Judgment :- 1. The appeal is directed against the decision of Madhavan Nair J. in second appeal confirming the decision of the Subordinate Judge reversing the decision of the Munsiff. The first matter for consideration is the interpretation of Ex. Al; and the second question is whether S.11 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the case. 2. Ex. Al of 1074 is captioned a trust deed; and the executant thereof, Subrahmania Pattar of Kundoor Kuttala Madom, creates a trust by the same. The document recites that the executant had already constructed a temple and installed therein the idol of Guruvayurappan in 1071; and had also constructed an oottupura (feeding house) and other accessory buildings and Brahmins and Gosayees were being fed. Then follows the recital that the properties mentioned in the document with the buildings and other improvements thereon are dedicated to Guruvayurappan. The recital continues that from 1075 onwards the income of the properties after payment of Government revenue, etc., has to be utilised for meeting the expenses of the pooja, (worship) and the feeding at the oottupura, in addition to an annuity of 60 paras of paddy to Krishna Sastrigal and another 36 paras of paddy to Subrahmania Pattar, both of Parli Gramom, as they were vaideek (learned in the vedas) Brahmins, to protect their 'vaideek vrithi' and also to enable them and their families to enjoy the same. One more recital to be noted is that the executant was already paying these annuities as charity from the income of the properties; and that the same should be continued in the future also. 3. The appellants are the heirs of Krishna Sastrigal and they claimed arrears of annuity due to them.The trial court allowed their claim and granted a decree for sale of the properties. In appeal the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the decree; and the same was confirmed in second appeal by Madhavan Nair J. Our learned brother observes: "Reading the document as a whole, the intention of the executant of this document appears to be very clear that he wanted only to perpetuate the religious and charitable purposes which he had in view. He must have never contemplated a case of any portion of the income of the property being given to persons who are not following a religious or vedic life. He must have never contemplated a case of any portion of the income of the property being given to persons who are not following a religious or vedic life. But it is true that no such condition is expressed when he provided that the annuity may be continued to be given to the heirs of the vedic Brahmins whom he adored with the annuity. Being essentially a trust for religious and charitable purposes if it can be construed to avoid disbursement of the income for non-religious or non-charitable purposes, I am of opinion that such a construction should be adopted." We are not able to agree with this view of our learned brother. There is no restriction that the annuities should be confined to vedic Brahmins alone. In the absence of any such restriction, it may not be proper to read into the provisions of the document that the executant "must have never contemplated a case of any portion of the income of the property being given to persons who are not following a religious or vedic life". This is no more than an assumption not warranted by the express words of the document. 4. It is well-known that in interpreting documents like this the entire document has to be read as a whole; and if all the provisions can be given effect to without overriding any principle of law, it has also to be done. If there are conflicting provisions, those provisions which are in accordance with the principal intention of the executant have to be given effect to; and the other provisions which go against such intention or against any principle of law have to be ignored. Bearing this in mind, if the provisions of Ext. Al are considered, what we find is that the provisions for payment of annuities to Krishna Sastrigal and Subrahmania Pattar and their families is only in accordance with the intention of the executant; and it may also be given effect to without contravening any principle of law. 5. Bearing this in mind, if the provisions of Ext. Al are considered, what we find is that the provisions for payment of annuities to Krishna Sastrigal and Subrahmania Pattar and their families is only in accordance with the intention of the executant; and it may also be given effect to without contravening any principle of law. 5. One of the decisions cited before Madhavan Nair J. is Har Narayanan v. Surja Kunwari (A.I.R.1921 P. C. 20), wherein the Privy Council observed that where the question was whether the property conveyed by a will was an absolute gift to a certain idol or whether the property was truly distinct to the testator's own heirs under the will subject to a charge of maintaining the idol and meeting all the suitable expenses of the temple, no fixed and absolute rule could be set up derived alone from the use of particular terms in one portion of the will; and that the question could only be settled by a conspectus of the entire provisions of the will. Our learned brother observes that this decision relates to the construction of certain provisions in a will and therefore, this dictum cannot be applied in the case of a non-testamentary instrument like Ext. A.I. In fact, this decision has been approvingly considered and followed by the Supreme Court in Menakuru Dasaratharami Reddi v. Duddukuru Subba Rao (AIR. 1957 S.C. 797) in a case relating to a non-testamentary document of trust. Gajendragadkar J. considers this Privy Council decision in Para.8 of the judgment and follows the same. The Supreme Court has laid down the same principle of construction in Para.5 of the judgment: that in such cases it is always a matter of ascertaining the true intention of the parties; and that the intention must be gathered on a fair and reasonable construction of the document considered as a whole. The Supreme Court again observes that it is naturally difficult to lay down a general rule for the solution of the problem; and that each case must be considered on its facts and the intention of the parties must be determined on reading the document as a whole. 