P. N. MOOKERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the defendants and it arises out of a suit for ejectment. ( 2 ) THE suit was brought on April 16, 1957, and it is governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The ground, taken under the said Act, was unlawful subletting. The suit has been decreed by the learned trial Judge, and, against his said decision, the present appeal has been filed by the defendants. ( 3 ) IN the trial Court, various points were raised in defence, to the effect inter alia, that the two defendants were not joint tenants of the suit property and, accordingly, the notice, served in the instant case, was defective in law, the case being that only defendant no. 2 was the tenant of the disputed premises. The alleged subletting was also denied. The defences were overruled by the learned trial Judge but they were been pressed and reiterated in the appeal before us in addition to certain other points, to which reference will be made in due course. ( 4 ) ON the question of the defendants' being joint tenants of the suit property, it appears from the judgment of the learned trial Judge that, although this was disputed in the written statement and put in issue, at the time of trial, this defence was not seriously pressed, and, in any event, on the defendants' own evidence, as found by the learned trial Judge, this point must be answered against them. If, now, the defendants were joint tenants, there can be no question that the service of notice, as made in this case, namely, by registered post on one of the defendants, namely, defendant No. 1, the notice being addressed to or made out in the names of both the defendants, would be valid and sufficient and the notice also would be a good notice, fully complying with the requirements of law (Vide, in this connection, Harihar Banerjee and others v. Ramdashi Roy and others, 45 IA 222 at p. 230, Syed Bodardoza and others v. Ajijuddin Sircar and others, 33 C. W. N. 559, at pp. 562-3, and Kanji Mani v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 468 at p. 471 ). 562-3, and Kanji Mani v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 468 at p. 471 ). The decision in Bejoy Chand Mahatab v. Kali Prosanna Seal and others, 29 C. W. N. 620, is clearly distinguishable, as, there, the notice was not addressed to or made out in the names of all the joint tenants but excluded or omitted one of them, and even otherwise, if the said decision purports to lay down the contrary, it must be deemed to have been overruled by the above Supreme Court decision. ( 5 ) A point was raised before us by Mr. Mitter, who appeared as the appellant's senior Advocate at a later stage of this hearing that the notice in question was a mere demand for possession and cannot be construed as a valid notice to quit. We are unable to accept this argument in spite of the supposed authority cited to us in support of his contention by Mr. Mitter, namely (5) Ahmad Ali, 581. We need only point out that the said decision turned on entirely different facts and related to wholly different questions and is not relevant for purposes of the present appeal and cannot be held to support the contention of Mr. Mitter. ( 6 ) ON the question of subletting also the defendants stand condemned by their own evidence and it is fairly clear from the defendant's own testimony on record, - and this is supported unmistakably by the documents, particularly, the rent receipts of the alleged sub-tenant, - that there was subletting by the defendants as alleged by the plaintiff. In that view, we would hold that the learned trial Judge was fully justified in holding against the defendants on the question of subletting too. Before us, Mr. Mitter raised a question as to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, namely, the Small Causes Court, Calcutta, to entertain the present suit and he contended that, under the law, the local City Civil Court, - and that Court alone, - had jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. For this purpose, Mr. Mitter relied on the City Civil Court Act and its amendment as contained in the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957. ( 7 ) IN our view, however, this submission of Mr. For this purpose, Mr. Mitter relied on the City Civil Court Act and its amendment as contained in the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957. ( 7 ) IN our view, however, this submission of Mr. Mitter overlooked certain important matters, namely, the coming into operation of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, before the instant suit was instituted, with a specific provision in Section 20 thereof, read with the corresponding schedule, for institution of such suits in the Court of Small Causes Court, Calcutta. He also overlooked that the City Civil Court Act, which amended the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, in the matter of the forum of such suits, in or by its second schedule, had not been amended, when the present suit was instituted, by including therein the new Act, namely, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which had come into force in the meantime and repealed the said 1950 Act and expressly provided, as stated hereinbefore, for the institution of such suits in the Court of Small Cause, Calcutta. The amendment also, namely, the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957, which, after necessary changes, made the City Civil Court the exclusive forum for suits, like the present, did not become operative until the relevant date, as mentioned therein, namely, January 13, 1953, which was several months after the institution of the present suit; or in other words, the instant suit must be held to have been pending on the date of the coming into operation of the said Amending Act and would, accordingly, under the second proviso to Section 2 thereof, be a valid suit, which may be validly continued on the footing as if the said amendment had not been made. The net position, then, is that the instant suit must be deemed to have been validly filed or instituted in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, and was to proceed in the said Court according to law, under the said amending Act itself, in spite of and without being affected by the law of change of forum of suits, effected thereby. The second proviso to Section 2 of the above amending Act, is, by itself, a clear pointer to that effect, although, possibly, even without the same, the position would have been more or less similar (Vide, in this connection, Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Limited, 58 IA 259 at pp. 266-7. ( 8 ) IN the above view, the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, had full jurisdiction to entertain and to try the instant suit and its decision cannot be assailed on the ground of want of jurisdiction, either in the matter of institution of the suit or in the matter of its trial or disposal. The point of jurisdiction, also, raised or sought to be raised by Mr. Mitter in this Court, must, accordingly, be overruled. ( 9 ) IN the result, this appeal will fail subject to this that the appellants will have, in the first instance, time till the end of February next, to quit and vacate the disputed premises and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the respondent, to be enlarged to a period, expiring with the end of November next, on the appellant No. 1's undertaking, to be filed in this Court within a fortnight from this date, to deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of the disputed premises to the respondent decree-holder within the said time, provided, in either case, the appellants go on depositing, in the trial Court, to the credit of the decree-holder, a sum of Rs. 121/- per month, month by month, regularly, according to the English calendar, within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calendar, on account of current mesne profits, and, in default of any two of such deposits, the above provision for time, be it the longer or the shorter one, will automatically lapse and this decree for eviction will become executable forthwith. Liberty is also given to the respondent to apply for modification of this or the relevant part of the above order, relating to the grace period, in case the disputed premises is found to be not in the actual occupation of the appellants or of any of them. ( 10 ) THERE will be no order for costs in this Court. The decree for costs, passed by the learned trial Judge, will, however, stand. ( 10 ) THERE will be no order for costs in this Court. The decree for costs, passed by the learned trial Judge, will, however, stand. December 21, 1964 ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, represented to us, the time for filing the undertaking under our judgment, dated November 24, 1964, is extended till to-day and the undertaking, filed to-day, is accepted as being in compliance with the said judgment. ( 12 ) LIBERTY is also given to the respondent decree-holder to withdraw any sum, which has already been deposited, or, which may be deposited, by the appellants, in the Court below, on account of current rents or mesne profits in respect of the disputed premises, without furnishing any security therefor. Let this order be treated as part of our judgment, delivered on November, 24, 1964. Appeal dismissed