Judgement JUDGMENT : This is an appeal by Tripathi Sansnath, defendant against the order of the Additional Civil Judge of Basti allowing the appeal of Tripalhi Bhagwat Nath (now represented by his legal representatives) and other, plaintiffs, whereby the decree and judgment of the Additional Munsif in suit No. 1124 of 1954 was set aside and the suit was remanded for a fresh hearing in accordance with the law. 2. The present suit was for the recovery of possession over plots detailed at the foot of the plaint. Issues were framed on 19-4-1955 and 26-5-1955 was fixed for final hearing. Hearing was adjourned on many dates, sometimes on the request of the plaintiffs, and at others, of the defendant The last adjournment was sought for by the plaintiffs. On the grounds that their witnesses were not present 20-4-1956 was then fixed for final hearing but on that date also the plaintiffs applied for adjournment on the same ground. The application for adjournment was rejected and the Munsif proceeded with the suit under Order XVII,. Rule 3, C.P.C. After the rejection of the adjournment application the counsel for the plaintiffs made a statement that he had no instructions. No evidence was thus adduced by the plaintiffs and after recording the evidence of the defendant the Munsif fixed 14-5-1956 for the pronouncement of judgment. Judgment was pronounced that day (14-5-1956). 3. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the District Judge against the decree of the Additional Munsif dismissing their suit with costs under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. The appeal was heard by the Additional Civil Judge who relying upon the case of Dayalji Wasanji v. Kedarnath Onkarmal and Co.. AIR 1953 Nag 222 allowed the appeal on the ground that it was necessary for the Munsif to pronounce judgment on the date the trial was ordered to proceed under Order XVII. Rule 3, C.P.C. As the judgment was pronounced after more than three weeks a gross illegality was committed and the decree being illegal deserved to be set aside. 4. Rule 3, C.P.C. As the judgment was pronounced after more than three weeks a gross illegality was committed and the decree being illegal deserved to be set aside. 4. Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. as amended by the Allahabad High Court runs as below "Where any party to a suit to whom lime has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which lime has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith." The rule lays down that instead of adjourning the hearing of the suit the Court can proceed to decide it forthwith. The learned Civil Judge was apparently of the opinion that the word forthwith' has the same meaning as "at once" and that it was necessary for the Munsif to record evidence of the defendant and also to pronounce judgment on the date he decided to proceed under Order XVII Rule 3. C. P. C. 5. Two questions for consideration are :- (1) Whether Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. permits the Court to decide the suit within a reasonable period :- (2) Whether Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. is mandatory in the sense that for the disregard thereof the decree becomes illegal and without jurisdiction ? The term "forthwith" has been defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th Ed. as below :- "When a defendant is ordered to plead forthwith, he must plead within 24 hours. When a statute or rule of Court or requires an act to be done 'forthwith' it means that the act is to be done within a reasonable time having regard to the object of the provision and the circumstances of the case." Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed the meaning of the expression "forthwith" has been given, at page 341 as below :- "When a statute requires that something shall be done ''forthwith" or "immediately" or even "instantly" it would probably be understood as following a reasonable time for doing it. An application to deprive a plaintiff of costs which must be made 'at the trial' was deemed made in time when made an hour after the trial was over and the judge was frying another cause." Consequently, it is necessary, for the Court while proceeding with the trial under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. to decide that suit within a reasonable period. What is a reasonable period shall depend upon the circumstances of each case. A similar view was expressed In re The Application of Sheshamma, (1888) ILR 12 Bom 276. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also appear to have taken a similar view in 1960 MPLJ 95 : (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 257) as would appear from the yearly digest of the year 1960. 6. It is true that it was observed in AIR 1953 Nag 222 (supra) that the Court proceeding under Order XVII. Rule 3, C.P.C. must decide the suit forthwith i.e. on the same date, but it appears to me that it was not the intention of Mudholkar, J., that judgment must be pronounced on the same date even if in spite of the best effort of the Court that was not possible. The facts of Nagpur case are also different. In that case the defendants were permitted to file their written statement within 20 days and the hearing of the case was adjourned to 29-6-1950. That was the last opportunity given to the defendants to file written statement and it was subject to the payment of Rs. 15 as adjournment costs. On 29-6-1950 the case was not taken up even though parties were present. The Reader of the Court wrote out the following order sheet :- "29-6-50 Parties by pleaders as before I have no time today as I am busy with Sessions Trial No. 16/50. Hence adjourned to 9-8-50. No earlier date is available. Costs awarded by last order sheet have not been paid by the defendant. So also the defendant did not file his written statement. He should file it without fail within 15 days." And thereafter the parties and their counsel left the Court. The Judge did not sign the order-sheet and when the case was placed before him on the next date, i.e on 30-6-1950 at 4.10 p.m. he passed the following order :- "29/30-6-50 Plaintiff by Shri Ranade. He should file it without fail within 15 days." And thereafter the parties and their counsel left the Court. The Judge did not sign the order-sheet and when the case was placed before him on the next date, i.e on 30-6-1950 at 4.10 p.m. he passed the following order :- "29/30-6-50 Plaintiff by Shri Ranade. The order sheet scored out was not put up for my signature yesterday. On the basis of yesterday's material 'Ex parte' order is passed today." Defendants absent Shri Bendra absent W.S. not filed. Costs not paid. Defendants proceeded with 'Ex parte' for not filing W. S. Ex parte' evidence on 18-7-50." In other words, even though the case was taken up on 30-6-50 at a very late hour, the hearing was adjourned to 18-7-50 for the recording of the ex parte evidence. Ex parte evidence was recorded and Judgment pronounced on 18-7-50. 7. Mudholkar, J., observed in para 5 of the report that the question was whether the decision was under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. or Order XVII. Rule 2. C.P.C It was rightly observed that "whatever default was committed by the defendants was on 29-6-50 and not on 30-6-50 when the order for the recording of ex parte evidence was passed, for the reason that they did not know on 29-6-50 that the case was to be taken up on 30-6-50 when they should remit in present in Court." It was also observed that "what the Court had done was to place the defendants ex parte for not doing something on a date on which they were not required to appear in Court." It was held that the exercise of jurisdiction under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. was erroneous and no party could be allowed to suffer for an erroneous action on the part of the Court. It was for this reason that the ex parte decree was set aside and the suit remanded for hearing on merits. 