Judgment BOSE, C.J. 1. CONSTITUTION. 2. THE appellant alleges that she carries on business, inter alia, in money lending, speculation in bullion and shares and investment in shares and other commodities under the name and style of Shankar and Co., at Ramrajatola, Santragachi, in the District of Howrah. In January, 1961, the appellant filed returns of her income for the asst. yrS. 1952-53 to 1960- 61. The ITO, D-Ward, Howrah, completed the assessments of income of the appellant in respect of the said years under S. 23(3) of the Indian IT Act, 1922, and issued the assessment orders in respect thereof on the 7th Feb., 1961. The ITO found that the sources of income of the assessee during the accounting years were income from interest from investments and speculation in shares and silver and/or other sources for which no bank account nor any proper books of accounts were kept by the assessee and the income returns had been based on estimate. In the assessment proceedings, the appellant was represented by one Sri Bagchi, an advocate an authorised representative of the appellant-and after hearing this advocate and discussing with him in detail certain particulars, the ITO had completed the assessments and issued the assessment orders. On the very same date-7th Feb., 1961-the ITO, respondent No. 2, also issued notices of demand under S. 29 of the Act of 1922 in respect of the said assessment orders. 3. ON the 25th Jan., 1963, the appellant was served with a notice dt. the 24th Jan., 1963, issued by respondent No. 1, CIT, West Bengal, purporting to be under S. 33B of the Indian IT Act, 1922, alleging that respondent No. 1 had called for and examined the records of the appellant's case in respect of the asst. yrs. 1952-53 to 1960-61 and other connected records and it appeared to him that the orders of assessment passed by the ITO, "D" Ward, Howrah, on the 7th Feb., 1961, were erroneous in so far as they were prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue for the following amongst other reasons : "Enquiries made have revealed that no business as alleged was carried on from the address declared in the returns. Also the said ITO was not justified in accepting the initial capital, the acquisition and sale of jewellery, the income from business, gift made by you (the appellant), etc., without any enquiry or evidence whatsoever " and the concluding paragraph of the said notice was as follows : "I, therefore, propose to pass such orders thereon as the circumstances of the cases justify after giving you an opportunity of being heard under the powers vested in me under S. 33B of the IT Act, 1922. The cases will be heard at 11 a.m. on 1st Feb., 1963, at my above office when you are requested to produce the necessary evidence in support of your contentions. Objections in writing accompanied by necessary evidence, if any, received on or before the appointment for personal hearing will also be duly considered. Please note that no adjournment of the hearing will be granted. Yours faithfully, Sd/- F. H. Vallibhoy, 24-1-63. CIT, West Bengal." ON the 31st Jan., 1963, the appellant through her solicitors, Khaitan and Co., wrote a letter to the CIT asking the CIT to recall or cancel the notice dt. 24th Jan., 1963, and to refrain from taking any steps thereunder. It is stated in this letter that the notice served was bad in law and illegal and void ab initio, inter alia, on the following grounds : "(1) that the assessments in question had been completed before the IT Act, 1961, came into force and there were no proceedings pending relevant to those years at the time of the commencement of the Act of 1961 and, as S. 33B of the old Act had been repealed by S. 297 of the Act of 1961, provisions of S. 33B of the Act of 1922 could not be applied to the orders of assessment in question : (2) that the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, issued under S. 298 of the IT Act, 1961, was ultra vires ; (3) that the notice is absolutely vague, as it does not indicate in what respects the said orders of assessments are erroneous and/or prejudicial to the Revenue, and further, no particulars of the alleged enquiry had been stated in the notice. " This letter also gave intimation to the CIT that failing compliance with the requisition contained in the letter, the appellant would be compelled to move the High Court at Calcutta for appropriate reliefs. 4. AS the CIT did not take any steps to comply with the requisition contained in the letter, the appellant moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for appropriate writs for the quashing of the records and proceedings relating to the notice dt. 24th Jan., 1963, and for direction upon the respondents to forbear from giving effect to that notice or taking any steps thereunder. The rule nisi was issued on that date limited to grounds (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 17 of the petition, which are as follows : "(a) The First Act having been repealed by the Second Act which came into force on the 1st April, 1962, respondent No. 1 had no power, authority or jurisdiction to initiate the said proceedings under S. 33B of the First Act. (b) Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act in no way authorises the initiation of the said proceedings inasmuch as no steps were taken in respect thereof when