Judgment 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order of Sinha, J., dated January 4, 1963, dismissing the appellant's application for setting aside a consent decree dated August 2, 1963, passed in Suit No. 3626 of 1952. The appellant carried on business as manufacturer of condiments in co-partnership with one Sambhunath Sen, since deceased, under the name and style of Boral and Sen, each of the partners having a half share in the business. Sambhunath died on June 6, 1939, leaving him surviving his two sons, the respondents herein, each of whom became entitled to a half share in the business, which was continued after the death of Sambhunath. A suit was filed in this Court in 1952 by the respondents being Suit No. 3262 of 1952 (Dulalchand Sen and Ors. v. Upendranath Boral) for dissolution of partnership and other reliefs. A decree was passed in this suit by consent of parties on April 1, 1953, by which it was declared that the respondents were each entitled to one fourth share, and the appellant was entitled to a half share, in the assets of the partnership, which was declared to have been dissolved from the date of the consent decree. There was a reference to the arbitration of Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, Barrister-at-Law, the subject-matter of the reference being all outstanding matters in dispute between the parties. Under the terms of the consent decree the business of Boral and Sen with its goodwill and assets and stock-in-trade was purchased by the appellant for Rs. 80,000/- As the appellant did not pay the full consideration, the balance due from him was secured by a charge on certain properties belonging to the appellant. The arbitrator made his award on May 19, 1956, and filed the same. This award was set aside by consent of parties, and a fresh reference was made of the outstanding disputes to the arbitration of Mr. G. K. Dutt, Barrister-at-Law. On April 15, 1960, the arbitrator made and published his award by which he awarded that a sum of Rs. 88,270-15-0 was to be paid by the appellant to the respondents in equal shares. This liability of the appellant to the respondents under the award was in addition to his liability on account of price of the business and its goodwill. One June 21, 1960, the appellant made an application for setting aside the award of Mr. 88,270-15-0 was to be paid by the appellant to the respondents in equal shares. This liability of the appellant to the respondents under the award was in addition to his liability on account of price of the business and its goodwill. One June 21, 1960, the appellant made an application for setting aside the award of Mr. G. K. Dutt. This application was heard by G. K. Mitter, J., on June 2, 1960. Mr. D. K. De and Mr. B. N. Banerjee appeared for the appellant and the respondents were represented by Mr. B. N. Sen. 2. THE application was disposed of by G. K. Mitter, J., by an order made by consent of parties whereby the amount due by the appellant to the respondents was reduced from Rs. 88,270-15-0 to Rs. 74,301/ -. The judgment upon the award matter, which was not on the list, was by consent of parties treated as on the day's list and a decree was passed against the appellant for Rs. 74,301/- with interest on judgment at six percent. per annum. Each party was to pay its own costs of the application, and the cost of the reference before the arbitrator, was to come out of the assets of the partnership. On August 24, 1960, the solicitors for the parties put in certain agreed minutes, setting out certain terms therein relating to the decree passed on August 2 1960. These minutes provided that the decree dated August 2, 1960, was to be drawn up according to the agreed minutes filed on August 24, 1960. According to the appellant he did not give his consent either to the order and decree passed on August 2, 1960, or to the agreed minutes which were put in on August 24, 1960. The appellant obtained an order for change of solicitor from Mr. Surendranath Sen, his previous solicitor, and on September 16, 1960, he took out a notice of motion for setting aside the consent decree. This application was heard by Sinha, J., on evidence, and an order was made dismissing the application. This appeal is against this order made by Sinha, J. dismissing the application. The appellant's case is that he was present in Court on August 2, 1960, when the matter was disposed of by G. K. Mitter, J., but he did not realise that the matter was being settled without his consent. This appeal is against this order made by Sinha, J. dismissing the application. The appellant's case is that he was present in Court on August 2, 1960, when the matter was disposed of by G. K. Mitter, J., but he did not realise that the matter was being settled without his consent. After the matter was disposed of he made enquiries of his solicitor and was told that a decree had been passed against him. The appellant went to his solicitor on the next day, when he was told that a decree had been passed against him for Rs. 74,301. The appellant contends that he was not consulted in the matter of settlement though he was present in Court, and his definite instructions to his lawyers, were not to settle the application in any event. According to the appellant, the settlement of the application had been brought about as a result of misapprehension on the part of his counsel, who consented to the decree against the appellant without any authority or instruction. He has alleged in the petition that his counsel had no actual authority to settle the application or to consent to the decree. He was never consulted either by