JUDGMENT H.C.P. Tripathi, J. - The petitioner, who was born on 17th of August, 1906, was appointed Tax Officer of the erstwhile District Board of Furrukhabad in the year 1935. The order of appointment laid down a condition that one year's notice on either side shall be necessary for the termination of the service. At the time of this appointment the age of superannuation under the rules was 60 years and the Board had the option to give extension of one year at a time till the age reached 65 years. In August 1940 the rules regarding the age of superannuation were changed and it was provided that no officer or servant of the Board shall ordinarily be retained in the service after he attains the age of 55 years and in no case after he attains the age of 60 years. The Board was given an option to give extension up to a total maximum period of five years, provided that no extension could be granted for a period exceeding one year at a time. The superannuation age was again changed in November, 1940 from 55 to 60 years giving an option to the Board to extend it by five years for special reasons. 2. On October 29, 1946 the retirement age was again extended by another notification which provided that the District Board employees were not to be retained ordinarily in the service of the Board after attaining the age of 60 years and in no case after the age of 65 years. By a notification dated 31st December, 1955 the aforesaid rule 7 framed in 1940 in respect of retention and retirement of District Board employees was amended providing that "the age of retirement from service of all employees of District Boards shall be 55 years, beyond which no one shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the Board." It, however, further provided that the age of retirement of employees who were between 45 and 50 years of age on December 31, 1955 shall be 57 years and those who were fifty years of age or over on the aforesaid date shall be 60 years, for special reasons to be recorded by the Board. The aforesaid notification of 31st December, 1955 was subsequently amended by a notification dated June 24, 1958 which provided that "the age of retirement from service of all employees of District Board shall be 58 years beyond which no one shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the Board, provided that those employees of Board who were 50 years or above of age on December 31, 1955, will be allowed to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years." 3. In place of the District Boards constituted under the District Boards Act, 1922, Zila Parishads came into existence in June 1963 in pursuance of the U.P. Kshetra Samities and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961 and all officers and servants in the employ of the District Board became officers and servants employed by the Zila Parishad on the same salaries and allowances and subject to the same conditions of the service to which they were entitled or were subject immediately before the enforcement of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner became an employee of the respondent No. 1. 4. On 4th May, 1964 the petitioner received a notice from the Chief Executive Officer, Farrukhabad that he will reach the age of superannuation on 16th of August, 1964 in accordance with the Notification of 24th June, 1958 and shall be finally relieved of his services with effect from the forenoon of that date. 5. In this petition a prayer has been made for the grant of a writ of certiorari for quashing the notification dated 24th June, 1958 and for another writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to superannuate the petitioner till he reaches the age of 60 years. 6. Sri. S.C. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised several contentions in support of the petition. He has urged that at the time of his appointment the petitioner was governed by rule 7 as it existed in 1935 which fixed the age of superannuation as 60 years and it cannot be changed subsequently to his disadvantage and such a change amounts to his per se removal from service. Learned counsel contends that the rules as amended in 1955 and 1958 lay down different ages of superannuation of different categories of employees of District Board and such classification is not based upon any rational basis. Learned counsel contends that the rules as amended in 1955 and 1958 lay down different ages of superannuation of different categories of employees of District Board and such classification is not based upon any rational basis. Further, by extending the age of retirement of the employees of the local bodies in urban area from 58 to 60 years while compelling the petitioner to retire at the age mentioned in impugned notification the respondent No. 2 is violating Articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 7. It has been further urged that the agreement on the basis of which the petitioner was appointed by the District Board provided that before terminating his services he shall be given one year's notice and as no such notice has been given the Board is not competent to terminate the same. 8. Lastly, it has been urged, that the Impugned notification, on terms, is not retrospective and even if it is held to be so, it having been issued by the State in exercise of its power to make regulations under Section 173(2) of the District Board's Act 1922, it cannot supersede contractual obligations of the parties and in its very nature can never be retrospective. 