the First Act was in force and/or prior to its repeal. (c) The powers under S. 298 of the Second Act can only be exercised in respect of the matters dealt with by S. 297 of the Second Act which do not deal with proceedings under S. 33B of the First Act at all. (d) Alternatively, the powers under S. 298 of the Second Act can only be exercised in case of any difficulty arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Second Act and not for the purpose of starting fresh proceedings under S. 33B of the First Act. (e) In still further alternative the powers under S. 298 of the Second Act cannot be exercised in any manner inconsistent with the provisions thereof. " In order to determine the questions involved in this appeal, it will be convenient at this stage to set out the relevant portions of s. 297 and 298 of the IT Act, 1961, and the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, and also S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and S. 33B of the Indian IT Act, 1922. "297. (1) The Indian IT Act, 1922, is hereby repealed. "297. (1) The Indian IT Act, 1922, is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian IT Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act), (a) Where a return of income has been filed before the commencementof this Act by any person for any assessment year, proceedings for the assessment of that person for that year may be taken and continued as if this Act had not been passed ; (b) Where a return of income is filed after the commencement of this Act otherwise than in pursuance of a notice under S. 34 of the repealed Act by any person for the assessment year ending on the 31st day of March, 1962, or any earlier year, the assessment of that person for that year shall be made in accordance with the procedure specified in this Act ; (c) Any proceeding pending on the commencement of this Act before any IT authority, the Tribunal or any Court, by way of appeal, reference or revision, shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed. (d) Where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940, (i) a notice under S. 34 of the repealed Act had been issued before the commencement of this Act, the proceedings in pursuance of such notice may be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed ; (ii) any income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within the meaning of that expression in S. 147 and no proceedings under S. 34 of the repealed Act in respect of any such income are pending at the commencement of this Act, a notice under S. 148 may, subject to the provisions contained in S. 149 or S. 150, be issued with respect to that assessment year and all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly . . .'? (j) Any sum payable by way of income-tax, super-tax, interest, penalty or otherwise under the repealed Act may be recovered under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such sum under the repealed Act . . . "298. . .'? (j) Any sum payable by way of income-tax, super-tax, interest, penalty or otherwise under the repealed Act may be recovered under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such sum under the repealed Act . . . "298. Power to remove difficulties.- (1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by general or special order, do anything not inconsistent with such provisions which appears to it to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of removing the difficulty. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, any such order may provide for the adaptations or modifications subject to which the repealed Act shall apply in relation to the assessments for the assessment year ending on the 31st day of March, 1962, or any earlier year." 5. CLAUSES (2), (3) and (4) of the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, are as follows : "(2) Registration and refund proceedings to be regarded as part of assessment proceedingS.--For the purposes of clS. (a) and (b) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the IT Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the repealing Act), proceedings relating to registration of a firm or a claim for refund of tax shall be regarded as part of the proceedings for the assessment of the person concerned for the relevant assessment year. (3) Completion of assessments in cases covered by S. 297(2)(b) of the repealing Act.--In cases covered by cl. (b) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the repealing Act, the assessment shall be made, inter alia, in accordance with the procedure specified in the following sections of the repealing Act, in so far as they may be relevant for this purpose : SecS. 131 to 136, 140 to 147, 153 [except sub-S. (2) and cl. (iii) of sub-S. (3)], 156 to 158, 185, 187 to 189, 282 to 284 and 288. (4) Appeal, reference or revision proceedings in respect of orders passed under the repealed Act.