his solicitor or his counsel regarding the terms of settlement and never gave his consent to the same. The respondents contend that the authority of Mr. D. K. De, counsel for the appellant, to settle the matter was never withdrawn or restricted and that instructions were given to him to settle the matter. The appellant was present in Court on August 2, 1960, when the matter was heard and disposed of by G. K. Mitter, J., and he had expressly authorised his counsel Mr. De, through his solicitor Mr. Sen, to compromise the matter. The appellant expressly agreed to a decree being passed against him upon some reduction of the amount awarded against him. But the amount of reduction to be allowed, was left entirely to the learned Judge. The respondents further contend that the mere fact that the exact figure was not agreed upon or that the appellant did not give his consent to a particular figure, is of no consequence, because he agreed to a decree being passed, upon such reduction, (besides the correction of an arithmetical error by Rs.9,000/-) as the learned Judge thought fit to allow. The Appellant's counsel had pointed out an arithmetical error and G. K. Mitter, J., expressed the opinion that if there was an apparent mistake in calculation, it could be then and there corrected by the Court without setting aside the award. Mr. B. N. Sen, learned counsel for the respondents, agreed to the correction being made. The order was about to be made when Mr. De turned to his solicitor Mr. Sen, and told him that the application was liable to be dismissed even if the correction was made, but if the appellant agreed to a decree being passed, and the award upheld, subject to the correction, Mr. De would try to have the amount of the decree reduced still further. Thereafter the solicitor Mr. Sen took instructions from the appellant, who instructed the solicitor to settle the matter, if a further reduction was allowed in the amount of the award. After some further discussion the award was reduced by Rs.13,969/ -. The order was thereupon made by consent. The judgment upon award matter, which was not in the list, was by consent of parties, treated as on the day's list, and a decree was passed on the award. The consent order was thereafter made and a judgment was passed on the award as modified by reducing the claim by RS. 13,969/ -. This was followed by certain agreed minutes which were put in on August 24, 1960, relating to the decree passed. These minutes, it is claimed by the respondents, were put in for the purpose of facilitating the drawing up of the decree on the judgment upon award which was passed on August 2, 1960. 3. SINHA, J., tried the application on evidence, Mr. D. K. De, learned counsel for the appellant, made a statement from the bar. The appellant examined himself and his solicitor Mr. Sen was called as a Court witness. The substance of Mr. De's statement is that G. K. Mitter, J., who heard the application was not very much impressed by the arguments advanced by him. But there was an arithmetical error in the award and he pressed his arguments on the ground of this error. There was a discussion between him and the learned counsel for the respondents, on the question of settlement, during the midday recess. Mr. But there was an arithmetical error in the award and he pressed his arguments on the ground of this error. There was a discussion between him and the learned counsel for the respondents, on the question of settlement, during the midday recess. Mr. De felt that if the matter was left to the learned Judge for a settlement, his client would not only get the benefit of the mistake, but also there would be a further reduction in the amount awarded against him. Accordingly he spoke to his solicitor, who was sitting by is side and who agreed to the settlement, and thereafter he submitted that the matter could be settled if there was a further reduction in the amount awarded against his client. Mr. De's impression was that his solicitor turned round to his client who was sitting behind, but he could not say whether the solicitor actually spoke of the client. The solicitor gave him the instruction to settle and this instruction, according to Mr. De's impression, was given after obtaining the consent of the client, His further impression was that there was no objection from his client to the proposed settlement. Sinha, J., accepted the statement of Mr. De and in our opinion, Mr. De's evidence as to what happened in the Court at the time when the matter was disposed of by G. K. Mitter, J., was rightly accepted by Sinha, J. The appellant's evidence was that he never saw the face of his counsel Mr. De although he was present in the Court room. Just before the Court rose for the midday recess, he made enquiries and was told that consent was being given and he at once said that he did not give his consent. He heard shouts of 'consent' from the counsel and attorney of the respondents. But although he was present in Court and his solicitor Mr. Sen was sitting by the side of his counsel, he did not know who his counsel was When the Court rose for the day, he did not know what the order was, but on the next day he saw his solicitor and came to know that a decree had been passed against him. His positive evidence was that he did not give his consent and he objected to the decree being passed by consent. His positive evidence was that he did not give his consent and he objected to the decree being passed by consent. During the time the matter was heard, there wag no talk at all between him and his solicitor, nor did he see his counsel having any conversation with his