9. Sri S.N. Kakkar, learned counsel for the respondents, has, on the other hand, argued that when the petitioner entered the service of the Board he knew that the State enjoyed a power under Section 173(2) to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of the Board and therefore, he cannot be allowed to raise the plea that the impugned notification adversely affects his interests. The language of the notification is explicit and on terms applies retrospectively. Learned counsel has urged that the impugned notification is perfectly legal and does not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as the classification based on age is reasonable and the State enjoys a power under the law to alter the service conditions of its employees even to their prejudice by amending the rules and it can never be held to amount to their per se punishment. Mr. Mr. Kakkar says that all the points raised in support of the petition are covered by a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Autar Pandey v. State of U.P. 1962 A.L.J. 31 wherein similar contentions raised by the petitioner were repelled by the Full Bench and the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision applies with full force to the facts of the present case. 10. In Ram Autar's case 1962 A.L.J. 31 the Court was dealing with a case in which the age of superannuation was changed by an amendment of rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules made by the Governor in the exercise of his powers under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The decision of the case mainly rested on the ground that as the power of the Governor under the aforesaid proviso was co-extensive with that of the legislature given in the Article, he could amend and change a rule whether to the detriment or to that advantage of the employees concerned. In that case when the petitioner had joined service, the age of superannuation was 55 years, which was subsequently raised to 58 years and then again reduced 55 years. Mr. Justice Oak has remarked that it was not a case where a Government servant's rights existing at the time of his joining service were being taken away. 11. Following the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab 1960 S.C. 1305 the Full Bench held that retirement under a service rule which provided for compulsory retirement at any stage whatsoever irrespective of the length of service, cannot necessarily be regarded as dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. On the question of the Government Notification being discriminatory, it was observed that the three categories mentioned in the first column of the schedule of the Notification were based on age which could form a reasonable basis of distinction. Hon'ble Dwivedi, J. was pleased to observe further that "all services, except entrenched posts, are held during the pleasure of the Governor. No rule framed under Article 309, which is subject to the provisions of Article 310, may carve out a tenure of any other kind. Hon'ble Dwivedi, J. was pleased to observe further that "all services, except entrenched posts, are held during the pleasure of the Governor. No rule framed under Article 309, which is subject to the provisions of Article 310, may carve out a tenure of any other kind. Accordingly, the old rule fixing 58 years as the age of compulsory retirement and framed under Article 309, would not avail against the Governor, even though it may bind his subordinates." 12. In my opinion, therefore, although much light can be derived from the aforesaid Full Bench decision, it does not furnish an answer to the questions posed in the present case, and is distinguishable on facts. 13. Under Section 172 of the District Boards Act, 1922, the State Government is empowered to make rules in respect of matters connected with general election of members of the Board, the assessment and collection of taxes and other matters relating thereto, the authority on which money may be paid from the district fund and the condition on which property may be acquired by a Board and other matters relating to the fund or property of the Board and also providing for the channel of correspondence between the Board and the State Government, the preparation and sanction of plans and estimates for works, the maintenance and keeping of accounts, its publication and audit and other matters connected with the finances of the Board. 14. Under Section 173 of the Act power is vested in the Board to make regulations by special resolution inter alia for regulating its internal management and for providing the period of service of its servant. Sub-Section (2) of the aforesaid section, however, gives option to the State Government to make regulations consistent with the Act providing inter alia the period and conditions of service of all servants of the Board which shall have the effect of rescinding any regulation made by a Board in respect of the same manner or inconsistent therewith. The impugned notifications have been issued by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (2) of Section 173 of the Act. The notification of June 24, 1958 runs: Swayaktta Shasan Vibhag. Miscellaneous. June 24, 1958. The impugned notifications have been issued by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (2) of Section 173 of the Act. The notification of June 24, 1958 runs: Swayaktta Shasan Vibhag. Miscellaneous. June 24, 1958. 1923-A/IX-A-1 (337)-57 in continuation of notification No. 3807-A/IX-A-1 (337)-57 dated November 5, 1957 is hereby notified that the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section 173 of the U.P.D.B. Act 1922, has after previous publication as required under Section 176(i) of the said Act made the following amendments in the regulations regarding retention and retirement of D.B. employees as published with notification No. 4944/IX-334-35 dated Nov. 15, 1940, and amended from time to time, and has further directed that these regulations shall come into force from July 1, 1958. Amendments For regulation 1, substitute the following:- 1. "the age of retirement from service of all employees of D.B. shall be 58 years beyond which no one shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the Board. Provided that those employees of Board who were 50 years or above of age on December 31, 1955, will be allowed to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years." 2. In regulation 2 and in the form appended thereto for the figure "55" wherever occurring substitute the figure "58". 