Judgment 1. THIS is an application under Article 227 of the constitution of India to set aside the judgment and order of the District Judge, Alipore made on the 12th day of August, 1961 confirming an order of eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. The petitioner has been a tenant of the Superintendent, Gun and Shell Factory, Cossipore in respect of about eight Cottahs of land being Plot No. 2254 outside the boundary wall of the Gun and Shell Factory from or before 1941,. The petitioner has constructed pucca building upon the said plot of land besides other substantial outhouses and Structures. On the 28th day of January, 1961 the Government issued a notice terminating the tenancy of the Petitioner with effect from March, 1961. Thereafter the Estate Officer issued a notice to the Petitioner under Section 4 of the said Act, The Petitioner filed an objection against the said notice without success. Thereupon the Estate Officer issued a notice under clause 1 of Section 5 of the eviction of the petitioner. 2. THEREAFTER, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section and of the said Act before the District Judge, Alipore. The District Judge, Alipore dismissed the said appeal. Thereupon this application for revision was filed on the 21st day of August, 1961 and a rule was issued calling upon the Opposite Parties to show cause why the order complained of should not be set aside or such other order or further orders made as to this Court may deem fit and proper. On the same day there was an interim order whereby the operation of the order of eviction was also stayed. The said interim order was later on confirmed. Thereafter, it has come for disposal before us. Mr. Mitter, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted strenuously that his client was not in unauthorised occupation for the notice dated 28th January, 1961 did not and could terminate the tenancy of Shri Shankar Lal Saha, the Petitioner with effect from 1st March, 1961 or otherwise, for he was a tenant in terms Of the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, and further contented that as the question of applicability of the West Bengal non-agricultural unit Tenancy Act raised a pure point of: law, his client should be allowed to canvas this point before us. The opposition filed by the petitioner to the notice under section 4 before the Estate Officer is not in the record of the District Judge, Alipore who heard the appeal. So, it cannot be said whether or not this point was raised by the petitioner before the Estate Officer. There is no indication in the one or of eviction made under clause 1 of Section 5 that such a point was taken before the Estate Officer. It however, appears from the judgment of the appellate Authority that when this point was raised before him it was stated on behalf of the petitioner that he does not claim any benefit under the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act but be relies upon the Crown Grant Act. In the grounds of the revision in filed before this Court this point again was not taken or indicated. It. was only on or about 23rd day of April, 1963 long after the issue of the rule, the point was indicated in a letter addressed by the learned Advocate of the petitioner to the learned advocate of the respondents. The paid better set out the following supplementary and or additional grounds. For that the learned Appellate Office" as well as the Estate Officer acted illegally and wrongly in not considering and adverting to the fact that the tenant petitioner was at all relevant times a non-agricultural tenant within, the meaning of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, inasmuch as all the materials or elements underlying the nature of the tenancy in question were present in the case, ii. For that the Notice to quit was invalid and insufficient in law inasmuch as at least 6 months1 notice as provided in the W.B., non-Agricultural Tenancy Art, was necessary. III. For that the Tribunals below ought to have held that your petitioner had the permanent tenancy in the suit land and that he was protected from being evicted there from in view of Section 7 of the said Act inasmuch as he is in occupation of the suit land as a tenant for more than 12 years without a lease in writing and has got pucca structures thereon. 3. 3. IT has been held that a petitioner may be allowed to canvas a pure point of law depending either on an admitted facts or alternatively upon facts which cannot be disputed at any stage of the proceedings and oven at the stage of hearing before the Supreme Court (Sec (1) Kamala Devi v. Takhatinal, A. LR. 1964 S. C. 359. There-lore, in my opinion, if no further evidence is necessary for the decision of the point of law, then the petitioner should be allowed to agitate this point even at this stage. The notice to quit is the most material document. It is not in the file of the Appellate Tribunal or before us. The notice to quit is the pivot upon which the contention of Mr. Mitter, is based. Hence, in its absence, the point cannot be allowed to be taken at this stage. It may be assumed that the absence of the notice is not fatal. The notification referred to in Section 1 (2) (b) of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act is not before us. Hence. again the point should not be allowed to be agitated now, it may further he assumed that the point was taken before the Estate Officer, it is, however, clear that the point was expressly and specifically abandoned before the Appellate Authority. 4. IN my opinion, in such circumstances, without any explanation, the Petitioner should not he allowed to turn back and take there points informally at such a late stage. It may be further assumed that the notice and ho notification or its inapplicability wore there before us. It may be assumed that on a construction of Sections 2, 3 read with Section 7 the plot of land in question attracts the application of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, This however, does not end the matter for under the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, notices of different periods are necessary varying with the facts of a particular case. It is not that in nil cases the notice must be for a period of at least 6 months. Hence, the sufficiency or otherwise of the notice dated 28th January, 1961 cannot be decided in this application for there are no materials for the determination of the adequacy of the same. Mr. It is not that in nil cases the notice must be for a period of at least 6 months. Hence, the sufficiency or otherwise of the notice dated 28th January, 1961 cannot be decided in this application for there are no materials for the determination of the adequacy of the same. Mr. Kar, earned Advocate appearing for the Union of India further