solicitor. After the matter was over, he obtained a change of attorney from Mr. S.N. Sen to his present solicitor Mr. P. N. Mallick. He had come to know that certain agreed minutes were put in on August 24, 1960, but he did not give his consent to those minutes. He followed the proceedings in English in Court though he could not follow them fully. Although he had taken a change from his previous solicitor Mr. S.K. Sen, because according to him, Mr. Sen acted contrary to his instruction, he has retained Mr. Sen as his solicitor in another matter which is still pending. But when actually he heard the shouts of 'consent' in Court, he did nothing, but merely stood in the Court and did not object to his counsel giving his consent. His explanation is that he did not know that Mr. De was giving consent to the decree on his behalf. But though his evidence is that the solicitor told him on the next day, i.e., on August 3, 1960, that a decree had been passed against him by consent, in paragraph 16 of his petition, it is stated that after the Court rose on August 2, 1960, his solicitor told him that a decree had been passed against him, but he could not mention the amount. On the question of his being informed about the consent decree, his evidence is that his junior advocate Mr. B. N. Banerjee told him that consent had been given to the decree. Although such a serious thing was done, namely, that a decree was passed against him by consent, though he did not give his consent, he did not write to his solicitor protesting against what was done, or at any rate recording the fact that he did not consent to the decree being passed against him by consent. On the same day he went to his solicitor's office but the solicitor merely asked him to come on the next day when he would tell him everything of what happened in Court. On the same day he went to his solicitor's office but the solicitor merely asked him to come on the next day when he would tell him everything of what happened in Court. This is quite at variance with what is stated in paragraph 16 of the petition. 4. SINHA, J., who had the advantage of observing the demean our of the witness came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a witness of truth and that his evidence is full of prevarications. In our opinion Sinha, J., was entirely right in rejecting the evidence of the appellant. We cannot accept the appellant's testimony that although he was in Court, and discussions went on for sometime about the question of settlement and a decree being passed by consent, and although he was fairly familiar with the English language and understood and followed, to some extent at least the proceedings that were going on in Court, he had no talk either with his Solicitor or with his counsel and even after it became clear to him that something was being done by consent which he had not given, he made no protest either to his solicitor or to his counsel, but remained silently standing. The appellant is not a person who is unfamiliar with proceedings in Court. He was party to several other proceedings in which he had given his consent and therefore fully knew what an order by consent meant. On April 1, 1953, a decree was passed by his consent in this suit. Thereafter there was a reference to arbitration of Mr. A. K. Bhattacharjee by consent. On June 14, 1953, the terms of the consent decree in this suit were modified by consent of parties. On September 3, 1956, the award made by Mr. A. K. Bhattacharjee was set aside by consent and a further order was made by consent of parties for a fresh reference of the disputes to the arbitration of Mr. G. K. Dutt, Barrister-at-Law. Thus it is clear that having been a party to so many orders made by consent, the appellant well knew the implications of an order made by consent of parties. According to his evidence, he heard shouts of 'consent', when the mater was heard by G. K. Miller, J. Yet his evidence is that he made no enquiries, much less any protest, and remained completely silent. According to his evidence, he heard shouts of 'consent', when the mater was heard by G. K. Miller, J. Yet his evidence is that he made no enquiries, much less any protest, and remained completely silent. In this state of the evidence, in our opinion, Sinha, J, rightly rejected the evidence of the appellant. Turning now to the evidence of Mr. D. K. De, the first comment to be made about this evidence is that Mr. De was not cross-examined by learned counsel on cither side. Sinha, J., put a few questions to him for clarification of the statement made by him, Mr. Do's evidence was that he was told that the appellant was sitting in the Court room behind him, and he enquired of his solicitor if he should agree to the terms discussed in Court and his solicitor answered in the affirmative and thereupon he told G. K. Mitter, J., that it would be better to settle the matter if the figure of his client's liability under the award was knocked down still further, that is to say, a further reduction, after correction of the arithmetical error. Mr. De had noticed his solicitor turn round though he could not say whether the solicitor actually spoke to the client. Mr. De's impression was that the solicitor had the consent of the client, at any rate, he got the impression that there was no objection to the order being made by consent. Sinha, J., has accepted the statement and evidence of Mr. D. K, De and has described Mr. De's statement as fair and impartial. We see no reason to differ from Sinha, J.'s view regarding Mr. De's evidence. The evidence of Mr. S. N. Sen, the solicitor, is that the appellant was in the Court room