- (1) Proceedings by way of the first or subsequent appeals, reference or revision in respect of any order made under the Indian IT Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act), shall be instituted and disposed of as if the repealing Act had not been passed. (2) Any such proceeding instituted under the repealing Act after the 31st day of March, 1962, and before the date of this order shall be deemed to have been instituted under the repealed Act and shall be disposed of as if the repealing Act had not been passed : Provided that if any such proceeding has been disposed of before the date of this order under any provision of the repealing Act, it shall be deemed to have been disposed of under the corresponding provision of the repealed Act and any appeal, reference or revision in respect of the proceedings so disposed of shall be instituted and disposed of as if the repealing Act had not been passed." 6. SEC. 6 of the General Clauses Act is as follows : "6. Effect of repeal.--Where this Act or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which therepeal takes effect ; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed ; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed ; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or regulation had not been passed." Sec. 33B of the Act of 1922 is as follows : "33B. (1) The CIT may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act and if he considers that any order passed therein by the ITO is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment. (2) No order shall be made under sub-S. (1) (a) to revise an order of reassessment made under the provisions of S. 34 ; or (b) after the expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be revised. " 7. THE first contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the CIT had no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of S. 33B of the Indian IT Act, 1922, as the said section had ceased to be in force after it was repealed by sub-S. (1) of S. 297 of the IT Act, 1961 (Act XLIII of 1961), which came into force on the 1st April, 1962, and it is not saved by any of the saving clauses introduced in sub-S. (2) of S. 297. THE further contention is that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is also not available in this case. It appears to me that the first contention has no force. In the instant case the return of income had been filed before the commencement of the Act of 1961, and so proceedings for the assessment of the person filing the return in respect of the relevant year can be taken and continued under the provisions of the Act of 1922, even after the coming into force of the Act of 1961, by virtue of the express terms of cl. (a) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297. THE provisions for assessment are contained in Chapter IV of the Act of 1922, and S. 33B finds place in this Chapter and the expression " proceedings for the assessment " indicates that any of the proceedings relating to assessment as contemplated in Chapter IV can be initiated and continued under cl. (a) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297. THE provisions for assessment are contained in Chapter IV of the Act of 1922, and S. 33B finds place in this Chapter and the expression " proceedings for the assessment " indicates that any of the proceedings relating to assessment as contemplated in Chapter IV can be initiated and continued under cl. (a) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 including the proceeding by way of revision under S. 33B of the Act. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the expression " proceedings for the assessment " has reference to the original assessment proceedings initiated for the first time after a return is filed and it does not cover proceedings by way of appeal, reference or revision against an order of assessment passed by the ITO after completion of the assessment, inasmuch as cl. (c) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 deals expressly with appeal, reference and revision and so it could not have been intended by the legislature that cases of appeal, reference and revision would also be covered by cl. (a). THE short answer to this argument is that cl. (c) deals with proceedings by way of appeal, reference and revision pending at the commencement of the Act of 1961. In other words, cl. (c) is limited to pending appeals, references and revisions. It is well-known that when the law is altered during the pendency of an action or a proceeding, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action or proceeding had begun. By enacting cl. (c) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297, the legislature has taken care to declare in express terms that the new Act of 1961 will not affect pending proceedings by way of appeal, reference or revision, but such proceedings will be continued and disposed of according to the provisions of the old Act of 1922. But merely because cl. (c) has been inserted in S. 297(2), it does not lead to the conclusion that thereby the scope of cl. (a) has been restricted to the proceeding for original assessment. But merely because cl. (c) has been inserted in S. 297(2), it does not lead to the conclusion that thereby the scope of cl. (a) has been restricted to the proceeding for original assessment. THE new definition of the word "assessment", which has been introduced by the Act of 1961 in S. 2(8), provides that, unless the context otherwise requires, "assessment" includes "reassessment" and the language of S. 33B makes it abundantly clear that, as a result of the action taken under this section by the CIT, there may be enhancement or modification of the original assessment or there may be a proceeding for a fresh assessment if the CIT