resisted the admission of the such of plea of law at this belated stage even on the assumption that Sections 2, 3 and 7 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act was applicable on the ground that the mere fact that the and attracts the provision of Ss. 2, 3 and 7 of the said West Bengal non-agricultural Tenancy Act does not clinch the matter for even in such a case the respondent, if the point had been pleaded before the Estate Officer, could have set up a plea or pleas under S. 85 of the said West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act which would have made the new point under 'the said Tenancy Act nugatory and ineffectual. It will be noticed that S. 85 enumerates several grounds upon which the claim of the petitioner under the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act can be defeated by the respondents. There are grounds in S, 85 which entail questions of facts. It is not necessary for me to say at this stage whether the plea or pleas under S, 85 if taken would have succeeded or not. It is sufficient to say that the respondents, if the point was taken earlier could have urged one or more of the grounds set out in S. 85 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act. In my view reasonable possibility of prejudice is sufficient to deny this opportunity to the petitioner. In my view, it cannot he said with certainty that ii it was pleaded properly, the respondents could not have taken shelter under any of the clauses mentioned in S. 85 (c) of the West Bengal Nor-agricultural Tenancy Act, Hence I accept the contention advanced on behalf of the Union of India by Mr. G. P. Kar. Therefore, the petitioner in my opinion, should not be allowed to rely upon the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act at this late stage. It is now necessary to turn to the relevant provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. G. P. Kar. Therefore, the petitioner in my opinion, should not be allowed to rely upon the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act at this late stage. It is now necessary to turn to the relevant provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. The Act starts with the preamble that "an act to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters" section 3, clause (a) defines Estate Officer as in Officer appointed as such by the Central Government under S. 3. Section 2 (c) -unauthorised occupation" in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. S. 3 authorised the Central Government Lo appoint any officer as an Estate Officer for the purpose of this Act, provided he is a gazette officer of the Government. S. 4 (1) and Cl (2) of the same Section provide inter alia as follows : s. 4 (1)-If the Estate Officer is of opinion that any persons are in un-authorised occupation of any public premises that they should be evicted, tie Estate Officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. Clause (2)-The notice shall specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, and S. 5 (1) of the said Act provides as follows : if after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under S. 4 and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity o[ being heard the Estate Officer may on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order of eviction for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the pubic premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises. 5. 5. THERE were considerable discussions before us on the construction of section 4 and section 5 of the said Act in course of submissions made under Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution, which are the; principal grounds of attack set out in the petition for revision. It will be noticed that a person is not in unauthorised occupation by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act for he cannot be declared as a person in, authorised occupation under any of the provisions of this Act. He call become a person, in unauthorised occupation if his tenancy or his occupation has been determined under any other law relating to landlord and tenants or licensees or alternatively if the occupant is a trespasser. Therefore, this question has to be determined under the ordinary law and not under this Act it is only upon such a determination that the question of pursuing the ordinary legal remedies open to one and all and taken recourse to this special provisions of this Act can and does arise for the consideration of the authorities mentioned in clause 2 (b) for it is not incumbent upon the authority to take recourse to the special statute. 6. THEREFORE, if the authorities chose to take recourse under this Special Act, they must approach the Estate Officer. The Estate Officer is then empowered to move under clause (1) of Section 4 of the Act if before issuing a notice under Section 4, clause (1), he is of opinion that the person is in. unauthorised occupation of a public premises and further the at he should be evicted. This is patent from the user of the word "and" and no; "or" between the two phrases or clauses. That the opinions on these two points are mandatory and conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction is clear from the words "the Estate Officer shall issue, in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in other words, if he has formed an opinion on these two points or conditions he can assume jurisdiction to issue a show cause notice under section 4 why an order of eviction should not be made. Therefore if the Estate Officer forms an opinion that the person concerned is in unauthorised occupation of a public premises but does not form on opinion that he should be evicted, the Estate Officer., cannot assume jurisdiction to issue a notice under section 4 (1). In the result, in my view it is incumbent upon the Estate Officer to form an opinion on both these points and unless he does it he is prohibited from issuing a show cause notice, it was urged on behalf of the State that it is sufficient to slate that the person is in unauthorised occupation. If this is what the Legislature meant they would not have used the words "and that they should be evicted". In my opinion, it should not be presumed that the Legislature has used redundant words unless the court is compelled to so hold. In my opinion, there is no compelling reason. It is difficult to imagine that these extra words "that they should be evicted" had been used in the Section only to expressly state what is implicit in the words unauthorised occupation, for when a person is in unauthorised occupation he is liable to be evicted. This implied consequence again is not the same thing as "he should be evicted". These words "should be evicted" indicate some sense of compulsion or necessity on the part of the authorities