JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal by Raj Mangal Singh, plaintiff, against the order of the lower appellate court holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. It was at the same time directed that the plaint shall be returned for presentation to the proper court. 2. The material facts of the case are that Suraj Bali, father of the appellant, Raj Mangal Singh, instituted two suits before the revenue court for declaration that he was a fixed rate tenant of the two sets of plots and was in possession thereof, and that the defendants were not in possession thereof nor did they have any right or interest therein. The suits were instituted on 23.6.1953. The revenue court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits and directed the return of the plaint. Such an order was passed on 2.5.1955 and the plaints were actually returned on 5.5.1955. As fresh suits were to be filed under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the plaintiff instituted only one suit before the civil court after incorporating all the plots in one plaint and making the necessary amendments. The amended plaint was presented before the Civil Court on 5.5.1955. 3. The relief sought for in the amended plaint were for declaration that the plaintiff was the fixed rate tenant and thereafter bhumidhar of the disputed plots and the defendants had no concern with them; that the defendants be restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's possession; and that in case it were found that the plaintiff was not in possession of any part of the land, he be given possession over such land. 4. Under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act there is no tenure-holder like a fixed rate tenant though all such tenants were made bhumidhars. Tenure-holders and bhumidhars, sirdars or assamis. There was also one more class of tenure-holders, namely, adhivasis. Consequently, the prayer for being declared a fixed rate tenant was superfluous and was by way of past history. For all the purposes the declaration sought for was that the plaintiff was the bhumidhar of the plots in dispute. Such a declaration could be given under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and not under the U.P. Tenancy Act. For all the purposes the declaration sought for was that the plaintiff was the bhumidhar of the plots in dispute. Such a declaration could be given under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and not under the U.P. Tenancy Act. Consequently, the present suit is under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act though a part of the cause of action arose before the commencement of this Act. 5. Where a party claim the relief of permanent injunction, the acts of the defendants are often continuing by nature. Consequently, where it is alleged that the plaintiff is still in possession, the mere fact that the defendants started asserting their rights before July 1, 1952, shall not show that no cause of action had arisen on or after July 1, 1952. 6. To put it differently, even though a suit of the present nature under the U.P. Tenancy Act was cognisable by the revenue court, and not by the civil court, the suit could after July 1, 1952 be filed before the civil court if cognisable by the civil court under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This shall be irrespective of the fact that a part of the cause of action had arisen before July 1, 1952. The finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the present suit was cognisable by the revenue court, and not by the civil court, is thus against the law. 7. It was, however, contended on behalf of the defendants-respondents that after the amendments made to the U.P. Zamindar Abolition and Land Reforms Act under the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961 the suit shall lie before the revenue court even though an additional relief was asked for which could not be granted by the revenue court. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Durgapal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 257. 8. At the time the suit was instituted before the civil court in May 1955 all the suits pertaining to bhumidhari land could be taken cognizance of by the civil court, and not revenue court, and in suits validly instituted before the revenue court a question of title, if raised in good faith, was to be referred to the civil court for decision. The U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was, however, amended in 1958 and thereafter suits for declaration and possession pertaining to bhumidhari land also lay before the revenue court, though it was possible for the plaintiff to oust the revenue court of its jurisdiction and to institute the suit before the Civil Court by asking for an additional relief, say, injunction, which, the revenue court could not grant. Apparently, the legislature amended Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act under U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961 to ensure that the jurisdiction of the revenue court was not ousted by any indirect means. 9. Section 331(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as amended by the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961 runs as below :- "Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Col. 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in Col. 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be attained by means of any such suit or application; Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof the provisions of Schedule II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation: If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for the civil court may not be identical to that which revenue court would have granted." 10. In view of the amendments made to Section 331 the jurisdiction of the revenue court cannot be ousted by asking for an additional relief which that court cannot grant. Consequently, a suit for permanent injunction with regard to agricultural land shall no longer lie before the civil court: it has to be instituted before the revenue court. In view of the amendments made to Section 331 the jurisdiction of the revenue court cannot be ousted by asking for an additional relief which that court cannot grant. Consequently, a suit for permanent injunction with regard to agricultural land shall no longer lie before the civil court: it has to be instituted before the revenue court. The point for consideration, however, is whether a suit pending before the civil court on the date the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961 came into force which, since after the commencement of the Amendment Act, would be cognisable by the revenue court only, can be heard and determined by the civil court, or it is necessary for the civil court to return the plaint for presentation to the revenue court. 