JUDGMENT B.N. Nigam, J. - Brij Raj Singh has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 13.2.1962 copy of which is annexure 5. The petitioner also claims a writ of mandamus commanding opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 to the dispose of the claim in accordance with law. 2. The petitioner alleges that he was a zamindar (prior to 30th June, 1952) of plots Nos. 254, 255, 256, 259, 267, 268, 269, 273, 309 and 323 in mohal Chak Qila, pergana Khairabad, district Sitapur. Plot No. 323 was a grove and the petitioner's bhumidhari. The other plots were held by him as a sirdar. He further alleged that the petitioner's name was recorded up to the year 1362 Fasli as a bhumidhar over plots Nos. 268 and 323 and over other plots as a sirdar. Plot No. 323 had, according to the assertions of the petitioner, been given to opposite-party No. 8Mauji Ram for Parwarish Darakhtan. Opposite-parties Nos. 5 and 6 Teji and Dwarka were the petitioner's servants and used to look after his cultivation. Opposite party No. 5 in collusion with the Patwari got himself entered over plots Nos. 259 and 309 and opposite party No. 6 over plots Nos. 255 and 256 as sub-tenants. The petitioner further alleged that opposite party No. 7 was his sub-tenant over plots Nos. 254,267,268,269 and 273 but he abandoned the plots and the petitioner was in possession of the plots from 1357F to 1366 Fasli. Under Section 240 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act opposite parties Nos. 5 to 8 were declared as adhivasi sirdars (perhaps the petitioner means that they were declared adhivasis and later declared sirdars). In April 1955 the petitioner filed an application for correction of papers. This application was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division who directed the petitioner that he should get his rights determined by a declaratory suit. The petitioner, therefore, filed an application before the Consolidation Officer, Khairabad. This application was dismissed on 2.10.1960. The first appeal, the second appeal and the revision against the order of the Consolidation Officer were dismissed by opposite parties 3, 2 and 1 respectively, the last order having been passed on 13.2.1962. 3. Only one contention has been urged before me. The petitioner, therefore, filed an application before the Consolidation Officer, Khairabad. This application was dismissed on 2.10.1960. The first appeal, the second appeal and the revision against the order of the Consolidation Officer were dismissed by opposite parties 3, 2 and 1 respectively, the last order having been passed on 13.2.1962. 3. Only one contention has been urged before me. The argument of the learned counsel is that the Consolidation Courts did not determine the question of the title of the petitioner because they held that he had no right or title left in the property having failed to file an objection under Section 240-G of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The learned counsel urges that under Section 240-J the statement becomes final. The argument of the learned counsel is that this finality attaches only to the compensation proposals. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. Section 240-J clearly lays down that the statement so signed and sealed shall become final. This can refer only to the statement under Section 240-D. That statement is to contain the names of the landholder and the rent paid at hereditary rates if the land referred to in Section 240-A was recorded as sir, khudkasht or fixed rate tenancy of the landholder or included in the holding of a person belonging to any of the classes mentioned in clause (d) of Section 18 or included in the holding of a person belonging to any of the classes mentioned in Section 19 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In case the land referred to in the notification was land other than that mentioned in Clause (b), the rent mentioned shall be the rent payable by the tenant. This compensation statement is for the purpose of compensation and payment of compensation for acquisition of rights, title and interest of the landholder in the land referred to in Section 240-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 240-G allows any person interested to file objection upon this statement and Section 240-H clearly indicates that the objection may be of the nature of the grounds mentioned in sub-Section 2(a) or 2(b). Section 240-G allows any person interested to file objection upon this statement and Section 240-H clearly indicates that the objection may be of the nature of the grounds mentioned in sub-Section 2(a) or 2(b). Here we are concerned with sub-Section 2(a) of Section 240-H. That sub-Section lays down:- "Where the objection filed under sub-Section (1) (a) is that the land is not land referred to in sub-Section (1) of Section 240-A, the Compensation Officer shall frame an issue to that effect and refer it for disposal to the Court which would have jurisdiction to decide a suit under Section 229-B read with Section 234-A in respect of the land....." 4. Thus it is clear that it is permissible under the law to file an objection as to the inclusion of any particular land in the notification under Section 240-A. The effect of Section 240-J is to finalise the statement i.e., to hold that the notification has not been objected to and to put the seal of confirmation on that notification. The effect of that notification as laid down in Section 240-A is to declare that as from a date to be specified therein, the rights, title and interest of the above landholder in the land held or deemed to be held by an adhivasi shall from the beginning of the date to be specified cease and vest in the State free from all encumbrances. 