when discussions for settlement were going on. He had a conversation with his client on the question of settlement, that instructions were given by the appellant to him and to Mr. Banerjee, the Junior advocate, and such instructions were duly conveyed to Mr. De. He told the appellant that a particular sum was deducted for the arithmetical mistake, for which no consent of the client was necessary and another sum was deducted by consent of parties. He also informed his client about a week after the order was made on August 2, 1960, about the agreed minutes which were put in later on. De. He told the appellant that a particular sum was deducted for the arithmetical mistake, for which no consent of the client was necessary and another sum was deducted by consent of parties. He also informed his client about a week after the order was made on August 2, 1960, about the agreed minutes which were put in later on. His positive evidence is that he took instructions from his client on the question of an order being made by consent and a decree also being passed on the award. The consent order was made upon instructions given by him to Mr. Do and he in his turn received instructions from his client. His client never raised any objection to the order being made by consent and also the decree being passed by consent between the date of the hearing of the application and the date on which the agreed minutes were put in. This in substance is the evidence of Mr. Sen, which Sinha, J., accepted. In our view, the evidence of Mr. Sen is corroborative of and is quite consistent with the statement made by Mr. De. The appellant was present in court when the discussions for a settlement were going on. The learned counsel for the appellant asked for instructions from the solicitor, the solicitor had a talk with the client who agreed to the order being made by consent and thereupon learned counsel for the appellant gave his consent to the order that was made on August 2, 1960. Having regard to the positive evidence of both counsel and solicitor that the appellant was present in Court, that he followed the proceedings in Court, that he understood that the order was going to be made by consent and that he did not raise any objection to the order being made by consent, it is difficult to believe that the solicitor should have taken the responsibility of instructing counsel to give his consent, when in fact such consent was not given by the client who was all along present in Court. We therefore hold that the appellant gave his consent to the order made on August 2, 1960. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Neale v. Gordon Lennox (1) (1902) A. C. 465. We therefore hold that the appellant gave his consent to the order made on August 2, 1960. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Neale v. Gordon Lennox (1) (1902) A. C. 465. This was an action for defamation in which the plaintiff authorised her counsel to consent to a reference on condition that the defendant should publicly state by her counsel that no imputation had been made or intended to be made. The plaintiff's counsel agreed to refer the action without any disclaimer of the imputations. In these facts, it was held that counsel having exceeded his authority, the plaintiff was entitled to have the agreement to refer the dispute set aside and the case restored to the list for disposal. The facts involved in this case are entirely different from the facts in the appeal now before us. Admittedly certain instructions were given by client to counsel which were exceeded. It was found as a fact that counsel had acted in excess of the authority given to him and the decision turned on counsel's conduct in acting in excess of such authority. This decision, in our view does not help Mr. De, as in this case we have held that counsel had acted on the instructions given to him to settle the matter by furnishing consent to the order made. 5. THE next case relied upon by Mr. De was Shepherd v. Robinson, (2) (1919) 1 K. B. 474. In this case the order made on consent was not drawn up and it was held that counsel acted under a misapprehension and therefore the consent order was set aside and the case restored for hearing. This decision does not help Mr. De, because there was no evidence of counsel having been under any misapprehension with regard to the instructions received by him. It is the appellant's submission that counsel was under misapprehension of his authority to settle. There is no evidence of such misapprehension. On the other hand, the evidence is that client instructed the solicitor to settle and the solicitor in his turn instructed counsel to give his consent to the order being made. It is the appellant's submission that counsel was under misapprehension of his authority to settle. There is no evidence of such misapprehension. On the other hand, the evidence is that client instructed the solicitor to settle and the solicitor in his turn instructed counsel to give his consent to the order being made. Then again the decree in this case has, since the filing of the appeal, been drawn up, perfected and put into execution, whereas the order in Shephered v. Robinson, (supra) was not drawn up and therefore had not become effective. Mr. De next relied upon the decision of this Court in Carrison v. Rodrigues and Ors. (3) I. L. R. 13 Cal. 115. In this case, in order to avoid ruinous costs of litigations, defendant's counsel suggested that the learned Judge should assist in a compromise. Terms of settlement were discussed between counsel on both sides in the presence of the learned Judge and thereafter plaintiff's