concerned. This construction is borne out by the words specified by clause (2) of section 4 which inter alia that the notice shall specify the "grounds" on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The words are not "specifying the ground and not oven ground or grounds". The word is "grounds". This is deliberate and significant for the user of the word "grounds" in my view, points to the fact that there must be indications of the two separate and independent requirements of the part of clause (2) in the notice. It may be said that the issue of the notice itself presupposes that the Estate Officer has formed his opinion which is subjective on both the points or requirements. This ends the matter. In my opinion, the Legislature did not think it right to leave the matter at that uncertain state and consequently provided that the notice shall specify the "grounds" for the benefit of the occupants. This ends the matter. In my opinion, the Legislature did not think it right to leave the matter at that uncertain state and consequently provided that the notice shall specify the "grounds" for the benefit of the occupants. It was contended that the word "grounds" in sub-clause (a) of clause- 2 should be read as ground. In this connection, reliance was placed on a copy of the notice issued under section 4 of the case, where only one ground is stated namely that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation and to the notice under section 5 (1), where again only a declaration is made or a satisfaction is recorded that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation. In my opinion, for the reasons given hereinbefore this contention cannot be accented. Therefore, as the contents; of the notice under section 4 is not consistent with the Section and as they cannot be reconciled, in my opinion, the provisions of the Section must prevail over the contents of the notice Hence in my opinion, the notice under section 4 is an invalid notice and equivalent to no notice. 7. THIS construction in my opinion, stands to reason. A person may be in unauthorised occupation, and yet there may be no grounds for evicting him immediately" or that the object of eviction is malafide when it is meant to supplant him by another though the occupant is not in fault Again, it may be even necessary to evict a person but that again would not be sufficient unless he is in unauthorised occupation, for if he is in lawful possession or authorised possession, necessity of the estate by itself cannot extinguish or destroy the lights acquired by the occupants under the existing laws of the country. The opening words of Section 5, clause (1) also lends support to this conclusion for it status "if after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of notice under Section 4 and the evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. " The hearing must be in terms of the show cause notice which brings in the elements or requirement that "they should be evicted". " The hearing must be in terms of the show cause notice which brings in the elements or requirement that "they should be evicted". The second part of clause (1) of Section beginning with the words "the Estate Officer" and ending with the words "an order of eviction" suggest however that it is sufficient if the Estate Officer comes to a decision that the person concerned is in unauthorised occupation. It is not sufficient for the Estate Officer to express his opinion on the question as to whether he is a person who should be evicted as is plainly a requirement under Section 4. It may however be said that the words following "for reason to be recorded therein" give room for passing a decision on the question as to whether that the person concerned should be evicted. It may however be conceded that Section 5 (1) is far from clear on the point. It seems however to me that if Section 4 (1) and (2) are read with the Section 5 (1) the words "for reasons to be recorded therein" should embrace a decision on the point as "they should be evicted" apart from the fact that the occupant is in unauthorised occupation. Be that as it may, the notice under Section 5 suffers from a defect that it does not record the reasons for a decision or conclusion is not the same thing as the reason for a decision or conclusion which is the not outcome or result of the reasons on a point. Hence if the notice under Section 5 docs not state the reasons as to why the occupant should be evicted out states only the decision that the person is in unauthorised occupation, it is an irregular notice for in the absence of reasons the notice does not comply with the requirement that "for reasons to be recorded therein," the language of the section makes the "reasons" essential or material. Hence, it is not a mere irregularity. The omissions to state the reasons in a notice under Section 5, in my opinion, is not a mere irregularity even on a more fundamental ground for its emission may be a cloak to cover capricious and arbitrary order of eviction and make an appeal illusory. 8. Hence, it is not a mere irregularity. The omissions to state the reasons in a notice under Section 5, in my opinion, is not a mere irregularity even on a more fundamental ground for its emission may be a cloak to cover capricious and arbitrary order of eviction and make an appeal illusory. 8. IN my opinion, however the notice under Section 4 relied upon clearly shows that the Estate Officer assumed jurisdiction in direct contravention of the requirements of the Section 4 of this special statute and the notice under Suction 5 does nut conform to an essential requirement of the Section, these however, are not points which wore taken by the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings and not even before us but it emerged in the course of the he hearing Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 is the forerunner of Article 227, The word "superintendence" under Section 107 was construed in a wide manner so that it enabled the High Court to intervene by revision in a proper case under section 107 when section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or Section 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code were inapplicable. In the Government of India Act, Section 107 underwent some modifications in its counterpart, Section 244 of the Government of India Act 1035 so that section 244 was construed as conferring powers of an administrative character only and did not enable the High Court to exercise powers of revision. Article 227 however made a departure from section 244 and was brought in conformity with section 107 of the Government of India Act therefore, this court can in it extraordinary revisional jurisdiction interfere with the orders made by the tribunals under the Special Act, Article 227 like its