15. There can be no doubt that this notification in terms is retrospective in terms is retrospective and applies to all the employees of the Board. The question, however, arises whether the Governor while exercising power under Section 173(2) of the Act can issue a notification changing the service conditions of the employees of the employees of the Board to their disadvantage without their consent. 16. There has been some divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether the terms and conditions of service embodied in the agreement can be changed unilaterally by the Governor. 17. In the case of Jogesh Chandra Dutta Gupta v. Union of India A.I.R. 1955 Assam 17, a Division Bench of that Court has observed: "Plaintiff accepted service on the representation that the Provident Fund rules of the State shall apply to him.......Plaintiff had been in service since 1916. He had a few months of service left to be able to retire. On the faith of terms offered to him, he agreed to continue on in service. The basis of his employment is contractual. He had a few months of service left to be able to retire. On the faith of terms offered to him, he agreed to continue on in service. The basis of his employment is contractual. The Government did not reserve any right to alter the rules relating to Provident Fund after the exercise of opinion by him to serve the Government. In the absence of any such reservation, the Government has no right or privilege to alter the terms of any agreement unilaterally and without the consent of the other party when conditions of service are embodied in an agreement.......Section 241(2) does not confer on the Rule-making authority any power to issue any circular which can change conditions of service of Civil servants after their retirement even when these conditions form part of written agreements." 18. In the case of Sunder Lal v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1957 Punjab. 140 Khosla, J. observed: "In fact I am extremely doubtful if a new rule can bind old Government servants without their consent, because one party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of contract or the conditions of service, but that, however, is a point not before me." 19. So far as this Court is concerned, however, the question has been finally settled in Ram Autar's case (supra) that the Governor while exercising power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution could alter the service conditions of its employees unilaterally be amending the rules. 20. In this case the power has been exercised by the Governor by issuing the impugned notification under Section 173(2) of the Act. Under Section 173 a power has been conferred on the Board to make regulations inter alia providing the period and conditions of service of all servants of the Board. Under Sub-Section (2) the same power is vested in the State Government and it has been provided that if the State Government makes any such regulations that "shall have the effect of rescinding any regulation made by the Board under the said sub-section in respect of the same matter or inconsistent therewith". It is, therefore, obvious that the power vested in the State Government under sub-Section (2) is of the same nature and content as the power which has been given to the Board under sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of the Act. It is, therefore, obvious that the power vested in the State Government under sub-Section (2) is of the same nature and content as the power which has been given to the Board under sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of the Act. In my opinion, the power initially vested in the Board under Section 173 does not possess any legislative content so as to supersede contractual obligations and, on the other hand, is administrative in nature. Therefore, it will not be open to the Board to frame any regulation so as to deprive its employees of their vested contractual rights. In other words, the Board will not be competent to frame any regulation which may change the service conditions of its employees to their detriment with retrospective effect. As the Governor was exercising a similar power under sub-Section (2) of the Act, it was not open to him to make the notification retrospective so as to effect the service conditions of the employees of the Board without their consent. It is true that while issuing the impugned notification the Governor was exercising a statutory power that this power vested in him under Section 173(2) is not analogous to one which he enjoys under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Under Article 309 of the power vested in him being co-extensive with that of the legislature possesses a legislative content. That in my opinion is not the case when he is exercising a power under Section 173(2) of the Act which is administrative in character. 21. The legislature can make and unmake laws even affecting the vested right so long as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. That, however, is not the case with the statutory bodies. In my opinion, the local bodies which are the creatures of the legislature cannot enjoy the powers of the same nature and extent as their creator. In this view of the matter, it must be held that the impugned notification so far as it purports to effect the service conditions of the employees with a retrospective effect is invalid and inoperative. 22. In this view of the matter, it must be held that the impugned notification so far as it purports to effect the service conditions of the employees with a retrospective effect is invalid and inoperative. 