:- Appellant filed the suit Original Suit No. 220 of 1961 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Thanjavur, to set aside the summary order passed in Execution Application No. 844 of 1960, in Original Suit No. 228 of 1954, on the file of the Court. Both the Courts below found that the appellant had no title to the suit property, that the respondent had title to the suit property and dismissed the suit. The appellant’s case is that the suit land belonged to P.W. 1 Kuppuswami Raja and that under Exhibit A-1 she got the permission of P.W. 1 Kuppuswami Raja to use the suit land for access to the house purchased by her under Exhibit A-5. She examined P.W. 1 Kuppuswami Raja to prove that he was entitled to the suit land. P.W. 1 Kuppuswami Raja is the son of Sundara Raja, one of the executants of Exhibit B-1. P.W. 1’s father and others parted with the suit land under Exhibit B-1 to one Balambal who in her turn sold it to Krishnaswamy Ayyar. Krishnaswami Ayyar acquired the entire suit land by virtue of Exhibits B-4, B-5 and B-9. Krishnaswamy Ayyar in turn delivered the suit land to the defendant’s paternal grandfather. Ultimately the defendant’s father sold the same to one Ramadoss and his brother. Admittedly Ramadoss was adjudged insolvent, but he was finally granted an absolute discharge as evidenced by Exhibit A-3. The lower Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that it is vain on the part of P.W. 1 to claim title to the suit land when especially it is seen that his father had parted away with the suit land under Exhibit B-1 to Balambal. Thus the appellant has no title to claim the suit property. The learned Advocate for the appellant however, contended that the respondent-defendant can have no valid title to the suit land on the ground that there was no vesting order of the suit property in favour of Ramadoss after the order of absolute discharge was granted to him. It is clear from Mullah’s Insolvency (Second Edition, page 369) that there is no provision that a property which is vested in the Insolvency Court should revest in the insolvent on the passing of an absolute order of discharge and it was never contemplated that an insolvent should get an order of absolute discharge and yet retain part of his property. Section 44(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act means that the order of discharge frees the insolvent from liability for all debts provable under the Act but does not free his property from such liability. It is possible for the Official Receiver to take action to deal with the property after obtaining suitable orders of the Insolvency Court. But as pointed out by the lower appellate Court there is no authority for the proposition that once a person was adjudged an insolvent, he was completely deprived of his property and that his property can be owned by the Official Receiver and that if and when he is granted an order of discharge, his property did not revest in him unless there was a specific order to that effect by the Insolvency Court. The fact that the sale by Ramadoss could be affected by the Official Receiver taking suitable steps cannot take away the title of the purchaser from Ramadoss so long as such steps are not taken. In other words, it is not open to the appellant to question the title of the defendant-respondent merely on the ground that the Official Receiver (P.W. 6 K. Balasubramania Iyer) could have taken such steps against the suit property. The Official Receiver could take any such steps only if there are creditors to be paid and the administration is not over. But there is no such proof in this case. In fact the trial Court has pointed out that, one of the contentions raised by the plaintiff’s Counsel which has not been stated in the plaint is that Ramadoss was adjudicated as insolvent and the property ought to have vested with the Official Receiver and that the sale by Ramadoss is void. This has been discussed under Issue 4 which runs as follows: To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? In fact objection was taken by the defendant to the trial Court going into this plea. But the trial Court proposed to go into the question on the ground that it was a pure question of law. But the necessary averments of fact have not been made even to raise the plea. But, as already pointed out, the defendant gets valid title so long as the sale by Ramadoss has not been questioned by the Official Receiver in any independent proceedings. There is no error of law. But the necessary averments of fact have not been made even to raise the plea. But, as already pointed out, the defendant gets valid title so long as the sale by Ramadoss has not been questioned by the Official Receiver in any independent proceedings. There is no error of law. The Second Appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.