forerunner Section 107 confers powers of superintendence. In my opinion, the power of superintendence can be exercised not only at the instance of parties but also suo motu by the Court where there is flagrant omission to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the tribunal or assumption of jurisdiction by the Tribunal in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Act or there is material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. This is in accordance with the law laid down in the case of (2) Nagendra Nath Bern v. Commissioner, Hills Division, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 398 (3) Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 137 and (4) Nibaran Chandra v. Mahendra Nath, A.I.R. 1963, S.C. 1895. Hence in my opinion, this is such a case where the Court should take suo motu notice of this illegal assumption of jurisdiction by the Estate Officer and/or irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. In my opinion, the failure by the Estate Officer to follow the obligator or mandatory requirements of Section 4 makes his order null and void and without jurisdiction and likewise the omission to state the reasons in the notice of eviction under section 5 makes hip orders null and void as being a material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him and consequently the order of the Appellate authority is null and void. This is sufficient for the disposal of the petition but as the points under Articles 19 and 14 have been argued at length-I feel it only right that I should express my views on the matter. Mr. Mitter strenuously urged that the Public Premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1958 is ultra vires as it offends Article 14 and 19 (f) of the Constitution of India, it is first necessary to consider the material: upon which the Court should act in finding out whether a particular statute violates the provisions of article 14 and/or article 19 (f) of the Constitution, of India. In he case of (5) Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in A.I.R. 1957 supreme Court, page 510 it was held with reference to the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution that the Court cannot go behind the preamble or object clause of the act in ascertaining the validity or otherwise of an Act. In the case of S.M. Transports (P) Limited v. Sankarwaswamigal Mutt, the Supreme Court while reiterating the rules laid down in (6) Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S, R. Tendelkar, (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538) extended the field in these words :- "(3) In order to sustain the presumption of Constitution at least the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the time and nay every state of facts which can be concerned existing at the time. of legislation," in this background it would be convenient at this stage to notice the scope of Article 19 (1) (f) and Art. 19 (5) of the Constitution. The said Articles read as follows: - Article 19 (1) -All citizens shall have the right- (f) to acquire hold and dispose Of property. (5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Schedule Tribe." 9. THE State can under clause (5) make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights embodied in Article 19 (l) (f) in the interests of the general public. What is "reasonable restriction" has been sufficiently stated by Patanjali Sastri. C. J. in (7) State of Madras v, V. G. Row, 1952 SCK 597 at page 607 (A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 196) at page 20 thus : "it is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, as between citizens, the individual proprietary rights are ordinarily respected unless a clear case is made out for imposing the restrictions thereon. There must, therefore, be harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Article 19 (1) and the social control permitted by Art. 19 (5), it is implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be laid down; each case must be decided on its facts. But the restrictions sought to be imposed shall not be arbitrary but must have reasonable relation to the object sought to he achieved and shall be in the interests of the general public," 10. But the restrictions sought to be imposed shall not be arbitrary but must have reasonable relation to the object sought to he achieved and shall be in the interests of the general public," 10. IN the statements of objects for this Act it is stated inter alia, that this Act was intended to provided for "the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the provisions of the Constitution, "in the preamble of this present Act the object is "to provide a speedy remedy of eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of government premises and other incidental matters" the Act is not confined to cases where the Government has to pay rent though it is receiving nothing from the unauthorised occupants or where the Government ejects the occupants for expanding is activities for the benefit of the State. The Act may be directed against persons who were in occupation of government lands under lease held by them from the State and had paid the rents regularly and promptly and there were no other special grounds for evicting except with a view to settle the land to another person. It is not the state only that wants speedy eviction but every landlord. It is in this background some of the provisions of the Act have to be examined. This Act leaves to the choice of the Estate Officer as to whether in a particular case, proceedings should be taken under the special Act or be left to the ordinary laws of the Court, this Act by its provisions in Sec. 4 places the Estate Officer in the position of a plaintiff for he in relates the proceedings. The same Estate Officer is given the power to determine the question in issue between him representing the state and the aggrieved occupants. The Estate Officer need not be a gazette officer who has knowledge and experience of law. He has been given the power under Sec. 5 to determine whether a person is in unauthorised occupation which often raises complicated questions of law relating to the land laws of the country which often baffles men experienced in law. He has been given power to make an order for eviction under section 5 (2. He has been given the power under Sec. 5 to determine whether a person is in unauthorised occupation which often raises complicated questions of law relating to the land laws of the country which often baffles men experienced in law. He has been given power to make an order for eviction under section 5 (2. He is again charged with the duty at this choice of considering or deciding under Sec. 6 the rival claims as to balance sale proceeds relating to the properties of the occupants