counsel went out to get his client's consent. He came back after explaining the matter to his client and the learned Judge was given the impression that the plaintiff's counsel had obtained his client's consent. Terms were put in, signed by counsel on both sides and on the next day, the plaintiff's attorney repudiated the settlement. The decree had not been drawn up when the application was made for setting aside the order. It was in these circumstances that It was held by trevelyan. J., that the consent decree should be set aside. This decision to our mind, again does not help Mr. De. In the first place, the client's consent was not in fact obtained, though an impression was created that the client had given her consent. Secondly the decree had not been drawn up and on this point Trevelyan, J., held that had the decree been drawn up and sealed, it would have been impossible to deal with the case. Mr. De next referred to another decision of this Court in Peary Chowdhury v. Sonoo Das, (4) 19 C. W. N. 419. In this case a decree was passed in an appeal by consent. It was found by the District Judge that the appellant caused the notice of the appeal to be suppressed and also caused a false and fraudulent vakalatnama and a compromise petition to be filed. In this case a decree was passed in an appeal by consent. It was found by the District Judge that the appellant caused the notice of the appeal to be suppressed and also caused a false and fraudulent vakalatnama and a compromise petition to be filed. The opposite party came to know of this fraud only when process in execution of the decree was taken out. It was in these circumstances that it was held that the Court had the power to correct its own proceedings when it was misled. This decision again docs not help Mr. De, because no consent was given to the decree that was passed in appeal and further it was found that fraud was practiced upon the Court by suppression of notice of appeal and also by the filing of a false and fraudulent vakalatnama. 6. THE facts in this case are entirely different from the facts in the instant case now before us in which there is positive evidence of consent having been given by the client to the order being made. Mr. De next referred to another decision of this Court in. Haridas Sadhukhan v. Iswar Ratneswar, (5) A. I. R. (1933) Cal. 94. This was an appeal from an order under O. 23, t. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code for recording a compromise. There were certain talks of settlement between the plaintiff and two of the defendants, the other defendant having declined to settle. At this stage the plaintiff applied under O. 23, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recording a compromise, which, he alleged, had been entered into between all the parties. It was held that the third defendant was not a party to the compromise which was entered into between the plaintiff and the first and second defendants. On the question of maintainability of the appeal, it was held that a party aggrieved by an order under O. 23, r. 3 of the Code need not appeal both from the order and the decree in order to maintain his appeal against the order under O. 23, r. 3. This decision also in our view, does not help Mr. De Inasmuch as it was found as a fact that one of the defendants was in fact not a party to the compromise. This decision also in our view, does not help Mr. De Inasmuch as it was found as a fact that one of the defendants was in fact not a party to the compromise. It is not necessary for us to refer to the other portion of the decision, namely, the maintainability of the appeal against the order on the ground that no appeal was preferred against the decree, as the decree in that case had not been drawn up and perfected, Mr. De next relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in sheonandan Prosad Singh and Ors. v. Hakim Abdul Fateh Mohammed, (6) L. R. 62 LA. 196. In this case the validity of a compromise of a suit was raised. At the trial of the action, an offer was made to buy the plaintiff's interest in certain mortgaged properties for Rs. 20,000/ -. This was followed by certain discussions. The offer was reduced and the representative of the other side, ultimately reluctantly agreed to accept the offer, believing that his master would lose the action if the same was not settled. This case was argued before the Judicial Committee on the basis of the implied authority of counsel to settle the matter. But the Judicial committee found that counsel was not attempting to exercise any implied authority and it was held that as the case had been rested on the implied authority of counsel alone, and the authority of the karpardaz of the appellant to agree to the settlement on behalf of his master was not established, the compromise must fail. This decision does not help Mr. De's client, firstly because it was not a case where express authority was given to counsel to settle and secondly because consent was purported to be given on behalf of the appellants by their representative, who it was found, had no authority to settle. Mr. B. N. Sen, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that there was ample and conclusive evidence that the appellant had instructed his solicitor to consent to the order. He argued that the evidence of Mr. D.K. De and Mr. S. N. Sen taken together, left no room for doubt that express authority was given by the appellant to his solicitor for an order being made by consent. The appellant was all along present in Court. He argued that the evidence of Mr. D.K. De and Mr. S. N. Sen taken together, left no room for doubt