P. N. MOOKERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the defendant and it arises out of a suit for ejectment, filed by the plaintiffs on 27th July, 1960, in the City Civil Court, Calcutta. ( 2 ) EJECTMENT was sought from the disputed premises No. 35/2, Sankar Haldar Lane, which the defendant had been occupying for some years as a tenant under the plaintiffs, at a monthly rental of Rs. 15. 84 np. , payable according to English calendar month. There was the usual notice of ejectment, upon which the instant suit was based. ( 3 ) IN the suit, two grounds were taken for evicting the defendant from the disputed premises under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which, admittedly, governs the present case. Those grounds were - (i) requisite default in the payment of rent, and (ii) plaintiffs' reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for building and rebuilding, the specific allegation in this behalf being that the pucca stair-case from the ground floor to the first floor and the wooden staircase, leading from the first floor to the roof, required rebuilding and replacement. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs' suit, holding, inter alia, that the defendant was guilty of requisite defaults in payment of rent for four months, that is, March, April, June and July, 1959. He, however, rejected the plaintiffs' case, so far as the other point was concerned, namely, the question of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding and his finding on this point is in favour of the defendant. ( 5 ) IN this appeal, Mr. Ganguly, appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, urged strongly that the decision of the Court below in the question of defendant's default in the matter of payment of rent for the above four months was not a correct decision. He contended, inter alia, that the learned Judge in the trial Court was not right in rejecting the defendant's claim for adjustment of certain payments, made by him (defendant), on account of municipal rates of the disputed premises, against the rentals of the above four months, and, if such adjustment had been allowed, the defendant would not have been a defaulter, as found by the learned trial Judge. There was also a point, raised by Mr. There was also a point, raised by Mr. Ganguly, that the notice of ejectment, in the instant case, must be held to be defective, invalid and insufficient in law, as it was not in terms of the month of the defendant's tenancy, his plea, in this respect, being broadly, to the effect that the defendant was originally a sub-tenant, who by virtue of the ejectment decree, passed against the tenant, on 13th January, 1959, was elevated to the status of a direct tenant under the plaintiffs with effect from that date, and accordingly, the month of this direct tenancy would start from the said date - the 13th January, 1959, - and would be regulated by the English calendar, or, in other words, that the months of the defendant's tenancy would be from the 13th of a particular English calendar month to the 12th of the next succeeding English calendar month, and, as the notice of ejectment, given in the instant case, was according to the English calendar month, the said notice was not a valid notice in law. One immediate answer to this argument of Mr. Ganguly would be found in the evidence of his client himself, where he clearly admitted that he was paying rents according to the English calendar month, that he had paid rent for the broken period from 13th January, 1959, to 31st January, 1959, and, thereafter, regularly, according to English calendar months, and, further, a specific statement that his tenancy ran according to the English calendar month. After these statements, it hardly lies in the mouth of the defendant to claim that his tenancy would be governed otherwise than by the English calendar month. In this view, we reject Mr. Ganguly's submission on the point of invalidity or insufficiency of the notice of ejectment, given in the instant case. ( 6 ) ON the other question, namely, the question of default in payment of rent, the position appears to be as follows :-As we have stated earlier, the alleged defaults were of four months, that is, March 1959, April 1959, June 1959 and July 1959. A point was raised by Mr. ( 6 ) ON the other question, namely, the question of default in payment of rent, the position appears to be as follows :-As we have stated earlier, the alleged defaults were of four months, that is, March 1959, April 1959, June 1959 and July 1959. A point was raised by Mr. Ganguly, that, as he was compelled to pay municipal taxes, which were payable by the plaintiffs in respect of the disputed premises, those payments should be adjusted against the rentals for the above months, and, upon such adjustment, there will be no default, as pleaded by the plaintiffs. It appears from the records that the occupier's share of municipal rates, in respect of the disputed premises, to the tune of Rs. 15. 