JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - This civil revision by a defendant arises out of a suit for fixation of rent and for arrears of rent. Kanhaiya Lal filed the suit against Vidya Ram with these allegations. The plaintiff is the owner of a certain shop at Agra. The defendant has been occupying the shop as plaintiff's tenant. The defendant got the rent of the shop fixed at Rs. 3/- per month under Section 3-A of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The rent so fixed is inadequate. The fair rent for the shop is Rs. 25/- per month. The defendant had not paid rent for the shop for several years. The plaintiff therefore requested the court to fix the rent of the shop at Rs. 25/- per month. The plaintiff also prayed for a decree for Rs. 300/- on account of arrears of rent for one year at the rate of Rs. 25/- p.m. 2. The defendant contested the suit on the ground that the annual reasonable rent fixed under Section 3-A of the Act was fair. The defendant also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable. The suit was tried by the 1st Additional Munsif of Agra. He held that the fair rent for the shop is Rs. 25/- p.m. He fixed the rent accordingly. The court also passed a decree in plaintiff's favour for Rs. 300/- on account of arrears of rent for one year. 3. Against that decree, the present revision has been filed by Vidya Ram defendant. When the revision came up for hearing before a learned single judge of this Court on 12.5.64. he was of the opinion that the revision raises certain important question of law. He, therefore, referred the case to a large Bench. 4. Mr. S.B.L. Gaur appearing for the plaintiff-respondent urged before us that, we should confine our decision to the question of law mentioned in the order of reference. It may, however, be pointed out that the learned single Judge remarked in his order dated 12.5.64 that, it was desirable that the case should be decided by a larger Bench. The operative part of that order runs thus: "I, therefore, direct that the papers on this case be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for the decision of the case." 5. The operative part of that order runs thus: "I, therefore, direct that the papers on this case be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for the decision of the case." 5. It is thus obvious that the learned single Judge was referring the entire case to a large Bench. The reference was not confined to the questions of law mentioned in the order of reference. Chapter V, Rule 6, Rules of Court enables the Chief Justice to constitute a Bench to decide a case or a question of law formulated by a Bench hearing the case. There is no indication on the record that in constituting this Bench the learned Chief Justice wanted the Division Bench to confine its attention to the questions of law mentioned in the order of reference. We, therefore, take it that the constitution of the Division Bench under Chapter V, Rule 6, Rules of Court was in terms of the order of reference, dated 12.5.64. We, therefore, take it that the entire case is before us for decision. 6. Mr. K.C. Agarwal appearing for the defendant-applicant contended that a landlord's suit for fixation of rent is not maintainable. For this proposition, Mr. Agarwal relied upon a decision by Desai, C.J. in Deo Datt Dwivedi v. Ajit Prasad Dube 1963 A.L.J. 888. In that case the landlord sued for fixation of rent. It was held that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. 7. A case under Section 5(4) came up before the Supreme Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad 1959 S.C. 492 : 1959 A.L.J. 626. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed on page 497 thus: "The reasonable annual rent could be varied at the instance of the landlord or the tenant on the ground of its inadequacy or excess but the landlord could not bring a suit to vary the agreed rent." According to that observation, the only restriction on the landlord is that, under Section 5(4) of the Act, he cannot apply for enhancement of the agreed rent. In the present case we are not dealing with agreed rent between the parties. So, the restriction considered in that case does not apply in the present case. In the present case we are not dealing with agreed rent between the parties. So, the restriction considered in that case does not apply in the present case. In Chaube Jagdish Prasad's case 1959 S.C. 492=1959 A.L.J. 626 it was held that, the reasonable annual rent could be varied at the instance of the landlord. That observation is inconsistent with the decision of the learned Chief Justice in Deo Datt Dwivedi v. Ajit Prasad Dube 1963 A.L.J. 888. 