that express authority was given by the appellant to his solicitor for an order being made by consent. The appellant was all along present in Court. He knew English sufficiently well to follow the proceedings in Court, he understood that an order was going to be made by consent. Yet the appellant wants the Court to believe that he remained completely silent and had no discussion with his solicitor. It was further argued that the subsequent conduct of the appellant, confirmed that he had consented to the order. He did not write a single letter to his previous solicitor to put it an record that the order was made by consent contrary to his instructions. Disputes certainly were going on, if the appellant was to be believed, between him and his previous solicitor. A change of solicitor was taken from Mr. S.N. Sen to the present solicitor of the appellant, but this was not done by agreement, but an order of Court had to be obtained for this purpose. Yet there was no complaint in writing from the appellant to his previous solicitor about the latter's conduct in acting contrary to and in violation of the instructions given by him. We think there is good deal of force in this contention of Mr. Sen. It is not necessary for us to deal with the oral evidence once again, as we have already discussed it earlier in this judgment. 7. MR. Sen relied upon a decision of this Court in Musst. Gulab Koer v. Badshah Bahadur, (7) 13 C.W.N. 1197. In this case a Division Bench of this Court held that when a consent decree is sought to be set aside on the ground of fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence or any similar grounds, the appropriate remedy is by way of a suit, though the Court has the jurisdiction to review a consent decree on any such ground. In this case a Division Bench of this Court held that when a consent decree is sought to be set aside on the ground of fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence or any similar grounds, the appropriate remedy is by way of a suit, though the Court has the jurisdiction to review a consent decree on any such ground. Dealing with the question whether a decree or order could be set aside after it has been drawn up, the decision in Neale v. Gordon Lennox (supra) was dissented from in the following terms at page 1213 of the report : "upon appeal to the House of Lords, the order of the Court of Appeal was discharged, Lord Lindley in his speech (at p. 473) proceeded on the assumption that the application was made after the order had been drawn up and apparently held that, although the order had been drawn up, it could be set aside by motion on the ground that it had been made without the consent of the plaintiff and inspite of her express instructions. Such view would be in conflict with the settled doctrine that, when a final judgment has been passed and entered, the Court cannot set it aside unless a fresh action is brought for that purpose, although it had been taken by mistake." Dealing with the question as to whether a suit is the appropriate remedy in such cases, namely, where a decree has been passed by consent, it was held as follows at page 1215 of the report : "as regards the second contention of the appellant, that when a consent decree is assailed on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, coercion, undue influence, or any similar grounds, it ought to be attacked by an original suit, we are of opinion that this ground is well founded and ought to prevail. It may be conceded that the comprehensive language of S. 623 of the Code of 1832, may make it difficult to sustain the extreme view that the Court had no jurisdiction to review a consent decree on the ground of fraud or for any similar reason; but we feel no doubt whatever that when a consent decree is attacked on such grounds, undoubtedly the more appropriate remedy is by a separate suit in which the question, whether the consent is invalidated by any visiting circumstance-a question which is entirely foreign to the subject-matter of the controversy between the parties may be fully Investigated upon evidence especially directed to that point and tested as to its adequacy not only by the Court of first instance but also by the Court of Appeal." This view, namely, that the appropriate method and procedure for setting aside a consent decree on the ground of fraud is by way of a regular suit and not by an application under S, 151 of the Code was upheld by another Division bench of this Court in Suresh Chandra Sen v. Jogesh Chandra Sen, (8) 43 C. W. N. 969. In support of this contention, Mr. Sen also referred to a passage in Halsbury, 3rd Edn. Vol. 30, page 405, in which it is stated that where a final judgment has been passed, the appropriate method of setting it aside is by way of a suit. 8. IN this case however, the decree was not drawn up when the application was heard and disposed of by Sinha, J., and an order for stay of drawing up of the decree was obtained from the Court of Appeal on certain conditions, but the conditions not having been fulfilled, the decree was drawn up, pending the appeal, and has been put into execution, When the matter WPS disposed of by Sinha, J., therefore the decree was not perfected. But in this case however, the question whether decree has been perfected and drawn up or not is not of any great consequence, because on the facts we have held that counsel had express authority from client to consent to the order passed. Mr. Sen next referred to another decision of this Court in B. N. Sen and Bros. v. Chunilal Dutt and Ors., (9) A. I. R. (1924) Cal. 651. Mr. Sen next referred to another decision of this