JUDGMENT S. Chandra, J. - Krishna Mohan Kulshrestha is a practising lawyer. He filed a complain under Section 500, I.P.C. During the course of the hearing of this complaint case a female witness, Km. Chand by name was put in the witness box. The counsel for the defence wanted to bring out from this lady witness the fact that she had been brought to the court by the complainant himself and not by Jwala Prasad. In this connection the defence counsel while cross examining the lady witness put a question to her and requested the court to call Jwala Prasad from outside the court. The learned Magistrate asked the defence counsel to make an application for calling Jwala Prasad and directed that further cross examination of the witness shall take place after lunch. The learned Magistrate thereafter intended to rise for lunch. At this point of time the lawyer complainant said that great injustice was being done. The learned Magistrate asked the applicant not to use such words. Thereupon the applicant said and repeated it, in a louder and stronger tone that great injustice is being done and that the courts are meant for doing justice, injustice should not be committed. 2. At this the learned Magistrate did not rise for lunch and drew up proceedings under Section 228 I.P.C. He found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 100/-. 3. The learned Session Judge, Mathura dismissed the appeal, hence this revision. In this revision the learned counsel appearing for the applicant has urged that no insult was offered or intended and as such no offence under Section 228, I.P.C. was committed. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashanker A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 102 the question whether there is an intention to offer insult to the Magistrate trying the case or not, must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 4. The incident in the instant case took place ex facie the Magistrate. Offending words were uttered by the applicant to the Magistrate himself in the court. He repeated them in spite of the Magistrate requesting him not to use such derogatory language. The question of intention is ultimately a question of drawing interferes from primary facts and in case like the present, is a question of fact. Offending words were uttered by the applicant to the Magistrate himself in the court. He repeated them in spite of the Magistrate requesting him not to use such derogatory language. The question of intention is ultimately a question of drawing interferes from primary facts and in case like the present, is a question of fact. Both the courts below have found that insult was intended and offered. 5. It was urged by the learned counsel that he was speaking the truth when he stated that injustice was being done by postponing the cross-examination of the lady witness till after lunch. The courts below have rightly explained that this is incorrect and that it would have meant injustice to the defence if the cross-examination had been completed then and there. I find myself in agreement with the view taken by the courts below on this aspect. 6. Learned counsel relied upon the case of S.A. Dange v. S.T. Sheppard A.I.R. 1930 Alld. 483. That is a case of comment in a news paper and is distinguishable. Reliance was also placed on the case of Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141. This again was a case of a critical article appearing in a daily news paper. It is thus equally distinguishable. In this case the Judicial Committee held that provided members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives so those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. According to this decision even the immunity from being proceeded against for contempt of court is not available where improper motives are imputed. To say that courts are meant for doing justice and should not commit injustice and that great injustice is being done in the face and presence of the court, as has been found by both the courts below, when there was no justification for saying so, does amount to imputing improper motives to the Magistrate. 7. It has to be remembered that the applicant was not a lay man. He is a practising lawyer. As such he had a duty to conduct himself properly when appearing in a court of law and to be circumspect in the tone and language which he used towards the court. 7. It has to be remembered that the applicant was not a lay man. He is a practising lawyer. As such he had a duty to conduct himself properly when appearing in a court of law and to be circumspect in the tone and language which he used towards the court. Just as hyper sensitiveness on the part of the court is to be avoided so is rudeness on the part of a counsel. In Emperor v. Mudvedkar I.L.R. 46 Bom. 973 the appellant called the trial court a "prejudiced judge". On being called upon to withdraw the remark he declined to do so. It was held that the words amounted to intentional insult of the Judge. In the matter of Shyam Lal, Advocate A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 502 the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court held that a statement by a counsel that his instructions were that his client did not wish the matter argued before the Bench as then constituted amounted to a deliberate and intentional insult to the court and involved an attack on the dignity of the court. 8. These decisions are opposite. The fact that the applicant was the complainant as well and was conducting his own case would not make the offered insult any the less intentional. The findings of the courts below that an insult was intended and offered by the applicant cannot be assailed as illegal or preserve. 9. The only other point urged was that the applicant had apologised to the Magistrate and should have been let off instead of being convicted and sentenced. In this statement the applicant did not apologise. He stated that if the court thinks that the applicant had said anything to undermine the dignity of the court then he wishes to be excused for it. Moreover, even under Section 484, Cr.P.C. the trying court has a discretion to accept or not an apology. In this case the learned Magistrate could not be said to have committed any error of principle in not acting on the so called apology, so as to entitle this Court to interfere in a revision. 10. In the result, the revision is not sustainable and is dismissed.