22. Under Section 174 of the Act "a board by special resolution may .....make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district.....for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants of such area and for the furtherance of the administration of the district under this Act." 23. The powers exercised by the State Government for making rules and by the Board for making bye-laws under Sections 172 and 174 of the Act respectively partake of a legislative character as they affect the public in general and provide for the fundamentals of the administration of local bodies. That is not the case, however, with the power which is exercised by the Board or by State in making regulations under Section 173 of the Act inasmuch as they are only in respect of matters relating to the internal management of the Board and do not concern the public at large or the fundamentals of the District administration. Regulations framed in exercise of this power, in my opinion cannot have legislative content and must be held to be administrative in nature incapable of affecting the vested rights of the employees under their service agreement with the Board with retrospective effect. 24. The appointment letter dated 5th November, 1935 issued by the Board to the petitioner inter alia mentions that "it has been laid down as a condition that one year's notice on either side shall be necessary for the termination of the service." Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Board has no authority to terminate the services of the petitioner without giving him one year's notice which has been incorporated as an essential condition in his service agreement. 25. This condition of giving one year's notice is applicable only in cases where the termination of service is not on account of superannuation but otherwise. A person who is superannuated knows that he will have to retire on reaching a particular age and, therefore, the question of notice in his case does not arise. 25. This condition of giving one year's notice is applicable only in cases where the termination of service is not on account of superannuation but otherwise. A person who is superannuated knows that he will have to retire on reaching a particular age and, therefore, the question of notice in his case does not arise. In this case, however, as I have held that the impugned notification is invalid in so far as it purports to reduce the superannuation age of the petitioner from 60 to 58 years, it is incumbent on the Board to give the required on year's notice to the petitioner, if they intend to terminate his service before he attains the age of 60 years. 26. The notification of June 24, 1958 provides that "the age of the retirement from service of all employees of District Board shall be 58 years beyond which no one shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the Board. Provided that those employees of Board who were 50 years or above the age on December 31, 1955, will be allowed to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years." 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that this classification of the employees for the purposes of their superannuation in two age grounds is not on any substantial basis and has no rational nexus with the object of the notification. Learned counsel further contends that the nature of the duties of the employees of the local bodies of the urban and rural areas is similar. The object with which these local bodies function in their respective spheres is also the same. During the last 50 years or so whenever the amendment have been made in the rule as to the age of superannuation of the services employed in District Board corresponding amendments had also been made in rules relating to the superannuation of the employees of the local bodies in urban areas. This time, however, though the State Government has taken a decision on the 8th of July 1964 to extend the age of retirement and superannuation of the employees of local bodies in urban areas, that is, the Municipal Board, Notified Area, Town Area and the corporations to 60 years, no such extension has been made in case of the employees of the District Board. Learned counsel contends that it is a clear discrimination against the District Board employees which has no reasonable basis and nexus with the object to be achieved and as such the decision of the State to retire the petitioner at the age of 58 years is hit by Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. 28. Sri Rajendra Pratap Jauhari in his counter-affidavit on behalf of the State has affirmed that "it is not admitted that always a change has been in the corresponding rule of the Act regarding age of municipal servants as and when changes were made regarding the age of superannuation of the servants employed in the District Boards. Generally, the changes in the age of superannuation of the District Board followed the changes of the age of superannuation of the employees of the Municipal Board." He has, further affirmed that "No notification has been issued by the State Government by which the age of superannuation of employees and servants of all the local bodies in urban areas as Municipal Boards, Notified Area, Town Areas and Corporations has been raised to 60 years. The State Government intends to frame rules from raising the age of superannuation of the employees and servants of the local bodies in urban areas and with that end in view has advised the various local bodies of the urban areas to take such steps consistent with the Rules so as not to retire their existing employees at the age of 58 years so that they may get the benefit of the rules that the State Government is intending to frame." 