who are successfully ejected from the premises and further of considering and determining the rate of mesne profits and damages according to executive guidance under section 11. THE Estate Officer has been given under Sec. 8 some powers which are usually conferred on the judicial officers but he is not bound to exercise them in every matter before him. Section 9 has conferred powers to hear application from the Estate Officer to a competent judicial officer. The appellate officers however may have to labour under a great disadvantage in view of the fact that the Estate Officer may be a gazetted officer without any training in law and may not be in a position to appreciate the points in issue in view of his ignorance of the land laws of the country. The appellate Officer labors under a greater disadvantage as the Estate Officers are not bound to keep records of the proceedings and forward the same to the appellate officers except the notice under Section 4 and the order under Section 5 of the Act. This may lead to an illusory right of Appeal. Hence, notwithstanding the removal of some objectionable features of the previous Act, in my opinion, there is no harmonious adjustment between the fundamental right declared by Article 19 (f) and the social control permitted by Art. 19 (6), and the restrictions sought to be imposed by the Act. Hence the Act is arbitrary and has no reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved though it may in the interest of the general public in some cases. Hence the Act is arbitrary and has no reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved though it may in the interest of the general public in some cases. This would be all the more so, if the correct position is as was contended on behalf of the state that the notice under S, 4 must only specify that the occupant is an unauthorised occupant and that the notice under section 5 must only contain a bare declaration that the person is in unauthorised occupation. 12. THIS conclusion in my opinion receives support from the decision of Sinha, J. (8) in Jagu Singh v. Shawkat Ali, (58 C. W. N. 1066) inspite of the replacement of the gazetted officer in the Act in the place and stead of competent officer in, the earlier act covering the some subject, where his Lordship observed while dealing with Government Premises (Eviction Act, 1950), as follows:- "firstly we find that the competent authority can be any person, whether such person has the necessary qualifications for evaluating title to moveable property or not in any event it seems to me that S. 38 is framed in such a manner as would permit Government to delegate their power to officers who I think would be fully unfitted to be trusted with the power of making such orders In the present case the competent authority is the Manager of Government of India's estate and I do not see how he can possibly decide complicated questions of the title arising in this case. But the provisions of the act put him in the position of not having to go into the complicated question at all which brings glaring injustice which is inherent in the Act." It is now necessary to consider the case of (9) Harikrishna v. Union of India reported in A.I.R. 1961 Pun, 98 where it was held that Sections 4 and 9 of the said Act did not offend the provisions of Articles 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and accordingly are valid. In that case, however the question of invalidity on the ground that it denies equal opportunity was not taken. In that case, however the question of invalidity on the ground that it denies equal opportunity was not taken. Their Lordships adverted to the fact that the earlier act was declared unconstitutional by the Courts but observed "in my opinion, the most objectionable features of the earlier act which furnished the main reason for holding it to be bad have now been removed". Then it was further observed "now section 4 provides for the issue of a show cause notice, which gives the person a right to appeal and state Ms case before the Estate Officer who has been substituted for the competent officer. Further provisions of the act make it clear that, if necessary, a full dress enquiry is contemplated since S. 8 provides that. " "it is thus clear that in the present case if the petitioners claimed that they owned the land on which the encroachment was alleged to have taken place, whether in their individual capacity or as manager of the Dharmasala, it was open to them to prove their claim by production of evidence. Moreover the right of appeal conferred by the new Act is much more comprehensive and satisfactory than in Old Act. S. 9 deals with appeal". This clearly envisaged a regular hearing of an appeal by an experienced judicial Officer. It is thus clear that even if a question of disputed title arises out of the issue of a notice under section 4 by an Estate Officer, the affected person has every opportunity to present his case and the dispute can be properly adjudicated before any final action is taken under Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances 1 am of opinion that the provisions of the Act of 1958 do not offend the provisions of the article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. " in view of the reason already given, I am unable to agree with their Lordships of the East Punjab High Court and respectfully dissent from the same. It is now necessary to consider the matter relating to Article 14 of the Constitution. " in view of the reason already given, I am unable to agree with their Lordships of the East Punjab High Court and respectfully dissent from the same. It is now necessary to consider the matter relating to Article 14 of the Constitution. In the case of (10) Brigade Commander, Meerut, v. Ganga Prosad reported in A. I. R. 1956 Allahabad 507, a Bench of that High Court when considering the 1950 Act held inter alia as follows :- "the net result of the provisions of the Act is that a person, may even lose his own property and may not even complain about it to any Civil Court, He cannot even move the Civil Court to restrain the competent authority to proceed under the Act. " "this unguided and unfettered discretion of non-judicial authority to relegate persons similarly situated to different remedies clearly violates the principle of equality before the law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution so that the provisions of this Act must be held to be void under Art. 13 of the Constitution," 13. IN the case of (9) Hari Krishna V, Union of India, A. I. R. 1961 P. 98 a case under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1953, his Lordship while upholding the validity of the Act under Article 19 (f) observed that there can be no question of application of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, it