Judgment :- 1. The two revision petitioners (accused 1 and 3), husband and wife together with the father of the husband (accused 9) were convicted by the Principal Sub Magistrate, Kozhikode under S.8 (1) (a) of the Prohibition Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-eaoh or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. On appeal to the District Magistrate, Kozhikode the conviction and sentence of the petitioners were upheld while the other accused whose conviction also was upheld, was released after admonition under S.3 of Probation of Offenders Act. 2. The prosecution case is that at about 11 a. m. on 2411963 Pw.l, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kasha, Kozhikode acting on information received raided the house of accused I and recovered from there a large quantity of fermented toddy. All the three accused were present in the house at the time and were arrested on the spot. The defence plea was one of simple denial. 3. The correctness of the concurrent finding of the lower courts that quantities of toddy were recovered from the accused's house and that they were present in the house at the time of recovery was not challenged before us. The learned defence counsel confined himself to the contention that the presumption that the contraband recovered from their house was in the possession of the accused, is not valid. The learned counsel argues that the petitioners cannot be held responsible for the possession of the contraband as there is no proof that it was in the exclusive possession of either. This argument cannot be accepted since, as has been held by this court on a former occasion, possession of the contraband need not be exclusive for it to amount to an offence under the Prohibition Act (vide Madhavi v. State of Kerala 1963 K. L. T. 659.) A person can be found guilty of possession even if he is shown to have been in possession of the contraband jointly with others. 4. Another contention of the learned defence counsel is that when the contraband is recovered from a house occupied by members of a family only the head of the family can be held responsible for it. This aspect of the question was also considered in the case cited above wherein we held that this is not a rule to be applied blindly to all cases irrespective of attendant circumstances. This aspect of the question was also considered in the case cited above wherein we held that this is not a rule to be applied blindly to all cases irrespective of attendant circumstances. As we had pointed out in that case the presumption of possession attaches itself to the head of the family for the simple reason that normally it is his will that prevails in the household. He can wield the authority to see that an article either remains in the house if he so desires or is removed from the house if he does not want it there. If however the nominal head of the family is an old man and the effective control over the household is exercised by someone else such as an adult son then there is little justification in holding him responsible for no reason other than that theoretically he still remains the head of the family. In the present case the nominal head of the family, accused 2, is an old man of 70. It is doubtful indeed whether his will could have prevailed over that of accused his adult son. It is therefore clear that accused $ cannot escape responsibility for the articles recovered from the house simply because his 70 year old father was also an occupant of the house. (The question whether accused 2's conviction was justified need not be considered here as his case is not before us). 5. It was further contended by the learned counsel that the conviction of the wife merely on the ground that she was present in the house at the time of recovery, cannot be sustained. This argument, we think has to be accepted. The prosecution case is that when the house was searched she was found in one of the rooms from where a portion of the liquor was recovered. As the jars and bottles containing the liquor were kept quite openly she must have had knowledge of their presence. The question before us therefore is whether these facts would justify the presumption that she was in possession of these articles. As the jars and bottles containing the liquor were kept quite openly she must have had knowledge of their presence. The question before us therefore is whether these facts would justify the presumption that she was in possession of these articles. The presumption that articles in a person's house are in his possession is a presumption under S.114 of the Evidence Act which permits a court "to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case". We presume that the head of the family is responsible for the contraband found in the house because according to common course of human conduct the bead of the family can, if he does not desire its presence in his house, secure its removal irrespective of the wishes of the other members of the household. Would it also be likely, according to the common course of human conduct, that the woman of the house can prevent the contraband from being kept in the house if her husband insists that it should be. In most cases the answer must be in the negative. If that be so a court will not be justified in presuming that everything found in a house is invariably in the joint possession of the householder and his wife. Knowing that the contraband is present in the house is not the same thing as possessing it. Or as the learned author Salmond puts it: "I may be alone in a room with money that does not belong to me lying ready to my hand on the table. I have absolute physical power over this money; I can take it away with me, if I please; but I have no possession of it, for I have no such purpose with respect to it". (Vide Jurisprudence by Sir John Salmond 10th Edition page 290)" If the contraband was recovered from a room under her custody or from a box containing her own things then there might have been some justification in calling upon the wife to explain its presence. as it is, the mere knowledge of the presence in the house of the offending article is insufficient to raise the presumption against her. 6. as it is, the mere knowledge of the presence in the house of the offending article is insufficient to raise the presumption against her. 6. In the result while confirming the conviction and sentence passed against accused 1, the conviction and sentence of accused 3 are set aside. The fine if realised from her will be refunded. Govinda Menon, J. I agree to the order proposed, but would like to emphasise, that the question whether a particular person, be it husband or wife is in possession of contraband has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in which cases it could be stated that the wife is not in possession of the incriminating article. Circumstances there might be in a particular case from which it could easily be inferred that the wife is also in possession along with her husband and in such a case the presumption under S.8 (2) (a) of the Act would arise.