in exercise of his power of revision cancels the original assessment and directs a fresh assessment. Thus, as the procedure laid down in S. 33B is a mode of securing a reassessment or of modifying or enhancing the original assessment, the section clearly embodies a "proceeding for the assessment" as contemplated in cl. (a) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297. It seems to me that the expression "proceedings for the assessment" in cl. (a) has a very comprehensive or wide connotation and it embraces within its scope the various proceedings relating to assessment as envisaged in Chapter IV of the Act of 1922, including the proceedings by way of appeal, reference and revision in a case where the return of income has been filed before the commencement of the Act of 1961. But curiously enough the saving clauses make no provision where no return of income has at all been filed before the commencement of the Act of 1961. This may be a lacuna in the Act of 1961, but the Court is not concerned with such omission which is a matter for the legislature. It is not the business of the Court to remove ambiguities or to fill up gaps in interpreting a statute in order to widen its applicability. It may also be pointed out that the word "assessment" has been held to have been used in the IT Act in a very comprehensive sense. 8. It is not the business of the Court to remove ambiguities or to fill up gaps in interpreting a statute in order to widen its applicability. It may also be pointed out that the word "assessment" has been held to have been used in the IT Act in a very comprehensive sense. 8. THE Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of CIT vs. Khemchand Ramdas (1938) 6 ITR 414 (PC) observed : "One of the peculiarities of most IT Acts is that the word 'assessment' is used as meaning sometimes the computation of income, sometimes the determination of the amount of tax payable and sometimes the whole procedure laid down in the Act for imposing liability upon the taxpayer." The Supreme Court in the case of C. A. Abraham vs. ITO, Kottayam (1961) 41 ITR 425 : (1961) 2 SCR 765 , in interpreting the expression " assessment " as occurring in S. 44 of the Indian IT Act, observed : "The expression 'assessment' used in these (provisions of Chapter IV of the Indian IT Act) is not used merely in the sense of computation of income and there is in our judgment no ground for holding that when by S. 44 it is declared that the partners or members of the association shall be jointly and severally liable to assessment, it is only intended to declare the liability to computation of income under S. 23 and not to the application of the procedure for declaration and imposition of tax liability and the machinery for enforcement thereof . . . . By S. 28, the liability to pay additional tax which is designated penalty is imposed in view of the dishonest or contumacious conduct of the assessee. " 9. IN the case of CIT vs. Bhikaji Dadabhai and Co. (1961) 42 ITR 123 : (1961) 3 SCR 923 , the question arose before the Supreme Court whether by reason of the repeal of the Hyderabad IT Act by the Finance Act of 1950, the power to impose penalty in respect of the years preceding the date of repeal was lost. Sec. 13(1) of the Finance Act of 1950, so far as it is relevant, provided as follows : "If immediately before the 1st day of April, 1950, there is in force in any Part B State . . . any law relating to income-tax or super-tax . Sec. 13(1) of the Finance Act of 1950, so far as it is relevant, provided as follows : "If immediately before the 1st day of April, 1950, there is in force in any Part B State . . . any law relating to income-tax or super-tax . . . that law shall cease to have effect except for the purposes of the levy, assessment and collection of income-tax and super-tax in respect of any period not included in the previous year for the purposes of assessment under the Indian IT Act, 1922 . . ." 10. AFTER referring to the previous decisions bearing on the interpretation of the word " assessment ", the Supreme Court held that the imposition of penalty was a necessary concomitant or incident of the process of assessment, levy and collection of tax and, hence, proceedings for imposing penalty taken under S. 40 of the Hyderabad IT Act could be continued after the enactment of S. 13 (1) of the Finance Act of 1950. It will thus be seen that the word "assessment" has been used in the IT Act in a very comprehensive sense and the expression "proceedings for the assessment" occurring in cl. (a) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 is wide enough to bring within its ambit the power of revision contained in S. 33B of the Act of 1922. 