29. In his rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has mentioned the notifications by which corresponding amendments in the rules relating to the superannuation of employees of local bodies in urban areas were made from time to time and has annexed copies of the same with it. 30. In his rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has mentioned the notifications by which corresponding amendments in the rules relating to the superannuation of employees of local bodies in urban areas were made from time to time and has annexed copies of the same with it. 30. The petitioner has also annexed copy of G.O.No. 3360-N-II/IX-A-156/64 dated July 27, 1964 to all the District Magistrates in Uttar Pradesh (Annexure D to the rejoinder affidavit) which says that "Government have decided to raise the age of retirement of the employees of urban local bodies, other than teachers, from 58 years to 60 years with the provision that extension upto the age of 62 years can also be allowed by the local bodies...Necessary steps to amend the relevant rules in this behalf are being taken by Government. You may, therefore, kindly advise the urban area local bodies of your district not to retire such employees as had attained the age of 58 years but had not attained the age of 60 years on June, 1964...." 31. It is obvious that though the Government has not yet amended the rule, it has taken a firm decision not to retire the employees of the local bodies in urban areas until they have attained the age of 60 years and is implementing their decision by continuing such employees in service even after they have reached the superannuation age according to the present rule. The question, therefore, legitimately arises whether this decision of the State Government to treat the employees of the urban bodies on a different plane in respect of their superannuation than the employees of the rural bodies has any reasonable basis for the classification, or amounts to a discrimination between the two groups of the employees who are similarly circumstanced. 32. In the case of Moti Ram v. N.E. Frontier Railway A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600, Hon'ble Chief Justice Gajendragadkar was pleased to observe: "In regard to the age of superannuation, it may be said prima facie the rules of superannuation which are prescribed in respect of public services in all modern States are based on considerations of life expectation, mental capacity of the civil servants having regard to the climatic conditions under which they work, and the nature of the work they do. They are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not involve the exercise of any discretion". They are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not involve the exercise of any discretion". In the light of the aforesaid observation, the decision of the State Government to provide different ages of superannuation for the employees of the local bodies of the urban and rural areas does not appear to be founded on any reasonable basis. 33. These local bodies, e.g. Municipal Boards, Corporations District Boards, Town Areas etc. function almost on identical planes for the achievement of similar objects, that is, for providing communication, sanitation, medical and education facilities for the residents in their respective areas. Their administration is run by almost an identical apparatus of services under the control and direction of non-official Chairman elected by the representatives of the people. There is neither any marked distinction in the nature of the work which these services render nor in the load of their responsibilities. An assessment officer of a District Board performs the same functions as an assessment officer in a Corporation or Municipal Board and under similar conditions. 34. The climatic conditions in rural areas of the State do not compare unfavourable with those prevailing in cities. People in rural areas are comparatively immune from the resultant stress and strain of modern civilisation. It cannot be said that their mental capacities and physical capabilities get depreciated earlier than those who are working and living in cities. 35. Then there is another aspect of the question. The offices of the District Headquarters which are all cities or towns. Their employees spend most of their time as do the employees of the Municipal Boards, performing their duties while sitting in their offices in the cities. On the ground of residence also, therefore, there can be no distinction between the two sets of the employees. 36. During past decade, with the rise in the living standard of the common man which is more marked in villages, and with the eradication of appalling epidemics the expectation of life in the country has shown an appreciable increase. It is, therefore, not surprising that the State Government has decided to increase the age of superannuation of the employees of the local bodies in the urban areas. But why they have considered the employees of the local bodies in rural areas not fit to get that benefit is not easily comprehensible. It is, therefore, not surprising that the State Government has decided to increase the age of superannuation of the employees of the local bodies in the urban areas. But why they have considered the employees of the local bodies in rural areas not fit to get that benefit is not easily comprehensible. There is no intelligible differentia between the aforesaid two classes of employees for fixing different ages of superannuation for them. They have been treated on par in that respect by the State Government during the past thirty years or so and nothing has happened meanwhile to justify any change in that position. In the present context of things, therefore, it must be held that the continuance of Government notifications of December 31, 1955 and June 24, 1958 reducing the superannuation age of District Board employees from 60 to 55 and then to 58 results in an arbitrary discrimination against them and as such they are hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 37. In view of my above finding, it is not necessary for me to consider the question as to whether the aforesaid notifications are also discriminatory because they provide two age groups between the employees for the purposes of superannuation. 38. In the result, the petition is allowed. A writ of mandamus shall go to the respondents directing them not to retire the petitioner from the service of the respondent No. 1 till he reaches the age of 60 years. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.