11. A consideration of Section 331(1), quoted above, shall make it clear that it places a bar on the taking cognizance of a suit by the civil court and not on proceeding with the trial. It is a settled law that any respondent on the jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be assumed and the civil court can decide, in accordance with the law, all the suits, applications or proceedings which they have lawfully taken cognizance of. The civil court shall naturally cease to have jurisdiction over the matter if under some enactment given retrospective effect its jurisdiction is taken away, i.e. the provision is applicable to pending suits also. To put it differently, prohibitions as to the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil court are not to be assumed, and if no bar has been placed on the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil court, it can continue to hear and determine suits already instituted. Section 331(1) places a bar on the taking cognizance of suits, applications or proceedings. Cognizance is taken at the time the suit or application is instituted or presented. Any stamp taken after taking cognizance of the proceeding is a step necessary for the hearing and determination of such suit, application or proceeding. Consequently, suits pending before the civil court on the commencement of the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961 can be heard and determined by the civil court. 12. In this connection a reference may be made to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which restrictions have been imposed on taking cognizance of certain offences. Consequently, suits pending before the civil court on the commencement of the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961 can be heard and determined by the civil court. 12. In this connection a reference may be made to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which restrictions have been imposed on taking cognizance of certain offences. Some offences can be taken cognizance of after obtaining the sanction of an appropriate authority or if the complaint is made by a person prescribed. It can easily happen that after the institution of a complaint or submission of a police charge-sheet, the law is amended by placing restrictions or additional restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction by Magistrates. Where the amendment has not been given a retrospective effect, it cannot apply to offences of which cognizance has already been taken. In all cases where cognizance of an offence cannot be taken unless certain formalities have been completed, the court has the jurisdiction to try the offence but cannot try a person for the offence, unless the formalities are complied with, e.g., sanction of the competent authority obtained or the complaint is made by an appropriate person. Where on the date of the presentation of the complaint or police charge sheet the court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, but thereafter some restriction is imposed on taking cognizance of such offence, the Magistrate can proceed with the trial of such offences of which he has already taken cognizance for the simple reason that the restriction imposed is on taking cognizance and cognizance has already been taken. 13. Section 331(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been expressed in clear and unambiguous words and, in my opinion, can lead to only one interpretation. 13. Section 331(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been expressed in clear and unambiguous words and, in my opinion, can lead to only one interpretation. However, doubt, if any, shall stand at rest on comparing this provision with the corresponding provision contained in Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which runs as below:- "Subject to the provisions of Section 286 all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court, and no court other than a revenue Court, shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could be obtained by means of such suit or application." 14. Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act placed two kinds of restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil court, one was in the hearing and determination (decision) of suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule and the other in taking cognizance of such suits or applications. On the other hand, Section 331(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act places restriction only on the taking cognizance of certain suits, applications or proceedings. Section 331(1) was amended on the lines of Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, and it can consequently be assumed that the legislature intentionally departed from the wording of Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, and desired that all the suits pending before the civil court be heard and determined by that court. In other words, on the coming into force of the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1962, civil courts could not longer take cognizance of suits, applications or proceedings which were, by virtue of amended Section 331(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court; but they could hear and determine all the suits, applications or proceedings already taken cognizance of under and in accordance with the law then in force. 15. The decision in Durgaphal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 257 rested upon the words "heard and determined" used in Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and not upon the word "cognizance" used therein. 15. The decision in Durgaphal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 257 rested upon the words "heard and determined" used in Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and not upon the word "cognizance" used therein. This would appear from many observations, quoted below. At page 258 column 2 it was observed: "Therefore, Section 242 at once came into effect to bar the learned Munsif from continuing to hear the suits. Under Section 242 he was debarred not only from entertaining the suits but also from hearing and determining them. So long as a revenue court could hear and determine a suit under Section 180, the jurisdiction of a civil court to hear and determine it was barred by the provisions of Section 9 C.P.C. The learned Munsif might have had jurisdiction upto 13.6.1947 to hear and determine the suits but on 14.6.1947 he was divested of the jurisdiction. 16. As soon as a revenue court became entitled to hear and determine them, he lost his jurisdiction because two different courts could not possibly have jurisdiction to hear them." 17. Similarly, it was observed at page 259 column 1: "The effect of the amendment, as we pointed out earlier, was not only to prevent a civil court from taking cognizance of such a suit,but also to prevent it from hearing and determining it." and in para 8 at page 259 column 2: "We hold that the learned Munsif had to jurisdiction to hear and determine the suits on or after 14.6.1947, on which date a revenue court became entitled to hear and determine them. He was, therefore, bound to return the plaints for presentation to the competent revenue court." 18. Consequently, the rule laid down in Durgapal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 257 cannot be made applicable to suits, applications or proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act pending before the civil court on the commencement of the U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1961. 19. The present suit was rightly taken cognizance of by the civil court and as it was pending on the date the U.P. Act XXVIII of 1961 came into force, it could be heard and determined by the civil court. The order of the lower appellate court directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the revenue court is thus illegal and deserves to be set aside. The order of the lower appellate court directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the revenue court is thus illegal and deserves to be set aside. 20. The F.A.F.O. is hereby allowed with costs, the order under appeal is set aside and the appeal is remanded for hearing on merits after registration at its original number.