11. NOW it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that if the word " assessment " has been used in cl. (a) in such a comprehensive sense so as to include the entire machinery of assessment, then there was no point in enacting special or express saving clauses relating to reassessment under S. 34 of the Act of 1922 and relating to imposition of penalty as contained in cl. (d) and cl. (f) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 respectively. The answer to this is that these provisions have been inserted by way of abundant caution ; and in order to meet anomalies and difficulties like these created by the new Act of 1961 that precaution was taken to enact a section like S. 298 empowering the Central Government to promulgate general or special orders making provisions for removal of such difficulties and in order to remove such difficulties that the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, was promulgated and cls. (2), (3) and (4) were inserted in that Order and sub-cl. (1) of cl. (4) of the Order of 1962 has made express provisions to the effect that proceedings by way of appeal, reference or revision in respect of any order made under the Indian IT Act, 1922, can be instituted and disposed of as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 12. BUT it is to be pointed out that the vires of cl. (4) of the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order 1962, has been challenged before us on the ground that such a provision is plainly beyond the power of the Central Government as conferred upon it by S. 298 of the IT Act, 1961. The submission of the counsel for the appellant is that cl. (4) is inconsistent with S. 297 of the Act and it has sought to fill up a lacuna which existed in that section. BUT if my interpretation of S. 297(2) (a) is correct and the " proceedings for the assessment " are wide enough to include the proceedings by way of appeal, reference and revision, which are different steps in the machinery of assessment, then what cl. (4) has done is simply to make explicit what was implicit in cl. (a) and it is with the object of removing the doubt or difficulty, if any, existing in respect of the construction of cl. (a) of S. 297(2) that a specific provision like cl. (4) was introduced in the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1962. In this view of the matter it must be held that there is no force in the criticism or challenge of the learned counsel for the appellant that cl. (4) is inconsistent with the provisions of S. 297 or that by enacting such a provision the Central Government was not purporting to give effect to the provisions of the Act or was doing anything inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. That the power conferred by S. 298 upon the Central Government is very wide in its amplitude will be clear by a reference to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of King Emperor VS. Sibnath Banerji AIR 1945 PC 156 : LR 72 IA 241. That the power conferred by S. 298 upon the Central Government is very wide in its amplitude will be clear by a reference to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of King Emperor VS. Sibnath Banerji AIR 1945 PC 156 : LR 72 IA 241. In that case the question arose whether r. 26 of the Defence of India Rules, which was enacted under the rule- making power conferred by S. 2(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended by S. 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940, was valid, and whether the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Keshav Talpade VS. King Emperor (1943) FCR 49 was correct or not. The Judicial Committee observed as follows at pages 258-259 : "Their Lordships are unable to agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court on his statement of the relative positions of sub-S. (1) and (2) of S. 2 of the Defence of India Act and counsel for the respondents in the present appeal was unable to support that statement or to maintain that r. 26 was invalid. In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of sub-S. (2) is merely an illustrative one ; the rule- making power is conferred by sub-S. (1), and the ' Rules ' which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub-S. (2) are the Rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-S. (1) ; the provisions of sub-S. (2) are not restrictive of sub-S. (1), as indeed is expressly stated by the words ' without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-S. (1). ' There can be no doubt-as the learned judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-S. (1) amply justifies the terms of r. 26 and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned judge expressed in relation to sub-S. (2). Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that Talpade's case (supra) was wrongly decided by the Federal Court, and that r. 26 was made in conformity with the powers conferred by sub-S. (1) of S. 2 of the Defence of India Act." The same observations are, in my view, applicable in interpreting sub-S. (1) and (2) of S. 298. Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that Talpade's case (supra) was wrongly decided by the Federal Court, and that r. 26 was made in conformity with the powers conferred by sub-S. (1) of S. 2 of the Defence of India Act." The same observations are, in my view, applicable in interpreting sub-S. (1) and (2) of S. 298. Under this section the Central Government may pass any order to resolve any difficulty that may arise in implementing the provisions of the Act of 1961. The only limitation put upon this power as is clear from sub-S. (1) of S. 298 is that the order that may be passed by the Central Government, whether it is a general or a special order, should not be inconsistent with the provisions to implement which the same is passed. Sub-S. (2) of S. 298 is illustrative and makes express provision authorising the Central Government to make provision, in such general or special order, as is contemplated in sub-S. (1), for adaptations and modifications subject to which the Act of 1922 shall apply in relation to the assessment for the assessment year ending on 31st March, 1962, or any earlier year. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant challenging the vires of cl. (4) of the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, must be rejected. In view of these findings on the question of construction of cl. (a) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the Act and as to the vires of cl. (4) of the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, it is not necessary to express any definite opinion on the point whether S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is available for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the Act of 1961. 13. BUT our attention was drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indira Sohanlal vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property AIR 1956 SC 77 , where it has been pointed out that it cannot be stated as a broad proposition that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Sec. 6 would be applicable in such cases also, unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Sec. 6 would be applicable in such cases also, unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law. The question before the Supreme Court was as to the true interpretation of sub-S. (3) of S. 58 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, which purported to repeal the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, both in negative and in positive terms. The Supreme Court in interpreting such a provision has observed that where the repealing section of the fresh enactment which purports to indicate the effect of the repeal of previous matters provides for the operation of the previous law in part and in negative terms, as also for the operation of the new law in the other part and in positive terms, the said provision may well be taken to be self-contained and indicative of the intention to exclude the application of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court held in this case that S. 6 could not be called in aid in the case before them. 14. RELIANCE is also placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Om Prakash vs. Moti Lal AIR 1958 All 409 (FB). In this case a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that there is no authority for the proposition that an application in revision stands on exactly the same footing as an appeal and that both are vested rights which can be taken away only by express enactment or necessary intendment. Consequently, S. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, as it was before its substitution by the U. P. Act XVII of 1957, whereby the jurisdiction conferred by the High Court was transferred to the district Court, did not confer any right or privilege on any person and in this respect neither cl. (c) nor cl. (e) of S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act was attracted. (c) nor cl. (e) of S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act was attracted. It was however held in this case that as the High Court in exercise of its power of revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act entertained the application for revision which was moved prior to 4th June, 1957, and directed the records to be called for, the order passed by the High Court on such application was an "act duly done" within the meaning of cl. (b) of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act and, therefore, the High Court still retained jurisdiction to dispose of that application in revision and was not bound to return the records to the district Courts under the provisions of the new enactment (U. P. Act XVII of 1957) which came into force on 4th June, 1957. In an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of CIT vS. Bidhu Bhusan Sarkar Since reported in (1966) 59 ITR 590 , being an application for certificate to the Supreme Court in Income-tax Reference No. 22 of 1960 (judgment dt. 7th Feb., 1963) objection was raised as to the maintainability of the application for certificate to the Supreme Court under the provisions of S. 66A(2) of the Indian IT Act, 1922, on the ground that as the assessment in respect of which the reference was made under S. 66 of the Act of 1922 was complete and the proceeding on reference came to an end on the 10th Jan., 1962 (1966) 59 ITR 531 and S. 66A of the Act of 1922, which contained provisions for appeal was repealed by S. 297(1) of the IT Act, 1961, the petitioner had no right to appeal to the Supreme Court and so the application for certificate was not maintainable. It was also submitted that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act did not apply to that case inasmuch as a different intention appears from the terms of the provisions of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the new Act. Reference was made particularly to cl. It was also submitted that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act did not apply to that case inasmuch as a different intention appears from the terms of the provisions of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the new Act. Reference was made particularly to cl. (c) of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 