8. The suit for fixation of rent was brought under Section 5(4) of the Act. Section 5(4) is in these terms:- "If the landlord or the tenant, claims that the annual reasonable rent of any accommodation to which the Act applies, is inadequate or excessive, or that the reasonable annual rent declared by the District Magistrate under Section 3-A is not correct, or if the tenant claims that the agreed rent is higher than the annual reasonable rent, he may institute a suit for declaration or as the case may be, for fixation of rent in the Court of the Munsif....." It will be seen that the first part of sub-Section (4) of Section 5 enumerates various circumstances, under which a landlord or a tenant may approach the Court for suitable relief. Firstly the landlord may claim that the annual reasonable rent is inadequate. Secondly, the tenant may claim that the annual reasonable rent is excessive. Thirdly either of the parties may urge that the reasonable annual rent declared under Section 3-A is incorrect. Fourthly, the tenant may claim that the agreed rent is higher than the annual reasonable rent. The second part of sub-Section (4) deals with certain reliefs. Two reliefs have been provided in sub-Section (4). The first relief is a declaration. The second relief is fixation of rent by the court. It will be seen that two reliefs in the alternative have been provided in sub-Section (4) for the four situations mentioned in the first part of the sub-section. It is not possible to say that a particular relief is meant for a particular situation mentioned in the first part of sub-Section (4). It is open to the court to grant a plaintiff the appropriate relief according to the circumstances of the case. If a tenant can get rent fixed by the court, there is no good reason why the landlord should not get rent fixed by the Court. It is open to the court to grant a plaintiff the appropriate relief according to the circumstances of the case. If a tenant can get rent fixed by the court, there is no good reason why the landlord should not get rent fixed by the Court. We overrule the objection raised on behalf of defendant-applicant, and hold that under Section 5(4) of the Act a suit by a landlord for fixation of rent is maintainable. 9. The second contention of Mr. K.C. Agarwal was that a claim for fixation of rent cannot be joined with a claim for arrears of rent in the same suit. This point was considered by Chaturvedi, J. in Bishambar Dayal v. Lala Girdhar Lal 1952 A.L.J. 697. He held that a prayer for recovery of arrears of rent at the same rate at which the plaintiff seeks to have the rent fixed by the court, can be joined to the claim for fixation of rent under Section 5(4) of the Act. We are in agreement with that view. So this objection raised on behalf of defendant-applicant also fails. 10. It was further argued by Mr. K.C. Agarwala that the learned Munsif did not deal with evidence in a satisfactory manner. Various defects were brought to our notice. The learned Munsif remarked that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer should not have considered the assessment of 1937 in fixing the rent under Section 3-A of the Act. That officer had to fix rent under Section 3-A in the light of the definition of Municipal assessment contained in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act. According to that definition Municipal assessment means the annual rental value assessed by the Municipal Board in force on 1.4.42. According to the title of Ex. A-7, the assessment made in the year 1937 was expected to remain in force up to March 1944. There is, therefore, reason to believe that assessment was in force in 1942 also. If that is the true position, it cannot be said that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was wrong in taking the 1937 assessment into consideration in fixing rent under Section 3-A. 11. The learned Munsif remarked that according to Ex. 5, the annual rental value came to Rs. 1200/-. It is true that in one column of Ex. 5 we find that figure Rs. 1200/- mentioned as annual income. The learned Munsif remarked that according to Ex. 5, the annual rental value came to Rs. 1200/-. It is true that in one column of Ex. 5 we find that figure Rs. 1200/- mentioned as annual income. But we also find that, in another column it was indicated that the assessment was reduced to Rs. 500/- in appeal. 12. The learned Munsif relied on one document, which has been marked as Ex. 8. Mr. Agarwala contended that this document was never received in evidence by the trial court. In support of this contention, our attention was drawn to the proceedings recorded in English. On 5.10.61 the learned Munsif recorded the following note: "Defendant's application for not admitting 60-A in evidence as plaintiff did not obtain any permission. The plaintiff may apply if he wishes to get permission. Plaintiff opens the case...... Arguments heard. Judgment on 10.10.61." Judgment could not be delivered on 10.10.61; and 23.10.61 was fixed for judgment. Ultimately, judgment was delivered on 23.10.61. These proceedings indicate that paper no. 60-A was not formally admitted in evidence to the knowledge of the defendant. Yet the paper was marked as Ex. 8. 13. Mr. S.B.L. Gaur contended that the document having been accepted. It is no longer open to raise the question of admissibility of the document. For this contention, Mr. Gaur relied upon Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana 1961 S.C. 1655. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed on pp. 1656 and 1957 thus: "Once the Court, rightly or wrongly, decides to admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed. Section 35 is in the nature of a penal provision and has far-reaching effects...... The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. The record in this case disclosed the fact that the hundis were marked as Ex. P1 and P2 and bore the endorsement 'admitted in evidence' under the signature of the court. It is not therefore, one of those cases where a document has been inadvertently admitted, without the Court applying its mind to the question of its admissibility. The record in this case disclosed the fact that the hundis were marked as Ex. P1 and P2 and bore the endorsement 'admitted in evidence' under the signature of the court. It is not therefore, one of those cases where a document has been inadvertently admitted, without the Court applying its mind to the question of its admissibility. Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and the trial has proceeded all along on the footing that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross examination of their witnesses Section 36 of the Stamp Act comes into operation." 14. In that case the Court had to consider whether a party could raise the question of deficiency in stamp before an appellate court. It appears that in that case Exs. P1 and P2 were brought on record and exhibited to the knowledge of both the parties. That is not the position in present case. In the present case the learned Munsif indicated on 10.10.61 that he would not admit paper No. 60-A in evidence without an application by the plaintiff. The trial proceeded on that basis. It appears that thereafter the plaintiff never moved an application for admitting the document in evidence, as suggested by the court on 10.10.61. The defendant was, therefore, entitled to assume that the court had not admitted paper no. 60-A into evidence. Yet the court proceeded to exhibit that paper as. -Ex. 8 and to use the document as evidence in the case. In his judgment the learned Munsif observed: "Exhibit 3 is the copy of the statement of Sobha Ram in suit No. 202/54 Munsif Agra. He deposed that he was the tenant at Rs. 29/- per month." That observation is open to several objections. In the first place, the statement of Sobha Ram would be hit by the rule against hearsay. Secondly, on perusing Ex. 3 on the record, we find that document is not a copy of the statement of Sobha Ram at all. Ex. 3 is a copy of the statement by Vidya Ram in suit No. 202 of 1954. In Ex. 3 we find no reference to Rs. 29/- per month as rent. Mr. Secondly, on perusing Ex. 3 on the record, we find that document is not a copy of the statement of Sobha Ram at all. Ex. 3 is a copy of the statement by Vidya Ram in suit No. 202 of 1954. In Ex. 3 we find no reference to Rs. 29/- per month as rent. Mr. K.C. Agarwal placed before us a document, which appears to be a copy of the statement of Sobha Ram in the same suit (No. 202 of 1954). It appears that the learned Munsif read Sobha Ram's statement without notice to the defendant, and used that document as evidence in the case for the purpose of fixing rent. 15. Had the defects in the judgment been confined to misreading of evidence, we would not have taken serious notice of such irregularities. But some of the defects pointed out by the applicants are of more serious character. As discussed, Ex. 8 was read in evidence without proper notice to the defendant. It is true that the document was shown to defendant's counsel; and he noted "not admitted" on the document. But the record does not indicate that paper No. 60-A was actually being received in evidence by the court. Further, the court relied upon Sobha Ram's statement in another case, although that document did not form part of the record of the present case at all. The procedure adopted by the trial court was unfair to the defendant. These defects constitute material irregularity in procedure. 16. Mr. Gaur urged before us that we should not interfere in revision on the ground of these irregularities, because the decision of the court is sound on merits. It has no be remembered that the rent fixed under Section 3-A of the Act was only Rs. 3/- p.m. We are, no means, sure that Rs. 25/- p.m. is fair rent for the shop in dispute. We are, therefore, unable to maintain the decision of the learned Munsif in spite of the serious irregularities committed by him in trying the suit. The proper order would be to remand the case to the trial court for decision according to law. 17. The civil revision is allowed with costs. We set aside the decree of the learned 1st Additional Munsif of Agra dated 23.10.61, and remand the case to the trial court for disposal according to law. The proper order would be to remand the case to the trial court for decision according to law. 17. The civil revision is allowed with costs. We set aside the decree of the learned 1st Additional Munsif of Agra dated 23.10.61, and remand the case to the trial court for disposal according to law. The trial court should hear arguments for the parties, and base its judgment only upon the evidence on record.