is necessary to examine whether such a view is consistent with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court regarding Article 4 of the Constitution, in the case of: (11) Bhusan Chowdhury v. State of Bihar, reported in A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 191 Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of seven judges observed as follows: - "it is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, It does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order however, to pass the days of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that, persons or things that are grouped together from other left out of the group, and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis, namely geographical and/or according to objections and/or the occupants or the like. What is necessary is, that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act under consideration," 14. THE Supreme Court made more or less similar observations inter alia in Jyoti a Pershad v. Union Territory of Delhi, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. at 1608 and in Devadasan v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 179 at 185. In the latest case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhupal Sugar Industries, A. I. R. 1965, S. C. 1179 at 1181 his Lordship Shah, J., of the Supreme Court again, explained the principle of equality in these words:_ "the State is undoubtedly enjoined by Art. 14 of the Constitution not to deny to any person equal protection of the laws within the territory, but a proper classification bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute does not on that account become impermissible. All persons who are similarly circumstanced as regards a subject-matter are entitled to equal protection of the laws, but it is not predicted thereby that every law must have universal application irrespective of the dissimilarity of objects or transactions to which it applies or of the nature or attainments of the persons to whom it relates. The legislature has always the power to make special laws to attain particular objects and for that purpose has authority to select or classify persons, objects or transactions upon which the law is intended to operate. Differential treatment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not supported by a rational relation with the object of the statute. This Court has held in several cases that where application of unequal laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons, a geographical classification founded on those historical reasons would be upheld. (12) Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1962) Suppl, (2) SCR 257 (AIR 1962 SC 98) (13) State of Madhya Pradesh 619, (14) Maharaj Kumar Prithvi Raj v, Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., 1962 2 SCR v. State of Rajasthan, C,a. Nos, 327-328 of 1956 D/2-l1-1960 (SC) and (15) Anant Prasad Lakshminiwas Generiwal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1963, SC 853. Ltd., 1962 2 SCR v. State of Rajasthan, C,a. Nos, 327-328 of 1956 D/2-l1-1960 (SC) and (15) Anant Prasad Lakshminiwas Generiwal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1963, SC 853. The decisions of this court, in (16) State of Rajasthan v. Monohar Singhji, 1954, SCR 996, (AIR 1954, SC 297) does not lay down any contrary principle. " This Rule of equality before law has not been confined to substantive law only but has also been extended to what is known as procedural law. In the case of Mehta and Co. v. Biswanath Shastri, the question of the infringement of article 14 of the Constitution arose in relation to Section 3 (4) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission Act, 1947. In this connection, Sections 31, 32, 33, 34 and 37 of the Income Tax Act come for discussion. His Lordship Chief Justice Mahajan who delivered the judgment observed inter alia as follows:- "it is well settled that in its application to ordinary proceedings article 14 assures to everyone the same rules of evidence and methods Of procedure in other words, the same rule must exist for all in similar circumstances. " 15. IN the case of (17) Methiah v. Income Tax Commissioner, Madras, reported in A. I. R, 1956 Supreme Court 269 the question for consideration was whether Section 5 (1) of Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission Act, 1947) is valid. In that case Bhagabati, J., observed inter alia as follows:- "it should be no answer to suggest that those substantial evaders whose cases were referred by the Central Government for investigation by the Commission before 1st September, 1948 formed a class by themselves leaving others though belonging as the same class or category of substantial evaders of income tax to be dealt with by the ordinary procedure prescribed in the Indian Income Tax Act without infringing fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution." 16. THE Rule of equality before law has been expended to one person pr family or corporation not withstanding the fact that a group ordinarily suggest that group consists of more than one person, family or corporation. In the case of (18) Chirenjilal v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1951 S. C, 41 at 57/ 58 it was held that a group may comprise of one individual family or corporation. In the case of (18) Chirenjilal v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1951 S. C, 41 at 57/ 58 it was held that a group may comprise of one individual family or corporation. The rule of equality before law has been extended again to the State itself notwithstanding that the State is charged with the duty of enforcing equality before law. In the case of (19) Menna Lal v. Collector of Jhalwar, reported in A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 828 at page 831, it was observed as follows:- "the last point argued was that in so far as the Act enables moneys due to the Government in respect of its trading activities to be recovered by way of public demand, it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It is said that the Act makes a distinction between other Bankers and the government as a Banker, in respect of recovery of moneys due. It seems to us that the Government, even as a Banker, can be legitimately put in a separate class. The dues of the Government of a State are the dues of the entire people of the State. This being the position, a law giving special facility for recovery of such dues cannot, in any event, be said to offend Article 14 of the Constitution. " In the case of (20) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopa1 Sugar Industries Ltd., A. I. R. 1964, S. C. 1179 at 1183 the Supreme Court observed as follows: - "it is true that acquisition for the purpose of cl. (a) can only be made for a Government