JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge, Agra confirming a decree of the trial court for his ejectment from an accommodation. The defendant appellant Babu Lal was the tenant of a shop situate in Fatehabad of which the plaintiff respondent Hanuman Prasad is the owner and landlord. The plaintiff alleged in his plaint that the defendant had taken the shop on a rent of Rs. 10/- per month; that he had failed to pay the rent for twenty months after September, 1, 1956; that the plaintiff served on him a combined notice demanding rent and terminating his tenancy if he failed to pay; that the defendant did not pay in spite of the service of this notice on him; hence the suit. The defendant resisted the suit and raised a number of pleas in defence. He contended that the tenancy was not monthly but from year to year the rent being Rs. 120/- per annum; that he had paid the entire rent due to the plaintiff who had agreed to withdraw the suit but had broken his promise. He also pleaded that the suit was barred by Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. He challenged the validity of the notice terminating the tenancy. Alternatively, he contended that the plaintiff had waived the notice by demanding rent for the period after the termination of the tenancy. 2. Both the court's below disbelieved the defendant's story that he had paid the rent and held that he had been in arrears since September, 1, 1956 and that his tenancy had been determined by a valid notice. All his pleas in defence were rejected and the suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent decreed. He has now come to this Court in second appeal. 3. Mr. A.K. Kirti, learned counsel for the appellant argued only one point in support of this appeal. He contended that the plaintiff must be deemed to have waived the notice terminating the tenancy by his demanding rent for the period subsequent to the termination. He pointed out that the plaintiff served on the defendant a notice on 15.2.1958, to terminate the tenancy with effect from 31.3.1958. He contended that the plaintiff must be deemed to have waived the notice terminating the tenancy by his demanding rent for the period subsequent to the termination. He pointed out that the plaintiff served on the defendant a notice on 15.2.1958, to terminate the tenancy with effect from 31.3.1958. But in his plaint he asked for a decree for rent for the period after 31.3.1958 which he could do only if he treated the tenancy as subsisting and accepted the status of the defendants as tenant. The relevant paragraph of the plaint was read out before me. It is correct that the plaintiff, in the paragraph relating to the reliefs, used the word "rent" ("kiraya") even for the period after 31st March, 1958. But it does not necessarily follow that the mere use of the word "rent" has the effect of waiver of notice. It is common knowledge that the word "kiraya" is frequently but erroneously used by landlords when filing a suit for the ejectment of the tenant for non-payment of rent, recovery of rent due, and compensation for use and occupation. In all such cases the use of the word kiraya ("rent") is inaccurate but the fact remains that under the prevailing practise the word is indiscriminately used. She tenant cannot take advantage of mere error in the pleading and claim that the landlord has waived the notice terminating the tenancy. He must prove from other circumstances that the landlord used the word "rent' with the intention of waiving the notice or renewing the tenancy. In Mohan Lal v. Sameer Kunwar A.I.R. 1964 All. 374 it was held that the mere use of the word "rent" is not conclusive, but combined with other circumstances it may establish either that the landlord intended to renew the tenancy or that any reasonable person dealing with him would have thought that he had this intention. In that case the landlord after terminating the tenancy filed a suit for ejectment but during the pendency of the suit accepted money from the tenant as rent and gave a receipt stating that rent for the period subsequent to the termination of the tenancy had been received. In that case the landlord after terminating the tenancy filed a suit for ejectment but during the pendency of the suit accepted money from the tenant as rent and gave a receipt stating that rent for the period subsequent to the termination of the tenancy had been received. On these facts the Court held that his conduct was such as to lead the tenant into believing that he was willing to renew the tenancy if the arrears of rent were paid upto date, and therefore he was estopped from denying that he accepted rent and renewed the tenancy. The authorities on this question are discussed in detail in the judgment. 4. In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the use of the word "rent" by the plaintiff in his plaint reveals an intention to renew the tenancy or to waive the notice terminating it. On the contrary it is clear that the word "kiraya" was erroneous it is somewhat absurd to argued that a landlord who prays for the ejectment of the tenant has any intention to renew or continue his tenancy. The were "rent" must be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with his prayer for ejectment. The plea of waiver has, therefore, no substance. 5. No other point has been argued. 6 The appeal is dismissed with costs.