8. It was for this reason that the ex parte decree was set aside and the suit remanded for hearing on merits. 8. The observations made by Mudholkar, J., must be read in the light of the facts of that case The observation that "the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XVII C.P.C. are penal in their nature and must, therefore, be construed strictly" would merely show that where the Court could not proceed under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. and even then a decree was passed under this clause, it would be without jurisdiction and can be set aside. At this place it may also he observed that when Mudholkar, J., observed that "a Court proceeding under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. must decide the suit forthwith, i.e. on the same date", he had in mind that the hearing of the suit is not to be adjourned to some other date. In other words, what was meant was that the Court must commence the hearing of the suit on the dale the party committed default and it was decided to proceed under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C and it would be against the law to adjourn the bearing of the suit which was permissible under Order XVII Rule 2 C.P.C. 9. Before making further comments on the scope of Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. and the procedure to be adopted by the Court while proceeding under this clause it shall be proper to make a reference to an important rule governing the interpretation of statutes which make a provision for the performance of public duty within a prescribed period. A question very often arises whether the time limit prescribed in an enactment is merely directory or is mandatory such that any order passed beyond the prescribed period shall be illegal and unenforceable. This rule is contained in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th Ed. at page 369 as below :- ".. .. .. . .. A question very often arises whether the time limit prescribed in an enactment is merely directory or is mandatory such that any order passed beyond the prescribed period shall be illegal and unenforceable. This rule is contained in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th Ed. at page 369 as below :- ".. .. .. . .. ..where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, yet not promote the essential aims of the legislature such prescriptions seen to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them. 10. When a party commits the default/and the Court can proceed and, in fact, proceeds under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C., a valuable right is conferred on the other party in that the suit shall be decided on merits without the first party having the opportunity to adduce evidence. A valuable right of a party cannot be taken away lightly. Parties to litigation cannot compel the Court to act in accordance with the law. They can merely make submissions which the Court may or may not accept. Consequently, where the Court declines to record evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. and to pronounce judgment on the date default was committed by one of the parties to the litigation the party who has acquired a valuable right in that the suit be decided without hearing the other party, has no power to make the Court record evidence and pronounce judgment the same day Consequently, by the disregard of the provision to record evidence and to pronounce judgment on the day the Court decided to proceed under O. XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. an injustice shall be done to the party who has acquired a right to the hearing of the suit ex parte. That party has naturally no control over the Court which is entrusted with the performance of the duty i.e. dispose of the suit under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. In the circumstances, the provision of time contained in Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. shall be held to be directory and not mandatory, and if a decree or order is passed beyond the period contemplated by this rule it shall not on this ground alone, be invalid. 11. To sum up, the provisions of O. XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. are directory and not mandatory. It gives power to the Court to proceed to decide the suit forthwith and not adjourn the hearing by granting the defaulting party an additional opportunity to produce his evidence or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit. Where the Court grants an additional opportunity to the party to produce evidence or to perform any other act, action taken shall be under Order XVII R. 2 C.P.C. However, where the Court decides not to grant an additional opportunity to the defaulting party it proceeds under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. and ordinarily ihe evidence of the other party must be recorded that day. But, if for some reason, not attributable to any neglect on the part of the party, his complete evidence cannot be recorded that day the recording of the evidence can be continued on the next day Judgment should ordinarily be pronounced on the date of the Court proceeded with the suit under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. or the evidence of the party was recorded. But where it is not possible to pronounce judgment immediately after the close of the evidence it can be pronounced within a reasonable period. This rule is for the guidance of the Court and the defaulting party cannot derive any benefit out of any omission on the part of the Court not to record evidence and not to pronounce judgment on the date it was decided to proceed under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. further any action taken by the Court shall not be invalid on the ground that evidence was not recorded or judgment was not pronounced on the same dale. It is a different thinK that the appellate Court may on consideration of the facts of the case, assume that the Court had proceeded under Order XVII Rule 2 C.P.C. and not under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. 12. Coming to the instant case, the evidence of the defendant was recorded on the date the Munsif decided to proceed under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. hut the Munsif fixed a dale after about three weeks for the pronouncement of judgment. For the delay in pronouncement of judgment the defendant was, in no way, responsible Nor did he have any power of control over the Munsif to compel him to pronounce judgment on the same date or within a few days. The judgment pronounced by the Munsif on 14-5-1956 was thus not invalid and without jurisdiction. The Additional Civil Judge took an erroneous view. As he had not disposed of the appeal on merits, its remand is necessary. 13. The F. A. F. O. is hereby allowed, the order under appeal is set aside and the appeal is remanded for hearing on merits after registering it at its original number. As the Munsif had proceeded under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. none of the parties shall have the right to adduce additional evidence Costs of this Court shall follow the final decision of the appeal. Appeal allowed.