. In and by that order, the authority has accepted the grievance made on behalf of the workmen concerned that the management is guilty of non-payment of wages. Ultimately accepting that claim, a direction has been issued to the management to pay a total sum of Rs. 2,235.31 to all the petitioners at the rate of Rs. 82.64 each. In addition to this, there is also a direction to the management to pay each of the applicants, viz., the workers a sum of Rs. 5 as compensation and there is also a further direction that the management is to pay all these amounts at once. As I mentioned earlier, the order appears to have been pronounced on 13th October 1961. 6. Actually it is seen from the records that a communication from the office of the authority concerned was despatched on 16th October 1961 to both the management as well as the counsel appearing for the workmen informing them that the application P.W.C 1/60 filed by the workers under sections 15 (2) and 16 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 has been allowed with compensation. That notice is dated 16th October 1961 and was despatched also on 16th October 1961. 7. The petitioner filed the application before the authority for the issue of certified copy of this order on 2nd November 1961. The office called for the necessary copying sheets on 17th November 1961 and on the same date the petitioner produced the necessary copying sheets. 7. The petitioner filed the application before the authority for the issue of certified copy of this order on 2nd November 1961. The office called for the necessary copying sheets on 17th November 1961 and on the same date the petitioner produced the necessary copying sheets. Actually, a certified copy was delivered by the authority to the petitioner on 24th November 1961. The petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge of Ernakulam, under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act on 8th December 1961. 8. At the hearing of the appeal, it is seen that objection was taken on behalf of the workers that the appeal, not having been filed within the period mentioned in section 17 (1), of the Payment of Wages Act, it should be considered to be barred by limitation and as such should be dismissed in limine. 9. The petitioner no doubt appears to have filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for excusing the delay if any, in the filing of the appeal. 10. The learned District Judge is of the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act does apply to proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. An alternative contention was taken before the learned District judge to the effect that, in this case, the order, though stated to have been pronounced on 13th October 1961, was actually communicated only by the notice, dated 16th October 1961, and therefore in this case it must be considered that the direction has been made by the authority only on 16th October 1961, in which case after excluding the time taken for obtaining certified copies of the order of the authority, the appeal has been filed within the period of 36 days referred to in section 17 (1) of the Act. The learned District Judge is of the view that the period of 30 days referred to in section 17(1) of the Act is to be calculated from the date when the order was pronounced viz., 13th October 1961. Even on the basis that the petitioner's claim that the order or direction in this case has been made only on 16th October 1961 is to be accepted the learned District Judge is of the view that the appeal filed by the petitioner is barred by time. 11. Even on the basis that the petitioner's claim that the order or direction in this case has been made only on 16th October 1961 is to be accepted the learned District Judge is of the view that the appeal filed by the petitioner is barred by time. 11. The question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to deduct the period taken by her for obtaining certified copy of the order has not been adverted to nor considered by the learned District Judge. Ultimately the learned District Judge comes to the conclusion that the appeal filed by the petitioner is beyond the period referred to in section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act and as such dismissed the application I.A. 875/61 to excuse the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act and in consequence dismissed the appeal itself as barred by time. 12. Mr. M. A. Joseph, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the contention that the view of the learned District Judge that the appeal is barred by time is not justified and it is also erroneous having due regard to the provisions of the Limitation Act as well as the material provisions contained in the Payment of Wages Act. The learned counsel urged that in this case the direction or order by the authority concerned can be considered to have been made not, on 13th October 1961 as wrongly assumed by the learned District Judge, but only on 16th October 1961 when the communication regarding the passing of the order was issued by the authority concerned. The learned counsel also urged that his client is entitled to deduct the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order of the authority. If that is so, the learned counsel urges that even though an application to excuse the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act may not lie as such, nevertheless the appeal itself having been filed within time, the rejection of the appeal as time-barred by the learned District Judge is not correct in law. 13. Mr. If that is so, the learned counsel urges that even though an application to excuse the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act may not lie as such, nevertheless the appeal itself having been filed within time, the rejection of the appeal as time-barred by the learned District Judge is not correct in law. 13. Mr. M. M. Cherian, learned counsel for the respondents has urged that in this case, the views expressed by the learned District Judge that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply is perfectly correct; and in this connection the learned counsel referred me to the provisions contained in section 29 (3) of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel also urged that the petitioner having admittedly chosen to remain exparte on the final date of hearing viz., 11th October 1961 she is not entitled to any further notice regarding the date on which the orders are to be pronounced; and that in any event in this case it must be held that the order or direction has been made, by the authority on the date when it pronounced orders viz., 13th October 1961. The learned counsel also relied upon the statement contained in the order of the authority that it has been pronounced in open court on 13th October 1961. If that is so, the learned counsel urged that the period of limitation for calculating the 30 days starts immediately, and even assuming that the petitioner is entitled to deduct the time taken for obtaining certified copy of the order of the authority, nevertheless the appeal has been filed long after the period of limitation provided under section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. Therefore, the learned counsel urged that the rejection of the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act as not maintainable as well as the further rejection of the appeal filed by the petitioner as time-barred by the learned District Judge are both valid and sound in law. 14. In order to appreciate the contentions of Mr. M. A. Joseph, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. M. Cherian learned counsel for the respondents it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, the Rules framed there under and to certain provisions contained in the Limitation Act. 15. 14. In order to appreciate the contentions of Mr. M. A. Joseph, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. M. Cherian learned counsel for the respondents it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, the Rules framed there under and to certain provisions contained in the Limitation Act. 15. Taking first the Payment of Wages Act, it will be seen that under section 15 (2) a right is given to the workmen concerned to approach the authority constituted by the State Government in that behalf for directing the employer for payment of the delayed wages or any illegal deduction that may have been done. If such an application is filed under sub-section (2) of section 15 the manner in which it is to be disposed of is dealt with under sub- section (3). After giving an opportunity to the employer or other person responsible for the payment, it is provided under sub-section (3), that the authority after complying with the other procedure indicated therein can direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted or the payment of the delayed wages. In this case, as I mentioned earlier, we are only concerned with a direction to the employer to pay delayed wages. The same subsection also gives jurisdiction to the authority to direct the employer to pay such compensation as it thinks fit in the circumstances. I have already indicated that the authority has also directed the management to pay the respondents each a sum of Rs. 5 as compensation in addition to delayed wages mentioned in the order. Therefore, the direction given by the authority in this case on 13th October 1961 strictly refers to the matters provided under sub-section (3) of section 15. The manner of recovery of the amount is also specified under sub-section (5) of section 15. There is also a provision in sub-section (4) giving jurisdiction to the authority to direct the applicant to pay a penalty in the circumstances mentioned therein. But it is not really necessary to consider that sub-section excepting the fact that a right of appeal is given under section 17 against an order passed under sub-section (4). 16. There is also a provision in sub-section (4) giving jurisdiction to the authority to direct the applicant to pay a penalty in the circumstances mentioned therein. But it is not really necessary to consider that sub-section excepting the fact that a right of appeal is given under section 17 against an order passed under sub-section (4). 16. Section 17(1) gives a right to a party aggrieved by orders passed under the various provisions referred to therein to file an appeal before the District Court or before the Small Cause Court in case it is a Presidency Town within 30 days of the date on which the order or direction was made. It is also seen from section 17 (1) that the directions or orders made under sub-section (3) of section 15 with which we are concerned, is made appealable. But the period is thirty days of the date on which the direction or order was made. 17.In this case there is no controversy that the appeal was filed before the proper authority namely the District Court. But the question that arises for consideration is as to when exactly it can be considered in this case that the authority made the order or direction under section 15 (3) which was the subject of attack before the learned District Judge. On a proper interpretation of those expressions depends the further question regarding the computation of the period of limitation of thirty days provided under section 17 (1). 18. The only other provision that requires to be noted in this Act is section 26 (1) under which the State Government has been given the jurisdiction to make rules to regulate the procedure to be followed by the authorities and in which case referred to in sections 15 and 17. Sub-section (2) of section 26 also gives power to the State Government to frame rules in respect of the various matters referred to therein. 19. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 26 of the Act the State Government have framed the Kerala Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1958 and they have been published in the State Gazette on 17th June 1958. Rule 3 provides for the Form in which the applications under sub-section (2) of section 15 have to be filed before the authority. Rule 3 provides for the Form in which the applications under sub-section (2) of section 15 have to be filed before the authority. There is also the provision to the effect in rule 8 regarding the appearance of parties; and it will also be seen that if the application is entertained by the authority it shall issue notice to the employer to appear before him on a particular date with the relevant documents and witnesses. Under sub-rule (2) of rule 8 provision is made for the authority proceeding to hear and determine the application ex parte if the employer or his representative fails to appear on the specified date in the notice issued under sub-rule (]). Sub-rule (3) provides for the dismissal of the application if the applicant fails to appear on the specified date. No doubt there is a proviso to sub-rule (3) giving jurisdiction to the authority for rehearing the matter and to set aside the exparte order on sufficient cause being shown. 20. Rule 9 relates to the record of proceedings and it provides for the signing and dating the Form at the time of passing orders. 21. Rule 12 relates to the procedure to be adopted in the matter of filing the appeals. Apart from the various other matters regarding the number of copies to be filed as well as the payment of court-fee and the ground of objection to be incorporated in the appeal, the one matter to be noted is that sub-rule (1) of rule 12 specifically provides that an appeal, shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the direction given by the authority. That rule may assume some importance in considering the claim made by the petitioner that he is entitled to deduct the time taken in obtaining certified copy of the order. It is not really necessary to consider the other provisions contained in this rule. 22. The relevant provisions in the Indian Limitation Act to be considered will be sections 3 and 29. There can be no controversy that the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 with which we are concerned, provides for the period of limitation for suits, appeals and applications to courts. 22. The relevant provisions in the Indian Limitation Act to be considered will be sections 3 and 29. There can be no controversy that the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 with which we are concerned, provides for the period of limitation for suits, appeals and applications to courts. So normally, unless special provision is made in a particular statute the provisions of the Limitation Act will apply in the matter of an appeal being filed under the Payment of Wages Act to the District Court, because the appellate authority is not the District Judge persona designata but really the District Court acting under section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act. 23. Section 3 provides for the dismissal of the suit, etc., which have been instituted after the period of limitation, but that is subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25. Section 4 deals with the procedure to be adopted when a court is closed when the period of limitation expires. 24. Before I pass on to section 29 it is also necessary to consider section 12 of the Limitation Act which provides for exclusion of time in legal proceedings and the substance of that section is to the effect that in computing the period of limitation for the appeal and other matters referred to therein the day on which the judgment was pronounced is to be excluded and it is also provided that the time taken for obtaining a copy of the judgment or order which is under attack is also excluded. 25. The question will arise whether the petitioner is entitled to claim deduction of the time taken for obtaining certified copy of the order. I will immediately show that the provisions of section 12 will apply having due regard to the provisions made in rule 12 of the rules referred to above wherein it is specifically provided that the memorandum of grounds of appeal will have to be accompanied by a certified copy of the order or direction of the authority. 26. The only other section of the Limitation Act which has to be adverted to is section 29. 26. The only other section of the Limitation Act which has to be adverted to is section 29. Section 29(2) consists of two parts viz., (a) that if any special or local law prescribes the period of limitation for a suit appeal or application different from that provided in the first schedule, section 3 of the Limitation Act will have to be read subject to that period prescribed by the special enactment and (b) for the purpose of determining any period of limitation by such special law the provisions contained in sections 4 and 9 to 18 and 22 will apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. One of the questions will be whether any of the sections referred to above and particularly section 12 has been excluded by the provisions contained in the Payment of Wages Act. Clause (b) of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act makes it very clear that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act will not apply. 27. Therefore it can be stated even at the outset that section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not one of those sections which applies in respect of the institution of appeals or other applications governed by the particular provisions by a special or local law. Therefore, it can be stated that the view of the learned District Judge in this case that the application filed by the petitioner for excusing the delay if any, in filing the appeal on the ground that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application is perfectly justified. If this was the only question that arose for consideration then the matter can be disposed of on the ground that inasmuch as section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply, the order of rejecting of the appeal will have to be sustained. 28. But the matter does not stop there because according to the petitioner he is entitled to deduct the time taken for obtaining certified copy of the order of the authority and secondly in this case the period of limitation will have to be reckoned not from 13th October 1961 namely, the date when the order was pronounced but only from 16th October 1961 when the order was communicated by the authority concerned. 29. 29. That the petitioner is entitled to deduct the period taken for obtaining certified copy of the order of the authority is borne out by the provisions of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, which clearly makes applicable the provisions of section 12 inasmuch as the special statute has not excluded the application of that section. It is not really necessary for me to consider what other sections of the Limitation Act will or will not apply to the proceedings finder the Payment of Wages Act. 30. That the provisions of section 12 of the Act will apply is also made clear by the rules framed by the State Government under section 26 of the Act particularly rule 12 which as I mentioned earlier insists upon the production of a certified copy of the order of the authority along with the memorandum of appeal. Therefore, from these circumstances it clearly follows that the petitioner was entitled to deduct the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order. 31. Even here in order to enable this court to come to the conclusion that the appeal filed by him was within time on the above basis he will have to establish that the time began to run as against him only from 16th October 1961. Therefore the controversy between the parties is really on this aspect namely, whereas according to the petitioner the order of the authority can be considered to have been made as that expression is used in section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act only when it was communicated by notice, dated 16th October 1961 the stand taken by the respondents is that the order or direction has been made by the authority on 13th October 1961 itself when it pronounced the orders in open court. It is the later view that it no doubt found acceptance at the hands of the learned District Judge when that court has not considered the various other aspects to which I have made rather elaborate reference in the earlier part of this Judgment. 32. Therefore the question in this case is when can it be stated that the direction or order of the authority was made within the meaning of that expression under section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act. 32. Therefore the question in this case is when can it be stated that the direction or order of the authority was made within the meaning of that expression under section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act. No doubt, prima facie going by the order of the authority it is stated it was pronounced in open court on 13th October 1961 and on that Mr. M. M. Cherian learned counsel for the respondents placed considerable reliance coupled along with other circumstances that the petitioner has been declared exparte on 11th October 1961. 33. The contention of Mr. M. M. Cherian, learned counsel for the respondents is that when once the petitioner has been set exparte on 11th October 1961 he cannot complain if no further notice of the date of the pronouncing of the orders was given to her; whereas according to Mr. M. A. Joseph, learned counsel for the petitioner it is only the notice, dated 16th October 1961 that was issued and despatched on the same date by the office of the authority concerned it can be stated that the order or direction has been made by the authority and it is only from that date the period of limitation will have to be computed. 34. I have gone through the entries in the case diary maintained by the authority and the last hearing admittedly was on 11th October 1961. No doubt on that date the request of the petitioner for an adjournment was rejected and she having been absent and exparte the evidence of the workers was recorded and the authority concerned 'reserved for passing orders'. If on the same date when the proceedings come to a close the tribunal or an authority immediately proceeds to deliver judgment or order, I am prepared to accept the contention of Mr. M. M. Cherian that direction or order in this case can be considered to have been made on that date itself. I am also prepared to accept his further contention that if that was the case the fact that the petitioner chose to be exparte on that date is absolutely immaterial because that party must take the consequence of not caring to appear before the authority concerned. These facts do not exist in this case because admittedly on 11th October 1961, the authority did not proceed, after the termination of the hearing, to pronounce the order. These facts do not exist in this case because admittedly on 11th October 1961, the authority did not proceed, after the termination of the hearing, to pronounce the order. 35. I was even prepared to accept the contention of Mr. M. M. Cherian that when the authority passed orders on 13th October 1961 that is the date when the direction or order has been made, if the authority had, after the termination of the proceedings on 11th October 1961 and when it also stated that the matter is reserved for passing orders, it had stated on the same date that the orders are to be pronounced on 13th October 1961, in which case also the petitioner must be held bound by the order passed on 13th October 1961 because he must be considered to have knowledge of the orders passed at the time when she was exparte on 11th October 1961, But in this case those circumstances also do not exist; because, excepting making a record that the matter is reserved for orders there is no further entry on 11th October 1961 that the orders are to be pronounced on 13th October 1961; and there is nothing on record placed before me to show that before pronouncing orders on 13th October 1961, any further notice was given to the parties, in the manner known to law, regarding the intention of the authority to pronounce orders. Under those circumstances it is difficult for me to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that in this case, when the authority without giving any notice whatsoever, passed orders on 13th October 1961 that must be considered to be the date, when the direction or order was made, for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation under section 17 (1) of the Act. If the contention of Mr. M. M. Cherian is to be accepted it will lead to rather anomalous results, as I will presently show. 36. Where an authority passes an order in his chambers, signs and dates and keeps it in his drawer without communicating the same to the parties at all for 28 days, does it mean that the communication on the 29th day to the parties concerned they will have only one more day for filing an appeal. 