JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - The appellant Chakki has been convicted under Section 395, I. P. C. and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and the appellant Jag Narain has been convicted under Section 412, I, P. C. and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment by an Additional Sessions Judge of Jhansi. 2. Both the appellants were arrested and prosecuted after a dacoity had been committed at the house of Rameshwar (P.W. 2) in village Pursua at about 8 P.M. on the night between 7th and 8th June, 1961 by seven or eight persons. In course of the dacoity, Durga Prasad (P.W. 5) the son of Rameshwar (P.W. 2) was beaten and also sustained gunshot injuries inflicted by the dacoits. A first information report was duly lodged at police station Gursarai on 9th June, 1961 at 12-30 A.M. in which a description of the dacoits was at tempted, and it was mentioned that some of them had moustaches. It was also mentioned in the first in-formation report that the dacoits were seen well in the light of lantern and the torches and could be identified on seeing them again. 3. The appellant Chakki Lal was arrested on 13-8-1961 and made bapurda at once and sent to jail bapurda immediately. He was put up for identification at a test parade on 22-8-1961 and was duly identified by four out of seven identifying witnesses. Out of these, Rameshwar (P. W. 2), Mulua (P. W. 3) and Man Khan (P. W. 4) identified the appellant in both the courts below. The appellant complained that he had been identified as a result of his moustaches but the cross-examination of Sri S. K. Modwell (P. W. 7), who conducted the identification parade, reveals that he had taken precautions to mix persons of similar appearance at the appellant's identification parade. The appellant also alleged that he had been shown to the prosecution witnesses, but nothing could be brought out from the cross-examination of the witnesses to indicate that this could be true. Indeed, if this appellant had been shown to the witnesses he would have been identified by more. There is evidence on record to prove that there was sufficient light and opportunity to identify the dacoits at the house of Rameshwar during the commission of the docoity. No adequate reason could be brought out to reject the evidence of identification of this appellant. There is evidence on record to prove that there was sufficient light and opportunity to identify the dacoits at the house of Rameshwar during the commission of the docoity. No adequate reason could be brought out to reject the evidence of identification of this appellant. I, therefore, uphold the conviction and the sentence of this appellant. 4. Jag Narain, who was also suspected, was arrested on 23rd July, 1961 at his house. At the time of his arrest, the investigating officer questioned him and it is alleged that when he was asked where "the loot of Pursua dacoity was, he led the officer to a room inside the house and dug out silver ornaments, a pair of churras (Ex. 1) and a pair of Gajarias (Ex. 2) from underneath the grain in one of the bins in the house. The evidence of recovery at the instance of the appellant Jag Narain has been challenged on the ground that it is faked. It was alleged that Bare Lal (P. W. 8), a close neighbour of Jag Narain, a witness of recovery, was hostile to Jag Narain. It was pointed out that Bare Lal (P. W. 8) had admitted that one Kishori Lal was beaten twelve years ago by Jag Narain, but no reason could be brought out for the hostility of Bare Lal (P. W. 8) himself who was alleged to be a co-sharer and relation of Kishori Lal. Bare Lal denied that he was giving false evidence due to the alleged hostility. In addition, there is the evidence of the police officer, Rais Ahmed Khan (P. W. 16), in respect of the recovery said to have been made from the house of Jag Narain in the manner indicated above. I have not been shown any sufficient reason for discarding this evidence of recovery against the appellant. 5. It was then argued that the recovery was not made from Jag Narain's possession even though it was from his house. It is pointed out that Bare Lal (P. W. 8) had admitted that Mata. Din, the father of Jag Narain, and Jag Narain's two elder brother, and a younger brother, were all living in the same house. The question arises whether the recovery could be from the possession of the appellant. If the recovery is believed, it was certainly made from a place which appeared to be known specially to the appellant. Din, the father of Jag Narain, and Jag Narain's two elder brother, and a younger brother, were all living in the same house. The question arises whether the recovery could be from the possession of the appellant. If the recovery is believed, it was certainly made from a place which appeared to be known specially to the appellant. The appellant did not explain or state that the objects had been kept hidden inside the grain by somebody else and that he had found them there. He gave no explanation whatsoever of this recovery. On the other hand, he denied the recovery altogether. In these circumstances, it appears quite reasonable to infer that the appellant himself had hidden these objects inside the grain and that the recovery was from his possession inasmuch as he had knowledge of the place where they were concealed and control over these objects. The objects were, duly proved to be part of the property taken away by the dacoits from the house of Rameshwar during the dacoity. 6. The next question which arises relates to the propriety of the conviction of the appellant Jag Narain under Section 412, I. P. C. It has been argued that some facts showing the knowledge of the accused, that the object recovered were the subject-matter of the offence of dacoity, must be proved. In this case, the knowledge of the appellant about the connection of the object with the dacoity could be proved by the conduct of the appellant when he was asked about the loot of the "Pursua dacoity" provided this part of the statement of the Sub Inspector was admissible in evidence. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act covers only the information given by a person who enables a discovery of some relevant facts to be made. The conduct of the appellant in taking the Sub-Inspector to the grain bin and producing the objects recovered from underneath the grain in the ;bin would indicate his knowledge of "the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, "in the words of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kottaya v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. p. 67 The fact that the objects were parts of the looted property is proved by other evidence. The police officer, who did not know what objects could be produced, asked the appellant whether he knew about the loot of the "Pursua dacoity." The statement of the officer to the appellant would not be excluded by Section 27 or by any other provision of the Indian Evidence Act. The conduct of the appellant as a consequence of the Police Officer's question, even if it were outside the purview of "information" supplied by the accused which "relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" as contemplated by Section 27, Evidence Act, would be admissible, in my opinion, as "effect of a relevant fact under Section 7, and as conduct" with reference to a relevant fact under Section 8, or even as part of a set of facts "necessary to explain" a relevant fact or tending to "establish the identity of anything" under Section 9 Evidence Act. It could not be excluded as a "confession" to a police officer because it is not a "statement" which a confession necessarily has to be. The tendency of the modern law of evidence is to admit and not to exclude pieces of evidence so far as it is reasonably and legally possible to do it. In my view, the query of the police officer and the conduct of the appellant as a consequence of it are admissible and enough to establish that connection in the mind of the appellant between the objects recovered and the offence of dacoity which makes out an offence punishable under Section 412, I. P. C. 7. In the result, the conviction of the appellant Jag Narain under Section 412, I. P. C. is upheld. A sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment, however, appears to err on the side of severity. I, therefore, reduce his sentence to four years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 412, I P. C. Subject to this modification, the appeals of Jag Narain and Chakki Lal are dismissed. Jag Narain is on bail. He will surrender forthwith and serve out the remaining period of his sentence. Chakki Lal is in jail and will serve out the remaining period of his sentence.