75 np. was paid by the defendant. The defendant contends that this occupier's share was payable by the plaintiffs. It is clear, however, from the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (Vide Section 191), that, primarily or, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the occupier's share of municipal rates would be payable by the tenant or occupier. It is, essential, therefore, in order to find the plaintiffs' liability for the said rate or taxes, that there should be such an agreement to the contrary. Of this, the records do not contain any sufficient material. It is true that, in the written statement, an allegation to that effect was made, and there was a plea of the existence of such an agreement. In evidence, however, in examination-in-chief, the plaintiffs' witness No. 2, denied the existence of any such agreement. He does not appear to have been cross-examined on the point. The defendant, no doubt, in his examination-in-chief, said that he was not liable for the occupier's share of rates but he followed it up by saying that, when the Corporation men came to demand the same from him, he took them to the plaintiffs, seeking to support thereby that the liability for such payment was of the plaintiffs. On this latter statement, there was sufficient cross-examination of the defendant, and, according to the learned trial Judge, - and there we fully agree with him, - his (defendant's) evidence, was shaken. On this latter statement, there was sufficient cross-examination of the defendant, and, according to the learned trial Judge, - and there we fully agree with him, - his (defendant's) evidence, was shaken. In this view, it may well be said that the existence of an agreement to the contrary has not been proved in the instant case, and, if that be so, the liability for the occupier's share of rates would be on the defendant and not on the plaintiffs, and the defendant would not be entitled to get any adjustment against rents, payable by him, by reason of discharge of such liability on his part. Even assuming, however, that there was an agreement, as spoken of by the defendant, and the liability for the occupier's share of rates also would be on the plaintiffs, the defendant, on his own materials, would be entitled to a deduction of only Rs. 15. 75 np. , and, on the deductions, made by him in making deposits of rent with the Rent Controller, this will be exhausted by adjustment against the rents for March and April, 1959. On these, again, the March rent, as found by the learned trial Judge, - and which finding cannot be disputed, - was deposited beyond time, and would, in spite of full payment in the above manner, be an invalid deposit. To that, will be added defaults for June and July, 1959, against which, there will be no further scope for any adjustment on the above footing. The defendant, then, would, certainly, be guilty of, at least, three months' default, and this will entitle the plaintiffs to a decree for ejectment under Section 13 (1) (i) of the above Act. The defendant also, in this case, would not be entitled to any protection under Section 17 of the Act, as, admittedly, there was no deposit by him, as contemplated by Section 17 (1), in respect of the above defaulted amounts, with the result that the benefit under Section 17 (4) of having the suit dismissed, in spite of defaults under Section 13 (1) (i), by reason of deposit under Section 17 (1), would not be available to him. The net result, thus, will be that the defendant, on the facts, appearing in the present records, would have no protection under the above West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and would be liable to ejectment under Section 13 (1) (i) of the said Act. In this view, we would affirm the decree of the learned trial Judge for eviction, it being unnecessary for us, in the said context, to consider the other question, namely, whether the plaintiffs, apart from the ground of default, would be entitled to a decree for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises, particularly, the stair-case above-mentioned, for building and rebuilding. ( 7 ) THE point, then, arises as to whether the defendant should be given time for vacating the disputed premises, and, if so, under what conditions. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the instant case before us, we think that the ends of justice will be amply met by allowing the defendant three months' time in that behalf, in the first instance, to be enlarged to a year, on his filing an undertaking in this Court, within a fortnight from this date, to deliver up vacant and peaceful possession, of the disputed premises to the plaintiffs within the said period of one year, subject to this that the defendant must go on depositing, in the trial Court, to the credit of the plaintiffs decree-holders, a sum of Rs. 15. 84 np. , per month, month by month regularly, according to the English calendar, within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calendar, on account of current mesne profits, and, in default of any two of such deposits, this decree for eviction will become executable forthwith and the above provision for time or grace period, - be it the shorter or the longer one, - will automatically lapse; subject, further, to liberty being reserved to either party to apply for modification to either party to apply for modification of the above provision for grace period, on satisfying the Court, on proper materials, as to the condition of the disputed stair-case, and, if any such application be made, the Court will pass appropriate orders thereon, in the light of the materials, which will then be placed before it. ( 8 ) SUBJECT as aforesaid, this appeal fails and it is dismissed. ( 8 ) SUBJECT as aforesaid, this appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs, either in this Court or in the Court below. Cross objection. ( 9 ) IN view of the above order, no further order is necessary on this Cross objection, which also may be taken as disposed of by the above judgment. Appeal dismissed.