company or a public company and cannot be made for a private company or an individual, but there is in our opinion a clear classification between a public company on the one hand a private company and an individual on the other, which has reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved under the law. The intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they may be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public purpose inasmuch as the enrichment consequent on such work goes to private individual or to a group of them who have formed themselves a company. Public companies on the other land are broad based and Government companies are really in a sense no Different from Government, though for convenience of administration a Government company may be formed, which then becomes a separate legal entity. Thus in one case the acquisition results in private enrichment while In the other it is the public which gains in every day. Therefore distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is, in our opinion justified, considering the object behind clause (a) as introduced into the Act. " 17. IN the light of law laid down on the point the relevant essential features of the Act may be noticed. The Act takes away the jurisdiction of the ordinary court to decide who a person is in unauthorised occupation or not any takes away the ordi-rights regarding disposal of property, and takes away the rights regarding arrears of rents and compensation. It confers power or jurisdiction to any gazette officer though he may be ignorant of he land laws of the country, the right to determine intricate questions of facts and law relating to land laws of India. The Act confers powers upon the Estate Officer or Gazette Officer who may be a person without legal training and experience to deal with the claim of the occupants to the balance sale proceeds. The Act confers power on the Estate Officer to determine the dues though in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Statute. The Act takes away the right of an appeal or a revision to the High Court, It however, confers a right of appeal to the occupant to equalized judicial Officer. Hence the occupants of government lands are put into great disadvantage compared to occupants of lands belonging to other persons. The Act does not expressly or impliedly bar the State from taking recourse to the ordinary courts of the country. It depends on the subjective satisfaction of the "estate Officer" whether the State will proceed under this Act or not. In case the Estate Officer is of opinion that the person concerned is not in unauthorised occupation and/or that he should not be evicted, the Department concerned is not helpless, it can take recourse to the ordinary courts of the country. 18. In case the Estate Officer is of opinion that the person concerned is not in unauthorised occupation and/or that he should not be evicted, the Department concerned is not helpless, it can take recourse to the ordinary courts of the country. 18. HENCE, the Act Leaves room for the application of the ordinary law administered in Civil Courts or the application of the special provisions of this Act, to persons similarly situated, namely the occupants of lands of the Government, so that some occupants of Government lands may be placed at a great disadvantage than other occupants of Government lands The Act classifies in a group not only occupants of Government lands but also lands belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Delhi Development Authority unlike the previous Act of 1950. There is no indication in this Act why these three authorities have been singled out for this privileged position. The lands belonging to the State belong to the people generally through,-out India, This cannot be true of the Municipal Corporation of India and Delhi Development Authority. The only common characteristic if there be any, is that the lands are not owned by single individuals but are owned by the people, though not in general. There is no reason to Include Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Delhi Development Authority and exclude other public and semi public bodies. Hence, again in my opinion the Act infringes Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, in my opinion, this provision of the Act infringes Article 14 of the Constitution. This is all the more so if the notices under sections 4 and 5 are correct. In this connection, the recent pronouncement of his Lordship Shah, J., of the Supreme Court in the (20) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., A. I. R, 1964 S.C. 1179 at 1183 may be quoted:- "the petition filed by the company was singularly deficient in furnishing particulars which would justify the plea of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of equal protection of the lands under Article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment by itself is not sufficient. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of equal protection of the lands under Article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment by itself is not sufficient. An applicant's pleading that equal protection of the land has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. A mere plea that the company find other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of import of fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution." It is not sufficient to plead that on a construction of the unchallenged Act, an Impugned Act, persons in similar situation can be dealt with differently. It is necessary to allege that the aggrieved party has been differently treated from others similarly situated without any reasonable basis or in other words his plea must be supported by particulars where others have been differently treated. It follows from this that the first aggrieved party under an Act assailed on the ground of Article 14 of the Constitution has no immediate remedy. This pronouncement as to pleading militates against the pronouncement of the Supreme Court explaining the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. Be that as it may, we are bound by the statement of law as made by the Supreme Court and we are bound to follow it, in this case it is not possible to ascertain whether any plea under Article 14 of the Constitution was taken in the Written objection filed before the Estate Officer for the Written objection was not forwarded to the Appellate authority and is not before us. It is however in the grounds of appeal filed before the Appellate Authority. It was taken in the Ground of Appeal filed before the High Court. It is however in the grounds of appeal filed before the Appellate Authority. It was taken in the Ground of Appeal filed before the High Court. It is as follows: "for that the Learned Court below ought to have held that Section 5 (1) of the said Act offended against Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch" as for eviction of the tenants a special discriminatory procedure was provided for therein in denial of the right to equality before the law and of equal protection thereof, and consequently at least the said section was void as being repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hence, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that there is no proper pleading under Article 14 of the Constitution even in the Memorandum of Appeal to the High Court and consequently that plea cannot be entertained. 