Court in B. N. Sen and Bros. v. Chunilal Dutt and Ors., (9) A. I. R. (1924) Cal. 651. In this case it was held that counsel's authority, if not expressly limited, extends to the action and all matters connected with it and that consent of client is not needed for the matter which is within the ordinary authority of counsel and therefore if a compromise was entered into by counsel in the absence of the client, the latter was bound by the decree. This decision is of no assistance in this case because the question discussed was the implied authority of counsel to compromise, but in the instant case now before us, we are not concerned with the question of counsel's implied authority. Mr. Sen also referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Yusuf I. A. Lalji v. Abdullabhoy Lalji, (10) A. I. R. (1930) Bom. 362, in which it was held that it was well established that a party must file a suit to set aside a consent decree or judgment which until it was set aside acts as an estoppel. Mr. Sen next referred to a decision of this Court in Ghasiram Goenka v. Haribux Goverdhondas, (11) C. W. N. 674. In this case the facts are somewhat similar to the facts in the instant case now before us. A suit was filed for recovery of price of goods. There were two defendants, the second defendant did not appear and the suit was decreed exparte as against him on the plaintiff's proving his case. Learned counsel for the first defendant was shown a letter in court, upon which he turned round and asked his instructing solicitor to consent to the decree and when the attorney was conferring with the first defendant's son, learned counsel for the first defendant told the Court that the petitioner consented to a decree for the amount claimed. The first defendant was not himself present in court, but his son was there. But the learned counsel did not know that he was not the first defendant himself, but his son. He later on came to know that the person present in. Court was the son of the first defendant. The first defendant was not himself present in court, but his son was there. But the learned counsel did not know that he was not the first defendant himself, but his son. He later on came to know that the person present in. Court was the son of the first defendant. The learned Counsel for the first defendant made a statement before the Court when the application for setting aside the consent decree was heard. According to this statement he had come to the conclusion that his client's case was hopeless and thereupon be turned round and said that there was no case and a decree should be passed by consent. The first defendant's son did not object to his so doing, nor did he get up to say that he withdrew his authority when the learned counsel consented to the decree. It was held that the defendant's son was sufficiently consulted and it was his duty to refuse to consent when the counsel was proposing to consent to a decree and to object to anything of the sort being done and also that he should have given notice to the other side and the Court that he was withdrawing the authority which the learned counsel had on his behalf. It was argued that the learned counsel had made a mistake in his judgment and that there was a misapprehension in his mind about the merits of the case and since the consent was given on a misunderstanding the decree should be set aside. It was held that learned counsel never said in his statement that he acted on a misunderstanding and that he had acted to the best of his judgment and even if it was shown that his judgment was not sound, because he had no good opportunity of appreciating the situation, that is no reason why the party on the other side was to be told that the agreement should not be enforced. In the instant case now before us, it was sought to be urged that the learned counsel for the appellant acted on a misunderstanding and that there was misapprehension in his mind. But in the statement made by Mr. De, there is no suggestion that there was any misunderstanding or misapprehension in his mind. On the other hand, he acted on the express instruction given by his solicitor to consent to the order made. But in the statement made by Mr. De, there is no suggestion that there was any misunderstanding or misapprehension in his mind. On the other hand, he acted on the express instruction given by his solicitor to consent to the order made. Mr. Sen relied upon this case and argued that the facts in this decision are similar to the facts with which we are concerned in this appeal. He further urged that in this case, the appellant himself was present in Court and the Solicitor's evidence was that the appellant had instructed the solicitor to settle the matter. We think that there is good deal of force in this contention of Mr. Sen. Mr. Sen next referred to another decision of the Judicial Committee in Sourendranath Mitra. v. Sm. Tarubala Dasi (12) reported in 34 C. W. N. 453. In this case counsel who was briefed in an interlocutory application, entered into a compromise settling the whole suit. The judicial Committee held, that in the facts of this case it was the client's Intention to place the learned counsel in the same position and to arm him with the game authority as though he had received the brief to conduct the entire suit. It was held that counsel had implied authority to settle a matter in which he has been briefed. It was further held that where counsel is briefed in an interlocutory application, but is armed with authority to act at though he had been briefed in the suit, he had implied authority to settle the suit and the settlement arrived