5. Thus a full procedure is provided. A notification is to be issued in respect of all lands held or deemed to be held by adhivasis. A right to object to the entry of any land in that notification is allowed. On decision of the objection the statement is to be amended and thereafter it is to be amended and thereafter it is to be finalised. The contention of the learned counsel that the consolidation courts have referred only to Section 240-G and not to the provisions of Section 240-A is, therefore, in my opinion, not entitled to any weight. What the Consolidation courts have clearly held, appears to be that no objection having been filed under the provisions of Section 240-G and the statement having been finalised under Section 240-J the rights of the petitioner in the land mentioned in the notification under Section 240-A have ceased and have vested in the State Government. 6. What the Consolidation courts have clearly held, appears to be that no objection having been filed under the provisions of Section 240-G and the statement having been finalised under Section 240-J the rights of the petitioner in the land mentioned in the notification under Section 240-A have ceased and have vested in the State Government. 6. It is to be noticed that the petitioner did not impugn the correctness or the validity of the notification under Section 240-A either in the applications before the Consolidation Officer or in this writ petition. It was throughout admitted to him that he was aware of this notification. He did not anywhere suggest either that his objection might be entertained even beyond the period of thirty days or that he was entitled to ignore the notification as it was null and void ab initio. The learned counsel today has urged that the consolidation courts did not challenge the notification. Apparently, the suggestion of the learned counsel is that he has been prejudiced but that argument does appeal to me. No challenge to the validity of the notification was taken in the original applications before the consolidation authorities. At no stage before any of the consolidation authorities was it ever argued that they should not hold the notification to be effective so far as the extinction of the rights of the petitioner was concerned as the notification was not binding, the conditions for issuing the notification not having been satisfied. It was not urged in the writ petition that this notification was not binding on the petitioner and I am unable to hold that the petitioner could not raise this contention only because this section was not specifically referred to in the judgments of the consolidation courts. The learned counsel must have been aware that the extinction of the petitioner's rights referred to in the decisions of the consolidation authorities could refer to the notification under Section 240-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and to no other provision of law. I am, therefore of opinion that as the petitioner did not in fact challenge the validity of the notification, it must be held to be binding on him. I am, therefore of opinion that as the petitioner did not in fact challenge the validity of the notification, it must be held to be binding on him. He did not adopt the procedure of filing an objection under Section 240-G nor did he ever assert that the notification being, so far as he was concerned, invalid, he was entitled to ignore it altogether. Thus it is clear that the petitioner's rights had become extinguished. It was, therefore, not at all necessary for the consolidation courts to adjudicate whether, but for the notification under Section 240-A, the petitioner would have certain rights. The question of the rights of the opposite parties did not arise. If the petitioner has no right in himself, he cannot claim any relief irrespective of the fact whether opposite parties 5 to 8 have any right in themselves in the plots in question or not. 7. When I was about to dictate that no other point has been pressed before me, the learned counsel, Mr. Srivastava, stood up and argued that Section 240-A mentions the acquisition of rights, title and interest of the landholders and not the right and title of a sirdar or a bhumidhar. He further points out that the petitioner had become a bhumidhar of two plots and a sirdar of the other eight plots when U.P. Act XX of 1954 came into force an October 10, 1954. I am unable to see any force in this contention. The learned counsel agrees that no definition of the word "landholder" is given anywhere in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act but the term is defined in Section 3(11) of the U.P. Tenancy Act which definition is applicable to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act under Section 3(26) of the latter Act. "Landholder" is defined in the U.P. Tenancy Act as meaning "the person to whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable....." 8. It is therefore, clear that the petitioner was a landholder if opposite parties Nos. 5 to 8 were in possession of the land. "Landholder" is defined in the U.P. Tenancy Act as meaning "the person to whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable....." 8. It is therefore, clear that the petitioner was a landholder if opposite parties Nos. 5 to 8 were in possession of the land. Section 240-D clearly refers to the landholder who might be a sir-holder, khudkasht-holder or a fixed-rate tenant or he may be a person belonging to any of the classes mentioned in Clause (d) of Section 18 or may be a person belonging to any of the classes mentioned in Section 19, Section 18 Clause (d) refers to three categories (1) an occupancy tenant, (2) a hereditary tenant and (3) a tenant on patta Dawami or Istamrari. Section 19 refers to a tenant holding on special terms, an ex-proprietary tenant, an occupancy tenant, a hereditary tenant, a grantee at favourable rate of rent, a non-occupancy tenant of the estates, a sub-tenant referred to in sub-Section 4 of Section 47 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and all land held under patta Dawani or Istamrari. It does not appear to me that it was intended to exclude sirdars and there is a reference to occupancy and ex-proprietary tenants who became bhumidhars. I am, therefore, unable to see any force in this contention of the learned counsel. 9. No other point has been pressed before me. 10. I, therefore, see no force in this writ petition and dismiss it with costs to opposite parties Nos. 5 and 8.