6. The Supreme Court again observes that it is naturally difficult to lay down a general rule for the solution of the problem; and that each case must be considered on its facts and the intention of the parties must be determined on reading the document as a whole. 6. In the case before us, the document recities that the executant has already been paying the annuities from the income of the properties, which are the subject-matter of the dedication, to Krishna Sastrigal and Subrahmania Pattar; and that after them the same should be continued to be paid to their families. Therefore, it is only proper to construe that the executant wanted Krishna Sastrigal and Subrahmania Pattar and their families to be benefitted by the annuities. 7. The next ground on which Madhavan Nair J. disallowed the claim of the appellants is S.11 of the Transfer of Property Act, which enacts the well known principle of law that if an absolute interest is created, any direction that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner has to be ignored. We do not think that a direction to pay annuities from a small portion of the income of the properties dedicated takes away from, or cuts down,or is repugnant to, the absolute estate. If an authority for that position is required, Ananthi Prasad v. Dulhin Kishori Kuer (AIR. 1940 Pat. 254) may be referred to; wherein it is laid down that where a testator by a will gives absolute estate to his widow and directs that it shall be incumbent on her to pay certain amount as annuity to certain institution, the absolute estate given to the widow is not cut down and the bequest to the institution cannot be said to be invalid. The learned judge observes at page 255 of the reports: "It is a misconception to say that the absolute estate in all the properties given to the widow is cut down by such directions as are contained is Para 5 of the will. The absolute estate is still there, & if I may use the expression (which is not strictly applicable to this country) the fee simple is is the widow, but subject to certain conditions which is this case is a payment of Rs. 700/- per annum to the college which payment does not cut down the estate. The absolute estate is still there, & if I may use the expression (which is not strictly applicable to this country) the fee simple is is the widow, but subject to certain conditions which is this case is a payment of Rs. 700/- per annum to the college which payment does not cut down the estate. Therefore, is my judgment, it could not be said that the bequest to the college is invalid." In the case before us also, the direction for payment of annuities does not out down the absolute estate granted to the idol, Guruvayoorappan. 8. One more decision of the Privy Council may also be noted; and that is Jadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramji (42 I.C. 225). In that case, a person dedicated property to an idol. He also nominated members of his family as managers and ear-marked certain part of the income to remunerate the managers. The Privy Council held that where there was such a clear expression of intention to apply the whole of the property for the benefit of the idol and the temple and then there was a subsequent direction that of the whole, which had already been given, part was to be applied for the upkeep of the idol and the repair of the temple, and the other was to go for the upkeep of the managers, the dedication was valid and operative. We think this observation of the Privy Council is apt in the present case as well. In this case, the executant dedicated the properties to Guruvayurappan. He then gave a subsequent direction that of the whole income from the properties, which had already been given to Guruvayurappan, part was to be applied for the upkeep of the temple and the oottupura and another part was to go as annuities to Krishna Sastrigal and Subrahmania Pattar and their families. Such a dedication must be valid and operative; and S.11 of the Transfer of Property Act is no bar. 9. In the result, we set aside the decision of Madhavan Nair J. and restore the decision of the learned Munsiff. But we make it clear that since the properties are trust properties, the appellants will not be entitled to sell the corpus of the properties as directed by the Munsiff. 9. In the result, we set aside the decision of Madhavan Nair J. and restore the decision of the learned Munsiff. But we make it clear that since the properties are trust properties, the appellants will not be entitled to sell the corpus of the properties as directed by the Munsiff. On the other hand, they will be entitled to collect the amount due to them from the income of the properties only. The appellants will also get their costs throughout. Allowed.