at was held to be good, as counsel had received no instruction inconsistent with such authority which must be taken to have been in existence. This decision turned on the question of the implied authority of the counsel who had been briefed in an interlocutory application to settle the entire suit, although he had not been briefed in the suit. In our view, this decision is not of any assistance to Mr. This decision turned on the question of the implied authority of the counsel who had been briefed in an interlocutory application to settle the entire suit, although he had not been briefed in the suit. In our view, this decision is not of any assistance to Mr. Sen because the question discussed in this case also was the implied authority of counsel to settle, but in the case now before us we are concerned not with the question of the implied authority of counsel, but with the authority of counsel to settle upon instructions received by him in court from his solicitor, who in his turn had obtained the authority and consent of the client who was present in Court. There is one other matter to which we should refer before we conclude. Prayer (a) of the application before Sinha, J., was for an order setting aside and/or recalling the consent decree dated August 2, 1960. Prayers (b), (c) and (d) are for ad interim reliefs regarding the decree. Prayer (e) is for rehearing of the said application. But there is no prayer for setting aside or vacating and/or recalling the order made on August, 2, 1960. The arbitration in which the award was made was an arbitration in a suit. But under section 25 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the provisions in Chapter II of the Arbitration Act, 1940, are attracted. The decree which was passed in the award is therefore controlled by section 17 of the said Act. Under that section, after the Court refuses to set aside an award, it should proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced, a decree shall follow and no appeal lies; from such a decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. These are the only two grounds on which an appeal lies from a decree on an award. In this case, although the award was modified, no order was; made setting aside the award and G. K. Mitter, J., has pronounced judgment on award in terms of S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The grounds that have been made in the petition are for setting aside of the order which was made on August 2, 1960. In this case, although the award was modified, no order was; made setting aside the award and G. K. Mitter, J., has pronounced judgment on award in terms of S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The grounds that have been made in the petition are for setting aside of the order which was made on August 2, 1960. But as we have already noticed, no prayer has been made for setting aside of the order made on August 2, 1960 and therefore even if an order was made in terms of prayer (a) of the petition which was the main prayer of the appellant, the award would still remain a valid award Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended, that the award having been made on a reference to arbitration made in a suit, should be treated differently, and provisions of section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, should not be applied to such an award. There is no substance in this contention. Chapter II of the Arbitration Act, 1940, relates to arbitration without intervention of a Court and section 17 of the Act is in this Chapter. But under Section 25 which is in Chapter IV, the provisions of the other Chapters apply to Chapter IV as far as they can be made applicable. 9. THAT being so, S. 17 of the Arbitration act, 1940, is applicable to the award and the decree with which we are concerned. Such a decree can be set aside in appeal only on the two grounds mentioned above and on no other ground. That being so, in our opinion an application for setting aside the decree made on the award does not lie. On the authority of the decisions discussed above a counsel has the implied authority to settle a matter in which he has been briefed, unless such authority has been expressly restricted or withdrawn. Further, when client is present in court and does not raise any objection to the terms of the settlement which are discussed in court, and which he followed and understood, he cannot be heard to say later on that he has not given his consent to the decree or order which appears to have been made by consent. Further, when client is present in court and does not raise any objection to the terms of the settlement which are discussed in court, and which he followed and understood, he cannot be heard to say later on that he has not given his consent to the decree or order which appears to have been made by consent. In this case, the appellant was not only present in court, but the solicitror's evidence, which was accepted by Sinha, J., and we think rightly, is that he had discussed with the client the question of settlement and that the appellant had agreed to the settlement. Learned counsel who appeared for the appellant acted not on the implied authority which he had, but on the instructions which he received from the solicitor to consent to the order which was made. There is no evidence of any misapprehension in the mind of the learned counsel or any misunderstanding of the situation by him. He acted on clear instructions given to him in Court. For these reasons, there is no ground for interfering with the judgment and order of Sinha, J. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel,