JUDGMENT J. Sahai, J. - This special appeal is directed against the order of the late Hon. Mr. Justice V.D. Bhargava dated 24.3.1959, allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent Sri Hari Raj Saran. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that public carrier no. USW 287 was registered in the names of the respondent Hari Raj Saran (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent') and one Babu Ram. The public carrier was plying on a temporary permit dated 21st April, 1948, in the names of the respondent and Babu Ram aforesaid. This permit was valid till 30.4.1949, but before that date could arrive the plying of the vehicle had to be stopped from December, 31, 1948, as a consequences of some disputes between the two parties. On 21.4.1949, the respondent made an application for the renewal of the permit in his name alone. This request was refused by the Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the 'R.T.A'). Bareilly with whom the public carrier was registered. It was alleged by the respondent and accepted by the learned Single Judge of this Court that the public carrier was never used after 31.12.1948. Some time in March, 1954, the respondent received a notice from the Taxation Officer, Bareilly, to the effect that the tax payable under the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) not having been paid in respect of the vehicle aforesaid from 1.1.1949 to 31.3.1954, a sum of Rs. 3,697/6/- was due to the State from the respondent on that account and that the same should be paid within a period of 14 days. On 29.3.1954, the respondent made a representation to the R.T.A. stating therein that he had deposited the permit of the aforesaid vehicle in the office of the R.T.A. and that thereafter a fitness certificate had not been granted with the result that no tax was due. It was also pointed out in the representation that the respondent had got the registration cancelled after 1952, and that the vehicle having been declared by the R.T.A. to be in possession of Babu Ram, the other partner, and for that reason the application of the petitioner for renewal having been disallowed by the R.T.A., no tax was liable to be charged from the petitioner on that account also. The R.T.A. did not accept this plea and by means of a letter dated 1.6.54 demanded from the respondent the tax due on the allegation that he was the owner of the vehicle and not Babu Ram. The respondent made several representations to the competent authorities but got no redress. He then filed an appeal before the Deputy Transport Commissioner who reduced the tax liability from Rs. 3,697/6/- to Rs. 1,866/8/- but dismissed the appeal for the balance. Thereafter proceedings under Section 14 of the Act were started by the collector, Bareilly, for the realisation of the said sum of Rs. 1,866/8/- from the respondent. 3. Faced with this situation, the respondent approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as already pointed out earlier, his writ petition was allowed by V.D. Bhargava, by means of the order dated 24.3.1959. It is against that order that the present appeal has been filed by the Taxation Officer the Deputy Transport Commissioner and the Collector of Bareilly. The factual position as disclosed in the writ petition filed by the respondent and the findings of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge of this Court have not been challenged before us and it is admitted that the respondent was neither granted a permit nor a fitness certificate without which he could not ply his vehicle. 4. The only question for consideration in this case is whether Section 4 read with rule 33 provides that if the use of a vehicle is stopped altogether even then the tax shall be payable. Section 4 and rule 33 are reproduced below:- "4. Imposition of tax :- (1) Save as otherwise provided by this Act or by any rule made thereunder or by any other law for the time being in force, no motor vehicle shall be used in any public place in Uttar Pradesh unless the owner thereof has paid in respect of it a tax at the appropriate rate specified in the first schedule to this Act within the time allowed by Section 5, and, save as hereinafter specified, such tax shall thereafter be payable annually notwithstanding that the motor vehicle may from time to time cease to be used." "33. Procedure in the case of non-user of a vehicle. Procedure in the case of non-user of a vehicle. (1) when the owner of a motor vehicle has occasion to withdraw his motor vehicle from use for a period exceeding three months, the registration certificate and the token issued in respect of the vehicle should be surrendered to the Taxation Officer together with a declaration in Part I of Forum 'F'. The Taxation Officer will complete Part II of Form 'F' and return it to the claimant, and will at the same time enter in the registration certificate the date of its surrender." 5. Learned Junior Standing Counsel Sri Raj Ram Agarwala contends that the words italicized by us in Section 4 clearly fix the liability for payment of tax on the owner notwithstanding the fact that the motor vehicle ceased to be used. The submission of learned counsel is that the section is absolute in its terms and for whatever reason the motor vehicle may not have been used, the liability for payment of the tax continued. With regard to rule 33 he contends that it was the duty of the respondent to have surrendered the registration certificate and the token issued in respect of the vehicle to the Taxation Officer together with a declaration in Part I of Form `F' and that inasmuch as that was not done, the liability for payment of the tax remained, notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle was not used because the appellants themselves refused to grant him the permit and the fitness certificate. We are unable to treat rule 33 as a mandatory provision. We asked Mr. Raja Ram to tell us as to what the word `should' occurring in Rule 33 connote and whether its use was not suggestive of the provision being merely directory and not mandatory. Learned counsel could give no answer to this question though he had to accept that the word `should' was not a synonym of the word `must'. We are of the opinion that the provisions of rule 33 cannot be treated as mandatory also for the reason that the non-compliance with it does not involve any penal consequence. At any rate, there is nothing in the rule which requires the payment of the tax only because the registration certificate and the token issued had not been surrendered. We are of the opinion that the provisions of rule 33 cannot be treated as mandatory also for the reason that the non-compliance with it does not involve any penal consequence. At any rate, there is nothing in the rule which requires the payment of the tax only because the registration certificate and the token issued had not been surrendered. With regard to Section 4 we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the use of the words italicized connotes that idea of the liability for the payment of the tax even in a case, where the authorities make it impossible for the owner of a motor vehicle to ply his vehicle. The learned Single Judge expressed himself with regard to Section 4 in the following words:- "The legislature has used a very guarded language. It contemplates a temporary non-user only. It does not provide that if the use of a vehicle is stopped altogether even then the tax shall be payable. For example, if the tax had been paid for one year in advance and if during the course of that year the vehicle has not been used from time to time, the user cannot say that he has not used the vehicle for part of the period. In such a case the burden of proving the non-user would be on the user and in case he does not intimate before hand it will not be possible to find out whether on that date the vehicle was used, and no rebutting evidence can be given. For such purposes this rule had been framed. But in my opinion this rule does not contemplate the case of non-user of a vehicle altogether after the lase of the period of tax." 6. It would be noticed that the provisions of Section 4 of the Act are subject to the other provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder, or any other law for the time being in force. It is provided that if a permit and certificate of fitness is not granted a vehicle cannot be used. Consequently Section 4 of the Act has got to be read in the light of those provisions. It is provided that if a permit and certificate of fitness is not granted a vehicle cannot be used. Consequently Section 4 of the Act has got to be read in the light of those provisions. We are of the opinion that the effect of the italicized portion is not to create liability for payment of tax even though the vehicle ceased to be used as a consequence of some orders passed by competent authorities and by the agency of the Government itself. We may also add that in our opinion Section 4 of the Act creates a liability for the payment of tax only if the vehicle is used and not otherwise. It is true that if during the year for which the licence has been obtained the vehicle had not been used for short periods, but that would not absolve the liability for the payment of the tax. In the present case, the vehicle was not used at all during the year for which tax demand is made. Consequently, in our opinion, Section 4 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. That being the position, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in allowing the writ petition and in issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the orders requiring the payment of tax by the respondent. In our opinion the order awarding a sum of Rs. 100/- as costs in proceedings before the learned Single Judge is also justified. 7. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.