and it was argued that what was saved by that clause from the effect of the repeal was pending proceedings by way of appeal, reference and revision at the time of the commencement of the new Act and the different clauses in sub-S. (2) of S. 297 indicated the intention of the legislature to save only the specific matters which are dealt with in such clauses from the effect of the repeal and no other matter and, consequently, the operation of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is excluded by reason of the different intention as appearing in the various clauses of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the new Act. The Division Bench consisting of Debabrata Mookerjee, J. and myself accepted this contention put forward on behalf of the respondent and it was observed as follows CIT vs. Bidhu Bhusan Sankar (supra):- "The effect of the repeal of an enactment is as if it had never existed except as to matters and transactions past and closed, in the absence of any saving clause which manifests or implies a different intention. If particular matters are kept alive by the saving clause, the repealed enactment is treated for all purposes as alive in respect of such matters. The saving clauses contained in sub-S. (2) of S. 297 in my view do indicate a different intention as contemplated by S. 6 of the General Clauses Act and ousts the operation of the general provisions contained in S. 6, with the result that S. 66A(2) which was completely obliterated by reason of the provision for repeal contained in sub-S. (1) of S. 297 of the new Act cannot be availed of by the petitioner for the purpose of initiating the proceeding for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court as contemplated in S. 66A(2) of the Act. But it is to be noted that to meet such contingencies as the present one, the Central Government has promulgated an order on the 8th Aug., 1962, which is known as the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962 . . . But it is to be noted that to meet such contingencies as the present one, the Central Government has promulgated an order on the 8th Aug., 1962, which is known as the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962 . . . . . " 15. AFTER referring to cl. 4 of the said order, it was further observed as follows:- "Sub-cl. (1) of cl. 4 makes it clear that any proceeding by way of appeal, reference or revision in respect of any order made under the provisions of the repealed IT Act, 1922, has to be instituted and disposed of as if the repealing Act, that is, the IT Act of 1961, had not been passed. In other words, the order which was made by the Division Bench on reference under S. 66 of the Indian IT Act, 1922, will be governed, in matters of appeal from that decision or order to the Supreme Court, by the provisions for appeal to the Supreme Court, as contained in the repealed Act of 1922, that is, under the provisions of S. 66A(2) of the Indian IT Act of 1922." 16. IN another unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in an application for certificate to the Supreme Court in Income-tax Reference No. 87 of 1960 (CIT vs. Allahabad Bank Ltd. (1966) 62 ITR 476 ), it was held that, as a reference under S. 66 of the Indian IT Act, 1922, was pending at the date of the commencement of the New Act of 1961, S. 297(2)(c) preserved the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in respect of the decision or order made on such reference and so the petitioner had a right of appeal under the provisions of that clause. It was further held that even assuming that S. 297(2)(c) was not applicable to the case, such right of appeal had been kept alive by the operation of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act inasmuch as no different intention appeared from the provisions of sub-S. (2) of S. 297 of the Act of 1961. It was further held in this case that in any event the right of appeal was also preserved by cl. 4 of the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, and so S. 66A(2) of the Indian IT Act, 1922, was available to the petitioner. On the question of the validity of cl. It was further held in this case that in any event the right of appeal was also preserved by cl. 4 of the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, and so S. 66A(2) of the Indian IT Act, 1922, was available to the petitioner. On the question of the validity of cl. 4, which was agitated before the Division Bench, it was held that the Income-tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, by enacting cl. 4, had not made any provision which is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1961 Act. As it is not necessary for us to express any definite opinion on the point of applicability of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, we refrain from doing so in the present case. We hold that S. 297(2)(a) is comprehensive enough to preserve the power of the CIT to initiate proceedings under S. 33B of the Indian IT Act, 1922, notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act by sub-S. (1) of S. 297 of the new Act and the action taken by the respondent-Commissioner against the appellant was properly taken and such action cannot be challenged as being without jurisdiction. 17. IN the result, this appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.