Judgment 1. THIS Rule is directed against the order of the learned Munsif deciding three issues in favour of the plaintiffs opposite parties in the suit pending before him being Title Suit No. 172 of 1959. Three points which the learned Munsif decided are (1) The valuation of the suit and court fees, (2) Jurisdiction of the court and (3) maintainability of the suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. They were respectively issues Nos. 5, 2 and 6 before him. On the point of valuation he came to the decision that the suit being a suit for declaration with consequential relief, the plaintiff was at liberty to put his own valuation in the plaint and did so rightly under section 7 (IV) (c) of the Court Fees Act. The defendant petitioners have not complained against this finding before me and have not urged any argument in respect thereof. Similarly, in issue No. 6 relating to the maintainability of the suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred by section 42 of the said Act. Having regard to the disputed facts of possession and having regard to the injunction granted by the civil court restraining the defendant-petitioners from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff opposite party, this finding also was not challenge before me and Mr. Janah, learned advocate for the petitioners did not advance any argument against this finding of the learned Munsif. 2. THE only point on which Mr. Janah made his submission is the point about jurisdiction which was issue No. 2 and which was found by the learned Munsif in favour of the plaintiffs. The point about jurisdiction is that the petitioners' claim that the suit is barred by section 21 (1) of the Land Reforms Act. This sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Land Reforms Act provides a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It expressly states that save as provided in section 19 no order or other proceeding whatsoever under this chapter shall be questioned in any civil court and no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter mentioned in sections 17 and 18 of the Act. Mr. It expressly states that save as provided in section 19 no order or other proceeding whatsoever under this chapter shall be questioned in any civil court and no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter mentioned in sections 17 and 18 of the Act. Mr. Janah submits that this suit is covered by the provision of section 18 of the Act and is, therefore, barred by section 21 of the Act. Briefly, his submission is that in this suit the plaintiffs ask for a declaration that the ex parte award passed in the Bhagchas Case Nos. 70 to 85 of 1959 was not binding upon the plaintiffs. I have examined the plaint in the suit. The plaint is an attack on the award or order of the Bhagchash Officer dated 28th February, 1959 on the jotedar's petition for termination of the Barga and produce. The allegation in the plaint and specially in paragraph 8 thereof is that this whole order or award of the Bhagchas Officer was obtained by the plaintiffs opposite parties by suppression of the notice and process in the Bhagchash ease and that the petitioners did not know about this proceeding. The petitioners' case is that the plaintiffs of this suit were not the real owners but were mere Benamdars and the real owner was opposite party No. 10. To my mind, such a dispute comes directly under section 18 (2) of the Land Reforms Act which provide that any question whether a person is a bargadar or not and to whom the share of the produce is deliverable shall be determined by the officer or authority mentioned in section 18 (1) The contention therefore, of the petitioners is clearly within the purview of section 18 (2) of the Act because it was a proceeding brought for tremination of the cultivation by the Bargadar and for division or delivery of produce within the meaning of section 18 (1. The order or the award of this case did determine that the petitioners were the bargadars of the plaintiff opposite parties. Therefore,, on the plain language of section 21 (I) of the Act that order or award would be a bar for the civil court to try that question again. This is really the substance of Mr. Janah's argument appearing for the petitioners. Mr. Therefore,, on the plain language of section 21 (I) of the Act that order or award would be a bar for the civil court to try that question again. This is really the substance of Mr. Janah's argument appearing for the petitioners. Mr. Janah for the petitioners develops his argument further in this way. His submission is that the opposite parties did not avail of the remedies provided by the statute and should, therefore, be debarred from agitating this question by means of a civil suit in a civil court. In support of this argument he relies on section 19 of the Land Reforms Act which provides for an appeal to the Munsif again any order made under section 17 or 18 except of course where such order is with the consent of the parties to the dispute. 3. MR. Panda, appearing for the contesting opposite parties avoids the attack by saying that his client could not prefer an appeal under section 19 of the Land Reforms Act in the fads of this case for the simple reason that this was time barred. An appeal under section 19 must have to be filed under sub-section (2) thereof within 30 days from the date of the order appealed against. He says that his clients could not do that because the order was ex parte and they were unaware of the award or order of the Bhagchas Officer until the 14th May, 1959 when more than 30 days had already expired. According to Mr. Panda there was no other way out but to file a suit which his clients did on the 1st October, 1959. It is necessary to point out that at that time the two amendments adding the two provisos to section 19 (2) of the Act had not been passed and especially the amendment which provides that the provision of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply to an appeal under this section, a provision which was introduced by the amendment in 1962. I am, therefore, bound to hold that on the facts of this; case no appeal was possible under section 19 of the Act by the plaintiffs opposite parties. Mr. Panda, for the plaintiffs opposite parties contests Mr. I am, therefore, bound to hold that on the facts of this; case no appeal was possible under section 19 of the Act by the plaintiffs opposite parties. Mr. Panda, for the plaintiffs opposite parties contests Mr. Janah's main proposition that section 21 of the Act is a bar to this suit on the ground that the facts of this case the bar cannot be applied. The facts which Mr. Panda emphasised in this connection in support of his argument are (1) the entire bhagchas proceeding was carried on by suppression of the notice and process, (2) the order or award of the Bhagchas Officer was an ex parte order in the circumstances of this case and (3) that before the Bhagchas Officer the dispute raised in the suit, namely, that the plaintiffs were not the bargadars of the petitioners could not be placed by reason of the suppression of the notice and process by the petitioners jotedars. In developing this argument, it is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that in order to establish the bar of section 18 read with section 21 of the Act it has to be established that there was a dispute between the bargadar and the jotedar and that that dispute has been decided. He says that where there was no service of notice and process there can be really no dispute in that sense and no decision in that sense. There is a good deal of force in Mr. Panda's argument on this point. 4. THE question, therefore, arises that if the case of the plaintiffs is correct and that there was fraudulent suppression of notice and process upon the plaintiffs, then why did not the plaintiffs go first to the Bhagchas Officer to recall his own ex parte order or award on the ground of fraudulent suppression of notice and process. The difficulty here is that neither the Land Reforms Act nor the Rules made thereunder has made the provision of the Civil Procedure Code universally applicable mutatis mutandis so that the Bhagchas Officer could be clothed with the power of setting aside the said ex parte order on the ground of suppression of notice and process. The Act contains no provision of this kind. The Rules have some provision but not on this exact point. In some Rules reference is made to certain particular provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The Act contains no provision of this kind. The Rules have some provision but not on this exact point. In some Rules reference is made to certain particular provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. For instance in Rule 6 it is laid down that every application shall be signed and verified in the manner provided in sub-rules 2 and 3 of Rule 15 of Order 6, Schedule I of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, Rule 7 provides that every appeal shall be filed in the form of a Memorandum and shall be signed and verified by the appellant in the manner provided in sub-rules 2 and 3 of Rule 15 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. References to the Civil Procedure Code are also made in Rule 9 dealing with execution. There is however, in rule 8 dealing with the manner of service of notice and process, this provision-''all notices and processes under these rules shall be served either by registered post or in the manner provided for the service of revenue or civil court processes. " it is this Rule 8 which can be supposed to enable the Bhagchas Officer to consider whether service has been effected in accordance with the Rule of the Civil Procedure Code because that Rule introduces the relative provision of the Civil Procedure Code for service of process and notices. But then Rule 8 as it stands and as quoted above, may not go far enough to clothe the Bhagchas Officer with the power to set aside an ex parts order on the lines indicated under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Rule 8 only indicates how service of the notice and process has to be effected, but does not say that if an order is passed without such observance then what is going to happen to such order and who is going to determine this question, namely, the Bhagchas Officer or the civil court. 