19. IN the result, the orders complained of are set aside and the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. R. N. DUTTA, J. I agree with my Lord that the Petitioner cannot be allowed to take for the first time in this proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution, the objection that there was no valid determination of the petitioner's tenancy as it was governed by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, A decision on this point will involve decisions on questions of fact which have not been averred or agitated at any time before. This point, therefore, fails. I also agree with my Lord that the Estate Officer wrongly assumed jurisdiction and committed material irregularity in exercising that jurisdiction. The Estate Officer can have jurisdiction to pass an order under section 5 of the Act only after service of a proper notice as required under section 4 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 states that the notice shall specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The only ground stated in the notice served on the petitioner is that his tenancy has been determined and he is in unauthorised occupation. No notice is to be issued under section 4 of the Act unless a tenant's tenancy has been determined and he is in unauthorised occupation. The only ground stated in the notice served on the petitioner is that his tenancy has been determined and he is in unauthorised occupation. No notice is to be issued under section 4 of the Act unless a tenant's tenancy has been determined and he is in unauthorised occupation. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 does not contemplate that the notice should specify only those facts because they form the basis on which a notice can be issued under sub-section (1. Sub Section (2) speaks of "grounds" on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made". Obviously, this means that the tenant should be informed of the reason for which the State requires the land. Otherwise, the tenant cannot be in a position to negative the plea of such requirement before the Estate Officer. This will also be clear from the fact that sub section (1) of section 4 requires the tenant to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. If the mere fact of determination of tenancy and the consequent fact of the tenant being in unauthorised occupation were to be stated in the notice, the provision for showing cause would in effect be in fructuous. Here in this case no grounds, that is, no reasons for the State's requirement were given in the notice. The notice was not therefore a proper notice under section 4 of the Act. The Estate Officer therefore wrongly assumed jurisdiction. Moreover, section 5 (1) requires the Estate Officer to record the reasons why he makes an order for eviction. But in this case no reasons have been recorded. The Estate Officer, therefore, acted irregularly in exercising his jurisdiction. The order of the Estate Officer should on this ground only be set aside. Since we dispose of this application on this ground, it is not necessary to consider the points raised by Mr. Mitter that the Act is unconstitutional as it offends against Article 19 (f) and Article 14 of the Constitution. My Lord has expressed his views that the Act offends against both Article 19 (f) and Article 14 of the Constitution. Since our decision in this case is not based on our decision on these points, I do not consider the points in detail. My Lord has expressed his views that the Act offends against both Article 19 (f) and Article 14 of the Constitution. Since our decision in this case is not based on our decision on these points, I do not consider the points in detail. But I think that the Act does not offend Article 19 (f) as the restrictions imposed by the Act are reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19 (5. The State is the owner of the land. The State might have leased it out at a time when the State had no necessity for its immediate occupation. With the expanding welfare activities of the State, the State might be in urgent need of a particular land for the interest of the general public, The Act provides for speedy eviction of the lessees in such circumstances from the demised land, The restriction on the right of the citizen, here a tenant under the State, to hold his property must, therefore, be construed to be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of that right in the interest of the general public. The Act does not, therefore, in my opinion, offend against Art, 19 (f) of the Constitution, Nor does the Act in my view offend against Article 14 of the Constitution because Article 14 does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The Act deals with persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises. The ordinary law deals with eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of private lands or premises. Special provision has been made for speedy eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation, of Government lands and premises. Can it he said that such classification is unreasonable. 20. THE State may urgently require for its occupation lands in unauthorised occupation of others for the interest of the general public for expanding the welfare activities of the State or say for defence purpose. Unless some special provision for speedy eviction in such cases is made, the interest of the general public or even the defence of the country may be highly prejudiced. Such a classification cannot, therefore, be said to be unreasonable. Unless some special provision for speedy eviction in such cases is made, the interest of the general public or even the defence of the country may be highly prejudiced. Such a classification cannot, therefore, be said to be unreasonable. There is now provision in the Act that a responsible officer, that is an officer of Gazette rank only can pass the order for eviction and there is no provision for appeal against that order to a judicial officer of the rank of a District Judge, I do not therefore, think that the Act as now framed offends against Article 19 (f), or Article 14 of the Constitution.