Order:- The plaintiff’s suit was to recover possession of certain property after a declaration that the sale deed dated 25th May, 1941 (it must be the sale deed dated 26th May, 1941) executed by her grand-mother Karuppayee as her guardian was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. She has failed in both the Courts below. She appeals. The property originally belonged to the plaintiff’s paternal grand-father. It appears that the father of the plaintiff had himself executed a mortgage for a sum of Rs. 75 on 24th August, 1936. After her father’s death, the plaintiff, who had also lost her mother, came under the guardianship of her grand-mother Karuppayee. Karuppayee is said to have been looking after her and maintaining her. Karuppayee sold the property for a sum of Rs. 240 under the impugned sale-deed. Out of the sale price, a sum of Rs. 100 went towards the discharge of the earlier mortgage executed by the plaintiff’s father. A sum of Rs. 40 was taken in cash by Karuppayee for the maintenance expenses of the plaintiff. With regard to the balance of consider action, the purchaser executed a mortgage on the property. Upon the contentions of the parties the Courts below had to consider whether Karuppayee had the power to sell the property, whether there was necessity for the sale or any benefit to the minor’s estate and whether the purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for consideration. Both the Courts have concurrently found all these questions against the plaintiff. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant does not dispute the position that in so far as Karuppayee’s authority to sell the property is concerned, there has been in concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below that Karuppayee was in the circumstances of the case the de facto guardian of the minor plaintiff. That question no longer survives. It is however contended that though legal necessity has been established in so far as the sum of Rs. 140 is concerned, there was no necessity at all for alienating the property to the extent of the balance. It is stated to be a case of only a partial necessity. It is also urged that the vendee made no enquiries whatsoever and his claim to be the bona fide transferee could not, therefore, be sustained. That this was the only item of property is not denied. It is stated to be a case of only a partial necessity. It is also urged that the vendee made no enquiries whatsoever and his claim to be the bona fide transferee could not, therefore, be sustained. That this was the only item of property is not denied. That it was also under a mortgage is also established. There was oral evidence to show that the earlier mortgagee did in fact demand payment of the amount. An examination of that mortgage document Exhibit B-2 shows that the period fixed for the payment of the mortgage amount was one year, so that by the date when the mortgage was actually discharged, nearly five years had passed by. I do not understand the position in law to be that the property should be actually in danger of being sequestered by the action of any creditor before a person in the position of a guardian of a minor could alienate the property. What is pressure upon the estate is one which will take different forms in different circumstances. Here admittedly the property in 1936 could be mortgaged only for a sum of Rs. 75 and the evidence clearly shows that the mortgagee did demand payment. The minor had also to be maintained. In the circumstances that there was legal necessity to sell the property must be accepted. Learned Counsel referred to Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandaram1.The principles laid down in this case have not, in any way, been departed from in entering into this alienation. There was thus undoubtedly a necessity for the sale in so far as part of the consideration of Rs. 140 was concerned. Learned Counsel for the appellant argues that it was wholly unnecessary for the guardian to make an investment as it were in a mortgage on the property for the balance. It is true that if a mortgage for Rs. 100 executed by the vendee as being part of the consideration of the sale is looked upon in the light of investment, it would be necessary to establish that benefit to the estate was derived thereby. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, where the property had necessarily to he sold, the guardian took the precaution of leaving a part of the consideration in the hands of the vendee himself in trust as it were for the minor. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, where the property had necessarily to he sold, the guardian took the precaution of leaving a part of the consideration in the hands of the vendee himself in trust as it were for the minor. It is not a separate act of investment of any portion of the minor’s estate in which event the benefit to the estate would be in question calling for an examination. But here the mortgage was really a part and parcel of the sale transaction itself and if the sale could be sustained on the ground of legal necessity, the other question of benefit does not arise. I am accordingly satisfied that the sale cannot be attacked as devoid of necessity. Reference has been made to Karuppu Goundar v. Sellammal1. In that cases legal necessity was established only in part. It was also found that there was no evidence to show that the alienee had made bona fide enquiries and had satisfied himself that the sale was justified by necessity in its entirety. In those circumstances, the learned Judges held that the sale should be set aside though in equity the alienee would be entitled to be paid that part of the consideration which was established to be binding upon the estate. The principle of this decision is invoked in aid of the appellant and it is stated that because legal necessity as such has been established only to the extent of Rs. 140 and not in full, a similar direction would be justified in this case also, namely, that the sale should be set aside with the condition that the plaintiff-appellant should pay that part of the consideration which was found to be binding. The question however is whether the vendee made bona fide enquiries and satisfied himself as to the legal necessity for the sale transaction. If it is found that the vendee did not make any such enquiries (though under the law be need not concern himself to the application of the money raised by the alienor), he cannot be regarded as a bona fide transferee. In this case it is pointed out that the sale was in favour of Karuppayee’s nephew who was the father of the defendants. In this case it is pointed out that the sale was in favour of Karuppayee’s nephew who was the father of the defendants. The alienee was the mortgagee, a person who knew the incidents of the plaintiff’s family very well and his relation to Karuppayee far from operating as an incident against the bona fide nature of the transaction, seems to me, to be in favour of it. The Court below have also found that there is evidence to show that the vendee did make enquiries beside being well aware of the circumstances of the case. This is not a case where I can hold on the authority of Karuppu Goundan v. Sellammal1, that the absence of bona fide enquiries on the part of the alienee would justify the setting aside of the sale. Factually the bona fides have been found by the Courts below; I fully agree with that view and no question of setting aside the sale can possibly arise. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The Memorandum of Cross-objections has been filed by the 2nd defendant with regard to costs. This is not pressed and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs therein. V.K. -------------- Appeal dismissed.