5. MR. Panda, appearing for the plaintiffs opposite parties, has also drawn my attention to the fact that even the power of review which was in the now repealed section 10a of the Bargadar Act of 1955, granting the power of review is no longer there in the Land Reforms Act. 5. MR. Panda, appearing for the plaintiffs opposite parties, has also drawn my attention to the fact that even the power of review which was in the now repealed section 10a of the Bargadar Act of 1955, granting the power of review is no longer there in the Land Reforms Act. Pertinently enough, his argument is that even if there was power of review it was doubtful whether the Bhagchas Officer could review an ex parte order on the ground of fraudulent suppression of notice and process because normal review will not cover such grounds. In aid of his submission he made the further submission that even where the provision of Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to courts an application to set aside an ex parte decree is not the only remedy for the aggrieved person and there are authorities to show that on the ground of fraud and suppression of court's process a suit would lie. That argument, attractive as it is, is not quite relevant to this point, because normally under the Civil Procedure Code a suit is not barred as is the case under the express power provided by section 21 of the Land Reforms Act read with sections 18 and 19 there of but then to my mind all this approach to this question both from the petitioners point of view as well as from the point of view of the plaintiffs opposite parties, is very academic in one sense. Technically speaking, I am inclined to accept and agree with the view put forward by Mr. Panda on behalf of the opposite parties that under the Land Reforms Act and the rules framed, thereunder, there is no express or implied power in the Bhagchas Officer to set aside an ex parte award or order made by him under section 18 of the Act. But then, supposing that he has no such power, what then is the bar to the Bargadar making an application of his own under section 19 of the Act again raising the question of delivery of the produce and termination of the cultivation of the Barga. In that case the Bhagchas Officer will have to determine that question again, unless he says that his previous order is a kind of res judicata. In that case the Bhagchas Officer will have to determine that question again, unless he says that his previous order is a kind of res judicata. But then in order to be a res judicata he has got to come to a finding that the notice and process had been correctly served before the impugned order or award was made previously and that the order passed ex parte was really an order where the Bargadar did not choose to appear deliberately in spite of proper and due service of notice and process. If the Bargadar succeeds in satisfying the Bhagchas officer on his view of the case, then there can be no res judicata by reach of the previous ex parte award, decision or order of the Bhagchas Officer and the whole question will be re-opened. The previous decision in that case ex parte and not on merits will not and cannot be res judicata. 6. IT is argued by Mr. Panda on behalf of the opposite parties that the civil court's jurisdiction is not lost in the facts of this case. His argument is that where an order or award of the Bhagchas Officer is challenged as being without jurisdiction and on the basis of fraudulent suppression of summons, the order of the Bhagchash Officer is a nullity and therefore, a civil suit for declaration that such order is bad and without jurisdiction is competent. The whole purpose of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is that this dispute relating to Bargadars and jotedars about termination of cultivation by the Bargadar or division or delivery of the produce or place of storing or thrashing of the produce should be decided expeditiously and not with all the complications of a full fledged civil suit under the Civil Procedure Code. The whole intention of the Act is that they should be decided under section 18 and except an appeal as provided in section 19, should finally compose the differences and should not be questioned in a civil court. It was intended that sections 18 and 19 will form a complete Code for disposal of matters mentioned in sections 17 and 18 of the Land Reforms Act. It is, therefore, not in keeping with the intention of the Act to find out remnants of jurisdiction in the Civil Court in respect of those very matters covered by sections 17 and 18. It is, therefore, not in keeping with the intention of the Act to find out remnants of jurisdiction in the Civil Court in respect of those very matters covered by sections 17 and 18. The learned Munsif's referece to section 19 showing such remnant of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not accurate because that only shows a very limited interference by the Civil Court and that also by the special appeal provided therein and no more, as expressly said in section 21 of the Act. In this view of the matter I think for the ends of justice and to avoid uncertainty and complications relating to this small dispute, the best course to adopt will be as follows and I do so accordingly. I shall stay the pending suit before the Civil Court with liberty to the plaintiffs opposite parties to make an appropriate application either under section 18 of the Land Reforms Act or other provision as they may be advised raising this question that the previous ex parte order or award of the Bhagcias Officer on the 28th Feb., 1959, was no order or award on the grounds mentioned in the plaint in the suit and raising the dispute afresh before the Bhagchash Officer. After the Bhagchas Officer gives his award or decision on this fresh proceeding and subject to such rights as are provided in section 19 and under the Civil Procedure Code and the Constitution of India, the suit which will remain stayed till then can thereafter be disposed of in the light of the decision obtained under the Land Reforms Act. Such a course will, in my view, be consistent with the provisions of sections 17, 18, 19 and 21 of the Land Reforms Act. While, therefore, I confirm the ad-interim order of stay already granted the Rule is disposed of on the terms mentioned above. There will be no orders as to costs in this Rule.