36. Where an authority passes an order in his chambers, signs and dates and keeps it in his drawer without communicating the same to the parties at all for 28 days, does it mean that the communication on the 29th day to the parties concerned they will have only one more day for filing an appeal. Or after signing and making an order, the Authority does not communicate it to the parties for 30 days, does it mean that a party aggrieved completely loses his right to file an appeal under section 17. In my view, the provisions of the statute will have to be construed in such manner as to serve the purpose for which a right of appeal has been given under section 17(1). It should also be borne in mind that this only effective remedy that has been given, to an aggrieved party, is a right of appeal conferred under section 17 (1). The expression order or direction made occurring in section 17(1), in my view, must be considered in such a manner so as to make the provisions conferring a right of appeal, not illusory, but really useful and effective. 37. Having due regard to the circumstances indicated above in this case, in my view, it must be held that the direction or order can be considered to have been made by the Authority concerned, only when the communication dated 16th October 1961 was despatched by the Authority to the parties concerned on the same date ; because by communicating that order, the Authority has done everything it can possibly do in the circumstances, to bring the passing of the order, to the notice of the parties concerned. There cannot certainly be a direction or order made so as to, make a party bound by it to comply with the same or enable a party aggrieved to challenge it in appeal unless such order or direction has been communicated to the parties concerned. Therefore having due regard to the scheme of the enactment, in my view, the order or direction of the Authority concerned must be considered to have been made, in this case only on 16th October 1961, on which date the notice, regarding the passing of the order, was issued by that Authority. 38. Therefore having due regard to the scheme of the enactment, in my view, the order or direction of the Authority concerned must be considered to have been made, in this case only on 16th October 1961, on which date the notice, regarding the passing of the order, was issued by that Authority. 38. In this connection, I may also refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Johan Begum A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1604 where Their Lordships had to consider the scope of the expression "within six months from the date of the Collector's award" occurring in second part of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In that connection the Supreme Court observes as follows at page 1606 : " As to the second part of Cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this Court in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 S.C.R. 676: [A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500 (Supra)]. It was there observed that a literal and mechanical construction of the words 'six months from the date of the Collector's award' occurring in the second part of Cl. (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and 'the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. " These observations, if I may say so with respect, are apposite to the case on hand. 39.I am also supported in the view that I have expressed above by the decision of Mr. Justice Ramaswami of the Madras High Court reported in Arumugham v. Jawahar Mills A.I.R. 1956 Madras 79, a case directly under the Payment of Wages Act. 40. From what I have stated above, it follows that the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to the filing of appeals under section 17 (1) of the Act in question, and the order or direction can be considered to have been made, under section 17(1) by the Authority in this case only on 16th October 1961. 40. From what I have stated above, it follows that the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to the filing of appeals under section 17 (1) of the Act in question, and the order or direction can be considered to have been made, under section 17(1) by the Authority in this case only on 16th October 1961. If that is so, it will have to be next considered as to whether after deducting time taken, for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the Authority, the appeal has been filed within time. 41. From the dates mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment, it will be seen that the appeal in this case was filed on the last day of limitation namely, the 30th day provided under section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act- If that is so, the order of the learned District Judge rejecting the appeal as time-barred will have to be set aside. 42. Section 5 of the Limitation Act no doubt, as held by me earlier, does not apply. But inasmuch as the appeal has been filed within time, the question of excusing any delay does not arise. The order of the learned District Judge rejecting the appeal as time-barred, is hereby set aside and A-S. 312/61 is directed to be restored to the file of the learned District Judge for disposal according to law. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed; but parties will bear their own costs.